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General Jacob Sechler Coxey and his relationship to the Industrial Armies of the Pacific Northwest

Edrie Vinson

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General Jacob Sechler Coxey and his relationship
to the Industrial Armies of the
Pacific Northwest

A Thesis
Presented to the Faculty of the Department of History, Carroll College, In Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for Graduation with Honors

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Chapter I

Prosperity, Populism and the Panic

"Or shall authority," asked House Speaker Charles Y. Crisp, to you, Jacob Sechler Canny, "represent sixty-five million people?"

Jacob B. Canny, the self-styled representative of the American people, demanded that Congress hear him and pass his legislation. For he claimed that his will was the will of the people. When the hearing was denied, Canny denounced Congress for refusing to grants the rights of the American people. In the instance, were the voices of the unemployed.

Canny to the American people, nor did he represent the four million unemployed. But for nearly eight years, Canny has been known as the leader of the unemployed armies who marched on Washington in 1933. It is the purpose of this paper to show that Canny was only a symbol, not a leader, to those armies. It was his idea of

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not the demands he intended to make. Armies of the unemployed marched to Washington from the east coast, the midwest, the Pacific Northwest,

New England, and the mid-Atlantic states. As these armies cannot be explained in terms of the traditional view of Cannyism, neither can they be explained in terms of collectivism. The scope of this paper is

limited to a study of the armies of the Pacific Northwest, whose distance vied against these five groups of marchers. Little has been written

about the armies of Montana, Oregon and Washington, and they have

for the past year been misunderstood. They have been called "sabotage," "dangerous," and "criminal," when actually they were unarmed, only to give to authority, and insane only as a last resort. Their most outstanding characteristic, persistent determination, has been all that
"By what authority," asked House Speaker Charles F. Crisp, do you, Jacob Sechler Coxey, "represent sixty-five million people"?\(^1\)

Jacob S. Coxey, the self-styled representative of the American people, demanded that Congress hear him and pass his legislation, for he claimed that his will was the will of the people. When the hearing was denied, Coxey denounced Congress for refusing "to grant the rights of the American people." The "people" in this instance, were the armies of the unemployed.\(^2\)

Coxey in no way represented sixty-five million people, nor did he represent the four million unemployed. But for nearly eight years, Coxey has been known as the leader of the unemployed armies who marched on Washington in 1894. It is the purpose of this paper to show that Coxey was only a symbol, not a leader, to those armies. It was his idea of marching to Congress with his demands that appealed to the unemployed, not the demands he intended to make. Armies of the unemployed marched to Washington from the west coast, the mid-west, the Pacific Northwest, New England, and the mid-Atlantic states. As these armies cannot be explained in terms of the traditional view of Coxeyism, neither can they be explained in terms of sectionalism. The scope of this paper is limited to a study of the Armies of the Pacific Northwest, whose demands varied among these five groups of marchers. Little has been written about the Armies of Montana, Oregon and Washington, and they have for the most part been misunderstood. They have been called "militant", "dangerous", and "turbulent", when actually they were unarmed, submissive to authority, and lawless only as a last resort. Their most outstanding characteristic, persistent determination, has been all but
forgotten. These five armies are remembered primarily for their train stealing episodes, but an examination of their situations and the catastrophic nineties may persuade us to refrain from branding them as thieves.

Coxey and the unemployed armies were not the only citizens advocating reform in the late nineteenth century. The People's Party, or the so-called Populists, made up initially of farmers from the south and mid-west, highly criticized the existing political and economic system. America's transformation from agrarianism to industrialism in the second half of the century left "society without a core." This period of prosperity, expansion, and industrialization was termed by Mark Twain, "The Gilded Age."

Railroads crossed the continent and hundreds of branch lines connected them to outlying cities and towns. Factories could be found from New England to the Great Lakes. Improvements in technology closed older businesses and created numerous new ones. Modern transportation opened virgin lands to farming and lumbering industries. Opportunities for gain appeared unlimited, and everyone confidently expected to become rich.

But in the midst of the wealth the farming element did not prosper. The land speculation boom in the Great Plains came to a halt after the poor crops of 1887, and the ensuing agricultural depression began. High mortgages, increasing operating costs and freight rates, coupled with inflationary money and falling staple prices, brought farmers to ruin or bare subsistence levels. The Jeffersonian backbone of the nation was not receiving just reward for his labor. Efforts to better the condition of the farmer resulted in the creation of the People's Party.

The Populists claimed the maldistribution of wealth was also a
problem of the laboring class. A surplus of workers due to unrestricted immigration, mechanization, and the instability of business, reduced wages for many, while leaving others unemployed. And, according to the Populists, labor was not only economically depressed, but socially alienated, degraded, and brutalized. They further insisted that "degradation and impoverishment of either class is a direct blow to the prosperity of the other." The farmers in the west burned corn for fuel while the miners sat idle and hungry because there was no demand for their coal. Neither could afford the products of the other. Thus sympathizing with the workers the Populists hoped to form a coalition for political action against the controllers of wealth. Though farmer-labor unity was never completely realized on a national scale, many workers joined the Populist party.7

By stressing their stand on free coinage of silver, the Populists gained a following in the mining areas of the West. The silver miners provided the much needed funds for the party, but also led to Populism's downfall. The westerners never accepted the Populists views on public ownership of transportation and utilities, and the coalition lasted only as long as silver remained the primary issue. In 1896 the democrats incorporated free silver into their platform, and the miners returned to the familiar party. ties.8

The Populist party was basically a movement to restore agrarian profit. They believed that progress, if directed in the interest of the people, would provide a more profitable and stable future for the American farmers. But society had changed since the growth of monopolies and the concentration of economic power. The common man was replaced by the machines that should have made his working hours less and wages greater. The owners grew wealthy while the laborers sunk to the verge of
poverty. The Populists wanted not to destroy the machines, but to control them, to insure the people of an equal share in the prosperity. 9

To gain the sources of opportunity and self-determination, the People's Party outlined the following demands in the Omaha Platform of 1892: free and unlimited coinage of silver and gold at the ratio of 16 to 1; the circulating medium of exchange be increased to $50 per capita; a graduated income tax; limited state and national revenue, offset by economical and honest administration; the establishment of postal savings banks; government owned and operated railroads and telegraphs; and prohibition of alien land ownership. The Populists also advocated the secret ballot, restriction of immigration, shorter working hours, abolition of the Pinkerton system, initiative and referendum, and direct election of senators. 10

The importance of Populism for the purpose of this paper is its attitude towards the government. The idea that success follows industry and perserverance failed the farmer, and social Darwinism favored only the large monopolistic powers. Kansas Governor Lewelling expressed the party's sentiments in a speech in Kansas City: "It is the business of the Government to make it possible for me to live and sustain the life of my family....to protect the weak, because the strong are able to protect themselves." This so called paternalistic view of the government was the most highly criticized aspect of the Populist ideology. But as C. B. Morton explained in 1894, "the failure of the Government to perform its functions, delegating its powers to individuals and corporations is worse than paternalism." Morton and other Populists made a distinction between "social action" and "governmental action". Only if the government invaded the social sphere would it be considered paternalistic. The Populists denied that asking the government to supply the means
for self help, such as work and decent wages, was equal to asking the government for bread. They wanted opportunity, not a handout.

The Populists fought for human dignity and freedom, believing that man was free only when he had the opportunity of self determination. When a man was forced into idleness the laws that should protect him were used against him, labeling him a vagrant. For this reason the party suggested a new interpretation of the Declaration of Independence: "life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness" was altered to read "life, liberty, and the means of happiness." To the older conception of property rights, they added the rights to employment at suitable wages. Since Coxeyism was the result of forced idleness and demanded that the government provide public works, it received the whole-hearted support of the People's Party.

The Panic of 1893 also had a profound influence on the rise of Coxeyism. The railroads, "overbuilt, overexploited and undermanaged," were the first to suffer. In February of 1893 the Philadelphia and Reading Railroad filed bankruptcy. A wave of frantic stock market selling sent seventy-three more railroads to destruction. A general loss of confidence led to more selling, and beginning with the National Cordage Co. in May of 1893, industries numbering in excess of fifteen thousand failed, pulling down more than six hundred banks with them.

Distrust of banks and securities was heightened by a continual flow of gold out of the country. In 1892, gold exports were valued around fifty million dollars. Fearing the banks would halt further gold withdrawals in the near future, foreign investors rapidly shipped securities to be redeemed to America. By May of the following year seventy-one million dollars in gold steamed toward Europe, lead-
ing to the crucial phase of the panic. Distrusting reserve facilities, the people began to remove their savings. Those collecting first proceeded to hoard the paper currency, now inflated by the withdrawal of gold. The late comers found the currency supply exhausted and many of the banks closed. Employers of the stable industries that withstood the stock market crash now found that the lack of circulating medium prevented them from withdrawing cash for pay rolls, supplies and operating expenses, or from obtaining cash by selling their products. Unable to operate without money, a new wave of factory closures resulted, adding to the list of unemployed.

The silver issue was a major focal point of the panic. Hostile to silver, the British closed the Indian mints to the white metal in June of 1893. Desiring to see the entire world on a gold standard, England locked distrustingly at the American legislation of 1890, the Sherman Silver Purchase Act. Believing the silver legislation caused the panic, President Cleveland called a special session of Congress to repeal the act. By a vote of 43 to 32 on October 30, 1893, the Senate complied with his wishes. The immediate effect of the repeal was the closing of mines in the western regions, greater unemployment, and widespread dissatisfaction.

The immediate causes of the panic were hotly disputed. W. E. Russell claimed the causes were world wide, beyond the power of American businessmen, bankers and politicians to control. J. W. Bennett blamed the evil of interest taking. The banks took their share of the blame from O. M. W. Sprague for over extention of loans and inadequate reserves, and rallied to the praise of Charles S. Smith for how well they conducted themselves "during these perilous days." G. Yard stepped far afield to place the entire financial crisis on President Cleve-
land's Venezuela message, which he claimed frightened the British with the threat of war and the repudiation of their securities. And of course, the old law of supply and demand was rehashed by C. A. Conant, as being the sole contributor. While the Democrats sought to expose past Republican legislation, the tariff issue, Republicans pointed to the Democratic administration. Likewise, the silverites accused the goldbugs and vice versa. Since the causes of the panic eluded Congress, reform was unattainable.16

The government took no active role in the financial crisis, nor in the problems of the four million unemployed. Relief measures were local and inadequate. The forty to sixty thousand professional tramps in the country found their ranks swollen by the honest workingmen traveling about in search of employment. The unemployed often grouped together in bands of fifty to three hundred to ride trains to their destinations, easily avoiding payment of a fare. Some of the unemployed had been engaged in railroad construction or operation, and believed they had a moral claim to ride the road home or to a new place of employment. Others holding Populist beliefs demanded that the railroads should be the property of the people, and felt no guilt for demanding free transportation. Thus, riding free of charge became as common for the unemployed as it had earlier been for the privileged friends of the railroad magnates. The armies of unemployed who rode toward Washington from the west did not turn to the railroads, they were already riding them.17
Footnotes


2 McMurry, pp. 113-114.


7 Morgan, p. 10; Minnesota State Farmer's Alliance Declaration, February 25, 1885, Edwin H. Atwood Papers, Minnesota Historical Society, as in Pollack, p. 44. See also pp. 29, 30, 45.


9 Hofstader, pp. 9, 25; Pollack, pp. 2-3, 15-16, 30.

10 Lindell, pp. 93-96.


p. 281. See also 279-80.


Chapter II

"General" Jacob Sechler Coxey, and the Commonwealth of Christ

While others grumbled under their breath and waited for the return of prosperity, Jacob Sechler Coxey took the giant step at point 40 both the "Coxey and Coxey" for the financial depression. For this daring act, he was considered a fool, a visionary, and "the most dangerous man since the Civil War."

Unlike the Populist reformers of his day, Coxey was a well-to-do businessman. Near East Liverpool, Ohio, he operated a steel mill that produced Silicon steel for steel and glass industries; he owned interests in agricultural land, the finest racing horses in his part of the state, and other regular enterprises. He supplemented his income by selling a home-made medicine called "Coxey's Elixir!"

Far from his affiliations with the Populist and earlier Greenback parties, Coxey hardly fit into the role of a reformer, demagoguing Indians,Socialists, and the working laborers. John L. Lewis found Coxey's leadership of the unemployed to be unusual, quite unlike his belief that Coxey was unaffected by the Panic of 1873. In defense of Coxey, he wrote in his conclusion that Coxey was not financially successful. Actually, Coxey was a well-to-do gentlemanly by the Panic. The closing of factories reduced the demand for silicon steel. Prices, once valued upwards of two hundred dollars, depreciated in both price and demand. Glass financially pressed many owners placed their stock on the market in competition with farmers and speculators.

And, most importantly, such failures made it impossible for anyone to rely on savings. The truth is that Coxey's creditors began attachment proceedings against him in the Spring of 1873.

