Russo-Finnish Relations, 1937-1947

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RUSSO-FINNISH RELATIONS, 1937-1947

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Presented to
the Department of History
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In Partial Fulfillment
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with a B.A. Degree in History

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Rex Allen Martin
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This thesis for honors recognition has been approved for the Department of History.

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Rex A. Martin
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INTRODUCTION

In 1967 the Finnish Republic celebrated its fiftieth anniversary. That Finland can celebrate her freedom is rather amazing in view of the Soviet Union's domination, with the exception of Greece, of every nation in East Europe from the Baltic to the Mediterranean. It is hard to believe that Finland, which in the period from 1939 to 1944 fought two wars against the Soviet Union and lost both, can still be independent.

In the 1920's and 1930's Finland was regarded, by foreigners and Finns alike, as the extreme outpost of the Western "civilized" world against the East. Prevailing Finnish attitudes toward the Russians were antagonistic in the extreme. One Russian diplomat of the 1930's characterized the Finn's attitude as "a zoological hate."1 This "zoological hate" carried over into Finnish-Soviet relations, which were strained from the time of Finland's declaration of independence in 1917 to the end of the Second World War. Considering the above factors, it would appear inconceivable that Soviet leaders would disregard any chance to incorporate Finland into the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics.

The first such chance to incorporate Finland occurred for Russia with the completion of the Nazi-Soviet Non-Aggression Pact of 1939. Prior to that time, Finnish Independence was based upon the opposing interests of Germany and Russia in the Baltic. It was this conflict of interests that kept Finland free from Soviet control. However, once the Pact was concluded and German attention turned westward and northward, Finland was open to Soviet aggression. Certainly after the Winter War of 1939-1940,

the Soviet Union could have Incorporated Finland, given the fact that although Finland's resistance was heroic, Russia's victory was complete. Surprisingly, however, Russia was content with limited gains: the Hanko naval base and a few hundred square miles of border territory and other minor concessions. In view of this restraint, it should be apparent that the primary goal of the Soviet Union was not to terminate Finland's Independence but rather to preserve it in order to advance other Soviet policies in Europe.

This becomes even more apparent when, following the "Continuation War" and three years of stalemated warfare, Russian troops finally broke through Finnish defense lines. All Finland lay open to Russian occupation. The Western Allies were not greatly concerned with Finland's fate. Even had they been, it is doubtful that any nation could have prevented the Soviet Union from absorbing Finland given the situation in Europe from 1944 to 1947. And yet, once again, the Soviet government ignored the opportunity of Incorporating Finland. In view of these facts, quite naturally the historian wonders why, after two successful wars, the Soviet government settled the Finnish affair without ending the independence of Finland.

It is the contention of this thesis that Finland remained Independent only because the Soviet Union allowed her to do so. Be it noted that such an explanation is not generally accepted. Prominent historians advance two

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2 Kohonen, "Finland and the Soviet Union," p. 34.

3 The Western Allies were totally concerned with the defeat of Germany, Japan, and Italy and allowed the Soviet Union to deal with the minor members of the Axis alliance. Their lack of concern for Finland became even more apparent during the Paris Peace Conference (1946-1947) when they accepted every Russian demand concerning Finland.

4 Korhonen, "Finland and the Soviet Union," 34-35.
major explanations for Finland's continued freedom from Soviet domination:
the performance of the Finnish Army and the interest and protection of the
Western democratic powers.

Some, especially Finnish historians, argue that Finnish military
performance prevented Soviet occupation, thereby precluding Soviet domina-
tion.5 Despite this contention, forcefully presented by Dr. Wuorinen and
Valno Tanner in their works, it should be noted that in 1940 and again in
1944 Finnish defense lines were breached and at both times only reserve
troops, greatly inferior to the Red Army, stood between Finland and com-
plete take over by the Soviet Union. Obviously, Russian troops, with
little opposition, could have occupied Finland in either of these instances.
On both occasions, the Soviet Union had created a government ready to take
power in Finland and establish Soviet control. Witness, for example, the
Kuusinen government of 1939-1940.

As for the contention that the Western Powers' concern for Finland's
democratic system kept Finland independent, it must be noted that the
situation in Europe from 1939 to 1947 prevented the Western Allies from
any meaningful involvement in Finland. From 1939 to 1941, the war in
Western Europe fully occupied the attention of the Western leaders. Even
had they wished to aid Finland, the Western Allies had neither the men
nor the materials to protect Finland from Soviet domination. Moreover,
from 1941 to 1945 Finland was an enemy of the Allied Powers; thus the
Western Powers would not have opposed any Russian measures to remove

5John H. Wuorinen, A History of Finland (New York, N. Y.: Columbia
University Press, 1966), 386-387.
Finland from the war, including a Soviet takeover and occupation of Finland. Even at the Paris Peace Conference, the Western Allies accepted every Soviet demand made on Finland. The West was perfectly willing to sacrifice Finland to appease the Soviet Union.

I therefore contend that Finland remained free only because the Soviet Union wished her to be so. To verify this, it is necessary to examine Soviet-Finnish relations from 1937 to 1947. Doing so will make it obvious that Russia had it within her power to absorb Finland and yet she did not take advantage of the opportunities presented. Study of the available records will help to explain why she did not.

At this point, the reader should know that Finnish documents obtained from the Finnish Embassy in Washington and the National Library in Helsinki, together with United States State Department documents and publications, and the memoirs of Finnish leaders of the period, constitute the primary sources for this examination. Unfortunately, essential Soviet diplomatic papers and documents for this period are still closed to the Western historian. This is a major problem which this thesis must deal with. However, even lacking Russian documentary evidence, it is possible to verify that Finland remained a free nation after World War II only because the Soviet Union desired her to be so.

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6Secondary sources used in the preparation of this thesis include the published works of Finnish historians and the standard reference works on World War II. A complete listing of all secondary sources may be found in the bibliography. It should be noted that I have used material from the works of such traditional historians of this period as Vuorinen, Upton, Lundin, Jakobsen, and Krosby, but depart radically from their explanations of continued Finnish independence.
CHAPTER I

1937 TO 1939

By 1937, it can be said that Finland had been a thorn in the side for the Soviet Union for nearly 20 years. In 1917, with the break-down of the Romanov rule, Finland declared her independence. This action created, just twenty kilometers north of St. Petersburg, later Leningrad, a state hostile to Russia. Finland, by her mere existence, blocked any Soviet plans to expand into the Baltic and Scandinavian areas of Europe. Moreover, Finland was the only state that bordered on the Soviet Union which could voluntarily allow her territory to be used as a base of aggression against Soviet Russia by other, stronger, Western powers, notably Germany. It is small wonder that Soviet leaders, from the Treaty of Dorpat on, dreamed of solving the Finnish problem.¹

Soviet fears that Finland would become a threat could only be strengthened by the strong ties between the rising Nazi Germany and the Republic of Finland. The Finns and Germans had long believed their fates to be linked. Both were outposts of Aryanism against the massive Slavic bloc in East Europe. Both nations despised Soviet Russia and all of its policies. Both had a long history of militarism and often Finns and Germans had fought the same enemy. For Finland, Germany was a protector and ally; for Germany, Finland was a smaller, colder Germany. Bonds stronger than foreign policy tied the two nations, or so it was believed in 1937.

¹For the text of the Treaty of Dorpat, see Appendix A of this work.
This was the situation in 1937 when a change of administration revised the Soviet attitude toward Finland. In the presidential election of that year, P. E. Svinhufvud, the Conservative leader, had been defeated by K. Kallio, the leader of the Agrarian Party. Shortly thereafter, the conservative cabinet that held power during the 1930's was replaced by a coalition in which the Social Democrats cooperated with the two non-socialist parties, the Agrarians and the Liberals. In Moscow, this change was hailed as a victory for the "peace-loving" forces in the struggle against the fascist aggressors, especially a victory over Nazi Germany.

Svinhufvud had exercised to the full his constitutional right to conduct foreign policy. K. Kallio had less interest in it. There is no record of his thinking on the great international or ideological problems of his time. Probably he avoided thought about them; his major achievements were in the field of agrarian reform. Thus, by default, the foreign policy of Finland was left totally in the hands of the new cabinet. More precisely, it was left in the hands of two Liberal members, Prime Minister Cajander and Foreign Minister Holsti.

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2Svinhufvud had been the leading exponent of pro-German orientation in Finland. Exiled to Siberia by the Czar, he had returned to Finland after the Bolshevik Revolution to lead the Independence movement. As head of the White government in 1918, Svinhufvud had invited German troops into Finland. After the Civil War, Svinhufvud was one of the leading proponents of a constitutional monarchy under Prince Karl of Hesse. In 1930, it was Svinhufvud who as Prime Minister had expelled the Finnish Communist Party from Parliament. In the eyes of the Russian government, Svinhufvud stood for everything they disliked and feared in Finland; he was one of the "fascist beasts" in Finland controlled by Germany.

3The Prime Minister, a mild-mannered professor of forestry and a scientist of international repute, was a man of reason, moderation, good will, and no previous experience with politics. The Foreign Minister, a former newspaperman turned diplomat, was more active and subtle than Cajander. Somewhat "un-Finnish" because of his restlessness and liveliness, he was
Cajander and Holsti were both "city-bred members of the middle-class intelligentsia," brought up in the traditions of humanism and liberalism. Because of this Cajander and Holsti did not share Svinhufvud's interest in German protection. They were revolted by the ideology and methods of the Nazis and shocked by their contempt for international law and their coarse diplomatic manners. More important, in their view, Finland's association with Germany had become a danger to Finnish security. Cajander and Holsti foresaw a clash between Germany and Russia and wanted to pull Finland out of the way. Finland's only hope of survival in a future conflict between her two powerful neighbors was not to rely on being defended by one against the other; but rather to make sure that Finland would not be drawn into the struggle in any way. Holsti convinced the cabinet that the immediate task of Finland's foreign policy was to disassociate itself from Germany and express the genuineness of Finnish neutrality. Holsti felt that this would lead in turn to a reconciliation with the Soviet Union.

Holsti's first act as Foreign Minister was to accept a Soviet invitation to visit Moscow. Officially, his purpose was to discuss means of removing such causes of Finnish-Soviet friction as the frequent border incidents and fishing disputes. His real objective, however, was to dispel Soviet suspicions of Finnish-German collusion. Litvinov, Soviet Commisar

accused by his critics of being inclined to intrigue and of suffering from illusions of grandeur; but no one could deny his thorough knowledge of international affairs acquired during his term as Foreign Minister in the early 1920's and as a Finnish delegate to the League of Nations.


for Foreign Affairs, saw his guest as a potential ally for Soviet foreign policy. Holsti, however, had not come to Moscow to join Litvinov's crusade. He ignored his host's promptings and made an innocuous pledge of support for the principle of the League of Nations. Holsti left Soviet diplomats feeling that Finland was still the scene of "fascist intrigue and chauvinistic agitation."

If Holsti did not succeed in removing Moscow's suspicions, he created some in Berlin. The German Minister in Helsinki, Wipert von Blucher, was quick to note that the program of the new cabinet, while declaring cooperation with the Scandinavian nations and proposing improved relations with Russia, made no mention of relations with Germany. After Holsti's visit to Moscow, the omission gained the significance of a declaration of policy; Finland was obviously drawing away from Germany. Blucher suggested that the Finnish Foreign Minister be invited to Berlin. His suggestion was ignored by the Foreign Officer in Berlin.

Meanwhile, Holsti kept traveling; he went to Stockholm, Copenhagen, Fallin, London, Geneva, Paris -- but not to Berlin. This gap in his itinerary attracted a great deal of attention in Finland and the cabinet itself began to question the policy of neglecting Germany. Finally in October 1937, an invitation to Berlin was procured through Blucher's offices and Holsti spent three days there at the end of the month. In

6Litvinov, the mastermind of Soviet foreign policy in 1937, was attempting to establish a protective ring of small nations around Soviet Russia. He hoped to link these small nations with Russia through non-aggressive pacts. These "buffer states" would absorb any German threat and Russian troops could then advance through them to strike at Germany.

Berlin, however, no advances were made by Baron von Neurath, the German Foreign Minister.

This period is a major turning point in Finland's position. Until 1937 and the election of Kallio, Finland's independence had rested upon the conflicting interests of Germany and Russia. Now, under Holsti's guidance, Finland was no longer interested in maintaining her security by relying on Germany. Nor did Holsti wish to become dominated by Soviet diplomacy. Thus begins a period which culminated with the Nazi-Soviet Non-Aggression Pact and its Secret Protocol, which gave Russia a position from which to threaten Finland's freedom. This is a period during which, because of the new Finnish policy regarding the Nazi State, Germany became more willing to sacrifice Finland to Soviet Russia.

Finnish leaders were determined to draw closer to the other Scandinavian neutrals. The general improvement in Finnish-Swedish relations after the defeat of Svinhufvud in 1937 created the necessary political basis for military cooperation in the Aaland Islands, long a point of contention between the two nations. The first contacts took place at the end of 1937; in January and February 1938 the Finnish General Staff, in close consultation with Sweden's military authorities, developed a detailed plan for the

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8The Aaland Islands had been the vital point of intersection for the strategic interests of the Baltic Powers for over two hundred years. In 1921, the League of Nations had made the islands part of Finland and at the same time, largely at Swedish insistence, the islands were demilitarized and neutralized. However, by the late 1930's both Sweden and Finland recognized that in a major conflict the islands could be seized by anyone. Sweden was especially interested in the status of the Aaland Islands for, as Napoleon had pointed out, Aaland was a "pistol aimed at the heart of Sweden." For more on the position and importance of the Aaland Islands in the Baltic, see the first chapter of Jakobsen's The Diplomacy of the Winter War.
defense of the islands. In April, the first formal talks between the
governments were held in Helsinki; after further talks in May, the two
foreign ministers were able to take over negotiations. On both sides there
were dedicated men who were working for a strong Finnish-Swedish alliance
and, perhaps, a new era in Scandinavian history.

Both Sweden and Finland saw the scheme as necessary to defend the
freedom of action of their governments in the event of war. The two nations
could not agree, however, on who threatened their freedom. Sweden saw
Nazi Germany as the logical threat to Scandinavian neutrality and freedom;
Finland saw Soviet Russia as the power that was prepared to move into
Scandinavia.

The majority of the Swedish cabinet was ready to accept joint defense
of Aaland. However, Swedish public opinion saw the proposed venture as a
risk; it was felt that through her participation in the defense of Aaland,
Sweden might be drawn into a Finnish-Soviet conflict. Public opinion
demanded, therefore, that the plan have prior consent from Moscow before
adoption by the Swedish government. To the Finnish military planners who
saw only one possible enemy, the idea of presenting detailed plans for the
approval of Moscow was absurd.

On 14 April 1938, Holsti received a telephone call from a young
Soviet diplomat, B. Yartsev, who held the rank of Second Secretary of the
Soviet Legation in Helsinki. The Russian urgently asked to see the Minister
for a private interview; he said he had an important message from Moscow
that he wished to deliver personally. Holsti agreed immediately. Yartsev
was no ordinary second secretary; he moved and talked with greater freedom
than any other Soviet diplomat in Helsinki. Any message brought by Yartsev should be investigated.  

Yartsev arrived that evening. He told Holsti that he had just returned from a visit to Moscow where he found the Foreign Office anxious to explore ways of improving Soviet-Finnish relations. He had therefore been empowered by his government to conduct secret negotiations with the Finnish Foreign Minister. He continued by outlining the Soviet view of the European situation and its possible effects on Finland's future.

The Soviet government was convinced, he said, that Hitler was preparing to attack the Soviet Union and that he planned to use Finland as his northern base. If German forces were allowed to operate freely in Finnish territory, then "The Red Army would not remain on the border to wait for the enemy, but would advance as far as possible to meet him." If Finland were prepared to resist the projected German invasion, the Soviet would offer all possible military and economic assistance and undertake to withdraw its troops as soon as the war ended. Acceptance of such assistance was essential if Finland was to avoid becoming German dominated; without it, according to Soviet leaders, she would be incapable of resisting German pressure. It was well known, said Yartsev, that if Finland refused to cooperate with Berlin, the country would be taken over by Finnish fascists who would let the Germans in.

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10Jakobsen, Diplomacy of the Winter War, p. 8.
Holsti did his best to allay Yartsev's expressed anxieties. He stated that he did not think his government or his country were in such peril. The government was certainly in no danger internally; it enjoyed wide popular support and controlled three-fourths of the members of Parliament. Also Finland's close adherence to Scandinavian neutrality was proof enough of her peaceful intentions.11

But this was not proof enough for Yartsev. The Soviet government, he said, had to have "guarantees" that Finland would not side with Germany. "What do you mean guarantee?" asked Holsti.12 Yartsev would not elaborate. The nature of the guarantees should be determined by the two governments. This was as much as Yartsev would say and no amount of questioning could move him to say more. This was the opening threat in what was to be a long series of increasingly belligerent ones culminating in the Winter War.

Equally inconclusive were subsequent conversations between Yartsev and two other members of the Finnish cabinet, Prime Minister Cajander and Finance Minister Tanner. These two maintained contact with Yartsev during Holsti's absence in June and July. Both saw him several times and each time Yartsev warned that Hitler planned to engulf Finland. Yet he consistently refused to say more. It was up to the Finns, he told Cajander's secretary, to take the next step.

At the end of July 1938, the twin lines of Finnish foreign policy, appeasement of the Soviet Union and cooperation with Sweden, converged. On the one hand, Yartsev kept asking for unspecified guarantees that


Finland would not side with Germany in a future war against Russia; on the other, the Swedish leaders demanded Soviet approval for the Finnish-Swedish plan to remilitarize and defend the Aaland Islands. At the time, the Aaland scheme itself, it was thought in Helsinki, could serve as the guarantee which the Russians demanded. Participation by neutral Sweden in the defense of Aaland would disprove Soviet suspicions of German machinations to gain a foothold in Finland, while close association with Sweden would insure that Finnish policy would remain peaceful.

The Finnish government proposed to satisfy both Sweden and Russia through a simple measure. If the Soviet Union would approve the Aaland Island scheme, Finland would guarantee that her territory would never be used as a base for aggression against Russia and that Finland would remain fully neutral in any war. It was obvious that this did not satisfy Yartsev; he demanded more concrete guarantees. Yet he had gained one advantage: the Finns were induced to take the first step toward formal negotiations.

Within a week of the Finnish proposal, Yartsev was back with a lengthy memorandum for Finland. According to this memorandum, the proposed Finnish declaration was not the kind of guarantee the Soviet Union demanded. "If the Finnish government cannot enter into a secret military alliance, the Soviet Union would be satisfied with a written agreement undertaking that Finland was prepared to resist a German aggression and to accept for that purpose Soviet military assistance." In practice Finland was to accept a treaty of alliance. However, Yartsev explained, there was no

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13 Jakobsen, Diplomacy of the Winter War, p. 42.
Intention of sending Soviet troops into Finland or occupying any part of Finnish territory. Instead, Finland would receive arms and her sea coasts would be protected by the Red Navy.

The next point in the memorandum dealt with the Aaland Islands. Moscow would agree to the remilitarization of the islands on the condition that the Soviet Union could take part in the project and control it. The Soviet Union wanted to have its own "observers" on the islands to make sure that the fortifications did not fall into the hands of the Germans. There was no mention of Sweden; the implication was that she would be excluded from the defense plans.

In addition, Moscow claimed the right to establish an air and naval base on the Finnish Island of Hogland which had been demilitarized in accordance with the Dorpat Treaty of 1920. This was necessary for the defense of Leningrad. Finnish territory was to become a base for the Red Fleet.

The Finnish reply, formulated by Cajander, was delivered to Yartsev by Tanner on 29 August. It stated briefly that acceptance of the Soviet proposals would violate Finnish sovereignty and neutrality. There was nothing in this to indicate any desire to continue the talks. Instead, it instructed Holstl to take up the Aaland question directly with the Soviet Foreign Minister in September. In Geneva, Holstl met Litvinov and discussed the plans for Aaland, but the Russian remained noncommittal.

Meanwhile Europe seemed to be "within two inches of war," as

14Jakobsen, Diplomacy of the Winter War, p. 47.
Litvinov put it. When Chamberlain flew home from Munich in September 1938 with "peace in our time," Finland relaxed. There were fewer cries of betrayal, less sense of shame and humiliation, than in most of the democratic countries. As Finland saw it, "A world conflagration would benefit only the Soviet Union, which would be able to spread the misery of Bolshevism across Europe." ¹⁵

What took place in Munich could not but strengthen the belief that the Western powers had granted Hitler a free hand in the East. An Eastern nation had been sacrificed to Germany in order to maintain the peace of the West. In Soviet eyes, Litvinov's foreign policy was bankrupt. Collective security fell apart. Soviet Russia had to protect herself in any manner possible.

In relation to Finland, the switch in Soviet policy showed itself by the refinement of the idea of military cooperation to specific Russian strategic interests. Hogland became the focus of Soviet interest. When Holsti returned from Geneva, Yartsev called on him on 3 October to offer a modification of his earlier proposal regarding Hogland. The Soviet Union would allow Finland to fortify the island provided Russian forces would have the use of the base in time of war. ¹⁶ Holsti promised that the Finnish government would consider carefully the idea, but implied that fortifying Hogland would be done by Finland alone and for her own use.

A few days later, Yartsev and Holsti finally came to the root of the problem: the Soviet attitude towards Finland's adherence to Scandinavian

¹⁵ Jakobsen, Diplomacy of the Winter War, p. 48.
neutrality. Holsti pointed out that the Finnish government could not remain faithful to its Scandinavian orientation if it allied itself in any way with Russia. Yartsev stated that Moscow had nothing against Finnish cooperation with Scandinavia in peace time. In time of war, however, Finland needed more protection than Scandinavia could give. It was acceptable that Finland be neutral in peace time, but in war time she was to be a Soviet ally.

After this, further Finnish-Soviet talks were futile. The issues Yartsev had raised were not forgotten; they would be considered later, after both sides had undergone important changes. Yartsev was recalled to Moscow. It is an unusual coincidence that the conclusion of Yartsev's efforts coincided with the resignation of R. Holsti as Foreign Minister of Finland on 16 November.

At the beginning of January 1939, after a year's work, the agreement to change the International convention demilitarizing Aaland was ready. On 5 January, Prime Minister Cajander, accompanied by Tanner and the new Foreign Minister E. Erkko, went to Stockholm to sign it. The plan was to take a few of the southernmost islands out of the neutralized zone and allow Finland to build upon them permanent fortifications and coastal batteries. The ban on naval movements in the Aaland waters was lifted for both the Swedish and Finnish fleets and both governments were to agree upon the strength and armament of the Aaland garrison. The two govern-

17Though the talks were now futile, Holsti would not retreat from his views nor consider compromise, Yartsev kept them going through October and November. He attempted to gain support among the left-wing liberals in Finland. Yartsev had arranged for two Finnish officials to meet A. Mikoyan, Commissar for Foreign Trade, in December. Litvinov was to be bypassed completely. But all of this led to nothing.
ments now moved to secure the consent of other powers. Finnish diplomats soon found their efforts in this direction blocked by their Soviet counterparts. 18

Then came the familiar bait -- a Soviet offer to reopen trade talks. At the beginning of March, Litvinov was ready to bargain. Instead of using its regular representatives in Helsinki, Moscow sent yet another secret emissary, this time its Roman Ambassador, Boris Stein. Stein presented Moscow's new proposals directly to Erkko on 11 March. The Soviet government wanted to lease Hogland and four other islands in the Gulf of Finland for thirty years. In return, Russia offered Finland a piece of territory in Soviet Karelia.

Before continuing the discussion, it would be important to remember the central thesis. Even at this early date, Soviet relations with Finland were remarkably different from Soviet relations with other Eastern European states. Throughout Eastern Europe, the Russians were demanding concessions and threatening forceful seizure of them; in Finland the Soviet leaders were willing to deal. While other Soviet diplomats were making demands in Poland, Hungary, Rumania, Latvia, Lithuania, and Estonia; Stein was willing to negotiate in Finland.

Erkko was, however, reluctant to discuss Stein's proposals. According to the Constitution, the territory of Finland was indivisible; Erkko

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18 The three Baltic states, Denmark, and Poland presented no difficulties. The Axis powers also announced their approval. In London and Paris, however, the Finns found Soviet suspicion shadowing their efforts. Soviet officials told the British and French Foreign Ministers there was a secret agreement between Finland and Germany to return the islands over to the German Navy in the event of war. As a result the British and French governments declared that they withheld their consent until the consent of other interested parties -- meaning the Soviet Union -- was obtained.
had no authority to negotiate about its frontiers. Erkko was not as secretive about his dealings with the Soviets as Holsti had been. He informed the German Minister of Stein's mission. He even sent his minister in Washington to ask Secretary of State Hull to intervene in Moscow on Finland's behalf, only to be harshly reminded of America's traditional unwillingness to meddle in overseas disputes unless these clearly endangered world peace. 19

After a few weeks of being stalled, Stein realized that Erkko had no intention of considering Stein's proposals. On 6 April, Stein left Helsinki with the words, "The Soviet government does not accept Finland's negative attitude. We will not give up our demand for the Islands in the Gulf of Finland." 20

Meanwhile, Hitler was on the march eastward. After Munich, he planned and executed the liquidation of what remained of Czechoslovakia. By the end of March 1939, Czechoslovakia ceased to exist: Bohemia and Moravia became German protectorates and Slovakia an independent puppet state of the Third Reich. Within a week, Memel was extracted from Lithuania. The pressure was now put on Poland to surrender Danzig.

Then the sudden reversal of British policy transformed the entire European scene. At the end of March 1939, Chamberlain was ready to commit England to the defense of Poland, and to do so under any circumstances which the Polish leaders judged threatened their independence. A guarantee of an equally general nature was offered to Rumania, Greece, and Turkey.

19 Jakobsen, Diplomacy of the Winter War, p. 64.
Almost overnight, British foreign policy had changed from appeasement to Improvising a military alliance, the Peace Front as it was termed. However, without the Soviet Union's active participation, the Peace Front was nothing but a group of unredeemable promissory notes.

Chamberlain, on 17 April, suggested that the Soviet government issue a declaration in its own name pledging to aid a victim of aggression, but only at the request of the country concerned and only in a manner acceptable to that country. Such a declaration would hardly carry much weight, for none of Russia's neighbors had any desire for Soviet aid under any circumstances. But two days earlier, the French government had forced the issue. Without informing London, it sent a proposal to Moscow for a mutual assistance pact between England, France, and the Soviet Union. This proposal set in motion the Anglo-French-Soviet negotiations that lasted until Ribbentrop's visit to Moscow.

The Anglo-French proposals for a Peace Front were seized upon by Soviet leaders as a means for advancing their long-standing ambitions in East Europe. The proposals also coincided obliquely with Soviet military plans to advance to meet the German threat, even if this meant advancing through the territory of allies or neutrals.

On 18 April, Litvinov told the British and French Ambassadors in Moscow that the French proposal for a mutual assistance pact was good, as far as it went; it was not enough to guarantee Poland and Rumania, all of Russia's European neighbors should be covered. In addition, Litvinov

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Insisted that the British guarantee to Poland be limited to apply only in case of a German attack; in other words, England was asked to accept the right of the Red Army to cross the Polish frontier. Litvinov's proposal in effect asked England and France to recognize the Soviet Union as the protector of East Europe.