Another reason for Coxey's involvement on behalf of the insolvent
While others grumbled under their breath and waited for the return of prosperity, Jacob Sechler Coxey took the giant step to point out both the "Cause and Cure" for the financial depression. For this daring act, he was considered a rebel, a visionary, and "the most dangerous man since the Civil War." ¹

Unlike the Populist reformers of his day, Coxey was a well-to-do businessman. Near Massillon, Ohio, he operated a stone quarry that produced silica sand for steel and glass industries; he owned interests in agricultural lands; and he bred some of the finest racing horses in his part of the country. In addition to these regular enterprises, he supplemented his income by selling a home-made medicine called Cox-E-lax. ²

Aside from his affiliations with the Populist and earlier Greenback parties, Coxey hardly fits into the role of a reformer, denouncing trusts, monopolies, plutocrats, and the money interests. John D. Hicks found Coxey's leadership of the unemployed to be unusual, since Hicks believed that Coxey was unaffected by the Panic of 1893. In defense of Hicks, it is true that Coxey was worth $200,000, but Hicks errs in his conclusion that Coxey was not financially hurt. Actually Coxey was affected greatly by the Panic. The closing of factories reduced the demand for silica sand. Horses, once valued upwards of two hundred dollars, depreciated in both price and demand when financially pressed factory owners placed their stock on the market in competition with farmers and breeders. And, most importantly, bank failures made it impossible for anyone to rely on savings. The truth is that Coxey's creditors began attachment proceedings against him in the Spring of 1894. ³

Another reason for Coxey's involvement on behalf of the jobless
lies in his paternalistic attitude as an employer. He always treated his employees with honesty and generosity, thus overcoming such obstacles as strikes and walk-outs that plagued other businesses at this time. When Coxey was no longer financially able to pay his employees, he was forced to let a number of them go. Unable to find jobs for them and feeling obligated to help them in some way, Coxey devised a plan for the government to aid the unemployed and bring an end to the panic.

A third explanation for Coxey's reform activity, and the type of relief he suggested is found on the muddy roads between the Coxey home and the stone quarry. Bogged down in the ruts and bottomless mud holes, Coxey decided to ask Congress to employ men on road improvement projects. The idea of public works for road improvement was certain to appeal to the farmers, but he had to devise another plan to gain the support of the urbanites.

The final step in his plan came as the result of a proposed new court house for Stark County. The people agreed to borrow two hundred thousand dollars, and tax themselves five percent of the amount, ten thousand dollars a year, to pay the interest. By the end of twenty years, interest amounting to the total note would be paid, while the principal would remain at two hundred thousand dollars. If they paid no interest, Coxey thought, the total bond would be eliminated in twenty years. If any state, territory, county, township, municipality, or incorporated town or village could get around the tyranny of interest, many needed improvements could be made, creating jobs for the unemployed.

Coxey's plan included two bills which he sent to Congress. The first was a "Good Roads Bill," which provided for the printing of five hundred million dollars to be expended by hiring laborers at $1.50 an eight hour day to work on public roads. The second bill, the "Non-
Interest Bearing Bond Bill," provided for public improvements financed by non-interest bearing bonds, and an undetermined amount of fiat money. The bonds were to be based on half the assessed property evaluation of the area applying, and were to be repaid at the annual rate of five percent. The fiat money was to be "cancelled" by the treasury as the bonds were repaid, and withdrawn from circulation. Coxey remained convinced of the efficacy of his plan, even though more than a few critics claimed it would not work.

Coxey argued that his legislation would have dramatic effects. His bills would establish a minimum daily wage of $1.50, as well as set an eight hour standard for the working day. The greenbacks printed by the government, which were to be legal tender, would replace the widely used "confidence" money, or bank notes, substituting a "cash system for a credit or script system." The major difficulty in Coxey's scheme was the fact that the greenbacks were not to be redeemable in gold, and the bonds, if not repaid, would create a problem in repossession of public projects, for there were no provisions made for repossession.

Congress refused to act on the bills, so Coxey set about to educate the public as to the "Cause And Cure" for the depression. Nearly twenty-five percent of the work force was unemployed by the spring of 1894, and Coxey proposed to use this force to prove to Congress the need for his bills. These unemployed were called upon to form "a petition to Washington with boots on." Carl Browne, an eccentric labor agitator, cartoonist, "part fakir, part religionist, party Wild West cowboy," began to advertise Coxey's road bill with great success in Chicago. Impressed by Browne's leadership qualities, Coxey persuaded him to stay in Massillon and prepare for a march on Washington.
Once Browne took over the advertising campaign, Coxey's bills were nearly displaced by a bizarre emphasis on religion. This religion, "theosophy", as Browne called it, which was a mixture of mystical intuition and reincarnation, was used to explain the great importance of the march. Browne believed that the souls of the dead were stored in a vast "cauldron" to be used again in the making of a soul for a new person. Furthermore, Browne believed that he and Coxey had received significant portions of Christ's soul at birth. They represented, as Brown explained, a partial reincarnation of Christ. Browne predicted that all of the many persons who received portions of His soul at birth would join together in the march to Washington. This force would create an irresistible "Army of Peace," which represented the "Second Coming of Christ," "not in any single form, but in the whole people." Thus the marchers were named the "Commonweal of Christ," the body of people in which Christ was reincarnated. Their purpose was to establish the kingdom of heaven on earth, where they would bring "peace and plenty to take the place of panic and poverty." 11

Coxey approved of this religious inflection either because he was mesmerized by Browne, or because he was not attentive to Browne's concoction of religious ideas. Though Coxey was Episcopalian by faith, he possibly enjoyed being referred to as the "cerebrum of Christ." Only a handful of the marchers seemed to take theosophy seriously, while the majority of the Coxeyites ignored the religious ideology. Instead, they referred to themselves as an Industrial Army. The only effect, it would appear, that Browne's religious ideas had was to attract a good deal of negative publicity. 12

Browne attended to all the advertising details, including such paraphernalia as: signs stating their goals or ideologies, portraits
of Christ with a striking resemblance to Browne himself, and a "panorama wagon" of cartoons, used as a speaking platform. The flyers he printed advertised Coxey's quarry and stock farm, as well as the bills and the proposed march. The two thousand dollar printing bill was paid mostly by donations received in the mail.\textsuperscript{13}

Believing they were "acting from inspiration from on high," Coxey and Browne set the date for the beginning of the march from Massillon to Washington for Easter Sunday, March 25, 1894. Easter Sunday, the day Coxey was born, was to be the birth of the Commonweal, or as Browne insisted, the reincarnation of Christ in the people.\textsuperscript{14}

Though Coxey confidently asserted that he would leave Massillon with five thousand men and arrive in Washington with one hundred thousand, when the Sunday arrived, only one hundred and twenty-five men were in line. The motley crew carried signs reading: "The Kingdom of Heaven is at Hand," "God is Not the God of the Dead, but of the Living," "The Farmer Leads, for he Feeds," "Workingmen Want Work, Not Charity," "Equal Rights to All, Special Privileges to None," and "Peace on Earth, Good Will toward men, But Death to Interest on Bonds."\textsuperscript{15}

The conglomeration of men were as strange as the signs they carried. A few of the more unusual ones were: "Doctor" Cyclone Kirkland, an astrologer who predicted hurricanes; "Prof." C. B. Freeman, the loudest minstrel singer in the world; a half-breed Indian who wanted to "spy out the land" ahead of the marchers; and "The Great Unknown", whose identity kept the press involved in a guessing game. Browne, dressed in a buckskin jacket, high boots, sombrero, and a "delicate white lace necktie," completed the spectacle.

During the nearly six hundred mile trek to Washington the Commonwealers enjoyed the hospitality of many cities and towns en route. In
return for food and camping facilities, the Army entertained the citizens. Each stop occasioned a speech from Coxey, in which he described the bills he had presented to Congress, and warned the people of the impending doom if the bills were not passed. Then Browne stole the show with his ranting and raving and humorous collections of parables and inaccurate scripture quotations. Drawing cartoons as he spoke, Browne compared the seven great monopolies of the country to the seven headed beast from Revelations. Browne often concluded his speeches with a tirade directed at unsympathetic newspaper reporters, whom he dubbed the "argus-eyed demons of Hell." 17

One such "demon", Ray Stannard Baker, a correspondent for the Chicago Record, at first considered the movement to be little more than a grand show. But as he became acquainted with the marchers, he recognized that the majority of them were no different from himself or his friends. They were just down and out, due to unemployment, and were looking for relief in any form. The warm-hearted marchers, the multitudes who came hopefully to listen to Coxey, the common people who furnished supplies to the marchers, all had a sobering effect on Baker. He wrote to his editor:

I am beginning to feel that the movement has some meaning, that it is a manifestation of the prevailing unrest and dissatisfaction among the laboring classes. When such an ugly and grotesque fungus can grow out so prominently on the body politic there must be something wrong. The national blood is out of order, and Coxey, Browne, and the other Commonwealers seem, seriously considered, to be but the eruption on the surface... It has more meaning than either Coxey or Browne imagines. 18

Baker began to realize that conditions were so hard and desperate that the people were reaching out for any panacea which promised to return the country to prosperity.
Baker's editor was no more favorably disposed toward the Coxey movement than other newspaper editors, who preferred to deal with the Coxeyites as "low comedy." Baker's editor commented on the journalist's letter:

The correspondent is right. . . . The country is sick just to the extent that its people try to lean on the government instead of standing upright on their own feet.

While the editors teased Coxey for being a "harmless sort of idiot," the U. S. Government considered him potentially dangerous. Their fear increased when reports indicated that Industrial Armies were forming in California, Oregon, Washington, Montana, and several other western and mid-western states. The secret service of the treasury department appointed operatives to pose as Coxeyites, and march with Coxey, enabling them to report on his operations. Their mission was "to guard the President and to protect the integrity and safety of the country's currency," for they feared the lives of public officials were in danger, and that the treasury and the city itself might be looted.

While the secret service spied on the Massillon movement, Attorney General Richard Olney moved to block the advance of the Western Armies. The job was made to order for Olney because most of the railroads, the major means of transportation, were in receivership in the hands of U. S. Courts. Olney could stop the marchers while appearing to protect the receiver's property. Olney's "Coxey War" resulted in the arrests of numerous Industrials for interfering with the receiver's property and interrupting U. S. mail service. This method of dealing with the "petition in boots" was not completely effective, and cost the government enormous amounts of money to hire all the necessary deputies and to care for the arrested men.
The war department prepared to face the "Army of Peace" with an army of force. Brig. General Ordway held fifteen hundred troops in Washington, and several thousand more on alert in Philadelphia, New York, and Annapolis. These latter troops were kept outside the city to prevent alarm. In case of a major confrontation, they could be rushed to the city in a matter of hours. The treasury guards were reinforced by sharpshooters, and the Capitol police force was doubled.

While all these precautions were being taken to prevent anarchy in the city, Congress disagreed over methods of dealing with the petitioners. Senator Peffer of Kansas advised his colleagues to give them a "full and respectful hearing." Senator Allen of Nebraska, though unconvinced by Coxey's doctrine, insisted that the workingmen had as much right to be heard as the lobbyists of the trusts and monopolies, whom the Senators welcomed with open arms. Senator Hawley of Connecticut regarded Peffer's and Allen's suggestions as those of "anarchists" and persuaded the Senate to refuse to hear Coxey. Allen tried again to insure peace through a resolution permitting the Coxeyites to assemble at the Capitol building. His resolution was rejected on the grounds that no law prohibited citizens from visiting the Capitol, and the precaution was unnecessary.

Meanwhile Coxey's Army continued the long journey. The recruits fluctuated in numbers according to the ease of the march, or the amount of commissary supplies. When they reached Rockville, Maryland, they numbered three hundred and ten. At this point the Massillon marchers were joined by Christopher Columbus Jones and his fifty men from Pennsylvania. Jones, who accepted the doctrine of Coxey and Browne, including reincarnation, rejuvenated the spirit of the tired marchers.
On May 1, with their ranks swollen to over five hundred men, the "petition in boots" marched down Pennsylvania Avenue in Washington City. The colorful parade, enlivened by beautiful girls on prancing horses, raised cheers from the thirty thousand spectators. Escorted by special police, the march proceeded as planned until they reached the Capitol. The city policemen stood side by side blocking the entrance to the Capitol grounds, and forced the army to turn aside. Undismayed with the turn of events, Coxey, Jones, and Browne left the ranks and walked undetected, toward the Capitol. Discovering their intentions, the police galloped on horseback after them. The three leaders jumped over a low wall and raced toward the Capitol steps. Jones and Browne were thrown to the ground and arrested, but Coxey reached the steps before being apprehended. He quickly tossed his prepared speech to a reporter, and was carted off to jail. Onlookers screamed insults at the policemen, and the officers responded with their clubs. Fifty or more persons were beaten or trampled in the melee that followed.25

On May 8, Coxey, Browne, and Jones were found guilty of "carrying banners" on the Capitol grounds, and Coxey and Browne were found guilty of "walking on the grass." On May 21, they were sentenced to twenty days and fined five dollars. Such a mockery of justice united the commonweal supporters under the cry, "Keep Off The Grass!"26

The arrests did not end the interest in the Coxey movement. An overwhelming amount of correspondence reached Coxey in "Parlor 67", "Uncle Sam's Summer Resort." Though Coxey failed to reach Congress, optimistic and determined marchers continued to stream into Washington as the summer wore on. But there were other marchers, as optimistic and determined as Coxey himself, who failed too, but in a different way.
Most of these marchers, particularly from the Northwest, never reached Washington. Their needs were not those of Coxey's, so their demands were different, and the distance to the Capitol required another style of "marching". To fully understand the ideologies of the Northwest Industrial Armies they must be distinguished from the doctrine of Coxeyism. 27
Footnotes

1. Jacob S. Coxey, Cause and Cure, (Massillon, Ohio, January, 1898). A number of pamphlets were published from 1894 to 1898; George A. Gipe, "Rebel in a Wing Collar," American Heritage, XVIII (December, 1966), p. 25.


3. McMurry, Introduction by John D. Hicks, 'p. xiv; Ray Stannard Baker, American Chronicle (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1945), p. 9; Statement of Mr. J. S. Coxey, of Massillon, Ohio, to the Committee on Ways and Means, January 8, 1894, p. 6; Vincent, p. 57. The citizens of Canton, Ohio, were called upon to contribute to Coxey's financial relief in March, 1894.

4. Vincent, p. 49; McMurry, xiv.


7. Statement of Coxey to the Committee on Ways and Means, pp. 3, 6, 7; Congressional Record, 53rd Congress, 2nd Session, p. 3076.

8. McMurry, p. 28; Vincent, p. 54; Statement of Coxey to the Commit- tee on Ways and Means, pp. 6, 2.

9. Congressional Record, 53rd Congress, 2nd Session, p. 3603; S. O. Preson, "Provision For or Treatment of the Unemployed," Charities Re- view, III (December, 1893), p. 216, as in McMurry, p. 9. The depend- dents of these men, ranging from two to five times as many, decreases the buying power of the public, and increases the need for public char- ity; McMurry, p. 33; Vincent, p. 50.


or political affiliations with Coxey; McMurry, p. 161. Charles T. Kelly, the leader of a San Francisco contingent, the largest army, claimed that his Industrial Army had nothing to do with the Coxey movement.

13McMurry, pp. xiv, 36; Baker, pp. 7-8; "On To Washington," Bulletin, No. II (1894), Massillon, Ohio, Ohio Historical Society, Columbus, Ohio.

14Baker, pp. 7, 9; Cipe, p. 25, Coxey was born in Selinsgrove, Pennsylvania, on Easter Sunday, April 16, 1854.

15Hooper, pp. 165-8.

16Baker, pp. 12, 13, 15; McMurry, pp. 75, 93, 94, 99. The Unknown's identity was speculated as follows: the ringmaster of a circus; Captain Livingstone of the British army; a secret service man; Major William Packard Clarke, drill master of the Colorado National Guard, and grandson of ex-Governor Packard of Pennsylvania; Governor Waite of Colorado, in disguise; a patent medicine faker; Jenson, a Swede, Pinkerton detective. The Unknown went by the pseudonym of Louis B. Smith, until he led a mutiny against Browne's domineering leadership, and identified himself to the army as A. P. B. Bozarro (or Pizzaro), a manufacturer of "blood medicine" in Chicago. Browne theorized that Bozarro "was the reincarnation of a good spirit and a bad spirit in the same man."

17McMurry, pp. 67, 70, 75. The seven monopolies guilty of conspiracy involving the people's money, according to Browne were: the Standard Oil Company, the railroads, the iron producers, the newspapers, the national banks, the speculators in grain, and the gold mining concerns. Another beast he often described represented the money power. It's two horns were the hypocritical church and the politicians; Baker, p. 22. The reporters, numbering forty to fifty, good-naturedly organized themselves as "The Argus-Eyed Demons," and wore badges and carried signs in mimicry of the Commonwealer.

18Barker, pp. 19-20.

19Baker, p. 20. The editor is Charles H. Dennis; Vincent, p. 17.

20Vincent, p. 17; McMurry, pp. 104-5; Matthew F. Griffin, "Secret Service Memories," Flynnis, XIII (March 13, 1926), p. 917, as in McMurry, p. 105; To, William P. Hazen to John G. Carlisle, April 20, 24, 1894, Reports, Secret Service Division, Treasury Department, Cleveland Papers, Library of Congress. Hazen includes letters from operatives Griffin, James J. Scavlon, J. W. Cribbs, and S. A. Donella. While the others stayed with the army, Griffin was assigned to following Coxey on all his side trips; River Press, Fort Benton, Montana, May 16, 1894. Mrs. Cleveland planned to spend the summer months at Woodley, but the presence of the commonwealers scared her out. She went instead to Buzzard's Bay, and took the children with her.

Some of the contingent believed they would have to do battle with federal troops when they reached Washington. This belief was not the result of Coxey's teaching, for he insisted the march was a peaceable petition.


23McMurry, pp. 101-2.


25McMurry, p. 123; Keep Off The Grass, Anaconda, Montana, I (June, 1894). This is one example of several newspapers published around this time, describing the incident of Coxey's arrest.

26Coxey to F. L. Baldwin, May 24, 1894, Baldwin Papers, Massillon Public Library; McMurry, pp. 246-8.
The effects of the Panic of 1873 and the repeal of the Sherman Silver Purchase Act were disastrous in Western Montana. Speculation in mining industries coupled with heavy Eastern and European investment brought the sting of the money crisis early to the region. The Northern Pacific Railroad Company along with its Montana branch banks faced bankruptcy and reduced its loans and deals, particularly to silver mines, leaving their accumulation ghost towns almost overnight. As the population and employment in the operating copper mines and smelters, banks closed their doors and businesses failed, while nearly twenty thousand workers sought in vain for employment. Efforts of the local government to hire the unemployed on public works projects provided relief for less than ten months, as the revenue decreased along with the falling price of silver.

Many of the unemployed were members of the Industrial Legion in Montana, who as radical populists formed their arms in 1890 to propagate the principles of the Grinnell Platform. The Butte Industrial Legion, under the leadership of Charles J. Craig—quoting William B. Bess—became the nucleus of the Montana division of Greeley's Army.

The Butte, a saloon townout for idle men, and a breeding ground for radical ideas, served as a gathering place until the first formal meeting of the Industrial Army was announced to be held on April 7, at the court house square. The newly organized army sent their greetings and plans to Greeley and his men marched to Washington.

Residents joined in the meeting and most over the proposed benefits. More than five hundred men joined the army, while other citizens supported the Committee with generous gifts of food and money.
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Many of the unemployed were members of the three Industrial Le- gions in Montana, who as radical Populists formed their groups in 1892 "to propagate the principals of the Omaha Platform." The Butte Industrial Legion, under the leadership of Shakespeare-quoting William Ho- gan, became the nucleus of the Montana division of Coxey's Army.²

The Sump, a saloon hangout for idle men, and a breeding ground for radical ideas, served as a gathering place until the first formal meeting of the Industrial Army was announced to be held on April 7, on the court house steps. The newly organized army sent their greetings and plans to Coxey and his men enroute to Washington.³

Residents joined in the mounting excitement over the proposed march. More than five hundred men joined the army, while other citi- zens supported the Coxeyites with generous gifts of food and money.
The workingmen's union, for example, sent fifty dollars and agreed to act as treasurer for further donations.4

Saturday night at 7:30 two to three thousand men crowded around the court house to find out just who this Coxey fellow was, and why the unemployed were willing to follow him to Washington. William Hogan called the meeting to order announcing that "the movement was against legislation [repeal of the Sherman Silver Purchase Act, 1893] which drove strong men to crime." The purpose of the march, he explained, was to ask Congress for an issue of bonds to finance road improvements, giving jobs to thousands all over the United States. "And," he added, "we ask for the free coinage of silver at a ratio of sixteen to one." This must have brought a tremendous applause, for now the army and the town were united in one goal, the restoration of silver, the life of Butte.

To satisfy the curiosity of those wishing to be better informed than the Oakland division, of whom the Butte Miner reported that most of the men had never heard of Coxey, Major Camp addressed the audience concerning his "personal friend." He described Coxey as a "reputable farmer worth at least $25,000, who has the interest of the working men of this country at heart," obviously unaware that his "friend" was a businessman worth nearly $200,000. Though unenlightened, the crowd seemed satisfied with this report on the deviser of the March On Washington.5

After the meeting many workingmen, convinced of the urgency of the march and arroused by the bustle and excitement, left their jobs to join the unemployed on their trek to the nation's capital. Perhaps this was due to the nomadic nature of the miners who were constantly on the move prospecting or working new found bonanzas. Also a great
deal of Butte's forty thousand persons were single men, free to wander as they desired. Many of the men may not have had housing, for the army made camp near the Northern Pacific Railroad yards on the flats southwest of Butte.

Eagerly preparing for the march, the Hoganites met with Mayor E. O. Dugan on April 12, and wired officials requesting transportation over the Northern Pacific line to St. Paul, Minnesota. It was then announced that the army would leave Butte on the 17th, but when the day arrived, departure was postponed for another three days without explanation.

On Thursday, April 19, near 10:00 a.m., an anxious Hogan and his men moved east to the Montana Union Transfer, piling their luggage and provisions near the track. Fearing that the army would capture the eleven o'clock train, the station agent quickly wired J. D. Finn, the Montana Division Superintendent at Livingston. Finn replied that the train must leave as scheduled, but should return to the station if the Hogan party attempted to get aboard.

Just before the train reached the transfer the army swarmed on to the track, forcing the engineer, W. T. McGonigal, to bring it to a halt. Hogan climbed up on the engine, and politely introducing himself, said he and his men wished to board the train. Within seconds the engine and cars were "covered with men as thick as they could cover it." The engineer relayed his orders to Hogan and protested that the engine was too heavily loaded to carry the army and their supplies up the steep mountain grades. Desiring to return to the station, McGonigal suggested that it would be best to exchange the copper cars for empty box cars, to which Hogan agreed, adding that he did not wish to interfere with the engineer's orders. Once the train backed into the station the run was "annulled." Hogan, refusing to allow the engine to be taken back
to the round house, demanded that McGonigal leave the engine, and placed two army members in charge. 

Hogan, believing that arrangements had been made previously for his army to leave Butte, asked the station agent, W. M. Merriman, to send a telegram to J. D. Finn. The agent read it, and acting on the advice of the chief dispatcher, a Mr. McCune, refused to send it. When Hogan left the office a wire was immediately sent to Finn, stating that Hogan wanted transportation for his army, and wished a reply within the hour.

Finn instructed Merriman to tell the sheriff and chief of police that the property of the N. P. was "in danger of being destroyed or taken." When the specified time elapsed, Hogan apparently assumed that Finn had no intention of opposing the army's desire for transportation.

Unemployed railroad men, who were now members of the Industrial Army, moved engines around, coupling cars for the journey. The preparation ceased when Sheriff Sam Reynolds and his posse arrived, showing that the army, though desiring to get out of town quickly, still had respect for the law. Hogan met with the sheriff and a Mr. Tuohy, the general agent in up-town Butte, and agreed to leave the trains alone until noon the following day, provided that Tuohy would make the necessary arrangements for the army to leave. The McGonigal train was then ordered to proceed as planned, unmolested by the Coxeyites.

The next afternoon Hogan was advised that his army would not be taken out "under the present circumstances." No other explanation was given. Between three and four o'clock an engine came out of the round house headed east. The army crowded onto the track yelling, "We're going to take a train out," refusing to allow it to pass. Hogan climbed aboard and confered with Mr. James Hogan of the American Railway Union, no relation, who was headed for Logan to meet the Helena train. The Coxeyites
refused to allow the train to proceed unless they could go along. The train returned to the station while the discussion continued. After more than three hours the army allowed James Hogan's train to pass through.

Unknown to William Hogan, who had missed his last chance to legally take a train out of Butte, forces were taking shape in Helena to destroy the hope of the army's ever reaching Washington by rail. In the fall of 1893 the Northern Pacific Railroad Company had filed bankruptcy. The property was placed in the hands of the court and then assigned to the receivers Henry Stanton, of New York, Samuel T. Hauser, of Helena, and Edward L. Bonner, of Missoula. On April 20, 1894, the receivers petitioned the court to protect their property from the Industrial Army. Cullen S. Toole, council for the petitioners, after relating the incident of April 19, when Hogan's army held a train about five hours, requested that the court order the United States marshal to "preserve the possession," so if Hogan's men tried again, they would be charged with contempt of court. Judge Hiram Knowles responded, ordering the marsh 'al "to restore or cause to be restored" all property of the receivers, and further authorized that William Hogan or any person within the army found in possession of the N. P. property should be arrested and brought to court "to show cause why they should not be punished."^{13}

The order or injunction was not delivered personally to Hogan, but he received the following message over Western Union telegraph lines:

Helena, April 19, 1894

Commander Hogan of the Butte Industrial Army, Butte, Montana.

Property of the Northern Pacific Railroad Company is in custody of the United States Court. Any interference with
it on the part of you or those under you is a contempt of court and will be punished accordingly. I therefore warn you not to interfere with said property or permit the same to be done.

Wm. McDermott  
U. S. Marshal

In keeping with the court order, the N. P. officials had an understanding with McDermott that he was to protect a train leaving at one o'clock Monday afternoon. The marshal's devotion to duty may be questioned, for soon he notified J. D. Finn that he was not prepared to protect the train "on account of its being St. George's Day," so the run had to be cancelled.

Mr. C. M. Colman, Justice of the Peace for Silver Bow County, while in the N. P. office that day, heard an employee of the company say that "if the Coxey army men wanted to get away, all they had to do was to take a train out of the yards;.....they would not be interfered with, ...and all they had to do was to fire her up, turn her head towards the east, and screw their nut."  

The concept of non-interference prevailed also as a result of several meetings held on April 21, 22, and 23, for the purpose of securing transportation for Hogan's army. The thirty to forty men attending tried to persuade J. D. Finn to authorize a train. His objection was that "if the army and the railroad company entered into any contract with one another, the company would then become responsible for the different statutory penalties provided for in the states through which they could pass." It was then construed by the others present, who tried to convince Hogan, that "if the army would secure a train without any cooperation or action on the part of the company, they would not be molested or interfered with upon their journey," for it was "commonly rumored in Butte that the injunction against the army
had been withdrawn."