Churchill later wrote that Russia's neighbors "could not make up their minds which to fear more -- German aggression or Soviet protection"; but he seems to have sacrificed accuracy for dramatic effect. In reality, Finland and the Baltic states had no difficulty in making up their minds; they had no fear of German aggression. Even Poland and Rumania, though directly menaced by Germany, refused to accept Moscow's offers of protection. Every Eastern nation, from the Baltic to the Black Sea, rejected any offer from Russia.

Yet an Anglo-French agreement with the Soviet Union was necessary. It remained to devise a formula to satisfy Russian aims without endangering the position of the border nations. After much work, such a formula was devised. England, France, and the Soviet Union would undertake to give each other all possible assistance if one of them were attacked directly or became involved in war as a result of giving assistance to another European state which had asked for help. On 27 May, the British and French ambassadors went to the Kremlin to present the proposal to the new Soviet Foreign Minister, Molotov. They felt that the Soviet government

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22Shirer, The Rise and Fall of the Third Reich, p. 490.

would have every reason to feel satisfied. Molotov, as soon as the ambassadors had finished, dismissed the proposals as entirely unacceptable.

Molotov later informed the French Ambassador that the Soviet Union would be forced "to help" Finland and the Baltic states if any one of them were "to sell itself to Germany." For this reason, he insisted that England, France, and the Soviet Union had to commit themselves to "defend against aggression" the countries whose independence they regarded as vital to their own security. It had become quite clear that an agreement with the Soviet Union could be purchased only at the expense of the countries bordering on Russia -- a price England was unwilling to pay.

The only line left to the British was to convince the border states that an Anglo-French-Soviet alliance would insure peace by deterring aggression and therefore the guarantee "might not" become operative. But the Finns would not be consoled with the thought that if they were to be sacrificed, it was for a good cause. As Erkko pointed out, it would be best if no one made an alliance with Russia.24

Meanwhile, the British Cabinet had reached the end of its patience. It decided on 20 July to make one final offer. It made one more concession: it agreed to postpone the signing of the political treaty until a military agreement could be completed. With these offers, the British and French Ministers called on Molotov on 24 July. Molotov received their proposals with stunning generosity. For three months, he had examined every Anglo-French statement with deep suspicion. Now he was amiable and expansive.

24 Jakobsen, Diplomacy of the Winter War, p. 85.
He was sure they could in the end agree; there was no point in getting "bogged down in details" about the border states. What mattered was to get on with the military talks.25

Molotov's sudden switch in policy rested on the announcement on 22 July that Soviet-German economic negotiations had been resumed. This was the first visible result of the secret feelers put out by both Berlin and Moscow. Both sides had been moving with extreme caution not unnaturally, for neither had complete faith in the other's sincerity. Molotov's decision to get the Anglo-French-Soviet military talks started must have been designed to force the German's hand. By that time, Hitler had an idea of the price Moscow demanded for its allegiance and he quickly made up his mind to pay it. Thus the old idea of dividing Poland, ever popular in both Berlin and Moscow was again revived.26 After this, the Anglo-French-Soviet military talks had no more practical importance than a game of cards played out to while away the time.

From Ribbentrop in one night, Molotov obtained everything he had worked for during a hundred days of negotiations with the English and French. The pact guaranteed that "In the event of a territorial and political rearrangement in the areas belonging to the Baltic States (Finland, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania), the northern boundary of Lithuania shall represent the boundary of the spheres of influence of Germany and

25 Jakobsen, Diplomacy of the Winter War, p. 89.

Poland was to be divided along the rivers Narew, Vistula, and San. In the Balkans, Germany declared herself disinterested in the fate of Bessarabia.

In Finland, the people felt that Germany had betrayed them. Finnish emotions were neither logical nor realistic. Germany had given Finland no guarantees or other promises; indeed Finnish foreign policy had avoided such guarantees and promises. In declaring herself disinterested in the fate of Finland, Germany had only done what the Finnish government had wished her to do. Up to the time of this pact, it had been regarded as a fact of nature that Germany would always resist any Russian advance into the Baltic. As Mannerheim saw it, a German-Soviet understanding was the worst thing that could happen: It destroyed the balance of power in the Baltic on which Finnish security had rested.

Yet, there was no sense of immediate danger in Finland during August and September 1939. The German-Soviet invasion of Poland and the Anglo-French declaration of war seemed remote events. More immediate was a joint Scandinavian declaration of neutrality issued by the Prime Ministers and Foreign Ministers of the four Northern states at a meeting in Copenhagen on 19 September. During these weeks, Sweden began to delay the implementation of the Aaland scheme on the basis that war no longer

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27 Wuorinen, Finland and World War II, p. 51.

28 For the full text of the agreement between Soviet Russia and Nazi Germany, see Appendix B of this work.

threatened the security of the Baltic. Russia and Germany no longer opposed each other and Sweden no longer feared German advances.

The Soviet government began to draw its profits from the German pact in late September. Stalin informed the German Ambassador on 25 September that he intended "Immediately to take up the solution of the problem of the Baltic States in accordance with the Secret Protocol and expected the unstinting support of the German Government." He mentioned Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania, but not Finland, as the countries whose "problems" he wished to "solve." On that same day, Estonia was handed a Soviet ultimatum.

On 28 September, Estonia's Foreign Minister Selter signed the Russian treaty. The other two Baltic republics were also dealt with quickly. The Latvian Foreign Minister received an invitation to Moscow on 30 September; he arrived on 2 October; the treaty was signed on 5 October. The Lithuanian Foreign Minister arrived in Moscow on 3 October and signed his treaty on 11 October. Russia obtained in two weeks all the military bases south of Finland which she had lost in the First World War.

Stalin had not indicated that Finland needed help in solving her problems when talking to the German Ambassador. This may have been due


31 Molotov proposed a treaty with Estonia that made Russia the protector of Estonia's national security. The Estonian Army was to be disbanded and its bases turned over to the Red Army. When the Estonian Foreign Minister, Selter, looked to Germany for aid, he found that an order for the evacuation of German nationals from Estonia had been issued by Hitler. Left without support, the Estonian government on 26 September decided that resistance was futile; two days later Selter signed Molotov's treaty.
to a natural caution toward Russia's new and powerful ally. Before tackling Finland, Stalin may have wished to make sure he would receive from Hitler "the unstinting support" which had been promised. In any case, it was logical that Finland, the strongest of Russia's northern neighbors with her Scandinavian ties and Western support, should be left until last.

On 5 October, the day the Latvian Foreign Minister signed his nation into the Soviet orbit, the Finnish Minister in Moscow, Baron Yrjo-Koskinen, was asked by Molotov to request that Erkko visit Moscow. Molotov wished to discuss "concrete political questions." A reply from Erkko was to be made within forty-eight (48) hours.

On 6 October, the Cabinet members and military leaders of Finland met to discuss the invitation. For the past eighteen months, Finland had carried on a quiet dialogue with her great neighbor. The Russians from time to time had asked a favor or two and Finland had politely refused. Now the Soviet tone had changed. It was no longer possible to put Moscow off with a declaration of neutrality or of selling or leasing this or that little island. The invitation to Moscow was an order and to be obeyed as such.

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33 Molotov's tone was very much in keeping with the character of the man. Vlacheslav Molotov had been one of the original members of the Red Guard. He was a fiery orator and had the ability to act any part that was needed. A close personal friend of Stalin, he was the natural choice to replace Litvinov in May 1939. Molotov was to serve as Commissar of Foreign Affairs for the next seventeen years.
The first indication of the spirit in which the order was received was that the time limit set by Molotov was totally ignored. In Moscow, this was immediately taken as a sign of defiance. When the reply from Helsinki did not reach Molotov on 3 October, it enraged him even more. Erkko would not come himself, but was sending a special diplomatic emissary, Juho Paasikivi.34

Paasikivi arrived in Helsinki from Stockholm on 9 October 1939. Here he was handed his instructions, drafted by Erkko and President Kallio. The only concessions he was allowed to make was to give up three small islands in the Gulf of Finland to Russia in return for part of Soviet Karelia. He was to reject any proposed mutual assistance pact. He was to refuse any proposals concerning Finland's borders and the Aaland Islands. Paasikivi was informed he was not to compromise the independence and neutrality of Finland in any way.

The tone of Paasikivi's instructions was backed up by military action. On 6 October, the day Molotov's invitation was received in Helsinki, all covering troops were ordered to their prearranged positions in frontier areas. On 10 October, the day Paasikivi was on the train for Moscow, a voluntary evacuation of the cities was urged by the government. On 11 October, the day the Finnish delegation arrived in Moscow, the government called up all reserve contingents for "refresher courses," which in fact amounted to mobilization.

34 The man chosen to represent Finland was Juho Paasikivi, who at the time was Minister in Stockholm. The choice was one of those accidental strokes of genius that change a nation's history. For Paasikivi it meant the beginning of an astonishing career in statesmanship. For Finland it produced a leader for the years of defeat and despair. Paasikivi came to mean to Finland what Churchill meant to England.

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Paasikivi and his associate -- Baron Yrjo-Koskinnen, Colonel A. Paasonen, and J. Nykopp -- received their first summons to the Kremlin on the afternoon of 14 October. They were taken to a conference room where Stalin, Molotov, Assistant Foreign Minister Potemkin, and the Soviet Minister to Helsinki, Derevyanski, waited. Stalin took control of the meeting and outlined his main demands which, as he explained, were designed to insure the safety of Leningrad: 35 a lease of the Hanko Peninsula for thirty (30) years, the right to use Lappvik (a bay off Hanko) as an anchorage, the ceding of several islands in the Gulf of Finland, the moving of the Soviet-Finnish border on the Karelian Isthmus farther north, the destruction of fortifications on the Karelian Isthmus by both sides, and, as a separate item, the ceding of the western part of the Fisherman's Peninsula near Petsamo on the Arctic Sea. 36

As compensation, the Soviet Union was prepared to cede a district in Soviet Karelia twice as large as the combined area of the territories to be surrendered by Finland. The Soviet government was also willing to withdraw its objections to Finland's fortifying the Aaland Islands, provided that no other power took part in the project.

Since Stalin's demands went far beyond his brief, Paasikivi informed Stalin at the close of the meeting that he had to return to Helsinki to consult his government. Stalin raised no objections but did point out that Finland had mobilized and admitted that Russia had also sent troops to the borders of Finland. "This cannot go on for long without danger of

35 For a full text of Stalin's demands, see Appendix C of this work.
36 Official Blue-White Book of Finland, p. 49.
accidents," he warned. But the Russians made no threats and Paasikivi was given no ultimatum to take with him.\textsuperscript{37}

At a meeting on 21 October, the Finnish Cabinet agreed that Finland had to satisfy Russia's "legitimate defense needs along the approaches to Leningrad."\textsuperscript{38} The Cabinet thus conceded Stalin's main point -- that the Soviet Union was entitled to improve its security at the expense of Finland. What remained at issue was which Soviet needs were "legitimate." It was decided that Finland could agree to a modest revision of the Karelian frontier. It was also decided to offer Russia the southern half of the island of Hogland and the northern half of the Fisherman's Peninsula.

Paasikivi left on 22 October for Moscow, accompanied by Finance Minister Tanner. On 23 October, Paasikivi made the new offers but Stalin brusquely pointed out that what he asked for was an indispensable minimum. The meeting broke up without arrangements for a further conference. The Finnish delegation prepared to return to Helsinki but were summoned to return to the Kremlin at eleven o'clock that evening.

When Paasikivi met Molotov and Stalin he was handed a memorandum in which the proposed border was more precisely defined.\textsuperscript{39}

He was also informed that Russia was willing to reduce the proposed Hanko garrison from 5,000 to 4,000 men. It is obvious that Moscow made this concession only to keep the talks alive, or at least to force the Finns to break off the negotiations. Paasikivi and Tanner, after

\textsuperscript{37}Wuorinen, Finland and World War II, p. 55.

\textsuperscript{38}Ibid, p. 56.

\textsuperscript{39}For the text of this memorandum, see Appendix C in this work.
consulting their Minister in Moscow, agreed to return to Helsinki for fresh instructions and to reply to Stalin's proposal later.

During the discussions in Moscow, Erkko was searching for aid from other powers. Neither Sweden nor Norway were willing to promise military aid in the event of open conflict between Finland and Russia. France and England were in no position to support Finland; they were too busy watching Germany. The United States was still clinging to its isolationist position. No Western power had the slightest interest in Finland's plight. Finland stood alone.

The new round of Cabinet debates was again inconclusive. Paasikivi and Tanner returned to Moscow on 31 October with only two new concessions to offer: a new border on the Isthmus north of the existing one but short of Stalin's proposed one and the western half of the Fisherman's Peninsula.

Until early November, the talks had taken place in absolute secrecy. But this was ended when Molotov disclosed in a speech at a session of the Supreme Soviet all Soviet demands to Finland. By this public announcement all Soviet-Finnish talks ceased to be negotiations in the true sense of the word -- a search for a mutually acceptable solution to a problem. The privacy of the conference room was invaded now by the propagandist and the psychological warfare expert. The problem of reconciling Soviet defense needs with Finnish independence was now to be solved by a public contest of nerves, by bluff and by blackmail.

Paasikivi and Tanner arrived in Moscow on 2 November. The attitude in Moscow was ugly. Articles in Pravda constantly attacked the Finnish government and its negotiation. On 3 November, the Finnish delegates were again admitted to the Kremlin, but Stalin was absent. With
Molotov they got nowhere and after an hour's discussion the meeting broke up. According to some, Molotov said, "We civilians don't seem to be making progress; now it is the soldier's turn to speak." It was the closest announcement to a threat of force that any Soviet leader had yet stated.

As the Finnish diplomats were preparing to depart Moscow, they were once again summoned by Stalin. Stalin asked if the Finnish government was willing to part with three small islands -- Hermanso, Koo, and Hasto-Buso -- just east of the Hanko Peninsula. He was willing to settle for these if it was really impossible for Finland to part with Hanko itself. Of course, Paasikivi could not reply at once. He asked for time to consult Helsinki and another meeting was arranged for 8 November.

In Helsinki the change in Soviet demands was taken as a softening; now was the time for Finland to stand firm. The Cabinet decided on 7 November to instruct its delegation not to discuss any proposal for a base anywhere in the western section of the Gulf of Finland. The meeting on 8 November therefore became mere formality. Finland stated its position and offered its concessions. Russia refused. Russia then stated its position and made its demands. Finland refused. Paasikivi and Tanner departed on 13 November. After two years of negotiations, nothing had been settled by the Finnish and Russian diplomats.

On Sunday, 26 November 1939, at 8:30 p.m., Baron Yrjo-Koskinen was summoned by Molotov to the Kremlin. Here he was informed that on that day at 3:45 p.m. Soviet troops posted near Mainila on the Karelian Isthmus

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40Wuorinen, Finland and World War II, p. 59.
41Jakobsen, Diplomacy of the Winter War, p. 136.
had been fired on by Finnish artillery. Four men had been killed and nine were wounded. This "provocative firing" was a menace to Leningrad and an act hostile to the Soviet Union. The Soviet government proposed that all Finnish troops be withdrawn immediately to a distance of twenty or twenty-five kilometers from the frontier.

Under Finnish investigation, it became obvious that Finnish artillery could not have fired the "Mainila shots." The Finnish reply to Molotov's suggestion concentrated chiefly on proving this. Even so, the Finnish government declared itself willing to discuss the withdrawal of forces, provided that on both sides the troops be pulled back from the border. The Finnish reply was handed to Molotov on 27 November and on the next day he rejected it. Molotov concluded that Finland had "no intention of complying with the provisions of the Soviet-Finnish Treaty of Non-Aggression."42 For this reason, the Soviet Government considered itself also "released from the obligations ensuing from"43 the treaty.

In view of Moscow's attitude, the Finnish Cabinet decided to agree to the withdrawal of its forces. Erkko instructed Baron Yrjo-Koskinen to do so on 29 November at 6:00 p.m. At 10:00 p.m., the Finnish Minister was requested to call on Assistant Foreign Minister Potemken immediately. At this meeting, Potemken informed Baron Yrjo-Koskinen that Soviet Russia was breaking off diplomatic relations with Finland.44 Yrjo-Koskinen was

42Jakobsen, Diplomacy of the Winter War, p. 152.
43Ibid, p. 152.
44Wuorinen, Finland and World War II, p. 63.
Informed when he left the meeting by his Embassy that Finland was ready
to resume discussions and make fresh concessions. The Ambassador immedi-
ately requested an interview with Molotov. It was too late. At that
moment, Molotov was announcing in a broadcast speech that the Soviet
government had ordered its military forces "to be prepared for all eventu-
alities and to take immediate steps to cope with any new attacks on the
part of the Finnish military clique." At one o'clock in the morning
of 30 November, the Finnish Minister informed his government of the new
developments and burned his papers.

In summary, the election of 1937, it has been seen, put two liberals
in control of Finnish foreign policy, Cajander and Holstl. Both were
revolted by everything associated with Hitler's Germany and determined
to end Finland's close involvement with Germany. They also saw that war
for the domination of Eastern Europe must soon break out between their
two totalitarian neighbors, Nazi Germany and Soviet Russia. Cajander and
Holstl, however, believed that Finland could never side with either one
and survive. Finland's survival lay only in the path of neutrality.

Thus, from 1937 to the middle of 1939, Finland's leaders moved to
end their association with Germany and to adopt the same type of neutrality
that Norway, Sweden, and Denmark enjoyed. Also, in order to avoid any
involvement with the coming war, even through accident, Finland began to
attempt to improve her relations with the Soviet Union. Holstl and
Cajander felt that by showing the sincerity of Finnish neutrality and by
showing that Finland would never be used as a base of aggression, any
Soviet thoughts of a preventive strike at Finland would be ended.

45 Jakobsen, Diplomacy of the Winter War, p. 154.
The Soviet leaders were also thinking of the war in the East that was being foretold by every diplomat in the world. Their thoughts, instead of being directed at avoiding any such war, were directed at improving their security. In the north, this meant protecting Leningrad. Soviet leaders in Moscow saw the worsening Finnish-German relations as a perfect chance to gain concessions from Finland, especially naval bases in the Gulf of Finland and a fortified zone north of Leningrad. They dismissed Finnish neutrality; Finland had never been neutral, and never would be. As early as Yartsev's talks with Cajander and Holsti, the Soviet Union pressed its demands on the basis of the security of Leningrad and ignored Finnish proclamations of neutrality. Finland could, and did, resist on the basis that, if all else failed, she could still rely on German protection.

The Nazi-Soviet Pact, signed in August 1939, ended Finland's hopes of German aid. It gave Russia a clear field in the north; freed from any threat of German intervention, the Soviet Union moved quickly. As Germany turned westward, so too did Russia. Within a few weeks, Soviet Russia had forced non-aggression treaties upon the three Baltic states; non-aggression treaties that made the Soviet Union their protector and later led to Soviet domination.

On 5 October 1939, the Soviet government began to make demands on Finland, the last threat to Soviet power in the north. Yet the Soviet Union's attitude towards Finland was not the same as her attitude towards the other Baltic states. Russia presented no ultimatum to Finland. Russia did not demand the dismemberment of Finland's military forces. All Russia asked for was a few military concessions in order to protect Leningrad --
a few naval bases and a fortified belt of land north of Leningrad. But even these minimum demands were not absolute. Soviet Russia was willing to negotiate with the Finnish government and reach an agreement in peace, without harming Finnish independence.

Finland, hoping still for German protection and convinced that England and France would miss no opportunity to strike at Germany's new ally, resisted all Soviet proposals. She was willing to negotiate with the Soviet Union, but on Finnish, not Soviet, terms. Thus, negotiations between Finland and the Soviet Union dragged on for two months and ended finally in war. Russia wanted security; Finland wanted security; the result was the Winter War.

Thus, the first phase of Soviet-Finnish relations had clearly ended. The two nations were at war. Let us now examine what developed in their relation during the period 1939 to 1940.
At nine o'clock on the morning of 30 November 1939, just as the Cabinet was discussing the meaning of Molotov's decision to break diplomatic relations, Helsinki was shaken by heavy explosions. A Soviet bomber squadron from Estonia had approached the city unobserved and dropped a mixed cargo of bombs and propaganda leaflets printed days before. Soon news of destruction and casualties started coming in from different areas of the capital and from other cities in southern and eastern Finland. The Finnish General Staff reported that Soviet troops had crossed the border in force in Karelia and in the north. Finnish installations on the islands in the Gulf of Finland were bombarded by Soviet naval craft. The Soviet offensive, by land, by sea, and by air, had begun.

In one sense, the attack must have been a relief for Finnish leaders. It saved them from facing up to the final, dreaded decision -- to submit or to fight. They had hoped to be forced to neither extreme. For almost two months they had evaded the issue, by ruling out any possibility of war. Now they had no choice. Finland was attacked; the nation had to defend itself.

That evening a special session of Parliament, transferred from the Parliament building to a convention hall at the edge of the city, passed a unanimous vote of confidence in the government. After the session, the members boarded a train to "an unknown destination" out of the way.
of Soviet bombers. The destination turned out to be the village of Kauhajoki in northwestern Finland. Isolated and protected by many miles of snow-covered forest, the Finnish Parliament never took an active hand in conducting the Winter War.

Throughout the talks with the Soviet government, Valio Tanner, Minister of Finance and leader of the Social Democratic Party, had favored a more conciliatory policy. The majority had overruled him with the argument that the Russians were bluffing. But the bombs dropped on Helsinki had demolished the majority argument. Appalled by the prospect of war, Tanner was determined to make a last effort to avoid it. But first, the government had to be changed. At least Erkko and Cajander had to be removed.

Tanner acted without delay. After the Cabinet meeting, he informed President Kallio of his plans. Then he convinced the other Social Democratic Ministers to accept the creation of a new government which would resume negotiations. This could only be done by making new concessions. Tanner did not describe the concessions he had in mind, presumably he was thinking of the islands off the Hanko Peninsula which he and Paasikivi had been willing to sacrifice earlier.

Tanner waited until the last session of Parliament was over on 30 November. He then drew the Prime Minister aside to tell him that the vote of confidence he had just received was no more than an obituary: It absolved the Cajander Cabinet of responsibility for the war but was

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not a mandate for continued leadership. Cajander had no choice. He called the Cabinet together and, just before midnight, it dissolved itself.²

The new cabinet was appointed the next day, 1 December 1939. Kallio chose Risto Ryti, Governor of the Bank of Finland, as the new Prime Minister. The Foreign Minister was Tanner, with Paasikivi as Minister without Portfolio. Erkko was packed off as Charge d'Affaires to Stockholm. The Ryti Cabinet was looked upon, at home and abroad, as a War Cabinet formed to unite the nation and meet the Soviet threat. But this was not the purpose for which it was formed; it was intended to become a Peace Cabinet.³

The new Foreign Minister lost no time in beginning his policy. At a meeting on 2 December of the Cabinet's Foreign Affairs Committee, Tanner outlined a two-point program: to ask Sweden to take part in the defense of Aaland and to reestablish contact with Moscow. He immediately telephoned Prime Minister Hansson of Sweden to ask him about the first point and was told by Hansson that the answer was still no.⁴

The committee then resolved that the Swedish government was to be asked to act as a mediator, and Sweden was instructed to tell Molotov that the Finnish government had new proposals to make. This decision was also transmitted to the other Scandinavian capitals as well as to Berlin, London, Paris, and Washington.

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³Jakobsen, Diplomacy of the Winter War, p. 161.

⁴Ibid, p. 162.
On hearing of the Soviet air raids in Finland, President Roosevelt of the United States appealed to the Soviet government to refrain from bombing civilians. At the same time, the American Ambassador in Moscow was instructed to draw Molotov’s attention to the change of government in Finland and the willingness of the Ryti Cabinet to resume negotiations. Molotov was not impressed. First, he coolly denied that civilians had been bombed. Not even the news of a new Finnish government seemed to interest him. Indeed, Tanner's appointment, in Molotov's view, was "clearly unsuitable," for Tanner had been the "evil genius" of the Soviet-Finnish talks.5

Molotov's statement, made public on 2 December, was a shattering blow to the new Finnish Cabinet. It was virtually deprived it of its reason for existence. The Cabinet had been formed on the assumption that Tanner was more acceptable to Moscow than Erkko. Now it appeared that Tanner was Persona non grata to the Kremlin. The reason for the Soviet ill will had nothing to do with Tanner's attitude to the questions discussed during the prewar negotiations, however. Stalin was no longer interested in any new proposals Tanner might have had to offer. Stalin had decided to create his own Finnish government and so had to degrade and ignore the new Cabinet and all of its offers.

On 30 November, Moscow Radio announced it had picked up a transmission of "an unknown station somewhere in Finland" informing the world that the Finnish Communist Party had set up a "democratic government of

5Jakobsen, Diplomacy of the Winter War, p. 164.
Finland, with Otto Kuusinen at its head. On 1 December, the Soviet Army acknowledged the existence of the Kuusinen government, established in Terijoki, the first Finnish town "liberated" by the Red Army. The Soviet government immediately entered into diplomatic relations with the Kuusinen government and accepted its request for military aid. On 2 December, Kuusinen arrived in Moscow in order to sign a treaty with Molotov.

After the discussions with Paasikivi and Tanner, the Soviet Foreign Minister must have enjoyed his talks with Kuusinen. In one day, Molotov gained the Hanko Peninsula, a large section of the Karelian Isthmus, and the majority of the islands in the Gulf of Finland. Finland was given areas of Soviet Karelia. Both parties also agreed to give each other all possible assistance, including military aid, in the event a third power attempted to attack the Soviet Union through Finland. The treaty carrying these agreements was to be ratified "in the shortest time in the capital of Finland, the city of Helsinki."

This was a public commitment which would not have been announced

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6 Jakobsen, Diplomacy of the Winter War, p. 166.

7 Kuusinen, head of the Democratic Republic of Finland, was a doctrinaire Marxist who had preached class war in Finland in 1918. He had been one of the leaders of the Red Insurrection that led to the Finnish Civil War. He fled to Russia to save his life in 1919 and there became one of the foremost theoreticians of Marxism-Leninism. Stalin relied on him to provide doctrinal justification for his policies. So valuable were his services that Kuusinen survived the great purges of the thirties, a remarkable feat.

8 Tanner, The Winter War, p. 106.

unless the Soviet leaders were determined to redeem it. The world ridiculed the government Molotov had pulled out of his hat and the elaborate pretense with which he had sought to establish its credentials. But the Finns believed that the Soviets did not intend it to remain a harmless hoax: Kuusinen's government was to be firmly established by the Red Army.