On Monday tension mounted as the army grew desperate to get out of town. The citizens filled the street for the St. George Day parade, then turning their excitement toward the marshal and his deputies, surrounded his headquarters and refused to permit him to leave. Several important businessmen, including Marcus Daly and William A. Clarke, the famous Copper Kings, wired St. Paul, saying they would pay for a train of box cars if the N. P. Company would only take the army on its way. The answer they received was similar to Finn’s argument, adding that the negative position had "not been taken for the purpose of exacting compensation." These businessmen thought the tone of the wire implied a consent to take a train without official authority, and were able to justify their belief to Hogan and his men. 18

That night the army paraded up town for a meeting on the courthouse steps. A huge, cheering crowd gathered to hear the speakers. Though the papers the following day quote no official announcement of the army’s departure, word spread to that effect, for after the army returned to their camp, a crowd of bystanders gathered at the railroad yards. 19

No opposition was encountered by the Coxeyites, except for two night N. P. watchmen, John Eckel and C. Park, who were held as prisoners in the round house while the railroad crew of the army made up a train. Park helpfully suggested that passenger engine No. 607 not be used, as it would interfere with the mail service, constituting a federal offense. Once an engine was fired up and five coal cars connected, the army moved to the transfer to pick up their provisions. A crowd of three to four hundred cheering well-wishers were waiting there to see the army out of town. The Hoganites released the watchmen and left Butte
at 1:15 a.m., April 24.  

The departure seems to have been neatly arranged, for although it took nearly two hours to get up steam the army encountered no opposition other than the seemingly sympathetic watchmen. While the marshal and his deputies may still have been confined to their headquarters by the angry citizens, all local law enforcement had withdrawn. The county commissioners, who were active supporters of Hogan, several days earlier had refused to send deputies to the N.P. yards since the company had not agreed to pay for them. It was also reported that a committee of business men had "fixed" the railroad agent and promised pay to the train crew who pulled the army out of Butte.  

Hogan's train traveled at "breakneck" speed over the branch line to Logan, then on to the main line to Bozeman. The army arrived there at 5:30 a.m. to a warm greeting of the local sympathizers, who enlarged the army's numbers as well as its commissary supplies. The train crew exchanged the coal cars for more comfortable box cars and pulled out of town by 10 a.m. Their progress was halted temporarily east of Bozeman due to a cave in at the mouth of a tunnel. Tools left on the site by working men were used by the Hoganites to clear the obstruction and resume their journey.  

Meanwhile, J. D. Finn wired Billings, ordering the sheriff to arrest Hogan and his army there. Finn earlier had been defeated in the election for sheriff, and the undersheriff, owing him no favors, and wishing to support popular sympathy for the Coxeyites, implied that Finn should stop Hogan himself, when he replied, "County attorney and sheriff out in Bull Mountains laying out additions to Billings. All able bodied men are busy selling real estate. Stop Coxey's army at Livingston."
But when the army reached Livingston at 3:35 p.m., they encountered no resistance, but another rousing welcome. They exchanged their engine for a fresh one, picked up a tool car and four more box cars to accommodate their increasing numbers, and pulled out of town at 7:33 p.m. Just east of town a road block had been dynamited from the hillside. Using the tools from the car recently taken, the army removed the rock slide and "thoughtfully replaced the obstruction" behind them.

Back in Butte the marshal finally succeeded in signing up about 100 deputies, or blood suckers and rounders, as the citizens called them, for they were "composed of the worst element in Butte, and several of them were recognized as criminals and gamblers." When placed under the authority of Deputy M. J. Haley, only seventy-seven showed up to board the special posse train. The deputies left Butte at 6:30 p.m., April 24, a full seventeen hours behind Hogan's train.

Running with orders "to pursue and overtake Hogan and his party," the posse arrived at Grey Cliff around 6 a.m., where they learned that Hogan was only three to four miles east of town. Haley obviously did not wish to stop the train of marchers who were going to Washington to petition for free coinage of silver. Stalling their progress, Haley ordered all of the deputies off the train and proceeded to casually call the roll, pin red badges of authority on their vests, read the entire court order, and repeat the complete object of their mission, of which all were aware upon leaving Butte, before continuing the now leisurely chase. The short distance required two hours before Haley came upon Hogan's train, still resting on a tressel high over the Yellowstone River. Only twenty-five of the deputies went up to the army's train to demand their surrender, and the Coxeyites quickly moved on, claiming later that they did not realize the train following them contained
deputies. Their beliefs were confirmed by two of the posse members who heard only the threat, "Don't pull that train ahead or we will shoot", rather than any expression of court authority for the arrest of the army. 26

Two more similar encounters took place at Stillwater, or Columbus, as it is now known, and Park City, where again the Hogan party sped away from the special posse train. 27

The Billings community greeted Hogan when he arrived at 11 a.m., offering a generous supply of provisions and a hundred new recruits. The train crew exchanged their engine for a fresh one while Hogan busied himself in the depot with the following telegrams.

Miles City,
April 25

Capt. Hogan,

Will give you a clear track over the Yellowstone Division. Hope you will come through without delay. We have an engine ready to take your train on arrival at Forsythe. I am anxious to get your train off the Division as to get my train moving.

John Dorsey, Supt.

This was the first official correspondence Hogan received from the N. P. Company. He felt thus insured that the resistance earlier encountered was only a token display of opposition. His view was strengthened when he was shown a second telegram.

You will get through, you keep 'mum' and we will too.

Kendrich, General Manager.

Though Hogan believed the telegram to be valid, Kendrich later claimed that it was sent "without his knowledge or consent". 28

The special train of deputies arrived in Billings and stopped about a half mile behind Hogan's train. Haley selected twelve deputies, eight
of whom carried "muskets", and leaving the others behind, marched upon Hogan's army and demanded their surrender. The crowd immediately came to the aid of the Commonwealers, pressing the deputies back. Shots were fired, probably by the deputies, whose weapons were soon taken by the crowd. One bystander was fatally shot, while the deputies and the Hoganites suffered a few wounded. The deputies were forced to retreat while Hogan and his men quickly manned the engine and sped out of Billings at 1 p.m. The special train of the deputies was prevented from following the industrial army for about seven hours by the angry "mob".  

When word of the Billings bloodshed reached Charles T. Kelly, the leader of a California contingent of Coxey's army, he deplored the incident, saying, "I fear our cause is ruined... We are now reduced to the level of a mob. The militia may be called out at any moment to stop our progress." Indeed Governor John E. Rickards had already wired President Grover Cleveland, requesting federal troops from Fort Keogh to intercept the army as they passed there, and the request was quickly granted.  

In the meantime Hogan's army made nearly a hundred miles' run to Forsythe, forty-five miles west of Miles City, and stopped for a rest. Around mid-night the train crew fired a fresh engine to continue the journey. A fast moving train approached from the east and the sentries tried to arouse the sleeping Hoganites. The train halted and troops of Colonel Page quickly surrounded the camp. Only about two hundred fifty men were fast enough to escape into the darkness. Page ordered a surrender, which was immediately accepted.  

The following excerpt from a reminiscence of this episode is probably apocryphal, but too humorous to set aside:
The train bearing the army of the unemployed pounded away east until they reached the neighborhood of Clendive, where they found the track crowned by an immense pile of ties and flanked by gatling guns, manned by a troop of soldiers.

They realized the game was up and accepting the results philosophically proceeded to build fires along the track and prepare their evening meal.

Meanwhile, a pompous, booted and spurred army officer hustled about among the group, asking for 'General Hogan'. Though Hogan was standing several times within a few feet of him, idly whittling a stick with a penknife, the Coxeyite addressed always peered around and remarked:

'Well he was here a few minutes ago, but I don't see him now.'

For over an hour the colonel went raging about fuming threats, until finally one of the soldiers, pointing out Hogan, told him that he thought that was the man.

The army officer came to a halt in front of Hogan, who continued whittling the stick.

'Are you in command of this dam [sic] rabble?' he roared.

'I was until an hour ago,' Hogan grinned.

'Do you surrender?'

Hogan sighed. 'It is the fortune of war,' he said sadly.

Then reversing his pen knife, with the blade in his hand, he handed it to the colonel, with a low bow and the remark, 'Please accept my sword.'

For a moment the colonel seemed about to have an apoplectic fit, then not even military austerity was proof against his sense of humor, and he joined in the roar of laughter that came from the Coxeyites.

Regardless of the details of the capture, the news was a disappointment, especially to a small group of unemployed who boarded a passenger train between Stillwater and Billings, with the hope of joining Hogan at Forsythe. Fearful of being arrested, they ran for the woods, although ironically no one was interested in pursuing them. At least one small band of recruits awaited in vain for the arrival of Hogan's train in Little Falls, Minnesota, where they hoped to join him.

At last the chase was over, but the problems were only beginning. What do you do with a captured army of 373 men? After a day of indecision the army was transferred to Helena for trial, rather than to Butte, where there was great public sympathy for the Coxeyites. Marshal McDermott placed the army under arrest and immediately wired Attorney General
Richard Olney of his predicament. From Olney the marshal received
permission to house the prisoners at the race track, at the rate of
twenty-five dollars a day. The expenses mounted during the army's
seventeen day captivity, as they all had to be fed, and the deputies
who guarded them, as well as the seventy-seven man posse, now were
demanding their five dollars per diem pay, totaling nearly four thou-
sand dollars.

Federal Judge Hiram Knowles set the bail for William Hogan and
William Cunningham at five thousand dollars each, which was signed by
a group of sympathetic citizens from Butte the following day. Bail
for Philip Rogers, Michael McElligott and James Hacket was placed at
two thousand dollars apiece, and one hundred dollars per man of the
rank and file, all of whom remained in custody.

The hearing, May 10, at 10 a.m., was presided over by Judge Hiram
Knowles, George Haldron and Robert Burns Smith, Populist lawyers, re-
presented the Hoganites, while Preston H. Leslie, United States Attor-
ney for the District of Montana, Mr. Cullen, and Joseph K. Toole, re-
presented the prosecution.

Mr. W. W. Walsworth, manager of the Butte office for the Anaconda
Standard, appeared on behalf of William Cunningham, a reporter for the
newspaper, who had been assigned the task of reporting the industrial
army's movement, and later, arrested with the army at Forsythe. The
judge dismissed the charge against Cunningham and waived his bond.

The army's engineer from Livingston to Grey Cliff, James Hacket,
claimed that he manned the engine fully believing that matters had
been arranged for the Hoganites to use the train. The judge found him
guilty of contempt of court and sentenced him to sixty days in jail.

The second engineer, Philip Rogers, had taken the Hogan train from
Grey Cliff to Forsythe, also believing that he was operating legally, for he considered Dorsey's telegram to Hogan as his running orders. In Billings Rogers signed the register as he would under normal conditions, giving his name and number of the engine. Judge Knowles refused to accept the legality of his position, and sentenced Rogers to sixty days.39

William Hogan insisted in his testimony that he was assured by the citizens of Butte that the railroad company would not interfere with the army taking the train, and that the court injunction had been withdrawn. He also claimed, as did Cunningham, Rogers, and Hacket, that no person calling themselves a deputy marshal had demanded the surrender of the army or the train. He believed, until the federal troops arrived, that their mission was unopposed by all concerned. Nevertheless, the judge found Hogan guilty of contempt of court, and since he was the commander of the army and gave the order to man the train, his sentence was heavier than others, at six months in the county jail.

The answer of Michael McElligott to the contempt charge is a most amusing one. He disavowed any connection with Hogan or his army. Wishing to travel to Miles City to meet some friends, and having no money, McElligott merely boarded the army's eastbound train. At Forsythe he met an acquaintance and stayed around town all night. The next morning, while walking along the tracks, he was apprehended by the soldiers of Colonel Page and taken into the army's prison camp. Though many unsympathetic editors often accused the Commonweal of being composed of tramps, hobos and bums, at least in this one instance, it was found to be more honorable to be a hobo than to be a Coxeyite. It was legally okay to steal a ride, so long as you didn't steal the train, for the judge found McElligott "not guilty" and released him from court.41
The rest of the army men were not questioned individually by the court, and were released upon the promise that they would not attempt to interfere with railroad property again. 42

Though nearly six weeks had passed since the Butte Coxeyites announced their plans to march on Washington, most of the men remained persistent in their determination to reach their objective. And now the citizens of Helena proved themselves to be as active supporters as the army had known in Butte. A parade to raise money for the marchers had to be stopped because of a "drenching rain". The people, realizing the army's desperation, generously supplied accommodations and food, until arrangements could be made to send the Coxeyites to Fort Benton to float down the Missouri River toward Washington.

William Sprague, at one time a boat builder, acting as an agent for the Helena citizens, traveled to Fort Benton to purchase supplies and materials for the men to build boats. He assured the local population that Helena was not intentionally unloading the unemployed on Fort Benton, but would finance the care for them during their stay. A warehouse on the waterfront served as a camp and workshop for the job that lay ahead. 43

Meanwhile, efforts continued in Helena to arrange for Hogan's release from jail. Cunningham, earlier acquitted, made his way to Bismarck, North Dakota, to secure supplies for the navy's boats when they reached that point. 44

The Industrials walked, caught trains, or rode on wagons, making headway as best they could, on the one hundred forty mile journey from Helena to Fort Benton, arriving sporadically in small bands, alone, or in larger groups. The River Press discussed the "possibilities of drowning a few of the number" as the contingents first began to arrive,
then catching the contagious Coxey fever, explained that with "boats and grub furnished, and free water passage for over 2,500 miles, with nothing to do but float, eat, sleep, admire the scenery, and discuss the Wilson bill, who wouldn't be a Coxeyite?" Not all the townsmen were convinced of the harmlessness of the Commonwealers, for they succeeded in engaging four extra night policemen as a precaution.

By June 2, around three hundred men had reached Fort Benton from Helena. They built ten large flat boats, naming them "Butte, Helena, Livingston, Bozeman, Great Falls, Free Silver, Hogan, and Fort Benton." The commissary boat, forty eight by ten feet, held nearly a car load of provisions, and was equipped with a large brick oven for cooking.

All preparations were complete on June 4, but high winds prevented the Army's departure. The following night the Army paraded through town and halted in front of the Grand Union Hotel. Attorney T. W. Murphy spoke to the crowd that gathered to encourage the voyagers, and collected enough contributions to buy the Coxeyites twenty pounds of tobacco.