It is necessary to pause here and examine more closely the nature of the Kuusinen government. The Kuusinen government has often been pointed to by historians as proof that the Soviet Union wished to seize Finland and set up a Soviet-controlled government in it. Certainly, the Finns believed this. However, the Kuusinen government was never more than a paper entity. It consisted of Kuusinen and two Soviet aides. It took no part in the planning or execution of the Winter War; it maintained no contact with Soviet leaders. Indeed, Kuusinen met only once more with Molotov during the Winter War. In reality, the Kuusinen government was never intended to hold power in Finland. It had been created as a threat, and possibly a warning, to the real Finnish government.¹⁰

In December 1939, the superiority of the Soviet forces advancing into Finland from four directions was overwhelming. Nine Finnish divisions, with fourteen thousand men in each, faced four Soviet armies,

¹⁰For more on the paper nature of the Kuusinen government, see the sections on the Winter War in Beloff's The Foreign Policy of Soviet Russia and Dallin's Soviet Russia's Foreign Policy. This opposes the view held by Wuorinen and Jakobsen that the Kuusinen government was a real threat to Finland.
about twenty-seven divisions of seventeen thousand five hundred men each, supported by tanks and artillery.\(^{11}\)

In the Western world, Finland's fight was written off in advance as no more than an heroic gesture, a romantic act of defiance, a reckless refusal to face the brutal facts of modern warfare. But the Finnish soldier did not think of himself as a hero doomed to destruction for a lost cause. Finns had fought Russians before and survived. He was aware of the odds, but he was not overawed by them. Rather, they became the subject of grim jokes: "They are so many and our country is so small, where shall we find the space to bury them all?"\(^{12}\)

It was an exceptionally cold winter; only twice since 1828 had lower temperatures been recorded in Finland. On the northern front, the temperature dropped to fifty degrees below zero even in December. This weather caused heavy casualties among the Russians of the Eighth and Ninth Armies who were poorly equipped to withstand it. But on the Karelian Isthmus they were favored by it for the ground was frozen hard, roads gained in firmness, there was little snow, and the ice on lakes and rivers was strong enough to carry even the heaviest tanks. Even

\(^{11}\) On the Karelian Isthmus on an eighty-eight mile line from the Gulf of Finland to Lake Lagoda, six Finnish divisions, with one in reserve, took the main attack carried out by twelve to fourteen divisions, more than a thousand tanks, and several divisions of heavy artillery. North of Lake Lagoda, two Finnish divisions held a sixty mile front against the Soviet Eighth Army. On the remainder of the front up to the Arctic Sea, a distance of six hundred twenty five miles, there were only independent Finnish battalions and companies facing the Soviet Ninth Army advancing to cut land communications with Sweden. And in the Petsamo area on the Arctic coast the Soviet Fourteenth Army was almost unopposed. In addition to their superiority in numbers and fire-power, the Russians had other advantages: complete mastery of the air and practically unlimited reserves.

then, however, continuous and heavy attacks by the Russians until the end of the year were beaten back time and again, until the first offensive wave had exhausted itself.

The first month of warfare had shown the Soviet Army to be clumsy and inept. All along the front it had either been brought to a standstill or broken down completely. The Soviet leaders were forced to revise their military strategy, which had been based on the assumption that political and military resistance would be negligible. There was no longer any question of a blitz war on the German model. New Year's Eve of 1940 was not a cheerful occasion in the Kremlin.

A vast reservoir of frustrated idealism and emotion was suddenly released into a flood of sympathy and enthusiasm for Finland. Everyone, it seemed, wanted to help. Volunteers offered themselves from as far away as Abyssinia. From dictatorships like Italy and democracies like the United States came offers of arms and funds. In France, Premier Daladier ordered the Soviet trade mission closed. The Pope prayed for Finland. A message of encouragement from Uruguay was read in the Finnish Parliament. However, the difficulty lay in translating sympathy into effective action.

On 2 December 1939, Finland decided to appeal to the League of Nations for aid. The Assembly of the League met in Geneva on 11 December to consider the actions of the Soviet Union. Yet few delegates volunteered to judge those actions. Their courage was in direct ratio to the distance of their country from Russia. The delegates of Iran and Afghanistan

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simply failed to appear, and the Scandinavian and Balkan members wished to help Finland but not antagonize Russia. The boldest and most righteous were the Latin Americans who insisted on stern measures, even war, to restore law and order. The Assembly did pass a resolution on 14 December stating that the Soviet Union, by its own actions, had placed itself outside the League of Nations. This resolution was all that the League could offer Finland; it was far from what Finland needed.14

Meanwhile, Germany, Sweden, and Norway offered no help to Finland. While volunteers to fight in Finland were allowed to train within their borders, Sweden and Norway clung to their neutrality and offered neither military nor financial support. Germany similarly clung to her Non-Aggression Pact with Russia. Hitler ordered shipments of arms from Italy and Hungary destined for Finland halted in Germany and turned back. The German Navy agreed to supply Soviet submarines operating in the Baltic against Finland's merchant shipping.

Only in England and France were any concrete plans developed to aid Finland. The Allied War Council saw the Finnish war as a perfect pretext to move forces into the Scandinavian Peninsula. The reasons for wishing to do so were twofold: the nature of the Norwegian coast and the iron ore fields in Sweden. The coast of Norway, with its fjords and its fringe of islands, afforded perfect protection to German merchant ships evading the British blockade. The iron ore of Sweden was vital

to the German war industry. Both formed for the Allies important stakes, more important than Finland's fate.15

Not until 5 February 1940 was the Anglo-French plan for a Scandinavian expedition finally worked out and approved. Under cover of assistance for Finland, English and French troops numbering one hundred fifty thousand were to land on the coast of Norway at various points. These troops were to occupy important Norwegian ports and to seize the ore fields of northern Sweden. Of these troops one division, approximately twenty thousand men, was to proceed to Finland's aid. The plan was to be put into operation in late March or early April.

These plans of the Allied War Council show dramatically the Allies' lack of interest in Finland at this stage of the war. The Allies were willing to send a full field army into Scandinavia, not to aid Finland whose cause they regarded as lost, but to aid themselves. One division was to be sacrificed in the defense of Finland as a gesture of Allied "good will." The Allies in 1939 had no interest in the fate of a minor Scandinavian nation of no worth to them.

At the beginning of January 1940, Foreign Minister Tanner received an offer from Mme. H. Wuolljoki to serve as Intermediator in peace talks with the Soviet Union. Mme. Wuolljoki, a left-wing playwright, was known as an eccentric lady whose political reliability and discretion were far from impeccable. However, she had important Soviet friends

throughout Europe. Since Stalin still refused to admit even the existence of the Helsinki government, Tanner accepted the offer.16

Mme. Wuolljoki arrived in Stockholm on 10 January. Here she met an old friend of hers, Mme. Kollontay, the Soviet Ambassador in Stockholm. Two days later Mme. Wuolljoki was able to report to Tanner that Mme. Kollontay had promised to make inquiries in Moscow. On 29 January Foreign Minister Guenther of Sweden received through Mme. Kollontay a message signed by Molotov to be transmitted to Tanner. This in itself was a momentous event: it meant that the Soviet government at least recognized the existence of the Finnish government. It stated that the Soviet government was not opposed to an agreement with Ryti-Tanner government. However, Moscow would no longer be content with what it had demanded in November.17

On 30 January, Ryti, Tanner, and Paasikivi met to draft a reply to Molotov's message. Their reply amounted to an offer to settle the contest for a draw. Having pointed out that Finland had not started the war or at any time refused to negotiate, it suggested that a compromise be reached on the basis of the prewar Moscow talks. In addition, Finland was ready to make further concessions on the Karelian Isthmus. Finally, it declared that Finland could not make unilateral concessions; she expected to receive Soviet territory in exchange.18

The Finnish reply was given to Guenther on 2 February for transmission to Moscow. Since it made no comment on the issue of Hanko, the Soviet government found it totally unacceptable. It was at this point that Erkko and Mme. Wuolijoki arranged a meeting between Tanner and Mme. Kollantay. They met on 5 February in Stockholm, where the Soviet Ambassador informed Tanner that the Finnish reply was unacceptable. She then expressed her sympathy for Finland's plight and her belief that Finland should make peace before the spring. At this point, Tanner moved to break the deadlock. He suggested that if the Soviet government was willing to accept an island instead of Hanko, he would do his utmost to work for such a solution in Finland. Mme. Kollontay promised to transmit his offer but received a cable of rejection the following morning. Tanner then informed her that it was now up to the Kremlin to say what it wanted and returned to Finland.19

Finland's defense forces were short of practically everything by February 1940. Their greatest need was for trained manpower. The greater part of the Finnish troops had been in the firing line since the war began; it was doubtful whether they could meet another Soviet offensive. No reserves remained and foreign volunteers were of little help. On 10 February, Ryti and Tanner met with Mannerheim in Mikkeli, a small town in eastern Finland. The three of them agreed that Finland had only three alternatives: make peace with Russia, receive aid from Sweden, or receive aid from the Allies. Of the three alternatives, only

19Tanner, The Winter War, 145-146.
peace with Russia seemed to be possible. It was agreed that peace must be had with Russia on almost any terms.

Having obtained the backing of the generals, Ryti and Tanner returned to Helsinki to convince the Cabinet that Finland had to make peace. However, the Agrarian Party and the Fascist IKL Party immediately opposed the suggestion. While the politicians deliberated, the pressure on the Mannerheim Line was mounting. In the Tahde sector, after an intensive artillery barrage, the Soviet troops succeeded in making a breakthrough nearly a mile in depth. This was the first crack in the main defense line. Now there was nothing between Finland and the Red Army but a weak supporting line manned by the last reserves. Yet the Cabinet could still not make up its mind. It finally agreed to sue for peace only if Sweden openly refused to give aid to Finland.20

Tanner arrived in Stockholm on 13 February to ask (at least for Finland) the all-important question once more: would Sweden give Finland active aid in its war with Russia? The question was presented to the Swedish Cabinet. On 14 February, Tanner had his answer. Sweden would not commit troops to the war; Sweden would also refuse to allow any Allied expeditionary force to march through Sweden into Finland.21 All the Swedish ministers could offer Tanner was the advice that the best thing to do was to sue for peace.

The pressure on the narrow front on the Karelian Isthmus was increasing: twenty Soviet divisions were attacking positions held by

20 Tanner, The Winter War, p. 166.

21 Jakobsen, Diplomacy of the Winter War, p. 231.
two Finnish divisions. Nowhere did the defense lines break, but on 14 February Summa, the key point of the defense, was evacuated. By 21 February, the entire army corps defending Karelia had been withdrawn to the last supporting line. The Mannerheim Line was collapsing.

Tanner, for one, saw the end coming. On 21 February, he sounded out the Cabinet on its attitude to Molotov's demands, and though the discussion was inconclusive, he felt encouraged enough to ask Guenther of Sweden to contact Molotov once more. Molotov demanded, in addition to Hanko, the entire southeast corner of Finland, area north of Lake Lagoda, and that Finland join the Soviet Union and Estonia in a defense pact for the Gulf of Finland. The Finnish Cabinet was stunned. To surrender to Molotov's demands meant giving the Soviets the second largest city of Finland, Viipuri, as well as Finland's entire defense system.

That Molotov condescended to make demands at this point is significant. The Soviet Army was but a few weeks away from complete victory and occupation of Finland. Five fresh Soviet Armies were poised to strike the last weak defense line in Finland. Obviously if Russia was going to seize Finland, there was no point in Molotov making demands. Russia wished to negotiate a peace with a sovereign state, not dictate a peace to an occupied nation.

On 28 February, after a week of impatient waiting by the Kremlin, at 11:00 a.m., Mme. Kollontay called on Guenther asking him to inform the Finnish government that Moscow had to have the Finnish answer within forty-eight hours. Tanner, as usual, urged the Cabinet to face the fact that there was no alternative to peace. "We have been left alone." 

22 Jakobsen, Diplomacy of the Winter War, p. 238.
he declared. On 29 February, the Cabinet was informed by Mannerheim that Viipuri was being attacked by Red Army units. The Finnish Army was broken and exhausted. Continued warfare was pointless. The Cabinet finally accepted the peace terms as a basis for negotiations and asked the Soviet government to suggest the time and place for peace talks.

On 3 March, Tanner informed the Soviet government that if Finland were permitted to keep Viipuri and Sortavala, a large communication center, peace could be made without delay. But he had no answer for three days. Meanwhile a vicious battle was raging in Viipuri where a handful of Finnish troops and foreign volunteers fought off the entire Russian Sixth Army. On 6 March, Tanner received a cable from Molotov inviting a Finnish peace delegation to Moscow. On 7 March, a delegation headed by Prime Minister Ryti arrived in Moscow.

On 8 March 1940, the Soviet government listed its demands and concessions. Besides Hanko, the Fisherman's Peninsula, and all of Karelia including Viipuri and Sortavala, the Soviet government demanded parts of the districts of Kuusamo and Salla in the northeastern part of the country. In addition, Finland was to build a railway from Salla to Kemijarvi (there to be linked with the line leading to the Swedish border). The Russians promised to evacuate Petsamo, but demanded free

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23 Jakobsen, Diplomacy of the Winter War, p. 239.


25 Vuorinen, Finland and World War II, p. 77.
passage through the area into Norway and the right to establish a consulate there. On 10 March, the delegation told the Cabinet that there was no hope of changing a single item. The following morning, the President and the Cabinet agreed to authorize Ryti to sign. A few hours before midnight on 12 March 1940, Ryti signed the document in the Kremlin.

The end came on 13 March. At eleven in the morning, fire ceased all along the eastern front. It was a day of quiet, bitter mourning in Finland. The remaining defenders of Viipuri, ninety percent of them wounded, marched north out of the demolished city. The troops in the eastern Karelian Isthmus and in the north surrendered the positions they had held for the hundred and five days of bitter warfare. With the retreating army marched the people of Karelia. The entire withdrawal had to be completed in twelve days. This was barely time enough to rescue the people, let alone movable personal property. Yet much was taken, for every means of transportation available -- even private caravans of cars from as far away as Norway -- was utilized. When the twelve days had expired, Russia held an empty, gutted Karelia.

During the Winter War, two facts became immediately obvious. The first was that Germany was adhering to her Pact with the Soviet Union. Even in this ultimate crisis, Finland could expect no help from Nazi Germany. Secondly, it became very clear that the Western Allies,

26 Jakobsen, Diplomacy of the Winter War, p. 250.
28 For a text of the Peace Treaty of 1940, see Appendix D in this work.
France and England, had no interest in Finland. Instead, their interest lay in the Swedish ore fields and Norwegian ports. The Winter War was of concern to them only for the opportunities it offered for access to Scandinavia. Indeed, the only state in the world truly interested in Finland's fate, besides the Soviet Union, was the United States, which was locked in its own policy of neutrality too tightly to do anything positive for Finland.

Finland's defense during the Winter War was fantastic. But Finland had no reserves and it is manpower and supplies, not bravery, which determines the outcome of wars. By the end of February 1940, Finland's defense lines were paper-thin and waxing thinner. It was a matter of weeks before there would be no Finnish Army to oppose the Red Army and the entire nation would be overrun. Russia faced no other threat at that time and only a small portion of her army would be needed to occupy Finland. However, the Soviet Union chose to settle for limited gains, namely territories that would add to the defense of northern Russia and Leningrad.

Why did Russia not take Finland into the Union or, at the very least, set up a Communist government headed by Kuusinen? Why did not the Soviet Union finally solve the Finnish problem? Finland was defeated, her army broken. Finland had no allies; neither Germany nor the Allies were in position to oppose a Soviet takeover. If, as Stalin later claimed, Soviet leaders foresaw a German attack, an independent Finland should have been removed and, thus, all possibility of German use of her territory would have been ended. On the other hand, if Soviet leaders believed that Germany would honor the Pact for its full duration,
an independent Finland should have been removed as a possible block to further Soviet plans. There appears to be no reason, other than a Soviet policy, that Finland should have survived the Winter War as a free nation.

If the Winter War was significant in the development of Soviet-Finnish relations, no less significant is the period 1940-1941, which saw Finland become a member in the German offensive against Russia.
CHAPTER III

1940 TO 1941

At noon on 13 March 1940, the Treaty of Moscow between the Republic of Finland and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics came into force. It gave Russia a broad belt of land in which the northern defenses of Leningrad could be organized and in which lay two major centers of communications, Vipuri and Sortavala. Lake Lagoda became entirely enclosed in Russia territory. Further north, in the Kuusamo-Salla area, the frontier was moved west and away from the Murmansk railway. On the Arctic Ocean, Finland was forced to cede half of the Fisherman's Peninsula, which then became an important outpost for the defense of the port of Murmansk from attack from the west. In the Gulf of Finland, a series of islands on the approaches to Leningrad were ceded to Russia, as well as the all-important Hanko naval base. Hanko and these islands, together with the bases acquired in the Baltic republics, gave Russia complete control of the Gulf of Finland.

Very few Finns, if they thought about the matter at all, accepted the Treaty of Moscow as a final settlement. Because of their strong love of country and because of their simplistic view of world politics, the Finnish people felt that such a manifest injustice would be corrected soon. In consequence, if they felt that an opportunity had come to put things right, few of them would have any scruples about taking it. Such sentiments were natural, but they were no help when it came to constructing a new relationship between Finland and the Soviet Union.
The leaders in Moscow could see that the opportunity which the Finnish people were dreaming of could only result from the Soviet Union suffering a diplomatic or military defeat at the hands of some other great power. It was obvious that Finland would attach herself to any power that threatened the Soviet Union. Thus, for the next year, Soviet policy was aimed at keeping Finland isolated.

While the people of Finland dreamed of regaining lost territory, the leaders of Finland dreamed of insuring Finland’s security. During the negotiations leading to the Treaty of Moscow, the Finnish government had approached the Swedish government with a proposal to form a Scandinavian defense alliance between Sweden, Norway, and Finland. On 14 March, Hambro, the speaker of the Norwegian Parliament, agreed that the scheme had its advantages. The Swedish government, while stressing that there must be guarantees that members of the alliance would not be endangered by one of their number launching a policy of aggression, stated that it was ready to discuss the idea.1 Everything, however, depended on the reaction of the major powers. On 15 March, the Finnish government announced to the ambassadors of all interested powers that negotiations to form a defensive alliance in the north had started. France, Germany, and England gave immediate approval to the scheme. Molotov, however, stated that the proposed alliance would be a breach of the peace treaty for Finland and also a breach of neutrality for Sweden and Norway, because the alliance was directed against the Soviet Union.2

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2 Ibid.
The problem was discussed on 21 March at a meeting between Molotov and the Finnish delegates Paasikivi and Volonmoa, who had arrived in Moscow on 18 March to present Finland's formal ratification of the peace treaty. Molotov declared that it was the view of the government of the Soviet Union that the alliance would be a breach of the peace treaty on Finland's part. All Paasikivi could say in reply was that the alliance was defensive and that the neutrality of Norway and Sweden guaranteed it could be nothing else. Molotov alleged that press comments in Sweden and Finland proved the alliance was hostile to the Soviet Union. The Soviet Union "Intends to observe the treaty. We regard all questions with Finland as finally settled." Paasikivi reported to Helsinki that the Soviet Union had "laid down its position strongly." The Finnish government had no choice; it withdrew from the negotiations to form a defensive alliance on 22 March.

While this first crisis developed, Finland was also engaged in the reconstruction of her government. The wartime coalition of Ryti had been formed to bring the war to an end. The war was over; the Ryti government's task was over. The people agreed that wartime unity must be preserved and, thus, it followed that the conservatives must be brought into any government formed. Also the people of Finland wanted

3Wuorinen, Finland and World War II, p. 90.


5Ibid.

6See Appendix of this work for a telegram from Paasikivi to his government following this meeting.
a strong government that could protect the nation's interests. Both of these factors combined to give the conservatives, who had never been popular, broad public support in Finland. The Conservative leaders immediately seized upon this support to further their positions.

After a week of discussion, the Finnish Parliament, brought back from the limbo of Kauhajoki, finally agreed to a new government. The wartime coalition of Ryti was to be continued with the Conservatives having a more prominent role than previously. Rudolf Walden, the great industrialist and founder of the modern Finnish paper industry and a powerful Conservative leader, was made Minister of Defense with the understanding that he was to have a free hand in defense policy and that the necessary money and legislation would be voted without question. Tanner was removed from his post and became Finance Minister once again. This left the crucial post of Foreign Minister open. President Kallio chose Professor Rolf Witting, a pro-German member of the Swedish People's Party, to fill the post. This new coalition government was formally installed on 27 March 1940.7

On 29 March, Molotov delivered a speech to the Supreme Soviet. It contained a review and a vindication of the Finnish war. Molotov stressed that the peace terms were dictated solely by considerations of military security and that the Soviet Union fully respected the independence of military security and that the Soviet Union fully respected the independence of Finland. The benevolent intentions of Russia towards Finland were proved by her magnanimous self-denial in not proceeding to conquer the whole country when that had been militarily possible. The

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7Upton, Finland In Crisis, p. 63.
war was justified by Molotov on the grounds that it had really been an attempt by England and France to attack the Soviet Union. The Finnish government had been the willing tool of their designs. In reality, Russia had defeated not Finland alone but the united strength of several hostile powers. The bitter hatred of the Finnish government, which continued in office, for the Soviet Union was proved by the atrocities committed by the Finnish troops. This speech set the tone for the next year of diplomatic relations between Finland and Russia.  

The speech was followed within two days by a move which seemed sinister to the Finnish government. It was announced by Moscow that the areas ceded to the Soviet Union under the Treaty of Moscow, with the exception of those in the immediate vicinity of Leningrad, would be added to Soviet Karelia to form the Karelian-Finnish Soviet Socialist Republic. This would become the twelfth constituent member of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics. The government of the new republic was headed by Otto Kuusinen. The majority of Finland's leaders suspected that the new republic was intended to form a nucleus to which the rest of Finland was to be added.

The business of implementing the Treaty of Moscow proved to be long and troublesome. Problems of protocol, of demarcation of the new frontier, of individual claims against the two governments, and of prisoners of war proved to be endless. The two governments finally

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8 For an extract from Molotov's speech, see Appendix E of this work.
9 Upton, _Finland in Crisis_, p. 67.
agreed on 13 May to set up a mixed Soviet-Finnish commission to settle the problems; this commission had not completed its work when war broke out again in 1941. 10

Finland watched events in Scandinavia with keen attention. The Finnish leaders were quickly convinced by the German successes in Norway in early April that Germany was a power they could not afford to offend. Witting was attempting to convince the Cabinet to adopt a pro-German policy. He eagerly presented all rumors of friction between Germany and Russia, but the Cabinet knew that there was no evidence of any Russo-German split, so for the moment they must take care not to offend either dictatorship. The policy of remaining neutral between the dictators in Germany and Russia seemed to be the only one possible.

On 19 May 1940, the new Soviet Ambassador to Finland, Ivan Zotov, arrived in Helsinki. Zotov was a thoroughly unpleasant man, both in policy and in character. 11 He had participated in the great purges of the 1930's in Russia. Zotov was a near-fanatical communist and hated any form of democratic government. This hatred affected all of his negotiations. He supported the Finnish-Soviet Peace and Friendship Society

10. Two major problems arose out of the treaty. One was the exact location of the new frontier; the other was the property removed by the Finns from territory given to the Soviet Union by the treaty. The first problem was solved on 9 April and it was agreed to mark the frontier by cutting away a strip of forest. The Finns were allowed to do so and even sell the timber. The second problem was never satisfactorily settled and was to trouble Soviet-Finnish relations until June 1941.

11. Upton, Finland In Crisis, p. 98.
Zotov's tenure at the embassy in Helsinki was to poison Soviet-Finnish relations.

In June, the Finnish government witnessed another, to them, sinister move by Moscow. In the mutual assistance treaties between the Soviet Union and the Baltic republics of Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania, the full sovereignty of those nations had been solemnly guaranteed. On 14 June, when the war in the west was beyond doubt, Russia handed Lithuania an ultimatum. It was accused of hostile acts against the Soviet garrisons within its borders and of conspiring with Estonia and Latvia against the Soviet Union. Russia demanded that Lithuania install a new government which could "honestly" perform the obligations of the mutual assistance pact and would permit Soviet troops to occupy the entire nation. Lithuania had no choice; she complied and was occupied on 15 June 1940. Estonia and Latvia were presented similar ultimatums and occupied within a week. Helsinki greatly feared that Finland was next.

The Winter War left Finland fairly intact. She bore no occupation, she had no indemnity to pay, she bore no foreign involvements. The Winter War had, however, destroyed Cajander and Holsti and their policy of neutrality. Foreign policy came to be dominated by Walden and Witting, both pro-German conservatives. But it was the diplomacy of the Soviet

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12 The S.N.S. cloaked a revival of the outlawed Communist Party in Finland. Tanner, Witting, and Walden advised the Cabinet to dissolve the S.N.S., for its presence could only harm the nation's security. However, Moscow, through Zotov, announced that it supported the S.N.S. and that any move against it would only harm relations between Finland and the Soviet Union. The Cabinet suspended all discussion about the fate of the S.N.S.
Union, not the efforts of Walden and Witting, that drove Finland into the arms of Nazi Germany. It becomes necessary to break the temporal development that has been followed thus far in order to examine individually each of the disputes and developments that occurred in the next year of Soviet-Finnish relations in order to show this.

It should be noted here that many historians view the constant Soviet pressure upon Finland from June 1940 to June 1941 as proof of Russia's hostile intentions concerning Finland. This view is a misinterpretation of Russia's foreign policy, for it assumes that Russia wished to absorb Finland. In reality, Soviet foreign policy in regard to Finland had two objectives: the isolation of Finland from other powers and the testing of Finland's good-will towards Russian or Russia's ability to control Finnish policy indirectly. These two objectives will become obvious upon examination of the disputes in Soviet-Finnish relations prior to the Continuation War.

On 23 June, Paasikivi was suddenly summoned to the Kremlin. There he was informed by Molotov that the Soviet Union was interested in the nickel deposits in the Petsamo region. He asked whether Finland would give a concession to exploit them to the Soviet Union or at lease set up a joint Russo-Finnish company to do so. Paasikivi pointed out that the concession was already held by the Canadian-British Mond Nickel Company. However, Paasikivi promised to inform his government of the Soviet Interest in Petsamo.13

13Wuorinen, Finland and World War II, p. 85.
This meeting was the beginning of the Petsamo dispute which would bedevil Soviet-Finnish-German relations for a year and be one of the major reasons for German involvement in Finland. It appears that Russia's interest in Petsamo was purely diplomatic, for the Soviet Union was one of the leading exporters of nickel. The Soviet Union wished to accomplish two things in securing control in Petsamo: remove the last British influence from Finland and cripple Germany's war production, for the Petsamo mines were a major source for the nickel Germany was forced to import. By cornering the supplies of nickel, the Soviet Union hoped to be able to control the capacity for waging war of Nazi Germany, her somewhat lukewarm ally.

The demand put the Finnish government in a genuine difficulty. It could not afford to offend the British government by confiscating its concession, for Britain had the power to end all Finnish ocean trade. Nor could it afford to offend the German government by cutting off nickel exports, for Germany was Finland's only hope of protection from Russian aggression. Yet all the signs indicated that it would be dangerous to refuse the Soviet demands.

For the next eleven months, Finland followed a policy of stalling in the Petsamo dispute. Finland objected to the Soviet demands because of English and German interests in the area. By mid-November 1940, England had renounced her interest in the Petsamo mines, provided they were not used for German war production. From then until the opening of the Continuation War, the Finnish leaders proposed various schemes of a joint German-Soviet sharing of the output of the mines, which would remain
In Finnish hands. The Petsamo dispute was eventually settled by the war and its peace treaties.

On 27 July 1940, Molotov, in a meeting with Paasikivi, raised another matter. The government of the Soviet Union had noted that Finland was keeping a garrison and fortifications on the Aaland Islands. These must be removed unless Finland would like to fortify them jointly with the Soviet Union. Otherwise, they must be completely demilitarized, this to be supervised by Soviet observers. On 3 July, the Finnish leaders decided to comply with the Soviet demand. The evacuation of the Aaland Islands would begin immediately. Molotov expressed satisfaction and added that the Soviet government would establish a consul there to inspect what was done. These points were formalized in an agreement between the Soviet Union and Finland concerning the Aaland Islands signed on 11 October 1949.

These concessions should have satisfied the Soviet Union, but on 8 July the Finnish government received another shock. It had been waiting for some time for Russian proposals to reopen railway communications between the two countries. When this arrived, it was discovered that there was a clause permitting the Red Army to run trains over the Finnish railway system to their base at Hanko. No limits were to be put on the number of trains or upon their contents. The trains would pass through the vital centers of industry and communications in southern Finland.

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\(^{14}\) Upton, *Finland In Crisis*, p. 108.

\(^{15}\) For a full text of this agreement, see Appendix E of this work.
Neither Mannerheim nor Walden could allow this. It became apparent that Russia wished to send whole trainloads of troops to Hanko and so the Minister of Defense in Finland demanded that their arms travel separately. Since Finland could refuse all transit over her soil, the Soviet government conceded this point. Only Red officers were to travel armed.

This rash of Russian demands made the Finnish leaders consider the possibility of German protection. But Germany was not interested in Finland, whose only use would be in the event of a Russo-German conflict. However, in the period between 21 July and 31 July, Hitler became convinced that an invasion of England would fail. He recognized that Russia provided the only possible continental ally for England; if Russia was eliminated, the Britain would be forced to give up any hope of continuing the war. On 31 July, Hitler outlined his plan for a campaign to be launched in the spring of 1941 to his General Staff. Finland must be brought into it and, with the carve-up of western Russia, could be enlarged as far as the White Sea. With this view, German diplomacy began moving quietly towards making Finland a German ally.

Meanwhile Molotov in Moscow had presented Paasikivi with more demands. The Soviet Union had noted that the Finnish government, and Tanner especially, was doing all it could to oppose the S.N.S. Molotov could not understand this, for it appeared that Finland's government was hostile towards a peaceful organization. His meaning was clear to Paasikivi. The Soviet Union wanted the S.N.S. to be given a free hand and wanted Tanner removed from his Cabinet post. These demands, concerning internal Finnish issues, were too much. On 29 July, the Finnish Parliament voted for the suppression of the S.N.S. and mass arrests.
followed. Riots broke out in Helsinki and Turku. Nor was any move made to remove Tanner; the question of his role in government was not even considered. Molotov was furious; he informed Paasikivi that this was to be the final test of how far the Finnish government was prepared to conform to the will of the Soviet Union. ¹⁶

To counter the growing Soviet threat, Walden and Witting attempted to get some diplomatic support from Germany by approaching Blucher, the German Ambassador, on 2 August. They suggested that Witting and Ryti travel to Berlin to discuss Finland's role in the "new Europe." ¹⁷

In other words, they would be prepared to accept some kind of German protectorate. Germany was also concerned with Soviet pressure on Finland. On 4 August, Berlin received a report that Moscow would present Helsinki with an ultimatum in the second half of that month. If Finland was to be of use in the next phase of the war, it had to remain free.

On 15 August, Colonel Veltjens, arms dealer and special envoy from the German Foreign Minister, called at the Finnish embassy in Berlin. ¹⁸ He informed the ambassador, Kivimaki, that he had been instructed by Hitler to offer arms to Finland and to arrange transit rights through Finland for German troops bound for north Norway. He then asked for a letter of introduction to Mannerheim. Kivimaki readily complied and, after

¹⁶Upton, Finland in Crisis, p. 119.
¹⁷Ibid, p. 121.
¹⁸Wuorinen, Finland and World War II, p. 92.
Veltjens departed, informed Helsinki of his mission. On 18 August, Veltjens met Mannerhelm in Finland. Mannerhelm immediately accepted the arms offered but could not give an answer on the question of transit rights, since that was a political question. Mannerhelm suggested that Veltjens approach Witting, but Veltjens insisted that he must be able to send Berlin a simple "yes" or "no" by 20 August and that he was authorized to speak only to Mannerhelm. The Marshal then agreed to contact Ryti personally and give Veltjens the government's answer in the morning.

Mannerhelm telephoned Ryti that evening and Ryti authorized him to agree to grant transit agreements. The next morning, Veltjens was told the answer was "yes." After receiving his answer from Mannerhelm, Veltjens went to see Ryti, Witting, and Walden. He urged the importance of playing for time with the Soviet Union. The Germans and Finns spent the next month arranging and carrying out the agreements. On 22 August, a Finnish colonel arrived in Germany to buy arms. On 12 September 1940, the transit agreement was signed in Berlin and on 22 September German troopships arrived at Vaasa and Oulu.

On 23 September, the news of the German-Finnish transit agreement was made known to the ambassadors of Sweden, Great Britain, and the Soviet Union. Sweden made no hesitation; it accepted the agreement.

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19 Wuorinen, Finland and World War II, p. 92

20 Ibid, p. 93.

21 There is some question as to whether Ryti had the power to authorize this. For an in-depth examination of the Veltjen's agreement, see the Memoirs of Marshal Mannerheln, Chapter 6 passim.

22 Ibid, p. 93.
England made a formal protest at the granting of facilities to its enemy on 26 September, but its reaction was subdued. The reaction of the Soviet Union was not. On 7 October, the Finnish authorities received a sharp note from Zotov demanding free access for Soviet observers to the German transit areas and Finnish military installations. But Finland was not to be intimidated and refused. This began a series of notes and threats from Molotov and Zotov making numerous demands to be allowed to observe German troop movements.  

The question of the German transits now had priority in all discussions between the Soviet Union and Finland and also between the Soviet Union and Germany. Berlin and Helsinki kept in close contact to insure that they presented a united front. On 2 October, von Tippelskirch, the German Ambassador in Moscow, informed Molotov that the transits were of no political significance and were purely military in nature. After further questions from Molotov, von Tippelskirch told Molotov that any further Soviet queries should be made directly in Berlin on 14 October. This had the effect of concentrating Soviet questioning on Finland. For several weeks, Finnish officials were battered by questions from Zotov, Molotov, and eventually Stalin.  

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23 Upton, Finland in Crisis, p. 150.


25 Paasiklvi met with Molotov on 17 October, 21 October, 29 October, 1 November, and 14 November, each time to discuss the transit of German troops. Molotov demanded to be informed of the exact number of the troops, the exact routes of their trains, and the right to place Soviet observers along the routes. Paasiklvi, on orders from Walden, refused all information. By the first week in November, Stalin was sending messages containing these questions directly to President Kallio in Finland.
However, by 14 November, Molotov was occupied in Berlin and had forgotten, temporarily, about pressing Finland. Hitler had decided to make one last attempt to resolve the growing Russo-German split. If the Soviet Union would join the Tripartite Pact and would accept her zone of expansion as being towards the Persian Gulf, Hitler would make a bargain with her. In effect, Russia was asked to renounce all interest in western Europe, including her traditional interests in the Balkans and her exclusive rights in Finland guaranteed her in 1939, and turn south into conflict with the British holdings in southern Asia. As it turned out, the Finnish question was the main point on which the negotiations broke down. In talks with Ribbentrop on 22 November, Molotov indicated that Russia would be willing to expand southward and would not press into the Balkans, but she would not give up her gains in the Baltic and Scandinavian areas. Molotov demanded a free hand in Finland. Hitler gave his answer the following day:

Germany recognized that, politically, Finland was of primary interest to Russia and was in her zone of influence. However, Germany had to consider the following two points: 1) For the duration of the war, she was very greatly interested in the deliveries of nickel and lumber from Finland and, 2) She did not desire any new conflict in the Baltic Sea, which would further curtail her freedom of movement.

Hitler implied that, if Russia agreed to cooperate, he was ready to surrender Finland at some indefinite point in the future, after the war with England was over. Molotov answered in 25 November; the Soviet

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26 Department of State, Nazi-Soviet Relations, p. 234.

27 Ibid.
Union was ready to join the Tripartite Pact and give up expansion in Eastern Europe if the Soviet Union was given a free hand in the north. This answer sealed Russia’s, and Finland’s, fate. Hitler never bothered to reply; instead he simply went on with his preparations for a military solution and no further negotiations took place between Soviet Russia and Nazi Germany.

On 18 December, General Order 21, for an operation to eliminate the Soviet Union under the code name "Barbarossa," was issued by the German General Staff. One of the main objectives was Leningrad and the elimination of Soviet military power in the Baltic. This emphasis on Leningrad gave Finland a key role in the offensive. Operation Barbarossa affected German policy towards Finland in three ways. First, Germany had to insure that she developed the confidence and friendship of Finland to the point where she would be willing to take part in the campaign. Second, since surprise was essential, Germany had to prevent any Finnish-Soviet break which would lead to conflict. Third, Germany could not allow Finland to escape into neutrality.

At this point, Finland was faced with an internal crisis. On 28 November, President Kallio resigned. Elections were to be held on 19 December. In the weeks prior to the election, both Germany and the Soviet Union became involved in attempts to influence the outcome. Germany backed Svinhufvud, the pro-German ex-president, and Kivimaki, the Finnish Ambassador in Berlin. The Soviet Union, through Zotov in

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28 Upton, Finland in Crisis, p. 191.
Helsinki, urged the election of Paasikivi. On the day of the election, however, the various parties united to elect Ryti to the post.

It now became necessary to reform the Cabinet; in particular, a new prime minister was needed. Tanner and Paasikivi were the logical choices but each was opposed, respectively, by Russia and by Germany. After weeks of debate, on 4 January, R. Rangel, a banker and member of the Swedish People's Party, was chosen as a compromise Prime Minister. He immediately reformed the Cabinet. Walden and Witting retained their posts. For the first time, a minister from the fascist IKL was included, A. Wilk, who became Minister of Agriculture. From the very beginning, the Cabinet was pro-German in viewpoint and policy. It was highly receptive to any recommendations made by Berlin.29

Meanwhile, German military experts continued to plan the coming offensive. On 27 January, the Norwegian Command produced a plan for joint Finnish-German operations code-named "Silberfuchs." It called for joint strikes against Murmansk, the Murmansk railway, Leningrad, and a drive around Lake Lagoda.

On 12 February, the Russian chairman of the mixed commission in Moscow dealing with the Petsamo dispute announced that he regarded the negotiations as having broken down. The following day, Molotov and Paasikivi agreed that a deadlock had been reached. Paasikivi realized that he could do no more. On 20 February, he sent in his resignation to Witting. The Finnish government accepted it and Paasikivi returned to Helsinki.

29Upton, Finland In Crisis, p. 194.
Meanwhile Hitler was revising the military preparations. Because of the fear of British Invasion, Hitler ordered extensive fortifications built in Norway and that no German troops were to be withdrawn from Norway. This necessitated extensive replanning for Silberfuchs. Now Murmansk and its railway became secondary objectives; the new drive was to be southward towards Leningrad. It was to be carried out by an SS Panzer brigade, a Finnish division, and a German division. Finland was also to eliminate the Hanko base and occupy the Aaland Islands. This plan was approved on 7 April 1941. Also during late March and early April, a Waffen SS battalion was recruited in Finland to operate in the north. This Finnish SS battalion worked in cooperation with a Norwegian SS battalion against partisans.

In April 1941, the international situation in Eastern Europe was altered by a major shift in the policy of the Soviet Union. Stalin became convinced that Hitler would not shrink from war in the east and may even had wanted an excuse to launch an attack. Stalin determined to postpone the attack by depriving Germany of any excuse for action. This meant that Soviet harassment of the small border nations which enjoyed German patronage must cease.

For Finland, this meant a change of Soviet Ambassadors. On 5 April, Zotov was replaced by T. Orlov. Orlov was a cultured and friendly man, sympathetic to Finland's position. In a meeting with President Ryti on 23 April, Orlov informed him that his mission was to improve Finnish-Soviet relations and work to end Finnish-German understanding. 30 But

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30 Wuorinen, Finland and World War II, p. 97.
Orlov had come too late. Witting informed him that Finland had nothing to discuss with the Soviet Union. Orlov made one attempt at advancing Soviet-Finnish relations. He hinted that if Finland wanted to reconsider the idea of a neutral alliance with Sweden, Russia would no longer oppose it. Even this, however, failed to rouse the Finnish leader's interest.

The leaders of Finland did decide to reassure Soviet Russia of her position. Paasikivi was asked to return to Moscow to tell Molotov that the attitude of Finland to the Soviet Union was unchanged and was one of neutrality "just like Sweden." Finland had no thoughts of revenge and "wanted to remain on the basis of the peace of Moscow."^31 These were empty phrases, as both sides realized. The three weeks Paasikivi spent in Moscow were taken up entirely with formal diplomatic leave taking.

On 9 May, the same day that Paasikivi arrived in Moscow, German and Finnish military leaders met to conclude plans for the attack on Soviet Russia. By 25 May, these plans were to be concluded, in order to get troops into position for the attack, scheduled for 22 June 1941. The German leaders were convinced that Finland would aid in any German attack in the north. Mannerheim informed the German officers that Finland would fight only to regain the areas lost in the Winter War. Finland would give all possible supply and medical aid and would put key communication centers in German hands. After three weeks of debate, it was agreed that Finland's Army would attack southward against Leningrad and the northern shore of Lake Lagoda. German troops would be part of this

^31Upton, Finland in Crisis, p. 243.
campaign and, in a separate venture, move to cut the Murmansk railway. On 26 May, the O.K.H., German Command East, agreed to the plan.

On 8 June, the German forces for the operations began to arrive in Finland. From 12 June on, German and Finnish troops were assembling at their starting positions. On 16 June, Finland began its mobilization. By 20 June, the forces to seize Hanko and occupy the Aaland Islands were ready and had received their orders.

Meanwhile Ryti began a program to educate the Parliament to what was happening. On 9 June, he informed it that war between the Soviet Union and Germany was unavoidable and that Finland was sure to be attacked by Russian forces. On 13 June, Witting informed Parliament that war was "at the door" and that Finland must have at least a partial mobilization. The Parliament agreed to this move.

The only thing that remained to be done was for Finland to have a reason for declaring war on the Soviet Union, some casus belli. It was decided that when German troops crossed into Russia, Russian air units would bomb, or at least fly over, Finnish territory. When the German attack on the Soviet Union was opened in the early hours of 22 June 1941, the Finnish forces were still in the middle of their mobilization. It would not be complete until 28 June and it was decided that the formal outbreak of hostilities had to be postponed till then. Meanwhile, German troops occupied Petsamo and Finnish troops occupied the Aaland Islands.

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32 Upton, *Finland in Crisis*, p. 272.
At Hanko on 23 June, Russian aircraft attacked Finnish shipping and Russian batteries opened fire on Finnish batteries, which were authorized to return this fire. Russian transits to Hanko were seized. On the same day, the cables to Hanko and Tallinn, across the Gulf of Finland, were cut, thus severing Finnish-Soviet communication. On 24 June, Finnish and German naval units mined the approaches to Leningrad.

On the morning of 25 June, Finland obtained its casus belli. Soviet air units bombed civilian targets in southern Finland. On that day, Parliament declared war. Operations began at once against Hanko and artillery units were authorized to shoot up any promising targets on the Soviet side. Not until 29 June did the joint Finnish-German offensive open. Finland was involved in its second war in two years.

Thus Finland, a nation that for three years had attempted to avoid war with Soviet Russia, had now joined Germany in Operation Barbarossa. It has been shown how Finland became involved in this war, now let us examine her role in it.
CHAPTER IV

1941 TO 1944

At the outset of the Continuation War, the name by which the German attack on Russia is known in Finland, Germany and Finland were linked by no formal alliance. The operational plans made before 25 June 1941 were based on the assumption of a short campaign and the low view of Soviet defensive capabilities which was so widely held at the time. For the purpose of pushing the ramshackle structure of the Communist state and military power into an irreparable collapse, no elaborate international military organization or long-range plan seemed necessary. The Finns and the Germans were co-belligerants -- "brothers-in-arms" -- not allies.¹

By late August, the Finnish Army had successfully carried out its first offensive. Sartavala, the northern shore of Lake Lagoda, and Viipur were all retaken with little loss to Mannerheim's forces. From this base, the Isthmus was rapidly overrun and Finnish lines were stabilized in an advantageous position a little south of the old frontier near Leningrad, between Lake Lagoda and the Gulf of Finland.

It was after the Finnish Army had achieved its immediate objectives that the first problems developed between the "brothers-in-arms." Mannerheim received a letter from Field Marshal Keltal, Chief of the Supreme Command of the German Army, in which he urged that the Finnish

Army should attack Leningrad from the north at the same time that the Germans proceeded to assault it from the south. After consultation with President Ryti, Mannerheim returned a negative answer. The Germans immediately repeated their wish for a combined offensive against Leningrad and were again promptly refused. Keitel sent one of his most trusted associates, General Jodl, to present the case personally to Mannerheim.

Jodl arrived in Mikkeli, Mannerheim's command center, on 4 September to present Mannerhelm with all three classes of the Iron Cross and to discuss the situation on the German front south of Leningrad and propose again joint operations against the city. Again, Marshal Mannerhelm refused. His reasons were political. The Soviet Union's standing argument in their dealings with Finland was that Finland was a threat to the security of Leningrad. Mannerhelm did not wish to fulfill the fears of the Soviet leaders in case, by some miracle, Russia should survive "Barbarossa."  

This growing tension between the military leaders of Finland and Germany was, however, suddenly eased. Hitler lost interest in Leningrad. Having been shown an old memorandum by Ludendorff which pointed out the problems of feeding the population of such a metropolis should it be occupied, the Fuhrer drew a logical conclusion. He intended to wipe the city off the face of the earth and hand the site over to Finland anyway; why not let a winter of cold and starvation simplify the work

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and, with the aid of the Luftwaffe, exterminate the inhabitants of the blockaded port. On 15 September, as the initial attack on Leningrad appeared to be reaching its climax and when the German troops could already see the golden spire of the Admiralty Building by the Neva, Hitler called away, for use against Moscow, the armored formations which would have taken the city. As late as the next spring, Hitler appears still to have believed that Leningrad would disintegrate through blockade and bombardment.4

Far more important than the disagreement on the Leningrad problem was the opposing ideas of German and Finnish leaders with regard to a campaign against the Murmansk railway. Leningrad might have fallen but, though its loss would have been a severe psychological blow to the Russians, its fall would have had little military significance. The Murmansk railway, on the other hand, which had already been cut in the Aumus region but was still connected with the interior of the country by a recently constructed link from Balamarsk on the White Sea to the Arkangel-S-Vologda route, was of incomparably greater significance. Murmansk was the principal opening to the great amounts of war material held by the Western Allies. The German General Staff also feared the possibility of British and Canadian troops being landed at Murmansk for the use in the defense of Moscow and northern areas of Russia.

To avoid such possibilities, the Germans in mid-September, mounted a three-pronged attack against Murmansk and the northern part of the

railway with German and Finnish forces under the command of General Falkenhorst. The offensive made some progress but was soon hopelessly stalled by difficult terrain, bad communications, and the determined and resourceful resistance of Soviet forces. It should be noted that it was a Finnish division under Falkenhorst, trained to fight in the terrain, that made the best advances.

On 28 November, just three days after Finland had signed the Anti-Comintern Pact, the British sent an ultimatum to the Finnish government demanding that all offensive operations against the Soviet Union cease by 5 December. Marshal Mannerheim had already announced his intention to halt the Finnish forces as soon as they reached the north shore of Lake Omega; he was willing in practice to comply with the British demand. On 5 December, Finnish troops entered Medvizhegorsk on Lake Omega and by the next day held the north shore. Within a short time, the Finnish front stabilized itself along the Isthmus called the Maaselka, a short distance south of Belomorsk. "I never had any intention," declared the Marshal, "of continuing the advance from the Maaselka Isthmus against the Murmansk Railway."  

But in February 1942, Mannerheim was visited by General Dietl, who had just been put in charge of the German forces in northern Finland. Dietl was eager to have Mannerheim agree to a joint operation in which the Finnish Army would take the city of Belomorsk. Mannerheim refused to extend his forces in problematic offensive movements. Several days later, Mannerheim received a letter from Keltal repeating the proposal

5Wuorinen, Finland and World War II, p. 118.
7Ibid, p. 160.
and offering German naval and air support. Even this did not tempt Mannerheim; he still refused to allow his troops to take part.

The year 1942 brought a stabilization of the front, a decrease in casualties, and some economic aid from Germany for Finland. For an entire year, Finnish troops prepared defensive positions north of Leningrad along the Svir River, on the Maaselka Isthmus, and along the border in the north. In March 1942, the areas lost to the Soviet Union in the Winter War were formally re-incorporated into Finland by the Parliament. Some of the older men under arms were discharged from the service in April and May. Air attacks on southern Finnish cities continued and eight Finnish divisions remained in the field, yet for all practical purposes, Finland had withdrawn from the war and was waiting for further developments in the Russo-German fighting.

It becomes obvious from the above facts that Finland was interested, not in the destruction of the Soviet Union, but in regaining her lost territory. Unlike other Eastern European states which were taken over by Russia at the end of the war, such as Rumania and Hungary, Finland never allowed her military aims to be dictated by Germany. It is possible that, because of this, the Soviet Union was not as ill-disposed towards Finland in 1944 as she might have been.

At the turn of the year 1942-1943 came the German disaster at Stalingrad. It soon became evident to many thinking people that this was the turning point of the war in the east. Top-secret German intelligence reports on public opinion in February 1943 revealed that morale was low in Helsinki and even in Mikkeli. Some of the Headquarters officers
were "preparing for the worst."⁸ Some even made plans for killing their wives and children.

At the request of the Commander-In-Chief, an important conference, lasting all day, took place at Headquarters on 3 February 1943, the day after the German surrender at Stalingrad. President Ryti, Prime Minister Rangell, Foreign Minister Witting, Defense Minister Walden, Supply Minister Tanner, and Commander-In-Chief Mannerheim were present. After an explanation by Mannerhelm of how Germany's position had deteriorated and would presumably continue to deteriorate, the discussion turned to the question of Finland's prospects in the war. Rangell reported on diplomatic pressures for peace from various foreign nations. Tanner reported on the worsening economic state in Finland. The group came to the unanimous conclusion that Finland must endeavor to get out of the war.⁹

That this would be difficult to accomplish was beyond question. Before any peace could be reached with the Soviet Union, Finland must break from Germany. Economically Finland was completely at Germany's mercy for by this time Finland depended totally on German agriculture and Industry. Militarily also a break was far from simple. All of northern Finland would at once fall into German hands, as would the major communication and supply centers. To bring about unfriendly relations with Germany might result in the whole country becoming a battlefield, with Russian occupation as the ultimate result. Even if Finland

⁸Lundin, Finland in the Second World War, p. 175.
did rid herself of German entanglements, would peace with Soviet Russia settle Finland's problems? Soviet peace terms were expected to be harsh and, if peace were made, would there be any way of preventing Russian occupation of Finland? Then, too, there appeared the new formula of the Allies, unconditional surrender. In Finland, unconditional surrender was considered the equivalent of "suicide committed because of fear of death." As long as any other possibility existed, Finland could not surrender to the Soviet Union.

Within a few days a secret session of Parliament heard a gloomy review of the military outlook by a colonel from Headquarters. He reported in detail the Stalingrad catastrophe and expressed the opinion that further German reverses were likely. His conclusion was that Finland might have to face a second Moscow Peace. This conclusion so alarmed the legislators and aroused so much indignation that he was unable to finish his suggestions of what Finland had to do to avoid total occupation by Soviet troops.

However clearly the Finnish leaders might recognize the disagreeable project ahead, they were for some time less than energetic in exploring the possibilities of making peace. A week after the conference at Mikkeli, or 10 February, the President and his advisors learned through an indirect diplomatic chain of American and Swedish intermediaries that Molotov was willing to stop hostilities, but was not prepared to initiate any negotiations to that end. The Soviet Union expected Finland, if it wished peace, to indicate the basis on which it was prepared to come to

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\(^{10}\)Wuorinen, \textit{Finland and World War II}, p. 146.
terms. However, the Cabinet took no action. Tanner did, on his own initiative, undertake an unofficial and tentative approach to Great Britain to gain their support in any possible peace that would be concluded.\footnote{Wuorinen, Finland and World War II, 163-165.}

At the end of February, it was necessary to elect a new president. By an overwhelming majority, the electors decided to retain Ryti in office. After the presidential election, Ryti's old cabinet resigned and was replaced by a new one which it was generally hoped would bring peace to the country. The new Prime Minister was Edwin Linkomies, a university professor and dean with pro-German sympathies. The disliked Witting was replaced as foreign minister by Henrik Ramsay, a successful businessman with powerful British and American connections. Tanner and Walden retained their posts. Significantly the Fascist Party, the IKL, was no longer represented in the coalition government.\footnote{Lundin, Finland in the Second World War, p. 183.}

On 20 March 1943, the American charge d'affaires in Helsinki presented a memorandum inquiring whether Finland was prepared to make use of the good offices of the United States to make contact between the governments of Finland and the Soviet Union for the purpose of initiating talks on ending Finland's involvement in the war.\footnote{Ibid, p. 161.} Ryti called a meeting of the Cabinet on 22 March to discuss the American offer. All agreed on the importance of getting out of the war. After some debate, it was agreed that the United States should be asked to make clear what conditions

\footnote{\textit{Ibid}, p. 161.}
of peace it considered possible. With respect to Germany, it was decided to inform the German foreign office of the American memorandum and the Finnish reply. Ramsay himself was to travel to Berlin to do so.

In Berlin, Ramsay met with Ribbentrop and informed him of the events in Helsinki and described the wish of the Finnish people to withdraw from the war. Ribbentrop flew into a rage and thundered for an hour. Only Germany had saved Finland in 1918 and 1940 he declared; Germany was still the only power which could protect Finland. Should Finland negotiate a separate peace, Germany would draw its own extreme conclusions. He demanded that conversations with the United States be ended at once and that Washington be informed of this. Helsinki's note to Washington was to be submitted for German approval before being dispatched. The German Foreign Minister then informed Ramsay that Russia would be defeated that very year. Furthermore, he demanded that Finland conclude a pact with Germany pledging that neither party should make a separate peace.

On 5 April, Germany recalled Blucher from Helsinki until the Finnish government should reply to the American offer. Meanwhile, Washington had answered Ramsay's request for details on the bases of a possible peace by making it clear that it did not intend to act as a mediator or transmit peace terms. The Finnish government replied on 10 April that it could find no indications that negotiations with the

14Vuorinen, Finland and World War II, p. 160.
15Lundin, Finland In the Second World War, p. 185.
Soviet Union would lead to Finland's securing guarantees for its future; it therefore had no choice but to continue the war. Blucher immediately returned to his post.

The second requirement set by Ribbentrop still remained unfulfilled; the demand for a solemn engagement not to make a separate peace. The Wilheimstrasse insisted on a formal pact while Finland wished to make joint declarations instead. Blucher, on instructions from Ribbentrop, insisted this was not enough. Although the Germans increased their pressure by interrupting deliveries of food and other supplies, the Finns refused to yield and eventually the Nazis permitted the matter to drop for the time being.

Through the spring and summer, the military and diplomatic prospects for Finland grew darker each month. In April, the United States called home all personnel of its Helsinki legation except the charge d'affaires and one code man -- a move which obviously might be a forerunner of something more drastic. In July 1943, the Allies landed in Sicily and before the month was over, Mussolini had fallen. Also in July, the Red Army launched a great offensive which swept the Germans back along the central and southern fronts. Allied bombings were cutting the German shipments to Finland.