The navy left Fort Benton June 6, with gala flags flying their decks. The citizens of Fort Benton "doubted if men so inexperienced with the river could master the perils of the many rapids" below the city. The expedition did suffer many hardships, and several men had deserted by the time the boats reached Yankton, South Dakota, on June 28. The remaining 200 were extremely short of food and begged for meals.46

"By July 9 reports reached Montana that four hundred miners had reached St. Joseph, Missouri," and at least one report claims that the army did reach Washington, but late enough that demonstrations in the capitol city had already disbanded.47
John Edwards, the chairman of the executive committee of Hogan's army, left Helena June 6, supported by local donations, to travel to Washington alone. He was to demand of Congress the free coinage of silver at the ratio of sixteen to one.

The purpose of the Butte Industrial Army had shifted from a primary desire to support Coxey's bills in Congress, to Montana's major concern, the free coinage of silver. The fiat money scheme of the road's bill would not help the West, for there was no gold to redeem the paper money already in circulation, and there was no faith in it. The West wanted bimetallism, "not more money, but a broader money standard." For these reasons, the "silver men" of Montana were suspected of hiring the Hogan army to crusade for free silver in Washington, D.C. Though many of the businessmen active in supporting the army were mine owners, other businesses as well as the citizens depended on the operation of these mines for the benefit of all. It has been suggested that N. P. officials and a train crew were bribed by these silver men, but there is nothing to suggest that the army men were actually paid by silver conspirators. If the mine owners were engaged in a conspiracy, the citizens of Butte and the surrounding area were just as guilty, and they would have quickly laid the blame on to Congress for their "evil legislation".

Aside from being variant in their demands, the Montana contingent of Coxey's army was suspected of being less than desirable in character. The reason for their misfortune and bloodshed, according to their official historian, Henry Vincent, was the fact that they were "miners" and "mountaineers who were unused to the conventionalities and restraints which characterize more thickly settled portions of the country, and a
residue of shifting and reckless men, a most disturbing element", who resorted to force, failed "from the start, to grasp the fundamental principals that Industrials were to be a peace army in fact as well as in name." 50

Unfortunately for our heroes, the Butte army became known for its violence, rather than its persistent determination, or its desire to march to Washington in a peaceful, law-abiding manner. Had the Hogan-ites disrespected the law, they had a sufficient force of men to take over the N. P. station and make up a train at any time during their two weeks' stay in camp. But because they did respect the law, the army waited until they felt assured that no one intended to oppose them.

After their imprisonment and release the army's perseverance was demonstrated by their perilous journey down the Missouri River. Hogan's army was not only the most exciting contingent, but also the least understood, as shown in Coxey's repudiation of the Butte Industrial Army. 51

Coxey reported that the Butte contingent was not a part of the Commonweal of Christ because he did not want his peaceful petition to be associated with this "disturbing element". Through Hogan's message Coxey himself had nothing to do with the organization of the Montana Industrial Army. The formation of this group was due to a spontaneous action on the part of members of the Industrial Legion. The organization can be traced to their capable leader, William Hogan. In this sense, it was a Butte Army, not a Coxey Army.

The goal of the Butte Army was the restoration of free coinage of silver. Western miners advocated this cause for some time, and particularly after the repeal of the Sherman Silver Purchase Act. But after
the introduction of Coxeyism, the old cause took on a new form, a "petition in boots".

The Army in Montana represented first of all, the right of the citizens to petition Congress, and secondly, the right to petition in person. Underlying these two points is the basic assumption that the government was responsible for the well being of its citizens, and that Congress should legislate reform according to the people's needs and requests. These ideas are the basic principals of Coxeyism. Though Coxey was not the leader or the organizer of Butte's Army, his name was the symbol of their conception of the rights of the people, and the duties of the government.

The People's Party, of which Coxey was a member, held this same view of the rights of the people and the duties of the government. They sought to bring about this change in emphasis of governmental actions by way of the ballot box. Coxeyism pointed out that the ballot was too slow, and that representatives often forgot their duty to those who elected them. Coxeyism intended to bring about this change by a direct confrontation of the representatives by the electors themselves. The underlying principals therefore are not entirely attributed to Coxey, but the points to bring about the change are truly Coxeyism.
Footnotes

1 Thomas A. Clinch, "Coxey's Army in Montana," Montana, The Magazine of Western History, XV (October, 1965), p. 5; M.S. Notice, Northern Pacific and Montana Railroad Company, St. Paul, Minnesota, November 23, 1893. Samuel T. Hauser Papers, Box 23, Folder 17, Montana Historical Society; M.S. Henry Selrman and Co. Bankers to Samuel T. Hauser, New York, July 17, August 11, September 8, and October 11, 1893. Hauser Papers, Box 23, Folder 20; M.S. Senator G. C. Vest to Samuel T. Hauser, Washington, D.C., August 3, 16, 27, 1893. Hauser Papers, Box 23, Folder 26; Henry Vincent, The Story Of The Commonwealth (Chicago: W. B. Conkey Co., 1894), p. 177. Vincent quotes William League of Chicago, who anticipating the arrival of Kelly's Army offered his idle copper factory as a place of lodging. "I have also received a letter from my son in California, stating that in Montana he has been thrown out of employment by legislation demonetizing silver, and that thousands with him had been thrown out of employment at the same time and from the same cause, and whose suffering is beyond description"; Anaconda Standard, September 23 to November 12, 1893, as in Clinch, "Coxey's Army in Montana," p. 6.


3 Butte Miner, Butte, Montana, April 5, 1894.

4 Butte Miner, April 7-8, 1894.

5 Butte Miner, April 8, 1894. Officers elected at the meeting were: William Hogan, marshal; John Gray, William Donahue, Thomas Murphy, and John McCabe, staff officers; Patrick McManus, secretary; Robert Bates, recruiting sergeant; John Douglas, commissary sergeant; James Flaherty and John Harrington, chiefs; and Alexander Abbott, secretary-treasurer. A Ways and Means committee was appointed with William Hogan as chairman.

6 Butte Miner, April 11, 1894, pleads with the men not to leave their jobs for a "will-o-the-wisp chase". But those who are unemploy- ed just "as well march as sleep in the sump"; Polk's Butte City Directory estimates the population in 1895 at 39,147. Other estimates range from 10,723 to 30,470.

7 Butte Miner, April 13, 16, 17, 1894.

8 United States Circuit Court, District of Montana, Cause 299. Farmers Loan and Trust Company, et. al. Affidavit of W. M. Merriman, sworn April 22, 1894. The affidavits are numbered 218, 295, and 299. This seems to be an error, as the former numbers are often crossed
cut and replaced by 299. All the information used was obtained under cause 299, and I shall use this number to refer to these documents.


11. **Cause 299**, Affidavit of W. M. Merriman; River Press, Fort Benton, Montana, April 25, reports that the people of Butte were "indignant at the treatment by N.P. officials who promised box car rides east and refused to keep their promise." The report that Reynolds and his posse "ran off the army, arresting one commander and half a dozen soldiers," is inconsistent with the report of the eye witness cited above.

12. **Cause 299**, Affidavit of W. M. Merriman; David B. Griffiths, "Far Western Populism: The Case of Utah, 1893-1900", Utah Historical Quarterly, XXXVII (Fall, 1969), p. 398, "James Hogan, a national organizer of the American Railway Union and friend of Eugene Debs, was the lead speaker at the Salt Lake County Populist Convention in September, 1895 and later received their nomination for Congress," p. 400, Hogan ran far behind his rivals, due to Republican and Democratic votes.

13. **Cause 299**, Order appointing receivers for the Northern Pacific and Montana Railroads, filed October 4, 1893; Petition of the Receivers, filed April 20, 1894; Order of Judge Hiram Knowles, filed April 25, 1894.

14. **Cause 299**, Affidavit of William McDermott, U. S. Marshal for the District of Montana, filed May 2, 1894; Testimony of William Hogan, filed May 8, 1894. Note that the telegram is dated April 19, a day before the petition and court order. Other discrepancies are found in dates throughout the court records; Clinch, "Coxey's Army in Montana," p. 9, erroneously bases his defense of the Coxeyites on the grounds that McDermott failed to serve Hogan with the injunction, which "constituted implied permission to take the train". The records cited above show that William McDermott asked Hogan personally, on April 21, if he had received the injunction, and was assured that he had. Hogan's testimony corroborated with the marshal.

15. **Cause 299**, Affidavit of W. M. Kerriman; Butte Miner, April 18, says St. George's Day Parade will be held on April 23. McDermott also may have found it difficult to find deputies on the day of the celebration.

16. **Cause 299**, Affidavit of C. M. Colman, filed May 10, 1894. Others present and hearing the statement were Pat Heany, Earney Cassidy, Tim Burns, Jim Eckell, and several others (unnamed). The "nut" is a safety valve on the boiler, which if tightened, allows increased speed in shorter time.

17. **Cause 299**, Affidavit of Melvin L. Wines, sworn May 8, 1894. Others present were H. L. Frank, W. R. Kenyon, Absolom F. Bray, W. D. Pinkerton, J. K. Clark, John Caplice, D. J. Charles, and E. S. Booth;
Testimony of William Hogan.


19 Butte Miner, April 24, 1894.

20 Cause 292, Affidavit of John Eckel, sworn April 28, 1894; Affidavit of C. Park, sworn April 23, an obvious error in dating; Butte Miner, April 24, 1894.

21 Cause 292, Affidavit of John Eckel; Affidavit of J. W. Kendrick; Affidavit of J. D. Finn, sworn May 11, 1894; T. B. Sullivan, a Butte Populist, to H. E. Laubeneck, Washington, D.C., the chairman of the People's Party National Committee, as printed in National Watchman IV (May 11, 1894), p. 799. Sullivan denied that the train was "stolen", adding "although the United States marshal knew what was going on, he did not try to follow until he thought the army would be out of the State before he and his deputies could reach it." Cause 292, Affidavit of C. A. Lindsay, sworn May 9, 1894; Donald L. McKurry, Coxey's Army (Seattle and London: University of Washington Press, 1929), p. 201. McKurry gives another version of the story: "when the marshal tried to serve the writs, he and his deputies were locked up by the Hoganites, who thereupon started east at the rate of forty to fifty miles an hour." He footnotes the quote from Indianapolis Journal, April 26, 1894, and goes on to add the New York Times, April 25, 1894, which stated that "after two day's struggle between local authorities and the mob, the officers were overawed, and no opposition was offered to the army's departure."

22 Anaconda Standard, April 25, 1894; Cause 299, Affidavit of G. F. Goodhue, sworn April 28, 1894; Clinch, "Coxey's Army in Montana," p. 7; McKurry, p. 202, who gets his information from Vincent, p. 202, mistakenly believe it took six hours to clear the cave in, and that the army did not reach Livingston until seven o'clock.

23 Anaconda Standard, April 25, 1894; Clinch, "Coxey's Army in Montana," p. 7; McKurry, p. 202; Vincent, p. 219.

24 Cause 292, Affidavit of G. F. Goodrick, sworn April 26, 1894; Clinch, "Coxey's Army in Montana," p. 7; Anaconda Standard, April 25, 1894; M.S. James McCaught, counsel for the Receivers to Genl. Garland, Washington D.C., April 25, 1894. "Fortune smiled on us yesterday morning early by causing in the shape of a land-slide at the east end of Bozeman tunnel, which we helped a little by emptying the water tanks, so as to kill their engine, and by removing bridges east of Bozeman, so as to entrap the mob between Bozeman and Livingston." Cleveland Papers, Library of Congress. I have no other report on the removal of a bridge. Since the Hogan train reached Livingston, we may discount the latter portion of his statement.
25 Clinch, "Coxey's Army in Montana," p. 7; Vincent, p. 218; McMurry, p. 201; _Cause 299_, Affidavit of M. J. Haley, sworn May 2, 1894.

26 _Cause 299_, Affidavit of M. J. Haley; Affidavit of J. S. Simpson and W. G. Tucker, sworn May 12, 1894; Testimony of William Hogan; Answer of Philip Rogers, filed May 14, 1894; Answer of James Hacket, filed May 14, 1894; Answer of William Cunningham, sworn May 12, 1894; Affidavit of W. J. Watson and Peter Opie, sworn May 7, 1894; Vincent, p. 218, reports that the army spent the "night of April 24, at the little hamlet of Columbus, formerly known as Stillwater." Clinch, Coxey's Army in Montana," pp. 7-8, also claims the army rested overnight in Columbus. These reports are hardly feasible since the army was still located approximately twenty miles west of Stillwater or Columbus at 8 a.m. the following morning.

27 _Cause 299_, Affidavit of M. J. Haley, affidavits of the deputies cited above state that they were present at "Grey Cliff, Stillwater, and Park City." Haley does not name the places of encounter with the Coxeyites; Mark H. Brown, _The Plainsmen of the Yellowstone_ (New York, G. P. Putnam's Sons, 1961), p. 357, states that the area at the mouth of the Stillwater River was first called Eagle Nest, then changed to Sheep Dip, "because some whiskey sold there had such a vile taste that a customer compared it to this liquid." Later, known as Stillwater, it became confused with Stillwater, Minnesota. Finally the name changed to Columbus. This accounts for the variance in names of the settlement in the affidavits and other reports.

28 _Cause 299_, Affidavit of Christopher Child, sworn April 28, 1894; Butte Miner, April 26, 1894; _Cause 299_, Testimony of William Hogan; Affidavit of John Dorsey, sworn May 14, 1894; Affidavit of J. W. Kendrick.