At the end of July 1943, the Prince de Croy, Belgian Minister in Stockholm, indicated to the Finnish Ambassador that a Russian in an official position was disposed to negotiate for peace with Finland, provided the latter should apply directly and in writing to the Soviet Union.
and make known its views as to the basis of negotiations.\textsuperscript{16} After more than a week's discussion, the Helsinki government replied through de Croy that Finland was prepared to negotiate on the basis of an adjustment of the 1939 frontier on the Karelian Isthmus and the cession of five islands in the Gulf of Finland to the Soviet Union in return for territorial compensations in Eastern Karelia. Moscow informed de Croy that the offers were unsatisfactory. In November, the Soviets made a more open approach through Madame Kollontay in Stockholm. If Finland wished to negotiate for peace, she said, Finnish delegates would be welcome in Moscow. First, however, Soviet leaders must know Finland's attitude towards peace and it was essential that Helsinki should reply in a friendly way and that it must ask "for no territory that did not belong to it."\textsuperscript{17} The Soviet Union, she explained, did not intend to make Finland a province or infringe upon its freedom unless Finland's future policies should force such treatment. The Soviet Union did not demand unconditional surrender. The Finnish Cabinet replied favorably, once more advancing as the basis of negotiations the 1939 frontier. After a long delay, Moscow informed the Finnish government late in December that their answer was unsatisfactory: the boundary must be that of the Treaty of Moscow. Helsinki repeated its view that it could not accept a peace which would leave Finnish cities in Russian territory. After this interchange of views, the desultory negotiations lapsed.

\textsuperscript{16}Lundin, Finland in the Second World War, p. 191.

\textsuperscript{17}Ibid, p. 192.
In January 1944, the Soviet forces broke out of the Leningrad area and drove the Germans back along the southern shore of the Gulf of Finland. Before the month was over, Novgorod had fallen to the Red Army and it was approaching the border of Estonia. These events aroused great anxiety a few miles to the north. Officers in Mikkeli spoke openly of the possibilities of a separate peace. By 22 January, no one at Headquarters believed any longer in the possibility of a German victory if the British-American-Soviet Alliance should hold together.

The menace of Soviet military activity was aided in its effect by increased diplomatic pressure from Stockholm and Washington in January to do something about peace. After lengthy cabinet meetings, the Finnish government requested that Paasikivi come out of retirement and sent him to Stockholm on 12 February. He made contact with Madame Kollontay and she gave him Moscow's conditions for peace: restoration of the 1940 boundary, the return of all Finnish troops to their side of it, release of prisoners-of-war and persons interned in concentration camps, and rupture of relations with Germany. Finland must not allow German troops to continue movements through its lands; the troops within Finnish territory must be disarmed and interned. The questions of partial or complete demobilization of the Finnish Army, the future of Petsamo, reparations, and further details would be worked out in Moscow.

Returning to Helsinki, Paasikivi informed Ryti and the Cabinet that in his opinion Finland's position was hopeless. Germany had lost the war and it was time for Finland to get out. The Soviet proposals
were unexpectedly mild. He suggested that the Finnish government should make a counter proposal that would go as far as possible towards meeting Soviet conditions. The trouble with Finland, in his opinion, was that it had always been too late in accepting what was offered. 18 Most Cabinet members and the Commander-In-Chief took the position that the Soviet terms were impossible to accept. The question was finally presented to a meeting of Parliament on 29 February. The Cabinet was authorized to continue negotiations and ordered to keep Parliament informed.

On 13 March, Paasikivi and Enckell, a Finnish diplomat, flew to Moscow. There, in a meeting with Molotov on 29 March, they found that the Soviet terms were much more severe than the preliminary negotiations had indicated. 19 When the delegation returned to Helsinki, a conference of high officials was held to listen to Paasikivi's report on his journey. He spoke forcefully in favor of accepting the terms but found no support from the others. After the two Finnish delegates had left


19 These terms -- for a truce, not a peace -- included: (1) Breaking off of relations with Germany and internment or expulsion of the German troops and seagoing vessels in Finland, to be accomplished at the latest by the end of April. The Soviet Union would, if necessary, give Finland armed assistance in accomplishing this. (2) Enforcement of the Moscow Treaty of 1940 and the return of Finnish troops to the 1940 boundary by stages during the month of April. (3) Immediate return of Soviet and Allied war prisoners and civilians held in concentration camps. Return of Finnish war prisoners was to follow a treaty of peace. (4) A fifty percent demobilization of the Finnish Army during the month of May and a reduction of the entire Army to peace-time status during June and July. (5) As compensation for damage done to Soviet territory by Finnish war operations, reparations to the value of six hundred million American dollars, to be paid in five years time. (6) Cessation of the Petsamo area, without compensation, by Finland to the Soviet Union which had granted it freely to Finland in 1920. (7) The possibility of a Soviet renunciation of its lease on Hanko in return for Finnish acceptance of the first six terms.
the meeting, those remaining were unanimous in agreeing that it was impossible to accede to the terms. Parliament was summoned to meet on 12 April and Linkomies informed them that the Cabinet had found the Russian terms unacceptable. This view was unanimously approved by Parliament. 20

The long-dreaded Soviet offensive on the Karelian Isthmus broke loose with unprecedented ferocity on 9 June 1944. The thunder of bombings and artillery barrage could be heard at Mikkeli and at Helsinki. On the second day of the attack, the first Finnish line of defense was broken and on the sixth day the second time. Reserves were rushed in from Karelia and northern Finland. To concentrate the overpowered Finnish forces more effectively, orders were given on 15 June for the evacuation of Eastern Karelia. The next day a general retirement had to be performed on the Isthmus to the unfinished VKT line, the last fortifications protecting southern Finland. The line did not hold long; Viipuri, its key point, fell on 21 June. 21

As early as 11 June, Mannerheim asked for German aid. He requested help from the Luftwaffe and urged the dispatch to Finland of planes and artillery that the Germans had promised but not sent. 22 General Dietl visited Mikkeli on 13 June and informed Mannerheim that the Russians were attempting to knock Finland out of the war. Because of the almost

20 Lundin, Finland in the Second World War, p. 200.
22 Ibid, p. 196.
irresistible onrush of Soviet tanks, the Finnish government requested formally a speedy delivery of antitank weapons. On 19 June, nine thousand of the very effective German antitank Panzerfausts arrived aboard torpedo boats. Some eighty German planes were sent a short time later. This was the opportunity for which the Nazis had been waiting. On the evening of 22 June, Ribbentrop arrived in Helsinki to bind the struggling Finnish government firmly to Germany. In return for German aid, Finland must not make peace until Germany did. President Ryti agreed to sign a statement to this effect to satisfy Ribbentrop. However, Ryti signed the document on his own initiative; he planned to resign at the first opportune moment and so dissolve Finland's obligation.

Ribbentrop, fully satisfied, carried back to Germany "a scrap of paper" and in return Germany sent arms, men, and the long-promised grain to stiffen Finnish resistance. The aid was not very impressive in quality or amount; nevertheless in the first part of July the front was stabilized. Attempts by the Soviets to outflank the defensive line by crossing the Bay of Võlibu were beaten off. There were more important things for the Soviets to do and in the course of July they pulled out several divisions and masses of armor to use against the Germans on the shrinking Baltic Front. For the moment, the Finnish Army had won a respite.

To many of the Finnish people, this seemed a favorable moment to make peace. Time was obviously running out and it became evident to all

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23 Lundin, Finland In the Second World War, p. 221.
in Helsinki that only a new national administration would be in position to cut the ties to Germany. On 28 July 1944, a delegation consisting of Ryti, Tanner, and Walden persuaded Mannerheim to assume the highest civil office in Finland while continuing to head the armed forces. On 1 August, Ryti resigned the presidency and a special bill was introduced into Parliament making Mannerhelm his successor. The bill was unanimously enacted into law on 4 August and Mannerhelm took the oath of office a few hours later. Four days later, a new cabinet headed by Antii Huikko was formed with Carl Enckell, who had accompanied Paasikivi to Moscow earlier, as Foreign Minister.

Mannerhelm seemed almost as reluctant as Linkomies and Ryti to take the decisive step of asking Moscow for terms, and he dreaded the consequences of a break with Germany. Eventually, though, the fatal step had to be taken. Rumania surrendered on 24 August. The next day, a Finnish communication was handed to Madame Kollontay in Stockholm asking whether the Soviet Union was willing to receive a delegation from the Finnish government to negotiate for an armistice, or peace, or both. The same day, Kivi, in Berlin was instructed to inform Ribbentrop that Finland no longer regarded itself as tied by Ryti's promise.24

The Soviet reply was harsh. Moscow was willing to receive Finnish delegates on condition that Helsinki officially announce it had broken off relations with Nazi Germany and required Germany to withdraw its troops from Finnish territory by 15 September at the latest. If Germany should not comply within the fixed period, its troops should be intervened and treated as prisoners-of-war.

24 Lundin, Finland in the Second World War, p. 223.
Parliament was summoned to meet on the evening of 2 September by President Mannerhelm and the legislators were rounded up all over the country and rushed to the capital. About three-quarters of the total membership were on hand when the fateful session opened at six in the evening. Hackzell informed them that Germany was unable to aid Finland and that the agreement with Ribbentrop was no longer binding. The government had decided that steps must be taken to arrange a peace with the Soviet Union. He then asked for their support and approval. At one o’clock in the morning, by a majority of sixty-six percent, the delegates present voted their approval.

Germany’s Minister Blucher was summoned by Enckell early the next morning, 3 September 1944, and informed of what had happened. He listened with suppressed rage and declared that the agreement to disarm and deliver any German troops left in the country after 14 September was inconsistent with Finnish honor. Further, Germany would not allow it. On 5 September, military action ceased on the Finnish-Soviet fronts. Two days later, orders were issued that the civilian population of Lapland should be evacuated into areas held by the Finnish Army or into Sweden.

The Finnish peace delegation arrived in Moscow on 7 September and was received by Molotov on 14 September. It received the same conditions for peace as it had in April with minor exceptions: reparations had been reduced to three hundred million dollars and the lease.

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25 Wuorinen, Finland and World War II, p. 177.
on Hanko was to be exchanged for one on the Porkkala peninsula, only a few miles west of Helsinki. All pro-Hitler organizations of a Fascist nature were to be disbanded. When Enckell attempted to obtain some delay in order that the terms might be presented to the Finnish Parliament, Molotov grew angry. He gave Enckell until noon the next day, 19 September, to sign. The desperate Foreign Minister telegraphed Helsinki for authorization to accept the Soviet conditions.

Bad though the terms were, there was no alternative to accepting them. Members of Parliament were called from their beds at five in the morning and hurried into session at six. There they grimly voted to approve the government's recommendation that the Soviet terms be accepted. Notification of this move was sent to Enckell and he and his colleagues signed the armistice just before noon. The Continuation War, which had begun three years earlier in such a blaze of optimism, was over with only 55,000 white war crosses in Finland's cemeteries to show for it.

In looking back over Soviet policy in the latter half of the Continuation War, several major points should be noticed. These points are crucial to the thesis that Finland retained its independence because the Soviet Union allowed it to do so.

Finland was but one of several nations that aided Germany in the attack on Soviet Russia. By mid-1944, the Finnish front was cracked

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26 Lundin, Finland in the Second World War, p. 228.

27 Ibid.

28 For the text of the armistice signed 19 September 1944, see Appendix F of this work.
by Soviet units and, once more, only a weak defensive line stood between Finland and the Red Army. In the Kuusinen Republic, Russia had a ready-made government that could have controlled Finland if supported by the Soviet Army. Yet Russia was willing to negotiate a peace with Finland, even when she would have been justified in demanding unconditional surrender, a policy condoned by the Western Allies. It is almost unexplainable that Soviet Russia, which demanded unconditional surrender from every other enemy nation and occupied them, allowed Finland to survive the Continuation War.

Finland was out of the war, but the "threat" to her freedom remained. It is necessary to examine the period 1944-1947 to see what this threat consisted of and why it did not materialize.
For Finland, the war was over, but not the fighting. On 20 September 1944, Enckell asked the German High Command to remove its troops stationed in northern Finland. On 21 September, President Mannerhelm repeated the request. But the Germans did not answer, instead they unified the German troops in Finland into an Army Group and gave command of it to Colonel General Tothar Rendulic. Then, following a German attempt to land on the Island of Hogland, Finland announced that it was now at war with Nazi Germany.¹

The fighting between German and Finnish forces centered about Petsamo. The German need for nickel ore had forced Germany into this last desperate effort to retain control of the mines. Finland refused all Soviet offers of aid in dealing with the problem and by mid-October had made significant gains. Meanwhile the need for troops grew greater than the need for nickel in Germany and the German units were withdrawn piecemeal until by early December no German troops remained in Finland. Uprisings in Norway against German rule ended any possible threat to Finland that Germany posed.

On 24 November, Hackzell resigned as Prime Minister for reasons of health. President Mannerhelm asked the Cabinet for its suggestions as to a replacement. After lengthy discussion, the Cabinet asked that

the post be offered to Paasikivi. Mannerheim did so and, on 30 November, Paasikivi became Prime Minister of Finland. He retained the Cabinet that Hackzell had formed.  

Paasikivi urged prompt measures to restore Soviet-Finnish relations. In January 1945, he convinced Enckell to re-establish a Finnish Embassy in Moscow, even though the peace between the nations was not final. He obtained permission from Moscow to maintain a Finnish Consulate in the Petsamo area when it was turned over to Red Army units. In early February, he legalized the existence of the Communist Party in Finland, a move that was met with opposition from many in Finland.

On 17-18 March 1945, the first post-war elections were held. Mannerheim was overwhelmingly supported in his bid to retain his office of President. The Communist Party and the left-wing Socialists allied and took a quarter of the seats in Parliament. The remainder of the seats in Parliament were held by members of the Agrarian Party. Mannerheim retained his existing cabinet, headed by Paasikivi.

Between March 1945 and March 1946, the Finnish government was involved solely with internal affairs. The new Finnish ambassador to Moscow, Kekkonen, did not once visit the Kremlin. On 31 April, Hitler committed suicide and a few days later, Nazi Germany's existence, which had Indirectly involved Finland in two wars, ended. In July 1945, the Petsamo area was handed over to the Red Army and the population of it moved south into Finland. Meanwhile, the Finnish economy recovered

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rapidly. Trade contacts were re-established with France, England, Germany, the United States, and Italy, but not with Soviet Russia. The damage done to the country by the warfare was repaired and the refugees from Petsamo relocated. In one year, the country had rebuilt itself.

Mannerheim now decided that he had accomplished all he had wanted to when he had taken office in 1944. He had brought the nation out of war, had rebuilt it, and had returned it to its place in the community of nations. Thus, on 4 March 1946, Mannerheim resigned as President but retained his post as Commander-in-Chief of the armed forces of Finland.

This necessitated new elections. On 6 March, Paasikivi was elected as President of Finland. The Communists made significant gains in the Parliament. For this reason, Paasikivi asked Mauno Pekkala, a member of the Communist Party, to form a new government. Pekkala’s new Cabinet was a coalition of the Agrarian Party, the Social-Democratic Party, and the Communist Party. Enckell remained as Foreign Minister; Tanner as Minister of Finance. Urjo Leino, a Communist who was married to Otto Kuusinen’s daughter Hertta, became Minister of the Interior. However, Paasikivi removed control of the police from the powers of the Minister of the Interior and gave it to the Minister of Defense, Walden.

The significance of this new government lies in the fact that the Communist Party in Finland, though controlled from Moscow, never

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3 For more on Finland's trade contacts after World War II, see "Finland and Regional Economic Integration in Western Europe" by Erkki Maentaken in Essays on Finnish Foreign Policy.

attempted to seize or abuse its power in the Finnish government. Due to some type of restraint, the Communists were content to work within the coalition. As a consequence, unlike other coalition governments created in Eastern European nations, the government of Finland never came to be dominated by the Communist Party. Clearly, Moscow was enforcing restraint on the party in Finland. This fact is significant in light of this thesis for, if supported by Moscow, the Communist Party in Finland could easily have seized control of the government.

On 14 August 1946, the Finnish government received an invitation from the Conference of Twenty-One Allied and Associated Powers which had convened in Paris at the end of July to make peace with their lesser enemies in the Second World War. Finland, along with Italy, Rumania, Bulgaria, and Hungary, was asked to send a delegation to present its views on the possible terms of peace. The Finnish government had anticipated the invitation. A Finnish delegation arrived in Paris on 13 August. It was headed by the Prime Minister and included both Enckell and Leino, who took his wife along to make contact through her with her father, who was a member of the Soviet delegation. Finland's delegation was accompanied by the nation's foremost experts


6Jakobsen, Finnish Neutrality, p. 22.

7For a complete list of all members of the Finnish, Soviet, and other delegations, see the List of Persons on pp XXVII-XXXVI of Foreign Relations, Vol. III, 1946.
on international law, defense, finance, and industry. It carried with it detailed instructions issued by the President of the Republic and approved by the Parliament.

The Finnish delegation had come to Paris willing and able to negotiate on all aspects and every detail of the proposed treaty of peace. The delegates were met, not with hostility, but with amiable indifference. The victorious powers were not interested in negotiation with their former enemies. That this was not what the Paris Conference was for was made clear by one of the first decisions of the conference. On 8 August, the Conference decided that representatives of former enemy states, though they would be granted a hearing, would not be permitted to attend meetings except when specifically invited to do so. 

This rule was rigidly enforced. At the first meeting of the Commission dealing with the political and territorial clauses of the treaty with Finland on 14 August, Prime Minister Pekkela and some of his delegation came to listen from the press gallery. As soon as they were seen they were asked to leave. Former enemies were to be heard occasionally, but not seen. Yet, it was an open meeting and the journalists, including those from Finland, were allowed to stay. From then on, the press provided virtually the sole link between the Finnish delegation and the Conference.

Finland, however, did have her day in court. Foreign Minister

8State Department, Foreign Relations, III, 1946, p. 162.

9Jakobsen, Finnish Neutrality, 22-23.
Enckell advanced the Finnish case at a plenary meeting on 15 August 1946. The Finnish government and the Karelian people hoped, he said, for a fair settlement of the Karelian problem. Karelia had been seized from Finland by a Soviet Russia that was then an ally of Nazi Germany. The seizure was therefore illegal and the final peace treaty should recognize this by returning Karelia, especially since Russia no longer needed it for the defense of Leningrad. The Republic of Finland, Enckell stated, hoped that the Allied Powers would not be influenced in their considerations of the Karelian problem by the fact that the Soviet Union was now one of the allies, but in any case Finland would abide by the decision that was reached.¹⁰

The Finnish Foreign Minister also pleaded for a reduction of the war indemnity imposed upon Finland. According to the Armistice Agreement Finland was to deliver to the Soviet Union three hundred million dollars worth of goods during a period of six years.¹¹ The Finnish government proposed to pay the indemnity in timber and forest products. But Stalin was not interested in trees, of which the Soviet Union had more than enough. He decreed that two-thirds of the goods to be delivered as reparations were to be ships, machinery, and other engineering products which Finland had never produced in sufficient quantities even for her own use. To meet this demand, Finland would have to double the capacity


¹¹The period was later extended to eight years.
of her shipbuilding and engineering industries immediately. To a
nation crippled by territorial and other losses and exhausted by
five years of war, this seemed excessive. On these grounds, Enckell
asked the Conference for a reduction of one hundred million dollars
in the war indemnity.\footnote{State Department, Foreign Relations, III, 1946, 237-240.}

The Soviet reaction was sharp and swift. Molotov, speaking
at the same meeting immediately after Enckell, rejected out-of-hand
any possibility of revising the Armistice Agreement. According to
Molotov, the annexation of Karelia was still essential for the safety
of Leningrad.\footnote{Ibid, p. 242.} As for the war indemnity, it represented only a
fraction of the damage caused by Finnish troops to the Soviet economy.
In a later statement, Molotov advised the Finns to consider themselves
lucky to get off so lightly.\footnote{Jakobsen, Finnish Neutrality, p. 28.}
The main theme of Molotov's speech was
to warn the Finnish government not to exploit differences among the
Great Powers. He stated that any Finnish attempt to enlist the support
of other countries against the Soviet Union would damage Finland's
chances of obtaining advantages in later direct talks with the Soviet
Union. The Conference readily agreed with the Soviet view and began to
prepare the Draft Treaty along the same lines as the Armistice Agreement.

The Allies invited to take part in the Conference were all
supposed to have "actively waged war with substantial force against the
European members of the Axis."\footnote{State Department, Foreign Relations, III, 1946, p. 242.} Five commissions were set up to create

\footnote{Ibid, p. 242.}
the Draft Treaties, each composed of representatives of the nations that had been at war with the enemy country involved. Thus, the United States and France, which had not declared war on Finland, were excluded from the commission for Finland. Britain was included with her five commonwealth powers (India, Canada, Australia, New Zealand, and South Africa); the Soviet Union, the Ukraine, Byelorussia, and Czechoslovakia were the only others to have declared war on Finland. But although all of these had been formally at war with Finland, the degree of interest each had in the Finnish Treaty varied greatly. The war between Finland and Britain, for instance, had been mere formality. Britain had ceremoniously declared war on Finland without ever taking military actions against her. The British declaration had been made in order to reassure the Soviet Union; no blood flowed between the nations of Britain and Finland; there were no hard feelings. As a consequence, however, British interest in making peace with Finland was as formal as had been the war between them. For the Commonwealth nations, the Finnish issue was even more academic. As for the Czechs, in their eyes Finland seemed to be a remote country of no concern to them. In fact, only one member of the commission was actively concerned with Finland's future. Only one country had a direct national interest in the Finnish treaty and the power to do something about it, the Soviet Union. Its attitude was hardly likely to be much affected by whatever was said, or done, by India, or New Zealand, or even Britain.

The Draft Treaty was quickly prepared by the commission. It followed the form of the Armistice agreement completely and was readily accepted by the Conference as a whole. Finland was then invited to present its views on the various articles in the Draft Treaty before it was finalized. On 26 August 1946, Finland presented its observations on the proposed treaty to the commission.

In view of the earlier Soviet reaction, the Finnish delegation omitted any reference to territorial revision. It did request a reduction of the war indemnity to two hundred million dollars and added a number of other suggestions for revision. The military restrictions imposed upon Finland, for instance, were dealt with in detail. The total strength of the Army, including frontier troops, was limited in the Draft Treaty to 34,400 men, the navy to 4,500 men and 20,000 tons, the air force to 3,000 men and 60 aircraft. Finnish military experts protested that these limitations would prevent protection of Finland's borders and asked for the maximum strengths of the navy and air force to be doubled.

More important in the Finnish view than the material provisions of the Draft Treaty were some of its political clauses, for they seemed to threaten the sovereignty and national integrity of the country.

One of them, Article 6 of the Treaty, enjoined Finland to guarantee its citizens all democratic rights and freedoms. The article had obviously been drafted for the benefit of the other former enemy states in which fascist regimes had been in power. In Finland, however, the rights and freedoms of the citizen had been maintained even in wartime to a degree that few of the Allied Powers could claim to have bettered. In Finnish opinion, the inclusion of such a clause in a treaty with Finland was proof at best of negligence on the part of the Allies, at worst of cynical disregard for the truth of the Finnish situation.

Even more dangerous seemed Article 9, according to which Finland had to arrest and surrender for trial all persons accused of war crimes and crimes against humanity and peace. This implied that it was possible to demand that Finnish citizens be surrendered for trial by foreign courts. The Armistice Agreement had left it to the Finnish people themselves to deal with those who had been guilty of war crimes. The Finnish delegation protested Article 9 and won their point. Eventually, however, at Soviet prompting, Finland's leading politicians were brought to trial, including Ryti, Tanner, and Linjomies, and sentenced to prison terms of from two to ten years.\(^20\)

The observations of the Finnish delegation on the Draft Treaty were discussed but briefly by the committee dealing with the Finnish issue. The Draft prepared by the committee passed through the Conference

virtually unchanged. No nation, except the Soviet Union, was concerned with the terms of the treaty or their enforcement. According to a story current at the time, the British delegate had asked his Foreign Secretary, Ernest Bevin, for instructions on how to deal with the question of the Finnish terms and had been told to "make a hell of a sympathetic noise." The British delegation accepted the Draft Treaty with hardly a murmur. This was wholly in line with British policy; Finland was not to be allowed to become an issue in British-Soviet relations.

In the end, the Peace Treaty was handed down to Finland with no attempts made to tailor it to fit Finnish conditions. The Finnish delegation was ignored after the Draft Treaty had been accepted by the Conference. One by one the Finnish delegates and experts drifted away until by the end of September 1946 only Enckell and his secretary remained in Paris. He remained until the end.

On 6 February 1947, the Finnish government was asked to send representatives to Paris to sign the final treaty. On 8 February, Prime Minister Pekkela arrived in Paris and met with Enckell. Together, on 10 February 1947, they signed the Paris Peace Treaty. Finland had survived the greatest threat to her existence. She was still a free nation.

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23 For test of the Treaty, see Appendix G of this work.
CONCLUSION

In 1937, a change in the government of the Republic of Finland resulted in a change in the direction of Finnish foreign policy. Because of the conflict believed to be materializing between Soviet Russia and Nazi Germany, Finland elected to align herself with the Nordic neutrals and thus avoid being drawn into any Baltic war. Soviet leaders also believed strongly in the possibility of a war between Russia and Germany; however, Soviet leaders were not concerned with avoiding such a war, but rather with improving Russia's position, even at the expense of her smaller neighbors.

The security of Leningrad became the predominant feature in the defense of north Russia. Yet to make this security absolute, several areas were necessary. Unfortunately, these areas were held by Finland. This led to nearly two years of Soviet demands and Finnish rejections. Then, in 1939, the Nazi-Soviet Pact changed the entire complexion of Soviet-Finnish relations. Free now of the fear of German intervention of Finland's side, Soviet Russia was able to press her demands more strongly. However, the Finns refused to yield and, thus, the Winter War resulted.

After three months of bloody warfare Soviet Russia was in position to seize Finland and assure Leningrad's security. Hitler and Germany were adhering to the Pact most rigidly. Britain and France had shown their disinterest in Finland. Finland's military power was destroyed. Russia had the means and the opportunity to end the existence
of a free Finland, yet she did not do so. Instead, the Soviet Union settled for minor advances in a negotiated peace.

The defeat in the Winter War altered radically Finnish foreign policy. Finland began to look toward Germany for protection, as it had done in 1918. This change occurred at the same time as Germany became dissatisfied with its ties with Soviet Russia. Moves by the Soviet Union in the areas around Finland (the Kuusinen Republic, the occupation of the Baltic Republics) convinced Finnish leaders that Russia posed a threat to their freedom. To counter this, Finland drew closer to Germany, even as Soviet Russia began to make demands on the Finnish government. The more the Soviet leaders demanded -- the closer Finland drew to Germany -- the louder Soviet demands became. Finland and Russia were trapped in an ever-shrinking circle of distrust and fear which led to the Continuation War.