29 _Cause 299_, Affidavit of M. J. Haley; Clinch, "Coxey's Army in Montana," p. 7; Vincent, p. 218, says four Hoganites were wounded; McMurry, p. 203; _Cause 299_, Affidavit of Christopher Child; M.S. telegram, Governor Richards to President Cleveland, April 25, 1894, Cleveland Papers.

30 Butte Bystander, Butte, Montana, April 26, 1894, as in Clinch, "Coxey's Army in Montana," p. 10; M.S. telegram, Governor Richards to Cleveland, April 25, 1894, Cleveland Papers; M.S. telegram, J. N. Scofield, to the Commanding General, April 25, 1894, Cleveland Papers. Vincent, p. 217, says the commanding general is Colonel Swayne; Vincent, pp. 151-52, quotes Kelly as saying, "This is the worst blow we have had. We will now be regarded as lawless men, we, who have broken no law. But we will march to Washington through thousands of regulars and tens of thousands of the militia. Not by physical force, men, but by law and through favorable public opinion."

31 McMurry, pp. 203-4; Clinch, "Coxey's Army in Montana," p. 8; Vincent, pp. 202, 217, 218; McMurry adds that the Tenth Cavalry were also sent from Fort Custer to cooperate with Page, but their assistance was not necessary; Montana News Association Inserts V (November 28,
1921), p. 65. Captain Webster, a member of the group from Fort Keogh, recalls that the soldiers acted "under instruction from federal officials, who had not been taken into the confidence of the officials of Butte in their effort to get the Coxeyites out of Montana." He further claims "the city officials entered into a conspiracy with the railroad officials" to arrange the army's departure.

32Montana News Association Inserts, The Shields Valley Record (June 26, 1922). The reminisce, "When 'General Coxey' Hogan Stole Whole Freight Train," by Percival J. Cooney, states that Hogan, "now a prosperous fruit grower in Orcas, Washington," had recently visited him and was still denying that he stole the train, but admitting that he "took it." "Hogan's earnest contention that he had been double-crossed by the railroad people seemed to have made some impression on the court, as he was soon released and returned to Butte, where he was for a number of years prominent in the reform and labor movement."

33Vincent, pp. 202-206.

34Senate Executive Documents, 53rd Congress, 2nd Session, IV, 120. Attorney General Olney increases his estimate of deficiency in the appropriation for fees and expenses of marshals from $50,000 to $125,000. As examples for the reason behind this increased debt he includes several telegrams requesting money, most of which are related to the Industrial Armies.

35Cause 299, Commitment for William Hogan, William Cunningham, Philip Rogers, Michael McElligott, and James Hacket, May 2 and 3, 1894; Bond of William Hogan and William Cunningham. Those signing the bonds were A. F. Bray, H. L. Frank, John O'Rourke, W. R. Kenyon, D. J. Hennessey, Henry Jonas, P. J. Brophy, L. Jacobs, A. Wehl, W. H. Lewis and Henry Nickel.

36Cause 299, Judgement Roll, filed May 14, 1894; Clinch, 'Coxey's Army in Montana,' p. 8.

37Cause 299, Affidavit of W. Walsworth, sworn May 8, 1894; Answer of William Cunningham, sworn May 12, 1894; Judgement Roll.

38Cause 299, Answer of James Hacket, sworn May 14, 1894; Judgement Roll.

39Cause 299, Answer of Philip Rogers, filed May 14, 1894; Judgement Roll.

40Cause 299, Answer of William Hogan; Judgement Roll.

41Cause 299, Answer of Michael McElligott, May 14, 1894; Judgement Roll.

42Cause 299, Judgement Roll; Clinch, 'Coxey's Army in Montana,' p. 9, claims that forty other officers were given thirty day sentences. There are no records in Cause 299 to support this.
The River Press, May 30, 1894; Marilyn Ritland, "Coxey's Army and the Merchants of Fort Benton," Montana Historian II (Winter, 1972), p. 24. William Sprague, "from 1864 to 1869, had been in the boat building business at Fort Benton. He had assisted the miners in the building of mackinaws and other types of boats for the long trip back East."

The River Press, June 6, 1894.


Clinch, "Coxey's Army in Montana," p. 9; Montana News Association Inserts, Opheim Observer, November 28, 1921.

The River Press, June 6, 1894.

Edward B. Howell, letter to the editor, Review of Reviews X (July, 1894), p. 43; McMurry, pp. 205, 263.

Vincent, pp. 216, 217.

Cause 299, Testimony of William Hogan; Vincent. p. 247.
Portland, being the only industrial center in an agricultural state, held most of Oregon's share of the four million unemployed in the country in 1936. Like other cities, Portland tried to employ some of these men on street improvement projects, but there were too many applicants and not enough jobs to achieve positive results. Local charities also tried repeatedly to aid these hungry families.  

One of the reasons for local inability to provide adequate relief was the impossibility of keeping people employed. Some local officials believed such projects were impractical because it destroyed the self-sufficiency of the recipient. Others averred that work was more profitable than direct charity, but that jobs should be "healthful, hard, and wholesome," to prevent a dependence on public employment in more prosperous times. The effect of relief on individual character was the primary concern, rather than a humanitarian desire to help those who found themselves through the depression years.

Unable to cope with the problems of unemployment, Portland officials and newspapers blamed California for sending its tramps and migrants upon Oregon. Ironically, those Oregonians tried to rescue the situation by praising California's climate, hoping the local climate would go south, but the northerly migration continued. In fact, the first Oregon's Army in Oregon came from California to join a similar group in Hanford before heading East. This group, which originated in San Francisco on April 7, under the command of Charles R. McChesney, moved north on the Southern Pacific, through Ashland, Roseburg, Cottage Grove, Salem, and finally to Portland.

Sain's Industrial Army moved on the city's east side. At the same time, Mayor Eugene Sullivan and Chief of Police Charles H. Bond...
Portland, being the only industrial center in an agricultural state, held most of Oregon's share of the four million unemployed in the country in 1894. Like other cities, Portland tried to employ some of these men on street improvement projects, but there were too many applicants and not enough jobs to achieve positive results. Local charities also tried unsuccessfully to aid these hungry families. One of the reasons for local inability to provide adequate relief was due to disagreements over what should constitute relief. Some local officials believed work projects were inadvisable because it destroyed the self-reliance of the recipient. Others averred that work was more profitable than direct charity, but that jobs should be "continuous, hard, and underpaid," to prevent a dependence on public employment in more prosperous times. The effects of relief on individual character was the primary concern, rather than a humanitarian desire to help those less fortunate ones through the depression years.1

Unable to cope with the problems of unemployment, Portland officials and newspapers blamed California for dumping its tramps and vagrants upon Oregon. Ironically, these Oregonians tried to reverse the situation by praising California's climate, hoping the local "bums" would go south, but the northward migration continued. In fact, the first Coxey's Army in Oregon came from California to join a similar group in Seattle before heading East. This group, which originated in San Francisco on April 9, under the command of Charles E. Kain, moved north on the Southern Pacific, through Ashland, Roseburg, Cottage Grove, Salem, and finally to Portland.

Kain's Industrials camped on the city's east side. At the army's request, Mayor Eugene Shelby and Chief of Police Charles H. Hunt
agreed to provide four meals if the army would then leave town. But when the army received word that the Seattle contingent had already started toward Washington, they had no reason to go north, and decided to remain in the city until transportation could be arranged from there.

The day after the arrival of the California army, Kain found employment at his regular trade as a painter, and Jack Short, one of the original instigators of the group, was chosen to be the new leader. Short’s first action was to ask the city officials for additional provisions. He was refused, for in the meantime another group of six hundred marchers planning to leave Oakland and travel to Portland had wired ahead for provisions. The city fathers, fearing that they had set a precedent, refused to give aid to any more armies. This refusal, coupled with Governor Sylvester Pennoyer’s failure in his attempt to secure the army’s transportation on the Northern Pacific, made the future of the marchers appear grim.

In spite of difficulties facing the California contingent, a group of Coxey supporters formed in Portland itself in conjunction with the Central Labor Council. The leader, J. S. Smith, came up from San Francisco to organize the army in secret meetings held in the council hall. On April 19, the four hundred new recruits staged a public meeting at the Third Street Plaza, securing public sympathy and support, an ingredient lacking in the California organization.

The status of Portland’s industrial army became truly Oregonian when Smith removed the last California stigma by resigning his post in favor of S. L. Scheffler, a local stone mason. Even the goals of the army took on a regional tone when Captain A. J. White explained, “What we want is plenty of work and free silver. If we get the latter, the
former will come without the bidding." J. S. Coxey was but a symbol to the far western army, not a leader. Coxey symbolized the idea of men appealing in person to Congress for relief legislation. The work projects Coxey recommended were recognized by the Portland army, but they believed silver to be the panacea that would return prosperity and employment for all.

The combined forces of the California contingent and Scheffler's men, now known as the "Fifth Regiment, U.S.I.A.", or Portland army, began looking for transportation eastward. They found that the Union Pacific and Northern Pacific railroads were not as generous in allowing the army to ride as the Southern Pacific had been. In fact, the U.P. and N.P. were more interested in preventing the army from riding than they were in conducting their normal business. The Portland army made two unsuccessful attempts to board a U.P. train, and then tried the N.P. lines. Chief of Police Hunt, discovering their plans, prompted the N.P. officials to move the train out ahead of schedule, while he and his deputies awaited the arrival of the unsuspecting army.

When their train hopping plans failed, the four hundred and forty-six man army left Portland on April 25, at 2:00 a.m. for a fifteen mile walk to Troutdale, along the U.P. tracks. There the army received a warm welcome and supplies from the Union Meat Company and local merchants, including accommodations in a stable. The following day the army members manned the telegraph office and the train depot, as if they worked there, in order to track the movement of trains, and ascertain when they might be able to hop a freight. The army conducted business properly, receiving and relaying all messages with such accuracy that their presence would probably have gone undetected, had not one employee escaped to Fairview and notified U.P. officials. The rail-
road officials vigorously protested the presence of the army in their offices, and secured an injunction to have them removed. Judge Charles Bellinger sent U.S. Marshal H. C. Grady and his deputies to Troutdale to deliver the injunction, because the railroad had gone into receivership and was placed in the hands of the court. Grady, finding no one who admitted being a leader in the army, read the injunction aloud to those occupying the offices. The army members vacated the premises immediately, but again took control when Grady returned to Portland.

The citizens of Troutdale continued to enthusiastically support the Coxeyites, although the Union Meat Company may have contributed more out of fear for the safety of their property than out of compassion. Aware of this situation, Sheriff Penumbra Kelly, wiring Governor Pennoyer, asked for the state militia to protect private property. The governor, unable to help the industrial army, and particularly unwilling to hinder them, refused by replying, "This is a civil and not a military government, and it is your duty to exercise the civil power to quell any disturbance when it occurs, and not to call upon the militia before it occurs."

On hearing of the governor's refusal to send the militia, Marshal Grady, a stalwart defender of law and order, took matters into his own hands. Grady wired Attorney-General Richard Olney to the effect that the lack of action by the state made federal troops a necessity, and he requested that local forts be alerted and prepared to deal with the industrial army. Then Grady and his sixteen deputies joined forces with Sheriff Kelly and his thirty men to disperse the lawless Coxey element in Troutdale. But when the posse arrived, Scheffler's men were lined up in marching position, with gear on their backs, as if preparing to leave town. The Coxeyites, undoubtedly wishing to display
their commissary provided by local citizens, offered to feed the posse who had come to evict them. But the people of Troutdale so vigorously condemned the law officers for their attempted intervention that the indignant deputies refused the meal and returned to Portland.

Grady, placed in a "rather awkward situation," defended his inability to expel the Coxeyites by claiming that three hundred of the five hundred man army carried revolvers. Chagrined by circumstances, the marshal resolved to get even with Scheffler once and for all. Grady schemed with U.P. officials to send a train of empty box cars to Troutdale, with each car containing a copy of the courts' injunction against the army. Though the industrials had never interfered with passing freight or mail trains, the stopped, empty box cars posed too great a temptation for Scheffler's men. Ignoring the injunction, the army fell into Grady's trap by boarding the train. The engineer immediately side-tracked his load of human freight and drove the engine out of town without them.

Grady's conniving placed the Coxeyites in contempt of court, as he desired, but he prematurely wired Olney that the Coxeyites had possession of the U.P. train and that he was powerless to regain it by force. He described the men as "desperate", and the situation as "critical". The wire was grossly misleading, for the army had not made off with a train. However Grady continued plotting. His second scheme entailed a lightly protected train carrying particularly influential officials, including General Manager G. W. Dickinson, of the N.P. and Superintendent Robert Baxter of the U.P. The train arrived in Troutdale on the pretense of picking up meat to haul to Portland, though previous orders stated that it was not necessary to ship freight at
this time, and that trains were to avoid Troutdale. The Coxeyites, who were informed by telegraph of the approaching train, immediately took possession of the engine, sidetracked the officials' car, and connecting the box cars, raced out of town eastward. 

The army had taken Grady's bait, so the marshal moved in to close the trap. First he called on Brig. Gen. Elwell S. Otis at Vancouver for assistance in capturing the wild Coxeyized engine, then he requested a fast train from Portland for his pursuit of the army.

The chase was on. Scheffler's train, forced to stop briefly for coaling at the Dalles, continued in such haste that they did not take on the provisions offered by the citizens. Grady, now in hot pursuit, shortened the distance between the trains while the federal troops from Fort Walla Walla pounded their way westward to cut off the runaway army. The troops halted at Arlington to set the scene for the capture. They placed torpedoes on the tracks about a quarter of a mile from their train, and flagged Scheffler's men down, just as the torpedoes went off. The industrial's train halted and the troops rushed in for an easy capture. Then the elated Grady, closing in from the rear stormed down the tracks and demanded the industrials be searched.

The battle equipment the marshal had described, much to his humiliation, turned out to be three guns, a few butcher knives, and shaving razors. Chafing from this embarrassment, Grady ordered that the men might have water, but no food. The five hundred and seven prisoners were returned to Portland, accompanied by federal troops.

On their arrival, only four hundred and thirty four prisoners were accounted for, as the others apparently dropped off the moving train during the night. Hereafter, marshal resorted to nailing the doors.
of trains secure to prevent captured industrials from escaping. Fifty-two leaders of Scheffler's army were placed in city and county jails, while the rank and file men were forced to remain in the box cars under heavy guard. Irate citizens scorned and insulted the guardsmen, while encouraging the army with mental support. The citizens gathered at the Third Street Plaza that afternoon, demonstrating sympathy in speeches favoring the Coxeyites and praising Governor Pennoyer for his attempt to aid them. In fact the governor was so popular with the industrials that they considered him "one of us."^{15}

The combined weight of public demonstrations and the arguments of attorneys F. V. Drake and M. L. Pipes, convinced the court that the Coxeyites had not realized the extent of their offense, and Judge Bellinger thought it best to be lenient. The men were released on April 30, upon the warning that a second offense would not be treated lightly.^{16}

Though about one hundred of the released prisoners decided to abandon the march, three hundred and fifty Coxeyites remained firm in their determination to reach Washington. To show their approval of the perseverance of the latter group, three thousand urban laborers staged a demonstration parade in honor of the industrials, which finally halted in front of the anti-Coxeyite Oregonian building. There, speeches glorified the Coxey movement and the crowd responded with noisy support, which greatly annoyed the Oregonian's editor, H. W. Scott.^{17}

The following day, May 1, the army participated in another parade for the celebration of International Labor Day. Marshal Grady, enraged at Judge Bellinger's dismissal of his captives, tried once again to foil the army's plan to reach Washington. Using the massive turn out for the parade as his excuse, Grady wired Olney that conditions were
bordering on insurrection and he needed fifty rifles and ammunition from General Otis to maintain order. The day's events constituted a gala celebration, with no signs of riots or insurrection. Surely Olney was able to see through Grady's last scheme, for no rifles were requisitioned. Grady's aggressive action toward the Coxeyites was interpreted by the *Telegram* as more than a desire for law and order. The editor accused Grady of making "a harvest" out of the affair, by "looting the treasury to the tune of one thousand dollars a day." The deputies, for which Grady requested five dollars a day, were the highest paid "laborers" in the country, even if Grady pocketed a portion of it. The editor claimed that there was "no actual danger of the destruction of railway property, and if there was the marshals would be powerless to prevent it."  

When the news of Coxey's arrest by Washington police reached Portland, more of the army members became discouraged and dropped from the ranks. It was reported that Scheffler's army was breaking up, but actually they were moving eastward in small groups of ten to twenty-five, gaining access to east-bound trains in the face of little or no resistance. The last group of thirty men left Portland on May 10.  

The U.P., practically powerless to evict the elusive industrials, requested forces of marshal or troops to protect their trains. Some army members however were thrown off trains near Weiser, Fayette and Caldwell, Idaho. These men were evidently the last of the groups leaving Portland. On May 15, over one hundred industrials were put off at Weiser, where they were lodged in the town hall. The citizens donated thirty dollars to feed them, and cheered the army as it marched out the following morning, carrying the American flag.
The same group marched into Fayette where they were permitted to camp near the pump house. Mayor Travis Brown secured, at city expense, enough food for two hearty meals and a lunch to take along the next day.

A few days later sixty of these men, acting on their own initiative, as Scheffler was not present, boarded a train at Nampa, Idaho. The railroad officials refused to move the train unless the Coxeyites would remove themselves. Local law enforcement moved in to arrest the army and take them to Boise for trial.

The groups of the industrial army leaving Portland earlier than those mentioned above made greater headway, arriving in Pocatello, Idaho, on May 12. When the U.P. refused to haul them farther, Scheffler and his men stole an Oregon Short Line and raced into Cokeville, Wyoming. Believing they had escaped Idaho authorities, the men rested while Scheffler went ahead to Granger to solicit supplies. But Judge Reiner issued an injunction against the army's interference with trains, and U.S. Marshal Joseph P. Rankin arrested Scheffler and his men.

Scheffler and nineteen officers of the army were taken to Cheyenne to appear before Judge Reiner, while the others remained in custody at Cokeville, at Idaho Marshal Joseph Pinkham's request. It seems that neither state wanted the expense of care and trial of the Coxeyites. Finally the Justice Department issued an order that all be taken to Boise. The prisoners in Cokeville were turned over to Pinkham, but only Scheffler was transported from Cheyenne to Boise, probably because of the distance and the expense involved in moving the prisoners. On May 23, Judge Reiner tried the remainder of the officers in Cheyenne, sentencing Hughes, Week, and Brien to five months in the Laramie County jail, while the others received lighter sentences.
The same day that Scheffler's group arrived in Pocatello, another advance portion of Portland's army reached Montpelier. Under the leadership of Tom Callahan, the army stole a U.P. train and raced as far as Green River, Wyoming. Green River's citizens refused to give provisions to the Industrials, who milled aimlessly around the tracks waiting to be arrested. The army mistakenly believed that they would be taken to Cheyenne and would be released without punishment. From there they planned to continue their journey toward Washington. But for Portland's army, the "petition in boots" was impossible. Federal troops arrested the Industrials and sent them back to Boise, Idaho, on May 16.25

During the layover in Green River, Callahan and Breckinridge escaped the Wyoming authorities, and proceeded to hop rides to Omaha. But even these two were captured and returned by Marshal Pinkham to Boise on May 29.26

The combined group of prisoners from Nampa, Cokeville, and Green River suffered a long, miserable wait for Judge Beatty to return from Moscow, Idaho. The Industrials were "crowded like wild cattle into a pen without sleeping and sanitary accommodations." Governor McConnell visited the army's quarters at the request of indignant citizens, and seeing the conditions, complained to Olney that Marshal Pinkham had not complied with "the demands of civilization" in the treatment of his prisoners.27

The industrial army of Portland did not receive their trial until June 4. Judge Beatty sentenced Scheffler to six months in the Ada County jail, and other leaders were to serve from three to six months. The rank and file were not released, as they had hoped, but sentenced to not more than sixty days.28
On the twelfth of June the commonwealers were loaded into box cars, the doors nailed shut, and transported to a site on the Snake River near Huntington, where they were forced to build their own prison encampment. The men were released a few at a time during the summer to prevent their regaining strength as a group to continue toward Washington. 29

The authorities back in Portland insisted that these train stealing Coxeyites were not of the Portland Army, which they claimed had dissolved by the tenth of May. But just as they failed to recognize their own unemployed industrial army, they lacked the ability to see their own shortcomings. Local relief had failed so miserably that a greater authority was needed to settle the affair. This was the purpose of Oregon's contingent as well as other armies all over the country. The greater authority they sought was Congress. Had all the Industrials reached their goal of Washington, perhaps Congress would have been forced to act decisively to aid the unemployed. But the concept of rights of the individual held by the Coxeyites in their desire to petition in boots must have been all but destroyed while they were penned "like wild cattle" in the barracks of Boise. 30

The Portland Army was not the spontaneous movement found in Butte, Montana. The Portland group was organized by J. S. Smith of San Francisco. The two armies were similar, however, in that Oregon's men were recruited from the Central Labor Council, and Montana's men from the Industrial Legion. Organizations such as these provided ties existing prior to the Coxey movement, as well as able leadership for the proposed march. The Portland and Butte Armies were identical in their goals, the restoration of free coinage of silver, Both contingents believed silver to be the panacea to end the depression.
It is interesting that the Montana group had the support and probably the cooperation of the railroad officials and Marshal McDermott and Deputy Haley, and yet failed to get away with the train because of Governor Rickard's call for federal troops. In Oregon, the situation was reversed. Governor Pennoyer was responsive to the Army's needs, but unable to help them. Marshal Grady and the railroad officials were particularly anti-Coxeyites, and yet in spite of the barriers they placed before the Oregon Army, they were unable to confine them within the state's borders.

Most importantly, the Butte and Portland Armies were synonymous in ideology. They both believed that they had a right to petition Congress, and a right to petition in person. Portland Army members, like those of Butte, believed that Congress had a duty to listen to their grievances and to pass legislation to alleviate their problems. This is the basic assumption that the government is responsible for the welfare of its citizens. In Oregon as well as Montana, this belief in governmental responsibility and the methods of marching to bring their problems to Congress was Coxeyism.
Footnotes


4Voeltz, pp. 273-5; Wahl, pp. 14-15, says the governor lost interest in the Coxey movement.

5Voeltz, pp. 275-6; Wahl, p. 14. Officers elected were: H. Hamilton, A. Company; D. Dugan, B; A. J. White, C; W. Fairbanks, D; William Burns, E; J. M. Schier, F; Frank Burke, G; H. L. Mason, H; William Johnson, I; Lee Stevenson, K; John Murphy, L; Dan Adrain, M. Each company contained sixty men, indicating the enrollment neared 720. Apparently there was no company J.

6Voeltz, pp. 277-8; Telegram, Portland, Oregon, April 19, 1894, as in Voeltz, p. 271. There is some confusion over the spelling of Scheffler's name, appearing also as Sheffer and Shreffler.

7Voeltz, p. 278; Wahl, p. 14; Butte Miner, Butte, Montana, April 26, 1894.

8Voeltz, pp. 278-9; Wahl, p. 15, claims the army left Portland the afternoon of April 25; Henry Vincent, The Story Of The Commonweal (Chicago: W. B. Conkey Co., 1894), pp. 209-10, describes this incident, but confuses the Portland army of Scheffler with the Seattle army of Shepard; Butte Miner, April 28, 1894.


10Telegram, Grady to Olney, April 27, 1894, Senate Executive Document, 53rd Congress, 2nd Session, no. 120; McMurry, p. 218; Vincent, p. 210; Voeltz, p. 282.

11Voeltz, pp. 286, 283; McMurry, p. 218; Butte Miner, April 29, 1894; Wahl, p. 15.

12Telegram, Grady to Olney, April 27, 1894, Senate Executive Documents; Voeltz, p. 284; McMurry, pp. 217-18; Wahl, p. 16, believed the army was surprised to see the train approaching, however the Coxeyites acted with a speed that indicates preparedness.
The industrial army prisoners were released April 30. This appears to be the first trial of the train stealing Coxeyites in the Northwest. Judge Bellinger's leniency and speedy trial did not serve as a precedent for latter court actions.

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Voeltz, p. 289; Wahl, p. 16, reports that only 221 continued among the ranks of Scheffler's army; Leslie M. Scott, "Review of Writings of H. W. Scott," Oregon Historical Quarterly, XIV (1913), pp. 178-82. H. W. Scott, the editor of the Oregonian, waged a literary war against Coxeyism. On April 21, 1894, a group of unemployed surrounded the Oregonian building, shouting, "We are starving in the midst of plenty. Why?" A man of thrift and ambition, Scott scolded the men for being lazy and wasteful, and blamed the depression on their demands for higher wages, forcing employers to close their doors. He believed the government had no obligation to "remedy the evils men placed upon themselves."

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Gaboury, p. 104; Butte Miner, May 14-15, 1894; Gaboury, Wahl, and Voeltz note only one train stealing incident, and are in disagreement as to where the train was taken, and where it was captured. The confusion results from incomplete information. Actually three trains were in the army's possession, one at Nampa, one from Pocatello to Cokeville, and one from Montpelier to Green River.
27 Gaboury, p. 106.
28 Gaboury, p. 106; Butte Miner, June 6, 1894.
30 Wahl, p. 18; Voeltz, p. 292, "The Oregonian was quite perturbed about the label 'Portland army', insisting that the group in Wyoming could not be the Portland army, because it had broken up."
Chapter V

The Industrial Armies of Washington State

In the prosperous years before the Panic, Washington State's population grew tremendously. Many immigrants and eastern laborers immigrated to the state, finding work in railroad construction, agriculture, mining, and lumbering industries. Seattle, Tacoma, and Spokane experienced the greatest population increases, and consequently, when jobs were no longer available, the depression hardened. Over seventy-five percent of their banks failed in the financial crisis, resulting in the closure of many businesses. The first real crop failures, coinciding with the Panic, increased the already high number of unemployed.

In the spring of 1893, the only work to be found was in the fields of potatoes, but no one wanted to work there, for the farmers had no money to pay even last year's laborers. Seattle and Tacoma Central Labor Unions rallied the highly organized unions of Portland and Seattle, and other unorganized wage workers, and it was estimated approximately during the Panic. The unemployed had neither ability nor strength until something went in Washington.

The first organize expression in Seattle was Henry Thayer, an unemployed miner. In a public meeting on April 7, he and county-wide followers invited the city's unemployed to join their Northwest Industrial Army. After outlining the depression industrial situation, Thayer stated that the unemployed must help themselves by organizing for mutual improvement. Those agreeing to join the army were bound by their signatures to the following resolutions:

First: That we will uphold the Constitution of the United States.
Second: That we recognize only the honest working man.
Third: That we will assist any officer in the lawful discharge of his duty.
Fourth: That we repudiate all connections with criminals.
In the prosperous years before the Panic, Washington state's population grew tremendously. Many immigrants and eastern laborers traveled to the state, finding work on railroad construction, agriculture, mining and lumbering industries. Seattle, Tacoma, and Spokane experienced the greatest population increases, and consequently, when jobs were no longer available, felt the depression hardest. Over seventy-five percent of their banks failed in the financial crisis, resulting in the closing of many businesses. The first bad crop failure, coinciding with the Panic, added to the misery and the number of unemployed. In the spring of 1894, the only work to be found was in the fields of Palouse, but no one wanted to work there, for the farmers had no money to pay even last year's laborers. Seattle's Western Central Labor Union, unlike the highly organized unions of Portland and Butte, had never exercised much power, and it was weakened seriously during the Panic. The unemployed had neither unity nor strength until Coxeyism came to Washington.