Finland quickly seized all she had lost in the Winter War only to lose it, and more, in the Soviet drives of 1944. Again, neither Germany, nor Britain, nor France, nor any other nation was in position to aid Finland. Again, the Finnish Army was destroyed. And again, the Soviets stopped short of total victory voluntarily. Russia imposed a relatively easy armistice upon Finland. Even two years later, when the Soviet drive to domination in East Europe was under way and the "Iron Curtain" was being forged, the Soviet Union imposed a peace that was surprisingly light upon Finland. Russia could easily have demanded, and gotten, a peace settlement in Finland that would have led to Soviet domination. But Russia did not do so.
It has been shown that neither Western interest and protection nor Finnish resistance maintained Finland's independence. Since the only two possible external reasons have been shown to be invalid, the explanation must be an internal one. For some unknown reason, Soviet policy needed an independent Finland. Because of the historical facts presented in this work, there seems to be only one valid explanation for Finland's survival of the period 1937 to 1947 as an independent nation: The Soviet Union wanted and, therefore, allowed Finland to remain a free nation.

I have shown that Finland remained independent only because the Soviet Union allowed her to do so. This raises the problem of possible motives the Soviet Union had for doing so. This problem can never be answered so long as Soviet Russia keeps her files and documents closed to historians. However, I would like to present briefly my own views on Russian motives.

The rise of Nazi Germany challenged the Soviet Union for control of East Europe. The Second World War was a contest of these two totalitarian systems for domination of East Europe, a contest that the Soviet Union eventually won. However, as the Soviet leaders of the late 1930's realized, if the Soviet Union spread into East Europe, she would antagonize the Western Powers. In creating an "Iron Curtain" Soviet Russia would lock herself behind it. This the Soviet Union did not want; she needed contacts, diplomatic and financial, with the West. She needed a door through her "Iron Curtain."

Finland had, since her creation in 1919, had very strong ties
with Britain and the United States. Her position forced her to be in close contact with the Soviet Union. Finland had a history of neutrality, and with the collapse of Germany, this became her primary policy. Finland was a logical choice to be the meeting point of East and West. For this reason, the Soviet leaders did not desire to dominate Finland.

Finland has fulfilled this role admirably. Even today, meetings take place daily in Helsinki on relations between the Soviet bloc and the United States. Through her ports great amounts of East-West trade, Soviet-British and Soviet-American trade, pour. Finland is the neutral meeting point of two conflicting ideologies; she is a democratic state that exists next to the most powerful Communist state in the world. If this was the role Soviet leaders foresaw for Finland in the late 1930's. Finland has more than justified their expectations.
All appendices are photocopies of documents supplied by the Finnish Embassy in Washington and the Library of Parliament in Helsinki.
APPENDIX A

TREATY OF PEACE, WITH
NOTE AND DECLARATIONS

S--Dorpat, October 14, 1920; R--Moscow, December 31, 1920.

Whereas Finland declared its independence in 1917, and Russia has recognized the independence and the sovereignty of Finland within the frontiers of the Grand Duchy of Finland,
The Government of the Republic of Finland, and the Government of the Federal Socialist Republic of Soviet Russia, Actuated by a desire to put an end to the war which has arisen between their states, to establish mutual and lasting peace relations and to confirm the situation which springs from the ancient political union of Finland and Russia, Have resolved to conclude a Treaty with this object in view, and have selected as their representatives for this purpose, the following:
For the Government of the Republic of Finland: Juho Paasikivi, Juho Heikki Vennola, Alexander Frey, Karl Rudolf Walden VALIO TAMAN, VALIO VOIRONA, VALIO GALIO WILINIA.
For the Federal Socialist Republic of Soviet Russia: Ivan Antonovich Bersim, Platon Mikhailovich Korgensiev, Nicholas Sergievich Tilkhmenov.

Who...have agreed to the following provisions:

I. From the date upon which this Treaty shall come into force, a state of war shall cease to exist between the contracting parties, and the two powers shall mutually undertake to maintain, for the future, an attitude of peace and goodwill towards one another.

II. The frontier between the States of Russia and of Finland shall be as follows:

1. Across the center of the bay of Vaasa as far as the point of the eastern promontory at its extremity (at approximately latitude 69°57'.0 and longitude 31°53'.5);

2. Thence along the meridian southwards to the point where it cuts the northern system of lakes (at approximately latitude 69°53'.0);

3. Thence in a southeasterly direction, as far as the meridian at longitude 32°03'.0 (at approximately latitude 69°56'.0) following as far as possible the chain of lakes of Tschervjanyja;

4. Thence to a point situated at latitude 69°16'.0 and longitude 32°08'.3;

5. Thence across the center of the isthmus between the two bays of the fjords of Punkamaki (Butschaja Volokovaja-Guba) and Oserko which extend farthest into the above-mentioned isthmus, as far as the point which is in the center of the isthmus between the peninsula of Srednig and the mainland (at latitude 69°23'.1 and longitude 31°47'.6);

6. Thence in a straight line as far as the former frontier No. 90 of Korvatunturi, situated near the lake of Jaurijarvi on the former frontier between Russia and Finland.

II. From the former frontier mark No. 90 of Korvatunturi, situated near the lake of Jaurijarvi, to the lake of Ladoga, thence across this lake and along the Karelian isthmus, following the line of the former frontier between Russia and Finland up to the point where that frontier reaches the Gulf of Finland.

Note 1. The islands of Heija (Ainojke ostrova) and the islands of Kiari are to be transferred to Finland.

Note 2. The frontier laid down in the above Article is marked by a red line in the maps appended to this Treaty, that is, the Russian maritime map No. 1279 and a land map. [Note reproduced.]

The frontiers mentioned in Paragraph 1 of the above Article will be fixed in the localities themselves, in accordance with these maps, natural conditions being taken into consideration wherever essential. Should there be a divergence between the maps and the text with reference to the peninsula "des Pecheurs" and Sredniy, the maritime map No. 1279 shall be taken as authentic, but in all other parts of the frontier the text alone will be regarded as authentic.

Note 3. All longitudes are calculated on Greenwich.

1. The breadth of the territorial waters of the contracting powers in the Gulf of Finland shall be four nautical miles from the coast, and, in an archipelago, from the last islet or rock above seal level.

The following shall be excepted:

1. From the point where the land frontier between Russia and Finland reaches the Gulf of Finland, to the meridian through the lighthouse of Systsudd, the breadth of the territorial waters of Finland shall be one nautical mile and a half, and the boundary line of these waters shall, at the commencement, follow the parallel.

2. From a point situated on the meridian which cuts the southern point of Hogland, the boundary line of the territorial waters of Finland shall follow a line drawn from this point to a point situated south of the southern point of Seitakar (latitude 59°55'.8 and longitude 28°24'.5) as far as the junction of this line and the boundary line of four nautical miles constituting Finnish territorial waters to the west of the meridian of Systsudd.

3. From a point situated on the meridian which cuts the southern point of Hogland, the boundary line of the territorial waters of Finland shall follow two straight lines, the first drawn from this point and the second at 260°, as far as the points where these lines cut the boundary line of four nautical miles constituting the territorial waters of Hogland.

4. Around the islands belonging to Finland, but situated outside Finnish territorial waters, the breadth of the territorial waters shall be three nautical miles.

The following exceptions shall, however, be made:

To the south of the islands of Seitakar and Luvansaari, the boundary line of the territorial waters of Finland shall pass through the following points:

3. " 59°55'.0 " 27°55'.0.

From a point situated on the meridian of the north point of Systsudd, at three nautical miles north of this point, the boundary line of the territorial waters of Finland will pursue a straight line, passing through a point on the meridian which passes through the north point of Rodskar, at one nautical mile north of that point, as far as the point where the above-mentioned line meets the boundary line of three nautical miles constituting the territorial waters of Rodskar.

6. Finland does not, and shall not in the future, oppose the following delimitation of Russian territorial waters in the eastern portion of the Gulf of Finland:

Along the boundary line of the territorial waters of Finland, starting from the point where the land frontier between Russia and Finland reaches the Gulf of Finland, as far as the point situated at latitude 69°08'.9 upon the meridian of Systsudd.

Thence to a point southeast of Seitakar at latitude 59°53'.8 and longitude 28°24'.5.

Thence to a point situated at latitude 59°58'.0 and longitude 27°55'.0.

Thence in the direction of the Vigrudlighthouse as far as the intersection of this line and the general boundary line, of a breadth of four nautical miles, of Russian territorial waters, and thereafter following that boundary line.

Note 1. The boundary lines of all these territorial waters are marked on the Russian maritime maps Nos. 1493 and.
3. Russian nationals proceeding to Norway through the territory of Pechenga and returning from Norway to Russia shall be allowed to pass freely on presentation of a passport issued by the competent Russian authority.

4. Unarmed Russian airplanes may fly freely over the territory of Pechenga between Russia and Norway, provided they observe the general regulations in force.

5. The routes by which passengers and goods may proceed freely from Russia to Norway and vice versa through the territory of Pechenga, and the detailed application of the provisions contained in the preceding Paragraphs, as also the organization and form of the consular representation of Russia in the territory of Pechenga, shall be determined in a special agreement to be drawn up between Finland and Russia after the coming into force of the present Treaty.

IX. Russian citizens domiciled in the territory of Pechenga shall, without any further formality, become Finnish citizens. Nevertheless, those who have attained the age of 18 years may, during the year following the entry into force of the present Treaty, opt for Russian nationality. A husband shall opt on behalf of his wife unless otherwise decided by agreement between them, and parents shall opt on behalf of those of their children who have not attained 18 years of age.

All persons who opt in favor of Russia shall be free, within a time limit of one year reckoned from the date of option, to leave the territory, taking with them their movable property, free of customs and export duties. Such persons shall retain all rights over immovable property left by them in the territory of Pechenga.

X. Finland shall, within a time limit of forty-five days, dating from the entry into force of the present Treaty, withdraw her troops from the communes of Repola and Porajärvi. These communes shall be reincorporated in the State of Russia and shall be attached to the autonomous territory of Eastern Karelia, which is to include the Karelian population of the governments of Archangel and Ononetz and which shall enjoy the national right of self-determination.

XI. The contracting powers have adopted the following provisions for the benefit of the local population of the communes of Repola and Porajärvi, with a view to a more detailed regulation of the conditions under which the union of these communes with the Autonomous Territory of Eastern Karelia, referred to in the preceding Article, is to take place:

1. The inhabitants of the communes shall be accorded a certain amnesty, as provided in Article XXXV of the present Treaty.

2. The local maintenance in order in the territory of the communes shall be undertaken by a militia organized by the local population for a period of two years, dating from the entry into force of the present Treaty.

3. The inhabitants of these communes shall be assured of the enjoyment of all movable property situated in the territory of the communes, also of the right to dispose and make unencumbered use of the fields which belong to or are cultivated by them and of all other immovable property in their possession, within the limits of the legislation in force in the Autonomous Territory of Eastern Karelia.

4. All the inhabitants of these communes shall be free, if they so desire, to leave Russia within a period of one month from the date upon which this Treaty comes into force. Those persons who leave Russia under these conditions shall be entitled to take with them all their personal possessions and shall retain, within the limits of the existing laws in the Independent Territory of Eastern Karelia, all their rights to any immovable property which they may leave in the territory of these communes.

5. Citizens of Finland and Finnish commercial and industrial associations shall be permitted, for the duration of one year from the date upon which this Treaty comes into force, to complete in these communes the felling of forests to which they are entitled by contracts signed prior to June 1, 1930, and to take away the wood felled.
XII. The two contracting powers shall on principle support the neutralization of the Gulf of Finland and of the whole Baltic Sea, and shall undertake to cooperate in the realization of this object.

XIII. Finland shall militarily neutralize the following of her islands in the Gulf of Finland: Sommaro (Someri), Nero (Narvi), Seitakar (Seitakari), Paini, Lavanasaari, Stora Tyterskar (Suuri Tytarsaari), Lilla Tyterskar (Pieni Tytarsaari) and Roskar. This military neutralization shall include the prohibition to construct or establish upon these islands any fortifications, batteries, military observation posts, wireless stations of a power exceeding a half-kilowatt, ports of war and naval bases, depots of military stores and war material, and, furthermore, the prohibition to station upon these islands a greater number of troops than is necessary for maintaining order.

Finland shall, however, be entitled to establish military observation posts on the islands of Sommaro and Nero.

XIV. As soon as this Treaty comes into force, Finland shall take measures for the military neutralization of Hogland under an international guarantee. This neutralization shall include the prohibition to construct or establish upon this island any fortifications, batteries, wireless stations of a power exceeding one kilowatt, ports of war and naval bases, depots of military stores and war material, and, furthermore, the prohibition to station upon this island a greater number of troops than is necessary for maintaining order.

Russia undertakes to support the measures taken with a view to obtaining the above-mentioned international guarantee.

XV. Finland undertakes to remove the gun breaches, sprints, elevating and training gears, and munitions of the fortifications of Ilo and Puumala within a period of three months from the date upon which this Treaty comes into force, and to destroy these fortifications within a period of one year from the date upon which this Treaty comes into force.

Finland also undertakes neither to construct armored turrets nor batteries with arcs of fire permitting a range beyond the boundary line of the territorial waters of Finland upon the coast between Styrsudd and Innaolem, at a maximum distance of twenty kilometers from the shore, nor batteries with a range beyond the boundary line of the territorial waters of Finland, upon the coast between Innaviisi and the mouth of Rajajoki, at a maximum distance of twenty kilometers from the shore.

XVI. 1. The contracting powers mutually undertake to maintain the neutrality of Ladoga, which is a lake, and canal system designed for purposes of defense upon Ladoga. Its banks, the rivers and canals running into Ladoga, nor upon the Neva as far as the Ivanovskaja rapids (Iovanovskaja porog). In the above-mentioned waters it shall, however, be permissible to station warships with a maximum displacement of one hundred tons, and provided with guns of a maximum caliber of forty-seven millimeters, and, furthermore, to establish military and naval bases conforming to these restrictions.

Russia shall, however, have the right to send Russian war vessels into the navigable waterways of the interior by the canals along the southern bank of Ladoga and even, should the navigation of these canals be impeded, by the southern part of Ladoga.

2. Should the Gulf of Finland and the Baltic Sea be neutralized, the contracting powers mutually undertake to neutralize Ladoga also.

XVII. Russia undertakes to allow the free navigation of the Neva, between the Gulf of Finland and Ladoga, to Finnish merchant vessels and cargo boats on the same terms as it is allowed to Russian vessels. The use, however, of these vessels for the transport of war material and military stores is prohibited.

The contracting powers undertake, should one of them desire it, to open negotiations within a period not exceeding one year from the date upon which such demand is made, with a view to concluding a special agreement to complete the provisions of the present Article. This provision shall not, however, be allowed to prevent the exercise of the right hereby granted.

XVIII. The level of the water of the Lake of Ladoga shall not be altered without previous agreement between Finland and Russia.

Questions dealing with customs, fishing, the upkeep of maritime establishments, the maintenance of order in the sectors in the Gulf of Finland which are outside territorial waters, the removal of mines in this free sector of the Gulf of Finland, the uniformity of the pilot service and other similar subjects, shall be submitted for examination to one or several Finnish-Russian commissions.

XX. 1. The contracting powers shall, as soon as the Treaty comes into force, take steps to establish an agreement for the regulation of passport and customs formalities and generally of all traffic on the frontier of the Karelian Isthmus, taking into consideration local conditions and the practical needs of both Parties.

2. Traffic in other parts of the frontier between Finland and Russia shall be regulated similarly by special agreements.

3. As soon as this Treaty comes into force, a special mixed commission shall be appointed to discuss detailed plans of the work in question.

XXI. 1. The contracting powers mutually undertake to open negotiations at the earliest possible date after this Treaty comes into force, with the object of concluding an agreement upon the traffic and rating of forest products along the waterways which run from the territory of one of the contracting powers into the territory of the other.

This agreement shall be based upon the principle that the traffic and rating of forest products in the waterways of this district is permitted by both Parties without restriction, both across the frontier and in the territory of the one and of the other contracting power, as far as the sea.

Similarly, and especially with regard to the raising, the agreement shall accord to the nationals of the two contracting powers the same rights which are accorded to the favored craftsman.

2. In addition, the contracting powers shall open the necessary negotiations with a view to an agreement guaranteeing the maintenance of the principal channels of the waterways, and dealing with the regulation of fishing and the improvement of pisciculture in the waterways mentioned in the preceding Paragraph, and, similarly, to the improvement along the common frontiers of the contracting powers.

XXII. Property in Finland belonging to the Russian state and to Russian national institutions shall, without indemnification, become the exclusive property of the State of Finland. Similarly, property in Russia belonging to the State of Finland and to Finnish governmental institutions shall, without indemnification, become the exclusive property of the Russian state.

Note. The contracting powers shall each retain, from among their former governmental properties in the other country, three urban properties with land and buildings for diplomatic and consular representation.

XXIII. 1. The Government of Finland undertakes to return to the Russian state, as soon as this Treaty comes into force, a certain number of Russian ships and vessels which are at present within its territory or in its service, and which were left in Finland in 1918. These ships and vessels shall be returned in accordance with the specification annexed to this Treaty.

2. Should claims be put forward by private individuals, or by commercial or industrial associations, with regard to ships to be restored to Russia, the Russian Government resolves the Finnish Government from all responsibility for their return to Russia, and undertakes to assume responsibility for demands for indemnification which may be presented to the Finnish Government. The Russian Government under-
takes to settle the question of the right of ownership to these vessels, and the claims put forward on this matter must therefore be submitted to it.

3. The Russian Government undertakes to restore to their former owners vessels belonging to Finnish nationals or to commercial associations established in Finland, and requisitioned by the Russian Government during the War without indemnification of their owners, and similarly Finnish vessels which have become the property of the Government, with similar indemnification. A list of the vessels mentioned in this Article is given in the Annex to this Treaty.

XXV. The contracting powers will exact no indemnity whatsoever from one another for war expenses.

Finland will take no share in the expenses incurred by Russia in the World War of 1914–1918.

XXV. Neither of the contracting powers is responsible for the public debts and other obligations of the other power.

XXVII. The debts and other obligations of the Russian state and of Russian governmental institutions towards the State of Finland and the Bank of Finland, and, similarly, the debts and obligations of the State of Finland and Finnish governmental institutions towards the Russian state and its governmental institutions, shall be regarded as mutually liquidated.

The Agreement, therefore, which was concluded in 1917 between the Finnish and the Russian Governments with regard to a country of vessels, and similarly, the Agreement with regard to the exchange concluded in the same year between the Bank of Finland and the Chancery of Credit Operations of the Russian Ministry of Finance, shall be regarded as cancelled.

XXVII. Russia recognizes that Finland shall not be held responsible for damage caused to vessels or other property belonging to nationals of the other country by reason of any acts of violence or of whatsoever nature or by any action of vessels of the other power.

Finland recognizes that the Russian state shall not have recourse to any proceedings against Finland or its governmental institutions in respect of any loss which the former may have sustained since the end of the World War because of any act of violence committed by any persons or vessels of the Russian state.

XXVIII. Finnish nationals and commercial, industrial, financial and other private associations established in Finland, as also Finnish public associations and corporations, shall, in so far as concerns their property in Russia, their debts, claims for damages, indemnities and other claims upon the Russian state or its governmental institutions, be accorded the same rights and advantages as those which are accorded or shall in future be accorded by Russia to the nationals of the most favored nation.

XXIX. 1. The contracting powers undertake at the first opportunity to look through all archives and documents which belong to public authorities and institutions which may be within their respective territories, and which refer entirely or mainly to the other contracting power or its history.

The Russian Government will therefore hand over to the Finnish Government, among other documents, the Archives of the former Secretariat of State for the Grand Duchy of Finland, but the documents in these archives, which are entirely or mainly concerned with Russia or its history, shall be left to the Russian Government. Finland shall be entitled to provide herself with copies of the documents thus handed over to Russia.

2. The Russian Government shall hand over to the Finnish Government copies of the most recent topographical and hydrographical maps of Finnish territory which are in its possession, and also the results of the unfinished work of triangulation carried out in Finland.

XXX. The State of Finland agrees to reserve, for the benefit of the inhabitants of the town of Petrograd and its surroundings, half the number of beds in the sanatorium of Ivala in the commune of Uusikirjo for a period of 10 years and on the same terms as for Finnish nationals.

XXIX. The economic relations between the contracting powers shall be reestablished after the coming into force of the present Treaty.

With this object in view, the contracting powers shall appoint, as soon as possible after the coming into force of this Treaty, a special commission composed of representatives of the two powers, which shall put forward proposals with regard to the measures to be taken to regulate commercial relations, and shall also draw up a commercial treaty.

XXXI. Until such time as a commercial treaty is concluded, the following temporary provisions shall be observed in commercial relations between Finland and Russia; these provisions may be denounced by each of the contracting powers, always provided that a period of six months shall elapse from the date on which the other power is informed, before they cease to be operative.

1. Goods in transit intended for transportation across the territories of the contracting powers may be transported by all the commercial routes which are or will be open to transit traffic, provided, however, that the regulations for the organization of traffic and the capacity of means of communication are observed, as also regulations intended to reserve the means of transport required by the country itself, and to ensure public safety.

2. Freight and other expenses charged for goods in transit on the railways or vessels belonging to the state shall not be higher than the charges upon goods of the same nature transported in their own country. For all other expenses which these goods may incur, the principle of the most favored nation shall be applied.

Should the collection of dues upon the transport of domestic merchandise be completely abolished in Russia, the freight charges for goods in transit coming from Finland shall not be higher than those collected for goods in transit coming from the most favored nation.

3. For goods sent from one country into the other, it shall be forbidden to charge higher freight or other expenses than those fixed for the transport of similar goods in their own country.

Should the collection of dues on goods transported within the country be completely abolished in the territory of the Russian state, freight and other expenses charged for Finnish goods shall not be higher than those charged for goods from the most favored nation.

4. The promulgation of prohibitions upon importation, exportation and transit is permissible by either Party only in cases where such prohibitions are based upon legislation with regard to public safety, public health, alcoholic products and the regulation of commerce and all the other branches of economic industry included in the country in question.

5. The contracting powers reserve to themselves the right of exercising a monopoly over various branches of commerce and industry.

6. Passenger and cargo boats belonging to one or the other of the contracting powers are entitled to call at every port and make use of their facilities, and to navigate the territorial waters, lakes, rivers and canals of the other contracting power for as long as these waterways are or shall in future be open to the vessels of this power, and provided that the regulations on national vessels which are in force in each country or which shall be promulgated, and the provisions regarding public safety and the control of customs, are observed.

The charges upon the vessels of the other country and their cargoes, and those collected for the utilization of harbor facilities, shall not be higher than the taxes upon vessels of the most favored nation and their cargoes.

Coasting and fishing vessels may be excepted from these provisions. The term "coasting vessels", however, shall not include vessels navigating between the ports of the Baltic and the ports of other seas contiguous to Russia, including the seas in the interior of that country.

Passenger and merchant vessels belonging to Russia shall be entitled to make use of all the channels open to Finnish

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vessels in the territorial waters of Finland, provided, how-

er, that they respect the provisions concerning the piloting of

foreign ships which are in force in Finland.

7. Natural, domestic and industrial products of Finland

shall, on their entry into Russia, be freed from all customs
duty and other import duties.

XXXIII. As soon as the present Treaty shall come into

force, the contracting powers shall proceed to take the nec-

essary measures for the organization of the railway service

between Finland and Russia, in such a manner as to provide a
direct service for passengers and goods without changing ve-

hicles from Finland to Russia and from Russia to Finland,

free of duty and other import duties, between Raajaksi and

Petropagd, including that of Petropagd. The contracting powers shall also

enter into negotiations necessary for an amalgamation of the

respective railway systems of the two countries and of direct

traffic between them.

XXXIV. Postal and telegraphic communications between

Finland and Russia shall be reestablished after the present

Treaty has come into force; a special convention shall be con-

cluded between the contracting powers to this effect.

The Finnish Government shall raise no objection to placing

at the exclusive disposal of Russia, until the end of the year

1926, the three direct telegraph lines (hereinafter designated

by the Nos. 13, 60 and 42) which cross the territory of Finland

from Raajaksi to Nystad and connect Petropagd with Stockholm,

Nystad and Fredericia, which lines the Finnish Govern-

ment and other import duties on January 1, 1920, ceded to

"Det Svera Nordiska Telgraafselskapet" for the Russian Tele-

graphic Service, provided that the conditions of this contract

with regard to the regulations in force for telegraphic corre-

spondence are observed. For the use of these lines, the Rus-

sian Government shall pay to the Finnish Government the trans-

it dues to which Finland is entitled as a sovereign state

by virtue of the provisions of the International Telegraphic

Convention and of the regulations attached thereto. This pay-

ment shall continue until such time as these dues are charged

to the sender by an agreement between the states concerned.

In the same way and for the same period, the rights over the
two cables connecting Nystad and Grislehamn for direct tele-

graphic communication with Sweden shall be reserved to the

Russian Government by virtue of the contract entered into with

"Det Svera Nordiska Telgraafselskapet".

XXXV. 1. Finnish nationals resident in Russia and Rus-

sian nationals resident in Finland shall, after this Treaty has

come into force, be permitted to return to their country with

the exception of persons detained in one or the other country,

for serious offenses.

2. Prisoners of war of the two contracting powers shall

be repatriated as soon as possible. The contracting powers

shall settle the manner in which this repatriation is to be car-

ried out by a special convention.

3. All other nationals of either power detained in the ter-

ritory of the other in consequence of the state of war or other

political reasons shall be forthwith set at liberty and repatri-

ated.

4. All Finnish or Russian nationals who have been con-

demned either for political offenses committed before the

signature of the present Treaty in the interests of the other

state, or for communication with the troops or authorities of

the other contracting state, or for an offense committed with

the intention of giving effect to national right of self-deter-

mination, shall have any further punishment remitted and shall

be forthwith set at liberty. Should the person concerned have

been accused of or detained for a crime of this nature, and

sentence not yet been pronounced or the prosecution

not yet prepared, the right of prosecution lapses whether

the person concerned is within his own country or outside its

frontiers. No subsequent prosecution on these grounds shall

be admissible.

5. That person has, by the same or any other action, been

guilty of a crime of another kind against the Government or

public order of his own country, and has subsequently taken

refuge upon the territory of the other contracting power, he

shall profit by any amnesty which may subsequently be grant-

ed in his own country for persons who have been accused and

condemned on the same grounds and who remained in the

country.

XXXVI. Diplomatic and consular relations between the

contracting powers shall be reestablished immediately after

the present Treaty has come into force.

The contracting powers, immediately after the present

Treaty has come into force, shall draw up a consular conve-

vention.

XXXVII. As soon as this Treaty comes into force, a Fin-

nish-Russian commission shall be appointed to deal with its

execution and with all questions of public and private law

which may arise from it; this commission shall be empowered to

appoint from amongst its members sub-committees for terri-

torial questions, settlement of economic relations, ex-

change of prisoners and fugitives, and for any other matters

that may arise.

The composition and methods of procedure of the commis-

sion provided for in this Article shall be settled in a subse-

quent convention. The work, power and duties of the various

sub-committees shall be arranged by means of special in-

structions issued by the commission.

Should a sub-committee have been unable to come to a de-

cision by reason of an equality of votes, the question shall be

submitted to a full meeting of the commission. Should there

also be an equality of votes in the commission, the question

shall be submitted to the Governments for decision.

XXXVIII. The Treaty shall be prepared in Finnish, Swedish

and Russian; all three texts shall be authentic.

At the time of the exchange of ratifications the contracting

powers shall also sign the French text of this Treaty, which

shall also be authentic.

XXXIX. The Treaty shall be ratified. The exchange of

ratifications shall take place at Moscow.

The Treaty shall come into force as soon as the exchange

of ratifications shall have taken place.

[Specification of the ships and boats which Finland shall

restitute to Russia according to Article XXXI of the Peace

Treaty, not reproduced.]

NOTE

1. The ships and vessels due to Russia, Finland under-

takes to deliver in the ports of Helsingfors, Viborg and Sor-
daval. The ships and vessels due to Finland, Russia under-

takes to deliver in the ports of Petrograd and Kronstadt.

2. Should one of the contracting powers demand that the

other power transport, on its own responsibility, into the ter-

ritorial waters of the former power the ships and vessels

which are to be returned, the latter power shall be authorized

to do so, provided that it pays the freight, insurance and other

expenses. The other power undertakes to comply with a re-

quest of such nature.

3. The return of the vessels, and all other details, shall be

arranged by a joint Finnish-Russian commission.

We, the undersigned, certify that the specifications here

annexed are attached as a supplement to the Peace Treaty be-

tween Finland and Russia.

Dipat, October 14, 1920.

Esko Heitimo, Secretary of the Finnish Peace Delegation.

G. Chicherin, Secretary of the Russian Peace Delegation.
Treaty of Nonaggression Between Germany and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics

The Government of the German Reich and the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, desirous of strengthening the cause of peace between Germany and the U.S.S.R., and proceeding from the fundamental provisions of the Neutrality Agreement concluded in April 1926 between Germany and the U.S.S.R., have reached the following agreement:

ARTICLE I

Both High Contracting Parties oblige themselves to desist from any act of violence, any aggressive action, and any attack on each other, either individually or jointly with other powers.

ARTICLE II

Should one of the High Contracting Parties become the object of belligerent action by a third power, the other High Contracting Party shall in no manner lend its support to this third power.

ARTICLE III

The Governments of the two High Contracting Parties shall in the future maintain continual contact with one another for the purpose of consultation in order to exchange information on problems affecting their common interests.

ARTICLE IV

Neither of the two High Contracting Parties shall participate in any grouping of powers whatsoever that is directly or indirectly aimed at the other party.

ARTICLE V

Should disputes or conflicts arise between the High Contracting Parties over problems of one kind or another, both parties shall settle these disputes or conflicts exclusively through friendly exchange of opinion or, if necessary, through the establishment of arbitration commissions.

ARTICLE VI

The present treaty is concluded for a period of ten years, with the proviso that, in so far as one of the High Contracting Parties does not denounce it one year prior to the expiration of this period, the validity of this treaty shall automatically be extended for another five years.
ARTICLE VII

The present treaty shall be ratified within the shortest possible time. The ratifications shall be exchanged in Berlin. The agreement shall enter into force as soon as it is signed.

Done in duplicate, in the German and Russian languages.

Moscow, August 23, 1939.

For the Government of the German Reich:

v. Ribbentrop

With full power of the Government of the U.S.S.R.:

V. Molotov

Secret Additional Protocol

On the occasion of the signature of the Nonaggression Pact between the German Reich and the Union of Socialist Soviet Republics the undersigned plenipotentiaries of each of the two parties discussed in strictly confidential conversations the question of the boundary of their respective spheres of influence in Eastern Europe. These conversations led to the following conclusions:

1. In the event of a territorial and political rearrangement in the areas belonging to the Baltic States (Finland, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania), the northern boundary of Lithuania shall represent the boundary of the spheres of influence of Germany and the U.S.S.R. In this connection the interest of Lithuania in the Vilna area is recognized by each party.

2. In the event of a territorial and political rearrangement of the areas belonging to the Polish state the spheres of influence of Germany and the U.S.S.R. shall be bounded approximately by the line of the rivers Narew, Vistula, and San.

The question of whether the interests of both parties make desirable the maintenance of an independent Polish state and how such a state should be bounded can only be definitely determined in the course of further political developments.

In any event both Governments will resolve this question by means of a friendly agreement.

3. With regard to Southeastern Europe attention is called by the Soviet side to its interest in Bessarabia. The German side declares its complete political disinterestedness in these areas.

4. This protocol shall be treated by both parties as strictly secret.

Moscow, August 23, 1939.

For the Government of the German Reich:

v. Ribbentrop

Plenipotentiary of the Government of the U.S.S.R.:

V. Molotov
MEMORANDUM OF THE GOVERNMENT OF THE U.S.S.R.,
HANDED IN MOSCOW ON OCTOBER 14th, 1939, BY
MM. STALIN AND MOLOTOV TO M. PAASIKIVI.

Translation.

In the negotiations with Finland, the Soviet Union is mainly concerned with the settlement of two questions:

a) Securing the safety of Leningrad,
b) Becoming satisfied that Finland will maintain firm, friendly relations with the Soviet Union.

Both points are essential for the purpose of preserving against external hostile aggression the integrity of the Soviet Union coast of the Gulf of Finland and also of the coast of Estonia whose independence the Soviet Union has undertaken to defend.

In order to fulfill this duty, it is necessary:

1) To make it possible to block the opening of the Gulf of Finland by means of artillery fire from both coasts of the Gulf of Finland in order to prevent warships and transport ships of the enemy from penetrating to the waters of the Gulf of Finland;
2) To make it possible to prevent the access of the enemy to those islands in the Gulf of Finland which are situated west and northwest of the entrance to Leningrad;
3) To have the Finnish frontier on the Karelian Isthmus which is now at a distance of 32 km from Leningrad, i.e. within the range of long-distance artillery, moved somewhat farther northwards and north-westwards.

A separate question arises with regard to the Kalastajas aarento in Petsamo, where the frontier is unskillfully and artificially drawn and has to be adjusted in accordance with the annexed map.

With the preceding as a basis it is necessary to settle the following questions by having in view a mutual arrangement and common interests:—

1) Leasing to the Soviet Union for a period of 30 years the port of Hanko and a territory adjoining thereto, situated within a radius of 5—6 nautical miles southwards and eastwards and within a radius of 3 nautical miles westwards and northwards, for the purpose of creating a naval base with coastal artillery capable of blocking by artillery fire together with the naval base Paldiski on the southern coast of the Gulf of Finland, the access to the Gulf of Finland. For the protection of the naval base the Finnish Government should permit the Government of the Soviet Union to keep in the port of Hanko the following garrison:

   1. Infantry regiment,
   2. Anti-aircraft battery groups,
   3. Air-force regiments,
   4. Battalion of armoured cars, altogether not more than 5000 men.
2) Granting to the naval forces of the Soviet Union the right of using the bay of Lappohja as an anchorage.
3) Ceding to the Soviet Union, in exchange for other territories, the following territories:

   The islands Suursaari, Seiskari, Lavansaari, Tytärsaari and Koivisto, part of the Carelian Isthmus from the village of Lipola to the southern border of the town of Koivisto, and the western parts of the Kalastajas aarento, in all 2,761 km² in accordance with the annexed map.

4) In exchange for the territories mentioned in paragraph 3, the Soviet Union cedes to the Republic of Finland Soviet Union territory in the districts of Repola and Porajärvi to the extent of 5,529 km² in accordance with the annexed map.

5) Strengthening the Treaty of Non-Aggression between the Soviet Union and Finland by including therein a paragraph according to which the Contracting Parties undertake not to join any groups or alliances directly or indirectly hostile to either of the Contracting Parties.

6) Suppression of the fortified zones situated on both sides of the frontier between Finland and the Soviet Union and leaving Frontier Guard troops only at the frontier.

7) The Soviet Union does not object to the fortifying of the
Aaland Islands by Finland’s own work provided that no foreign Power, Sweden included, has anything to do with the question of fortifying the Aaland Islands.

MEMORANDUM OF THE GOVERNMENT OF THE U.S.S.R., HANDED AT MOSCOW ON OCTOBER 23rd, 1939, BY MM. STALIN AND MOLOTOV TO MM. PAASIKIVI AND TANNER.

Translation.

With reference to the Finnish Government’s memorandum of October 23rd, the Government of the Soviet Union beg to state that, in accordance with the views defined in the memorandum of the Government of the Soviet Union of October 14th, the proposals advanced by them represent their minimum terms, the attitude having been dictated by the fundamental security requirements of the Soviet Union and particularly of the city of Leningrad with its 3 1/2 million inhabitants. These proposals were expressly put forward as minimum terms and, further to this, the Soviet Union withdrew their proposal for the conclusion of a mutual assistance agreement between the Soviet Union and Finland, in order to enable Finland to maintain her strict neutrality. At the same time, the Government of the Soviet Union abandoned their proposal concerning the non-fortification of the Aaland Islands or their fortification in co-operation with the Soviet Union, substituting for these proposals their assent to the fortification of the Aaland Islands by Finland herself. The Soviet Union made these important concessions, as she relied upon Finland’s friendly attitude and was also confident that Finland could agree to the minimum proposals made in the Union’s memorandum of October 14th.

The exchange of views between the representatives of the Soviet Union (Molotov, Stalin) and those of Finland (Tanner, Paasikivi) on October 23rd enabled both parties to understand each other’s
views better, but at the same time revealed a divergence between them. Taking into account the results of this conversation and in order to pay due regard to the Finnish Government's wishes, the Government of the Soviet Union wish to make the following statement:

1) The Government of the Soviet Union are unable to withdraw their proposal that a naval base be placed at the disposal of the Soviet Union in Hanko, since they regard this proposal as an absolutely essential minimum condition for the safeguarding of the defence of Leningrad. In this connection, the Government of the Soviet Union, amending their memorandum of October 14th, would find it possible to limit to 4,000 men the land force for the protection of the naval base, and to maintain this force on the territory of Hanko only up to the end of the war between England, France and Germany in Europe.

2) The Government of the Soviet Union find it impossible to agree to the proposal that a strip of 10 versts of Finnish territory on the Isthmus of Carelia should—as proposed in the Finnish Government's memorandum of October 23rd—be ceded in return for the territory to be ceded by the Soviet Union. The Government of the Soviet Union find such a step quite inadequate as a means of providing a minimum of security for Leningrad at the eastern end of the Gulf of Finland. Being desirous, however, of meeting Finland in an accommodating spirit, the Government of the Soviet Union would find it possible, as an extreme concession, to amend their original proposal in some measure by reducing, in the manner shown in the annexed map, the area of the Isthmus of Carelia to be ceded by Finland to the Soviet Union against territorial compensation; in this connection, the original proposal of the Government of the Soviet Union regarding the Island of Koivisto remains unaltered.

3) The Soviet Government find it necessary to maintain the other proposals contained in the Soviet Government's memorandum of October 14th.

4) The Soviet Government accept the Finnish Government's proposal regarding the amendment of Article 2, paragraph 1, of the Non-Aggression Treaty.
TREATY OF PEACE

BETWEEN THE REPUBLIC OF FINLAND AND THE UNION OF SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLICS

The Government of the Republic of Finland, of the one part, and
The Presidium of the Supreme Council of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, of the other part,

Being desirous of bringing to an end the hostilities which have broken out between the two States and of creating permanent peaceful relations between them,

And being convinced that the creation of definite conditions for their mutual security, including guarantees for the security of the cities of Leningrad and Murmansk and the Murmansk Railway, is in the interests of both Contracting Parties,

Have decided that for this purpose the conclusion of a Peace Treaty is essential and have therefore appointed as their Plenipotentiaries:

The Government of the Republic of Finland:

Risto Ryti, Prime Minister of the Republic of Finland,
Juho Kusti Paasikivi, Minister,
Rudolf Walden, General,
Väinö Voionmaa, Professor.

The Presidium of the Supreme Council of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics:

Vjatsheslav Mihailovitch Molotov, President of the Council of Commissars of the USSR and Commissar for Foreign Affairs.
Andrei Aleksandrovitch Shdanov, Member of the Presidium of the Supreme Council of the USSR.
Aleksander Mihailovitch Vasilevski, Brigadier;

who, having exchanged their credentials, found in due and proper order, have agreed upon the following provisions:

ARTICLE 1

Hostilities between Finland and the USSR shall be immediately concluded according to the procedure defined in the protocol attached to the present Treaty.

ARTICLE 2

The frontier between the Republic of Finland and the USSR shall follow a new boundary line which shall incorporate in the territory of the USSR the whole of the Karelian Isthmus, the city of Viipuri and Viipuri Bay with the Islands thereof, the western and northern coastal area of Lake Ladoga with
the towns of Käkisalmi and Sortavala and the village of Suojärvi, a number of islands in the Gulf of Finland, the territory east of Mäkiläjarvi and the village of Knuoljärvi, and parts of the Rybachy and Sredni Peninsulas—in conformity with the map attached to the present Treaty.

The exact delimitation and establishment of the frontier line shall be effected by a mixed committee of representatives of the Contracting Parties, which shall be appointed within ten days of the signing of the present Treaty.

**Article 3**

Both Contracting Parties undertake to refrain from all acts of aggression directed against each other, and undertake not to conclude any alliance or to become parties to any coalition directed against either of the Contracting Parties.

**Article 4**

The Republic of Finland agrees to lease to the Soviet Union for thirty years, in consideration of an annual rent of eight million Finnish marks to be paid by the Soviet Union, the cape of Hanko and the surrounding waters within a radius of five nautical miles to the south and east and three nautical miles to the west and north thereof, and a number of islands situated therein, in conformity with the map attached to the present Treaty—for the establishment of a naval base capable of defending the access to the Gulf of Finland against aggressions; and in addition for the defense of the naval base the Soviet Union is granted the right to maintain there at its own expense essential armed land and air forces.

The Government of Finland will withdraw within ten days of the entry into force of the present Treaty the whole of its armed forces from the cape of Hanko, and the cape of Hanko with the islands appertaining thereto will pass into the administration of the USSR in conformity with this Article of the present Treaty.

**Article 5**

The USSR undertakes to withdraw its military forces from the Petsamo area which the USSR voluntarily ceded to Finland under the terms of the Peace Treaty of 1920.

Finland undertake, as provided in the Peace Treaty of 1920, not to maintain warships and other armed vessels in the waters along the Arctic coast belonging to it, with the exception of armed vessels of less than one hundred tons, which Finland may maintain there without limit, and a maximum of fifteen war vessels or other armed ships, the tonnage of which may in no case exceed four hundred tons.

Finland undertakes, as provided in the said Treaty, not to maintain submarines and armed aircraft in the waters mentioned.

Finland further undertakes, as provided in the said Treaty, not to construct on this coast any naval harbors, naval bases or naval repair yards which are larger in size than is necessary for the said vessels and their armament.

**Article 6**

The Soviet Union and its nationals, as provided in the Treaty of 1920, are granted free right of transit through the Petsamo area to and from Norway,
and the Soviet Union is granted the right to establish a consulate in the Petsamo area.

Goods transported through the Petsamo area from the Soviet Union to Norway, likewise goods transported through the said area from Norway to the Soviet Union, shall be free of all inspection and control, with the exception of the control necessary for the conduct of transit traffic; nor shall customs duties or transit or other charges be imposed.

Control of the abovementioned transit goods shall be permitted only according to the established practice in such cases in international traffic.

Nationals of the Soviet Union who travel through the Petsamo area to Norway and from Norway back to the Soviet Union, shall be entitled to unhindered passage with passports issued by the appropriate authorities of the Soviet Union.

With due observance of the general provisions in force, unarmed aircraft of the Soviet Union shall be entitled to maintain air traffic between the Soviet Union and Norway through the Petsamo area.

**Article 7**

The Government of Finland grants to the Soviet Union goods transit rights between the Soviet Union and Sweden, and for the development of this traffic by the shortest railway route the Soviet Union and Finland regard as necessary the construction, each in its own territory, and if possible in the course of the year 1940, of a railway connecting Kandalaksha with Kemijärvi.

**Article 8**

With the entry into force of the present Treaty, trade relations between the Contracting Parties shall be renewed and for this purpose the Contracting Parties shall proceed to negotiate regarding the conclusion of a Trade Agreement.

**Article 9**

This Peace Treaty shall enter into force immediately after its signature and shall later be ratified.

The exchange of instruments of ratification shall take place within ten days at Moscow.

The present treaty is drawn up in duplicate in the Finnish, Swedish and Russian languages, in the City of Moscow on March 12, 1940.

Risto Ryti
J. K. Paasikivi
R. Walden
Väinö Voionmaa

V. Molotov
A. Shilansky
A. Vasilievski

**Protocol**

attached to the Treaty of Peace concluded between Finland and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on March 12, 1940.

The Contracting Parties establish the following procedure for the cessation of hostilities and the transfer of troops behind the frontier fixed by the Treaty of Peace.

1. Both Contracting Parties shall cease hostilities on the 13th day of March, 1940, at twelve o'clock noon Leningrad time.
2. Beginning with the moment agreed upon as the close of the hostilities, a neutral zone one kilometer wide shall be arranged between the advance positions of the troops, for which purpose the troops of that Contracting Party which, with reference to the new frontier, occupies territory belonging to the other Contracting Party, shall be withdrawn a distance of one kilometer on the first day.

3. The transfer of military forces to the other side of the new frontier and the movement of the military forces of the other Contracting Party to that frontier, shall begin at 10 a.m. on March 15, 1940, along the whole of the frontier between the Gulf of Finland and Lieksa, and at 10 a.m. on March 16, north of Lieksa. The transfer shall be effected in marches of not less than 7 kilometers per day, the troops of the other Contracting Party moving forward in such order that an intervening distance of not less than 7 kilometers is maintained between the rearguard of the withdrawing troops and the advance guard of the other Contracting Party moving toward the new frontier.

4. In accordance with Clause 3, the following time limits are fixed for the transfer of troops to the various sections of the frontier:

(a) in the sector comprising the upper reaches of the Tuntssjoki River, Kuolajärvi, Takala, the eastern shore of Lake Joukamojärvi, the transfer of the troops of both Contracting Parties shall be completed at 8 p.m. on March 20, 1940;

(b) in the Latva sector south of Kuhmoniemi, the transfer of troops shall be completed at 8 p.m. on March 22, 1940;

(c) in the sector Lonkavaara, Värstilä, Matkaselkä railway station, the transfer of the troops of both Contracting Parties shall be completed at 8 p.m. on March 25, 1940;

(d) in the sector Matkaselkä railway station, Koitsanlahti, the transfer of troops shall be completed at 8 p.m. on March 23, 1940;

(e) in the sector Koitsanlahti, Enso railway station, the transfer of troops shall be completed at 8 p.m. on March 25, 1940;

(f) in the sector Enso railway station, Pientonsaari, the transfer of troops shall be completed at 8 p.m. on March 19, 1940;

5. The evacuation of Red Army troops from the Petsamo area shall be completed by April 10, 1940.

6. The Army Commands of both Contracting Parties undertake, during the transfer of troops to the other side of the frontier, to take necessary measures, in the towns and localities to be ceded to the other Contracting Party, to preserve them from damage and to take necessary measures to preserve towns, localities, defensive and economic establishments (bridges, dams, aerodromes, barracks, depots, railway junctions, industrial establishments, the telegraph system, electric power stations) from damage and destruction.

7. All questions arising out of the cession by one Contracting Party to the other of the areas, localities, towns or other objects mentioned in Clause 6 of the present protocol, shall be decided on the spot by representatives of both Contracting Parties, for which purpose the Army Commands shall appoint special delegates on each of the main routes utilized by both Armies.

8. The exchange of prisoners of war shall be effected with the minimum of delay after the cessation of hostilities in accordance with a special agreement.

March 13, 1940

RISTO RYTI J. K. PAAKKIVI R. WALDEN VÄINÖ VALTONMAA

V. MOLOTOV A. SHOANOV A. VASILEVSKI
APPENDIX E

Document 6

Telegram from the Finnish Legation in Moscow, Dated March 22, 1940

... Finally Molotov proceeded to discuss the question of the Finnish-Swedish-Norwegian defensive alliance. He referred several times to Hambro's speech, and to the disavowal by the Tass agency. He said that the USSR regarded the purpose of the defensive alliance as being revenge against the Soviet Union. The USSR also regards the defensive alliance as contrary to the Peace Treaty and our neutrality. A long conversation ensued, in the course of which we brought forward our contrary opinion, but he would not consent to give way. He assured us several times that the USSR will strictly observe the Peace Treaty.

J. K. Paasikivi
Väinö Voionmaa

Document 7

Extract from a Speech by Commissar Molotov, March 29, 1940

[Helsinki Press, March 30, 1940]

... Soviet Russia had the power to occupy all of Finland. We chose not to use it—something that no other Great Power would have done—and were satisfied with the least possible minimum. We must repel every attempt to violate the Peace Treaty recently concluded. Finland has made such attempts, and Norway and Sweden as well, using as a pretext a military defensive alliance. It is not difficult to understand that these efforts are directed against the USSR, and that their objective is to get satisfaction by avenging the war of 1939-1940. The participation of Norway and Sweden in an alliance with Finland would mean that these countries have abandoned their traditional policy of neutrality for a new foreign policy from which it would be impossible for the USSR not to draw the obvious conclusions.

Document 34

Agreement Between Finland and the Soviet Union Concerning the Åland Islands

The Government of the Republic of Finland, of the one part, and
The Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, of the other part, desiring to strengthen their security and foundations of peace in the Baltic Sea, have found it necessary to conclude among themselves the following agreement and have therefore appointed as their Plenipotentiaries:

The Government of the Republic of Finland:
The Envoy Extraordinary and Minister Plenipotentiary of Finland in Moscow, M. Juho Kusti Paasikivi;
The Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics:
President of the Council of Commissars of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and Commissar for Foreign Affairs, Vjatseslav Mihailovitsh Molotov,
who, having exchanged their credentials, found in due and proper order, have agreed upon the following provisions:

**Article 1**

Finland agrees to demilitarize the Aaland Islands, not to fortify them, and not to place them at the disposal of the armed forces of any other Powers.

This means also that neither Finland nor any other Powers can maintain or build in the area of the Aaland Islands any military or naval construction or base, nor military air force construction or base, nor any other establishment for military purposes, and that the existing artillery foundations must be destroyed.

**Article 2**

The designation "the area of the Aaland Islands" means, in this Agreement, all the islands, banks and reefs located within the sea area bounded by the following lines:

- **a.** To the north, north latitude $60^\circ 41'$.
- **b.** To the east, straight lines, which consecutively join the following geographic points:

  1) $60^\circ 41'$, 0 North lat. and $21^\circ 09'$, 0 East long.
  2) $60^\circ 35'$, 9 " " $21^\circ 05'$, 9 " 
  3) $60^\circ 33'$, 3 " " $21^\circ 08'$, 6 " 
  4) $60^\circ 15'$, 8 " " $21^\circ 03'$, 5 " 
  5) $60^\circ 11'$, 4 " " $21^\circ 00'$, 4 " 
  6) $60^\circ 09'$, 4 North lat. and $21^\circ 01'$, 2 East long.
  7) $60^\circ 05'$, 5 " " $21^\circ 04'$, 3 " 
  8) $60^\circ 01'$, 1 " " $21^\circ 11'$, 3 " 
  9) $59^\circ 59'$, 0 " " $21^\circ 08'$, 3 " 
  10) $59^\circ 53'$, 0 " " $21^\circ 20'$, 0 " 
  11) $59^\circ 49'$, 5 " " $21^\circ 20'$, 0 " 
  12) $59^\circ 27'$, 0 " " $20^\circ 46'$, 3 " 

- **c.** To the south, north latitude $59^\circ 27'$.
- **d.** To the west, straight lines, which consecutively join the following geographic points:

  13) $59^\circ 27'$, 0 North lat. and $20^\circ 09'$, 7 East long.
  14) $59^\circ 47'$, 8 " " $19^\circ 40'$, 0 " 
  15) $60^\circ 11'$, 8 " " $19^\circ 05'$, 5 " 
  16) —the center of the Märket Rock
  60° 18', 4 North lat. and $19^\circ 08'$, 5 " 
  17) $60^\circ 41'$, 0 " " $19^\circ 14'$, 4 "

The territorial waters of the Aaland Islands are considered to extend three nautical miles from the islands, banks and reefs defined, above which rises the sea level, at least at times, at low water.

**Article 3**

The USSR is granted the right to maintain its own consular office in the Aaland Islands. In addition to ordinary consular functions, it shall also control the observance of the demilitarization and nonmilitarization of the Aaland Islands provided in Article 1.
In the event that the USSR consular representative observes circumstances which in his opinion run counter to the provisions of this agreement for the demilitarization and nonfortification of the Aaland Islands, he has the right to notify Finland's authorities, through the Provincial Government of the Aaland Province, of the holding of a joint investigation.

Such investigation will be conducted by a delegate of the Finnish Government and the USSR consular representative in the quickest possible manner.

The results of the joint investigation shall be recorded in a protocol drawn up in four copies in Finnish and Russian, and will be forwarded, for the purpose of undertaking necessary measures, to the governments of the two Contracting Parties.

**ARTICLE 4**

This agreement will go into effect immediately upon signature, and will thereafter be ratified.

Ratifications will be exchanged in Helsinki within ten days.

This agreement has been drafted in Finnish and Russian in two original copies.

*Moscow, October 11, 1940*

J. K. Paasikivi
V. Molotov
APPENDIX F

CONDITIONS OF AN ARMISTICE WITH FINLAND,
SIGNED AT MOSCOW, 19th SEPTEMBER, 1944.

Whereas the Finnish Government has accepted the preliminary condition of the Soviet Government regarding a break with Germany and the removal of German troops from Finland, and whereas the conclusion of a future treaty of peace will be facilitated by the inclusion in an Armistice Agreement of certain conditions of this peace treaty, His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, acting on behalf of all the United Nations at war with Finland, on the one hand, and the Government of Finland, on the other hand, have decided to conclude the present agreement for an armistice, the execution of which will be controlled by the Soviet High Command similarly acting on behalf of the United Nations at war with Finland, hereinafter named the Allied (Soviet) High Command.

On the basis of the foregoing the representative of the Allied (Soviet) High Command, Colonel-General A. A. Zhdanov, and the representatives of the Government of Finland, Mr. Carl Enckell, Minister for Foreign Affairs, General Rudolf Walden, Minister of Defence, General Erik Heinrichs, Chief of General Staff, and Lieutenant-General Oscar Enckell, duly authorised thereto, have signed the following conditions:

Article 1.

In connexion with the cessation of military activities on the part of Finland on the 4th September, 1944, and on the part of the Soviet Union on the 5th September, 1944, Finland undertakes to withdraw her troops behind the line of the Soviet-Finnish frontier of 1940 in accordance with the procedure laid down in the Annex attached to the present Agreement. (See Annex to Article 1.)

Article 2.

Finland undertakes to disarm the German land, naval and air armed forces which have remained in Finland since the 15th September, 1944, and to hand over their personnel to the Allied (Soviet) High Command as prisoners of war, in which task the Soviet Government will assist the Finnish army.

The Finnish Government also accepts the obligation to intern German and Hungarian nationals in Finnish territory. (See Annex to Article 2.)

Article 3.

Finland undertakes to make available at the request of the Allied (Soviet) High Command the aerodromes on the southern and south-western coast of Finland with all equipment to serve as bases for Soviet aircraft during the period necessary for air operations against German forces in Estonia and against the German navy in the northern part of the Baltic Sea. (See Annex to Article 3.)

Article 4.

Finland undertakes to place her army on a peace footing within two and a half months from the day of signing of the present Agreement. (See Annex to Article 4.)

Article 5.

Finland, having broken off all relations with Germany, also undertakes to break off all relations with Germany's satellite States. (See Annex to Article 5.)
Article 6.

The effect of the Peace Treaty between the Soviet Union and Finland, concluded in Moscow on the 12th March, 1940, is restored subject to the changes which follow from the present Agreement.

Article 7.

Finland returns to the Soviet Union the oblast of Petsamo (Pechenga), voluntarily ceded to Finland by the Soviet State in accordance with the Peace Treaties of the 14th October, 1920, and the 12th March, 1940, within the boundary indicated in the Annex and on the map(1) attached to the present Agreement. (See Annex to Article 7 and map to scale 1:500,000.)

Article 8.

The Soviet Union renounces its rights to the lease of the Peninsula of Hangö, accorded to it by the Soviet-Finnish Peace Treaty of the 12th March, 1940, and Finland for her part undertakes to make available to the Soviet Union on lease territory and waters for the establishment of a Soviet naval base in the area of Porkkala-Udd.

The boundaries of the land and water area of the base at Porkkala-Udd are defined in the Annex to the present article and indicated on the map.(1) (See Annex to Article 8 and map to scale 1:100,000.)

Article 9.

The effect of the Agreement concerning the Åland Islands, concluded between the Soviet Union and Finland on the 11th October, 1940, is completely restored.

Article 10.

Finland undertakes immediately to transfer to the Allied (Soviet) High Command to be returned to their homeland all Soviet and Allied prisoners of war now in her power and also Soviet and Allied nationals who have been interned in or deported by force to Finland.

From the moment of the signing of the present Agreement and up to the time of repatriation Finland undertakes to provide at her cost for all Soviet and Allied prisoners of war and also nationals who have been deported by force or interned adequate food, clothing and medical service in accordance with hygienic requirements, and also with means of transport for their return to their homeland.

At the same time Finnish prisoners of war and interned persons now located on the territory of Allied States will be transferred to Finland.

Article 11.

Losses caused by Finland to the Soviet Union by military operations and the occupation of Soviet territory will be indemnified by Finland to the Soviet Union to the amount of three hundred million dollars payable over six years in commodities (timber products, paper, cellulose, seagoing machinery, and river craft, sundry machinery).

Provision will also be made for the indemnification in the future by Finland of the losses caused during the war to the property of the other Allied States and their nationals in Finland, the amount of the compensation to be fixed separately. (See Annex to Article 11.)

Article 12.

Finland undertakes to restore all legal rights and interests of the United Nations and their nationals located on Finnish territory as they existed before the war and to return their property in complete good order.

Article 13.

Finland undertakes to collaborate with the Allied Powers in the apprehension of persons accused of war crimes and in their trial.
ARTICLE 14.

Finland undertakes within the periods fixed by the Allied (Soviet) High Command to return to the Soviet Union in complete good order all valuables and materials removed from Soviet territory to Finland during the war belonging to State, public and co-operative organizations, factories, institutions or individual citizens, such as: equipment for factories and works, locomotives, railway carriages, ships, tractors, motor vehicles, historical monuments, valuables from museums and all other property.

ARTICLE 15.

Finland undertakes to transfer as booty to the disposition of the Allied (Soviet) High Command all war material of Germany and her satellites located on Finnish territory, including naval and other ships belonging to these countries in Finnish waters.

ARTICLE 16.

Finland undertakes not to permit the export or expropriation of any form of property (including valuables and currency) belonging to Germany or Hungary or to their nationals or to persons resident in their territories or in the territories occupied by them without the permission of the Allied (Soviet) High Command.

ARTICLE 17.

Finnish merchant ships other than those already under Allied control shall be placed under the control of the Allied (Soviet) High Command for their use in the general interests of the Allies.

ARTICLE 18.

Finland undertakes to transfer to the Allied (Soviet) High Command all ships in Finnish ports belonging to the United Nations, no matter at whose disposal these vessels may be, for the use of the Allied (Soviet) High Command for the duration of the war against Germany in the general interests of the Allies, these vessels subsequently to be returned to their owners.

ARTICLE 19.

Finland will make available such materials and products as may be required by the United Nations for purposes connected with the war.

ARTICLE 20.

Finland undertakes immediately to release all persons, irrespective of citizenship or nationality, held in prison on account of their activities in favour of the United Nations or because of their sympathies with the cause of the United Nations, or in view of their racial origin, and will also remove all discriminatory legislation and disabilities arising therefrom.

ARTICLE 21.

Finland undertakes immediately to dissolve all pro-Hitler organisations (of a Fascist type) situated on Finnish territory, whether political, military or para-military, as well as other organisations conducting propaganda hostile to the United Nations, in particular to the Soviet Union, and will not in future permit the existence of organisations of that nature.

ARTICLE 22.

An Allied Control Commission will be established which until the conclusion of peace with Finland will undertake the regulation and control of the execution of the present Agreement under the general direction and instructions of the Allied (Soviet) High Command, acting on behalf of the Allied Powers. (See Annex to Article 22.)
ARTICLE 33.

The present Agreement comes into force as from the moment of signature.

Done in Moscow the nineteenth day of September, 1914, in one copy which will be entrusted to the safe-keeping of the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, in the Russian, English and Finnish languages, the Russian and English texts being authentic.

Certified copies of the present Agreement, with Annexes and maps, will be transmitted by the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics to each of the other Governments on whose behalf the present Agreement is being signed.

For the Governments of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the United Kingdom:

A. ZHDANOV.

For the Government of Finland:

C. ENCKELL.
R. WALDEN.
E. HEINRICH.
O. ENCKELL.
APPENDIX G

The Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, Australia, the Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republic, Canada, Czechoslovakia, India, New Zealand, the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic, and the Union of South Africa, as the States which are at war with Finland and actively waged war against the European enemy states with substantial military forces, hereinafter referred to as "the Allied and Associated Powers", of the one part, and Finland, of the other part;

Whereas Finland, having become an ally of Hitlerite Germany and having participated on her side in the war against the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, the United Kingdom and other United Nations, bears her share of responsibility for this war;

Whereas, however, Finland on September 4, 1944, entirely ceased military operations against the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, withdrew from the war against the United Nations, broke off relations with Germany and her satellites, and, having concluded on September 19, 1944, an Armistice with the Governments of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the United Kingdom, acting on behalf of the United Nations at war with Finland, loyally carried out the Armistice terms; and

Whereas the Allied and Associated Powers and Finland are desirous of concluding a treaty of peace which, conforming to the principles of justice, will settle questions still outstanding as a result of the events hereinbefore recited and will form the basis of friendly relations between them, thereby enabling the Allied and Associated Powers to support Finland's application to become a member of the United Nations and also to adhere to any Convention concluded under the auspices of the United Nations;

Have therefore agreed to declare the cessation of the state of war and for this purpose to conclude the present Treaty of Peace, and have accordingly appointed the undersigned Plenipotentiaries who, after presentation of their full powers, found in good and due form, have agreed on the following provisions:

PART I

TERRITORIAL CLAUSES

Article 1

The frontiers of Finland, as shown on the map annexed to the present
Article 2

In accordance with the Armistice Agreement of September 19, 1944, Finland confirms the return to the Soviet Union of the province of Petsamo (Pechenga) voluntarily ceded to Finland by the Soviet State under the Peace Treaties of October 14, 1920, and March 12, 1940. The frontiers of the province of Petsamo (Pechenga) are shown on the map annexed to the present Treaty (Annex I).

PART II

POLITICAL CLAUSES

SECTION I

Article 3

In accordance with the Armistice Agreement, the effect of the Peace Treaty between the Soviet Union and Finland concluded in Moscow on March 12, 1940, is restored, subject to the replacement of Articles 4, 5 and 6 of that Treaty by Articles 2 and 4 of the present Treaty.

Article 4

1. In accordance with the Armistice Agreement, the Soviet Union confirms the renunciation of its right to the lease of the Peninsula of Hango, accorded to it by the Soviet-Finnish Peace Treaty of March 12, 1940, and Finland for her part confirms having granted to the Soviet Union on the basis of a fifty years lease at an annual rent payable by the Soviet Union of five million Finnish marks the use and administration of territory and waters for the establishment of a Soviet naval base in the area of Porkkala-Udd as shown on the map annexed to the present Treaty (Annex I).

2. Finland confirms having secured to the Soviet Union, in accordance with the Armistice Agreement, the use of the railways, waterways, roads and air routes necessary for the transport of personnel and freight dispatched from the Soviet Union to the naval base at Porkkala-Udd, and also confirms having granted to the Soviet Union the right of unimpeded use of all forms of communication between the Soviet Union and the territory leased in the area of Porkkala-Udd.

Article 5

The Åland Islands shall remain demilitarised in accordance with the situation as at present existing.
Section II

Article 6

Finland shall take all measures necessary to secure to all persons under Finnish jurisdiction, without distinction as to race, sex, language or religion, the enjoyment of human rights and of the fundamental freedoms, including freedom of expression, of press and publication, of religious worship, of political opinion and of public meeting.

Article 7

Finland, which in accordance with the Armistice Agreement has taken measures to set free, irrespective of citizenship and nationality, all persons held in confinement on account of their activities in favour of, or because of their sympathies with, the United Nations or because of their racial origin, and to repeal discriminatory legislation and restrictions imposed thereunder, shall complete these measures and shall in future not take any measures or enact any laws which would be incompatible with the purposes set forth in this Article.

Article 8

Finland, which in accordance with the Armistice Agreement has taken measures for dissolving all organisations of a Fascist type on Finnish territory, whether political, military or para-military, as well as other organisations conducting propaganda hostile to the Soviet Union or to any of the other United Nations, shall not permit in future the existence and activities of organisations of that nature which have as their aim denial to the people of their democratic rights.

Article 9

1. Finland shall take all necessary steps to ensure the apprehension and surrender for trial of:

(a) Persons accused of having committed, ordered or abetted war crimes and crimes against peace or humanity;

(b) Nationals of any Allied or Associated Power accused of having violated their national law by treason or collaboration with the enemy during the war.

2. At the request of the United Nations Government concerned, Finland shall likewise make available as witnesses persons within its jurisdiction, whose evidence is required for the trial of the persons referred to in paragraph 1 of this Article.

3. Any disagreement concerning the application of the provisions of paragraphs 1 and 2 of this Article shall be referred by any of the Govern-
mments concerned to the Heads of the Diplomatic Missions in Helsinki of the
Soviet Union and the United Kingdom, who will reach agreement with
regard to the difficulty.

SECTION III

Article 10

Finland undertakes to recognise the full force of the Treaties of Peace
with Italy, Roumania, Bulgaria and Hungary and other agreements or
arrangements which have been or will be reached by the Allied and Asso-
ciated Powers in respect of Austria, Germany and Japan for the restoration
of peace.

Article 11

Finland undertakes to accept any arrangements which have been or
may be agreed for the liquidation of the League of Nations and the Perma-
nent Court of International Justice.

Article 12

1. Each Allied or Associated Power will notify Finland, within a period
of six months from the coming into force of the present Treaty, which of its
pre-war bilateral treaties with Finland it desires to keep in force or revive.
Any provisions not in conformity with the present Treaty shall, however,
be deleted from the above-mentioned treaties.

2. All such treaties so notified shall be registered with the Secretariat
of the United Nations in accordance with Article 102 of the Charter of the
United Nations.

3. All such treaties not so notified shall be regarded as abrogated.

PART III

MILITARY, NAVAL AND AIR CLAUSES

Article 13

The maintenance of land, sea and air armaments and fortifications
shall be closely restricted to meeting tasks of an internal character and local
defence of frontiers. In accordance with the foregoing, Finland is authorised
to have armed forces consisting of not more than:

(a) A land army, including frontier troops and anti-aircraft artillery,
with a total strength of 34,400 personnel;
(b) A navy with a personnel strength of 4,500 and a total tonnage of 10,000 tons;

(c) An air force, including any naval air arm, of 60 aircraft, including reserves, with a total personnel strength of 3,000. Finland shall not possess or acquire any aircraft designed primarily as bombers with internal bomb-carrying facilities.

These strengths shall in each case include combat, service and overhead personnel.

Article 14

The personnel of the Finnish Army, Navy and Air Force in excess of the respective strengths permitted under Article 13 shall be disbanded within six months from the coming into force of the present Treaty.

Article 15

Personnel not included in the Finnish Army, Navy or Air Force shall not receive any form of military training, naval training or military air training as defined in Annex II.

Article 16

1. As from the coming into force of the present Treaty, Finland will be invited to join the Barents, Baltic and Black Sea Zone Board of the International Organisation for Mine Clearance of European Waters and shall maintain at the disposal of the Central Mine Clearance Board all Finnish minesweeping forces until the end of the post-war mine clearance period, as determined by the Central Board.

2. During this post-war mine clearance period, Finland may retain additional naval units employed only for the specific purpose of minesweeping, over and above the tonnage permitted in Article 13.

Within two months of the end of the said period, such of these vessels as are on loan to the Finnish Navy from other Powers shall be returned to those Powers, and all other additional units shall be disarmed and converted to civilian use.

3. Finland is also authorised to employ 1,500 additional officers and men for minesweeping over and above the numbers permitted in Article 13. Two months after the completion of minesweeping by the Finnish Navy, the excess personnel shall be disbanded or absorbed within the numbers permitted in the said Article.

Article 17

Finland shall not possess, construct or experiment with any atomic weapon, any self-propelled or guided missiles or apparatus connected with their discharge (other than torpedoes and torpedoes launching gear comprising the normal armament of naval vessel permitted by the present Treaty),
sea mines or torpedoes of non-contact types actuated by influence mechanisms, torpedoes capable of being manned, submarines or other submersible craft, motor torpedo boats, or specialised types of assault craft.

Article 18

Finland shall not retain, produce or otherwise acquire, or maintain facilities for the manufacture of, war material in excess of that required for the maintenance of the armed forces permitted under Article 13 of the present Treaty.

Article 19

1. Excess war material of Allied origin shall be placed at the disposal of the Allied Power concerned according to the instructions given by that Power. Excess Finnish war material shall be placed at the disposal of the Governments of the Soviet Union and the United Kingdom. Finland shall renounce all rights to this material.

2. War material of German origin or design in excess of that required for the armed forces permitted under the present Treaty shall be placed at the disposal of the Two Governments. Finland shall not acquire or manufacture any war material of German origin or design, or employ or train any technicians, including military and civil aviation personnel, who are or have been nationals of Germany.

3. Excess war material mentioned in paragraphs 1 and 2 of this Article shall be handed over or destroyed within one year from the coming into force of the present Treaty.

4. A definition and list of war material for the purposes of the present Treaty are contained in Annex III.

Article 20

Finland shall co-operate fully with the Allied and Associated Powers with a view to ensuring that Germany may not be able to take steps outside German territory towards rearmament.

Article 21

Finland shall not acquire or manufacture civil aircraft which are of German or Japanese design or which embody major assemblies of German or Japanese manufacture or design.

Article 22

Each of the military, naval and air clauses of the present Treaty shall remain in force until modified in whole or in part by agreement between the Allied and Associated Powers and Finland or, after Finland becomes a
member of the United Nations, by agreement between the Security Council and Finland.

PART IV
REPARATION AND RESTITUTION

Article 23
1. Losses caused to the Soviet Union by military operations and by the occupation by Finland of Soviet territory shall be made good by Finland to the Soviet Union, but, taking into consideration that Finland has not only withdrawn from the war against the United Nations, but has also declared war on Germany and assisted with her forces in driving German troops out of Finland, the Parties agree that compensation for the above losses will be made by Finland not in full, but only in part, namely in the amount of $300,000,000 payable over eight years from September 19, 1944, in commodities (timber products, paper, cellulose, sea-going and river craft, sundry machinery, and other commodities).

2. The basis of calculation for the settlement provided in this Article shall be the United States dollar at its gold parity on the day of the signing of the Armistice Agreement, i.e. $35 for one ounce of gold.

Article 24
Finland, in so far as she has not yet done so, undertakes within the time-limits indicated by the Government of the Soviet Union to return to the Soviet Union in complete good order all valuables and materials removed from its territory during the war, and belonging to State, public or co-operative organisations, enterprises or institutions or to individual citizens, such as; factory and works equipment, locomotives, rolling stock, tractors, motor vehicles, historic monuments, museum valuables and any other property.

PART V
ECONOMIC CLAUSES

Article 25
1. In so far as Finland has not already done so, Finland shall restore all legal rights and interests in Finland of the United Nations and their nationals as they existed on June 22, 1941, and shall return all property in Finland of the United Nations and their nationals as it now exists.

2. The Finnish Government undertakes that all property, rights and
interests passing under this Article shall be restored free of all encumbrances and charges of any kind to which they may have become subject as a result of the war and without the imposition of any charges by the Finnish Government in connexion with their return. The Finnish Government shall nullify all measures, including seizures, sequestration or control, taken by it against United Nations property between June 22, 1941, and the coming into force of the present Treaty. In cases where the property has not been returned within six months from the coming into force of the present Treaty, application shall be made to the Finnish authorities not later than twelve months from the coming into force of the Treaty, except in cases in which the claimant is able to show that he could not file his application within this period.

3. The Finnish Government shall invalidate transfers involving property, rights and interests of any description belonging to United Nations nationals, where such transfers resulted from force or duress exerted by Axis Governments or their agencies during the war.

4. (a) The Finnish Government shall be responsible for the restoration to complete good order of the property returned to United Nations nationals under paragraph 1 of this Article. In cases where property cannot be returned or where, as a result of the war, a United Nations national has suffered a loss by reason of injury or damage to property in Finland, he shall receive from the Finnish Government compensation in Finnish marks to the extent of two-thirds of the sum necessary, at the date of payment, to purchase similar property or to make good the loss suffered. In no event shall United Nations nationals receive less favourable treatment with respect to compensation than that accorded to Finnish nationals.

(b) United Nations nationals who hold, directly or indirectly, ownership interests in corporations or associations which are not United Nations nationals within the meaning of paragraph 8 (a) of this Article, but which have suffered a loss by reason of injury or damage to property in Finland, shall receive compensation in accordance with sub-paragraph (a) above. This compensation shall be calculated on the basis of the total loss or damage suffered by the corporation or association and shall bear the same proportion to such loss or damage as the beneficial interests of such nationals in the corporation or association bear to the total capital thereof.

(c) Compensation shall be paid free of any levies, taxes or other charges. It shall be freely usable in Finland but shall be subject to the foreign exchange control regulations which may be in force in Finland from time to time.

(d) The Finnish Government shall accord to United Nations nationals the same treatment in the allocation of materials for the repair or rehabilitation of their property in Finland and in the allocation of foreign exchange for the importation of such materials as applies to Finnish nationals.
(c) The Finnish Government shall grant United Nations nationals an indemnity in Finnish marks at the same rate as provided in sub-paragraph (a) above to compensate them for the loss or damage due to special measures applied to their property during the war, and which were not applicable to Finnish property. This sub-paragraph does not apply to a loss of profit.

5. All reasonable expenses incurred in Finland in establishing claims, including the assessment of loss or damage, shall be borne by the Finnish Government.

6. United Nations nationals and their property shall be exempted from any exceptional taxes, levies or imposts imposed on their capital assets in Finland by the Finnish Government or any Finnish authority between the date of the Armistice and the coming into force of the present Treaty for the specific purpose of meeting charges arising out of the war or of meeting the costs of reparation payable to any of the United Nations. Any sums which have been so paid shall be refunded.

7. The owner of the property concerned and the Finnish Government may agree upon arrangements in lieu of the provisions of this Article.

8. As used in this Article:

(a) "United Nations nationals" means individuals who are nationals of any of the United Nations, or corporations or associations organized under the laws of any of the United Nations, at the coming into force of the present Treaty, provided that the said individuals, corporations or associations also had this status at the date of the Armistice with Finland.

The term "United Nations nationals" also includes all individuals, corporations or associations which, under the laws in force in Finland during the war, have been treated as enemy;

(b) "Owner" means the United Nations national, as defined in sub-paragraph (a) above, who is entitled to the property in question, and includes a successor of the owner, provided that the successor is also a United Nations national as defined in sub-paragraph (a). If the successor has purchased the property in its damaged state, the transferor shall retain his rights to compensation under this Article, without prejudice to obligations between the transferor and the purchaser under domestic law;

(c) "Property" means all movable or immovable property, whether tangible or intangible, including industrial, literary and artistic property, as well as all rights or interests of any kind in property.

Article 26

Finland recognises that the Soviet Union is entitled to all German assets in Finland transferred to the Soviet Union by the Control Council for Germany and undertakes to take all necessary measures to facilitate such transfers.
Article 27

In so far as any such rights were restricted on account of Finland's participation in the war on Germany's side, the rights of the Finnish Government and of any Finnish nationals, including juridical persons, relating to Finnish property or other Finnish assets on the territories of the Allied and Associated Powers shall be restored after the coming into force of the present Treaty.

Article 28

1. From the coming into force of the present Treaty, property in Germany of Finland and of Finnish nationals shall no longer be treated as enemy property and all restrictions based on such treatment shall be removed.

2. Identifiable property of Finland and of Finnish nationals removed by force or duress from Finnish territory to Germany by German forces or authorities after September 19, 1944, shall be eligible for restitution.

3. The restoration and restitution of Finnish property in Germany shall be effected in accordance with measures which will be determined by the Powers in occupation of Germany.

Article 29

1. Finland waives all claims of any description against the Allied and Associated Powers on behalf of the Finnish Government or Finnish nationals arising directly out of the war or out of actions taken because of the existence of a state of war in Europe after September 1, 1939, whether or not the Allied or Associated Power was at war with Finland at the time, including the following:

   (a) Claims for losses or damages sustained as a consequence of acts of forces or authorities of Allied or Associated Powers;

   (b) Claims arising from the presence, operations or actions of forces or authorities of Allied or Associated Powers in Finnish territory;

   (c) Claims with respect to the decrees or orders of Prize Courts of Allied or Associated Powers, Finland agreeing to accept as valid and binding all decrees and orders of such Prize Courts on or after September 1, 1939, concerning Finnish ships or Finnish goods or the payment of costs;

   (d) Claims arising out of the exercise or purported exercise of belligerent rights.

2. The provisions of this Article shall bar, completely and finally, all claims of the nature referred to herein, which will be henceforward extinguished, whoever may be the parties in interest.

3. Finland likewise waives all claims of the nature covered by paragraph 1 of this Article on behalf of the Finnish Government or Finnish
nationals against any of the United Nations whose diplomatic relations with Finland were broken off during the war and which took action in cooperation with the Allied and Associated Powers.

4. The waiver of claims by Finland under paragraph 1 of this Article includes any claims arising out of actions taken by any of the Allied and Associated Powers with respect to Finnish ships between September 1, 1939, and the coming into force of the present Treaty, as well as any claims and debts arising out of the Convention on prisoners of war now in force.

Article 30

1. Pending the conclusion of commercial treaties or agreements between individual United Nations and Finland, the Finnish Government shall, during a period of eighteen months from the coming into force of the present Treaty, grant the following treatment to each of the United Nations which, in fact, reciprocally grants similar treatment in like matters to Finland:

(a) In all that concerns duties and charges on importation or exportation, the internal taxation of imported goods and all regulations pertaining thereto, the United Nations shall be granted unconditional most-favoured-nation treatment;

(b) In all other respects, Finland shall make no arbitrary discrimination against goods originating in or destined for any territory of any of the United Nations as compared with like goods originating in or destined for territory of any other of the United Nations or of any other foreign country;

(c) United Nations nationals, including juridical persons, shall be granted national and most-favoured-nation treatment in all matters pertaining to commerce, industry, shipping and other forms of business activity within Finland. These provisions shall not apply to commercial aviation;

(d) Finland shall grant no exclusive or discriminatory right to any country with regard to the operation of commercial aircraft in international traffic, shall afford all the United Nations equality of opportunity in obtaining international commercial aviation rights in Finnish territory, including the right to land for refueling and repair, and, with regard to the operation of commercial aircraft in international traffic, shall grant on a reciprocal and non-discriminatory basis to all United Nations the right to fly over Finnish territory without landing. These provisions shall not affect the interests of the national defence of Finland.

2. The foregoing undertakings by Finland shall be understood to be subject to the exceptions customarily included in commercial treaties concluded by Finland before the war; and the provisions with respect to reciprocity granted by each of the United Nations shall be understood to be subject to the exceptions customarily included in the commercial treaties concluded by that State.
Article 31

1. Any disputes which may arise in connexion with Articles 24 and 25 and Annexes IV, V and VI, part B, of the present Treaty shall be referred to a Conciliation Commission composed of an equal number of representatives of the United Nations Government concerned and of the Finnish Government. If agreement has not been reached within three months of the dispute having been referred to the Conciliation Commission, either Government may require the addition of a third member to the Commission, and, failing agreement between the two Governments on the selection of this member, the Secretary-General of the United Nations may be requested by either party to make the appointment.

2. The decision of the majority of the members of the Commission shall be the decision of the Commission and shall be accepted by the parties as definitive and binding.

Article 32

Articles 24, 25, 30 and Annex VI of the present Treaty shall apply to the Allied and Associated Powers and France and to those of the United Nations whose diplomatic relations with Finland have been broken off during the war.

Article 33

The provisions of Annexes IV, V and VI shall, as in the case of the other Annexes, have force and effect as integral parts of the present Treaty.

PART VI

FINAL CLAUSES

Article 34

1. For a period not to exceed eighteen months from the coming into force of the present Treaty, the Heads of the Diplomatic Missions in Helsinki of the Soviet Union and the United Kingdom, acting in concert, will represent the Allied and Associated Powers in dealing with the Finnish Government in all matters concerning the execution and interpretation of the present Treaty.

2. The Two Heads of Mission will give the Finnish Government such guidance, technical advice and clarification as may be necessary to ensure the rapid and efficient execution of the present Treaty both in letter and in spirit.

3. The Finnish Government shall afford the said Two Heads of Mission all necessary information and any assistance which they may require for the fulfilment of the tasks devolving on them under the present Treaty.
1. Except where another procedure is specifically provided under any Article of the present Treaty, any dispute concerning the interpretation or execution of the Treaty, which is not settled by direct diplomatic negotiations, shall be referred to the Two Heads of Mission acting under Article 34, except that in this case the Heads of Mission will not be restricted by the time limit provided in that Article. Any such dispute not resolved by them within a period of two months shall, unless the parties to the dispute mutually agree upon another means of settlement, be referred at the request of either party to the dispute to a Commission composed of one representative of each party and a third member selected by mutual agreement of the two parties from nationals of a third country. Should the two parties fail to agree within a period of one month upon the appointment of the third member, the Secretary-General of the United Nations may be requested by either party to make the appointment.

2. The decision of the majority of the members of the Commission shall be the decision of the Commission, and shall be accepted by the parties as definitive and binding.

Article 35

The present Treaty, of which the Russian and English texts are authentic, shall be ratified by the Allied and Associated Powers. It shall also be ratified by Finland. It shall come into force immediately upon the deposit of ratifications by the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland. The instruments of ratification shall, in the shortest time possible, be deposited with the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics.

With respect to each Allied or Associated Power whose instrument of ratification is thereafter deposited, the Treaty shall come into force upon the date of deposit. The present Treaty shall be deposited in the archives of the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, which shall furnish certified copies to each of the signatory States.
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Secondary Sources:


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