The first outspoken commonwealer in Seattle was Henry Shephard, an unemployed surveyor. In a public meeting on April 7, he and seventy-two followers invited the city's unemployed to join their Northwest Industrial Army. After outlining the depressed industrial situation, Shephard stated that the unemployed must help themselves by organizing for mutual improvement. Those agreeing to join the army were bound by their signatures to the following resolutions:

First: That we will uphold the Constitution of the United States.
Second: That we recognize only the honest working man.
Third: That we will assist any officer in the lawful discharge of his duty.
Fourth: That we repudiate all connections with drunkards,
thieves, and convicts.

Fifth: That as an industrial association we pledge ourselves to the protection of life, liberty, and prosperity.

Shephard's ideas were neither radical nor revolutionary. Though he placed no blame for existing conditions, the Montanans blamed the repeal of the Sherman Silver Purchase Act. Shephard realized that no one would help the unemployed, and therefore they must unite and seek help for themselves. His resolutions posed no threat to the existing government or to the citizens of the country. The recruits for this army were to be respectable working men and law abiding citizens. The lower elements of society were not to be tolerated. With these resolutions as guidelines of conduct, the army intended to march to Washington to persuade Congress to enact the roads bill and non-interest-bearing bonds bill proposed by Jacob S. Coxey.

To acquaint the people of Seattle with their mission, the army staged parades on April 14 and 18, during which their numbers grew from three hundred to four hundred and fifty. The women were so enthused by the parades that they proposed to join the marchers. Displeased by the idea of prospective women marchers, the men convinced the wives to keep their support at the home front. A ball was given to raise funds for the army. The women, in disagreement as to how the money should be spent, quickly disbanded their auxiliary group. Speaking to the Boston unemployed earlier in the spring, Mary E. Lease advised the men that if they would stay home and "mind the babies, the women would soon find a road out of this terrible business depression." But it appeared, at least in Seattle, that the women needed first to learn to get along with each other, before they tried to tackle Congress.

When the membership in the Northwest Industrial Army neared one thousand, the leaders began searching for transportation to Washington.
Since the unemployed were usually allowed to hop rides on the railroads, the army believed the N.P. Company would provide free transportation. Though the N.P. refused to carry the men, the officials offered work to the army to replace striking members of the American Railway Union. The industrials declined the offer, stating that their objective was to "uphold the dignity of labor and not degrade it." While the army waited to see if the city of Seattle would pay their fare, Shephard went to Tacoma to help organize their local army.4

The colorful Frank T. Cantwell, a well-to-do boxer and saloon bouncer, led Tacoma's contingent of the Industrial Army. An independent spirit prevailed Cantwell's camp, for rather than accepting Shephard's resolutions, the men made their own proposals to present to Congress. The Tacoma army wanted a government financed liberal education, construction of a canal in Nicaragua, restrictions on immigration, and development of farm lands, probably by irrigation. It is obvious that Cantwell's army's demands were as restrictive in scope as Coxey's plan for building roads and public facilities. Cantwell's demands represent local needs in the state of Washington, where shipping would be faster and more profitable with a canal in Central America; agriculture would be successful and more widely applicable with irrigation; and all concerned would be better prepared for life with a liberal education. As for restrictions on immigration, the west coastal area felt the effects of cheap Chinese laborers much more than did the town of Massillon, Ohio, the birthplace of the "petition in boots". Personal goals such as these, which meant more than employment at $1.50 a day, may be the reason why Cantwell's army pushed on to Washington, while many other armies failed.5

Cantwell proved to be an exceptionally persuasive speaker. Calling for recruits, "Jumbo", as he was known, challenged the men to go to
Washington and call Cleveland a traitor. "If Cleveland and both houses of the national Congress know that the people throughout the country are calling through their empty stomachs for work and bread, and the government can put these men to work on public improvements and does not, then it is a traitor to the wants of the people." Cantwell believed the depression was due to "bribery and class legislation" in Congress, and that the representation should be forced to obey the will of the people.  

Competent in respect to recruiting and organizing the army, Cantwell's talents were of no more value than other army "generals" when it came to dealing with the railroads. Insisting that his men would not have to walk, Jumbo requested free transportation. When this was refused he offered one thousand dollars for their fare. Again rejected, Cantwell raised his offer to ten thousand dollars, but to no avail. This enormous sum, offered from the leader's own pockets, represented only ten dollars for each passenger, as the enlistment had nearly out grown regiment strength. Since the railroads refused to haul the men as freight, Mrs. Cantwell proposed to ship one cow in each box car, along with thirty to forty hands to care for it, but her plan also failed.

With no other way to Washington than by foot, the armies of Seattle and Tacoma marched out of their respective towns and joined forces in Puyallup, on April 28. The combined armies, numbering between fifteen and thirty-five hundred, set up a barracks in a half finished hotel, and relied on the citizens for provisions, while continually dealing with railroad officials to gain transportation.

The officials of the U.P. and N.P. considered the armies a potential danger to their property, and the receivers secured an injunction from Judge Hanford, requiring the U.S. Marshal to protect their posses-
sions. U.S. Marshal Drake hired two hundred deputies to guard the rail-
road property while the armies were in their home cities, but when the
armies began to move on foot, extra deputies were required to man all
trains in and out of the areas the industrials occupied, to prevent the
Coxeyites from boarding. 9

During the week long stay at Puyallup trouble developed in the town
and within the army itself. The citizens called a meeting to ascertain
what should be done about the presence of the armies. Governor McGraw
came to address the audience. Being a politician, the governor desired
to allow the local citizens to speak first, enabling him to take a sim-
iliar stand. A Mr. Jasper expressed the view that the armies were un-
wanted guests, and he thought the town should eject them. He suggested
"that the army disband and drift over the state as tramps; that they be
sent to their respective homes; or that the railroads give them trans-
portation towards Washington City." Indicating his displeasure, Cant-
well assured the citizens that the army would be happy to leave if trans-
portation were arranged at least as far as Spokane, the home of "true
American citizens." McGraw, realizing that his stand would be supported,
explained that he did not sympathize with the army, and suggested that
they disband and send only a representative to Congress. The governor
intimidated that if the army did not leave Puyallup, he would be forced
to call the militia to drive them out. 10

The army had a leadership problem. Seattle's Commander Shephard,
suspected of planning to abscond with the treasury, was asked to give
account of army funds. When he could produce only forty-three cents,
the enlisted men demanded his resignation. E. J. Jeffries, a more able
leader, replaced Shephard, and the latter returned to Seattle, claiming
the army had become discontented. 11
Anxious to be on their way, Cantwell and one hundred men boarded a train east of Puyallup. Their cars were sidetracked and the engine returned to Tacoma. The army obviously could get nowhere as a unit, so they were ordered to travel in small groups and rendezvous in Spokane. The popular route was east to Ellensburg, south to Yakima, southeast to Kennewick and Pasco, then northeast to Spokane. These areas provided food and lodging, and the men were able to catch trains easily until the engineers were ordered to rush at high speed through towns that were not regular stops. However, nearly three hundred men were arrested by deputy marshals for boarding trains in direct violation of the court's injunction. Cantwell, taking no chances of being incarcerated, bought tickets for himself and his family to ride to Spokane to make preparations to receive the army.

While Cantwell proceeded with ease in a first class railway coach, the long trip played havoc on his scattered groups of Commonwealers. On the fourth of May, one group "waiting for a chance to sneak on a blind baggage or break the beams" boarded a train, and were sidetracked and arrested near Palmer. On the ninth, in Yakima, a bloody battle between Coxeyites and deputies resulted in the arrest of nearly one hundred army members. The following day, a group captured a train near Ellensburg, and attempted to free the prisoners in Yakima, but were also arrested. The same day another group boarded a train near Cle Elum, only to be disconnected from the engine. Though Jeffries encouraged groups of Commonwealers to halt the train of prisoners, their attempts to release them were unsuccessful, and all the captured were tried and sentenced by Judge Hanford on May 25, in Seattle.

Some industrials believed the river route would keep them out of the grip of the deputies, and left Ellensburg by boat. But the Yakima
River proved more destructive than Marshal Drake's forces, as thirteen Coxeyites drowned in two incidents in the rapids. Two hundred others, who stayed by the railroad, were arrested in Pasco by Sheriff Sam Vinson, on May 6, the day Jeffries arrived in Spokane with three hundred men.

For three weeks prior to Jeffries' arrival, Dr. James Dolphin busily formed the Spokane contingent of Coxey's Army. The city of "true American citizens," as Cantwell characterized Spokane, turned out to be less favorably disposed than expected. The newspapers printed only the accounts of the less serious marchers, while the Populists feared that the army was a conspiracy to remove the men who might vote Populist in the upcoming elections. The conservative press advocated that the unemployed should exercise "patience, moderation, and good sense," indicating that Coxeyism was far too radical to accept. They believed that prosperity would return, and the U.S. would be "the happiest, the richest, and the greatest nation on earth."

But the Spokane army had neither the patience nor the means to await the return of prosperity. To avoid the difficulties of securing transportation, Dolphin requested that his men be allowed to repair Great Northern tracks in return for rides to the Mississippi River. The President, James J. Hill, strongly opposed to Coxeyism, refused the conditions of the offer, calling the Industrials the "worst class of men."

The responsibilities of leadership, such as procurement of provisions, lodging and transportation, combined with harassment from law enforcement officers and grumbling of anxious recruits, proved too much for Dolphin to handle. If he left the army, his prospects for improvements were unlikely, especially if he left without money. The army's funds proved too great a temptation for Dolphin, and he
attempted to leave town with the army's treasury. Cantwell, who
was well-to-do, had advocated stealing rather than starving, but no
one would permit stealing from the army. The Spokane recruits were
not in the least sympathetic, and dismissed Dolphin from their ranks.
The leadership was placed upon J. W. Kelly, the younger brother of
Charles Kelly, who led the San Francisco Industrial Army.

Using Cantwell's policy of splitting into small groups, Kelly
started his army, a few at a time, toward Washington. Gill and Thomas,
acting as advance guards, set up stations for food and lodging in Mis-
soula and Great Falls, Montana. Most of the Spokane army never reached
these points, however, for they ran afoul of the law. As early as
April 27, many of the army gathered in Hauser Junction, hoping to catch
a train. Idaho Marshal Pinkham and his deputies guarded the trains so
heavily that the army again set out on foot. Fifty men, reaching Sand
Point, Idaho, on May 12, stole a train and ran it to Hope before being
captured. The citizens of Clark's Fork, armed with revolvers, drove
away the guards and released the prisoners. Another portion of Kelly's
forces moved farther north to Troy, Montana, where they stole a Great
Northern train, getting only as far as Jennings before being stopped
by the law.

This new wave of Coxeyites in Montana prompted the receivers of
the N.P. to petition the court for an injunction ordering them not to
interfere with trains. Marshal McDermott received the order only a
few hours before the third train was captured. Around 2:00 a.m. on
May 19, Kelly and 150 followers took a N.P. train from Heron Station,
one hundred and fifty miles northwest of Missoula. The Kellyites
cleared embankments and replaced tracks that had been removed to halt
their progress. But their determination was hardly a match for Marshal
McDermott, who captured them at Arlee and placed them under military guard. The marshal earned his pay that week, for within a few days another train was stolen from Heron Station, and one from Noxon, both probably by members of the Spokane army. By the twenty-third of May, McDermott held over three hundred prisoners in western Montana.

Though the Spokane Industrial Army was considered to be defeated by Marshal McDermott and his nine thousand dollars worth of deputies, small groups of industrials continued to pass through Missoula, Butte, Helena, Great Falls, Fort Benton, and Havre on their way eastward, avoiding clashes with the law enforcement officers.

The Spokane industrials, left leaderless by Kelly’s arrest at Arlee, were probably assimilated into the small groups of Jeffries’ and Cantwell’s armies. Jeffries arrived in Wallace, Idaho, on May 18. He organized a group of local miners with the intention of using their force to steal a train. Plans in Wallace did not materialize, though the town’s citizens were generous in supplying provisions. The next day, trains were captured by Coxeyites, probably of the Seattle contingent, in Mullen and Kingston, but Jeffries was not personally involved.

Jeffries reached Missoula, Montana, on May 21 with one hundred followers. From fifty to seventy-five industrials streamed through Missoula daily prior to Jeffries arrival, and more were expected at a daily rate of twenty to thirty for the next two weeks. But the flow of marchers west of Montana was halted in a few days. Heavy rains causing floods, destroying bridges and railroads, were able to do what the deputies could not, in halting the progress of Coxey’s Army.

The citizens of Butte provided a warm welcome for Jeffries and two hundred of his men on May 27. The Home Guard, organized to support Hogan’s army, secured a ten thousand dollar treasurer’s bond to help the
Seattle contingent and other armies passing through Butte. The bond, to be retired at one dollar a month from each subscriber, comprised the efforts of nearly seventy-five percent of the businesses and working men. Showing his approval in speeches on the 27th and 28th, Jeffries complimented Butte on being "the best organized town in the world," and promised an audience of two thousand that he would ask Congress "for the free and unlimited coinage of silver." Taking advantage of the upcoming Populist primary, Jeffries requested that the citizens pledge their vote to the candidate who could get transportation for the army. But the Butte citizens wanted no further dealings with the railroads after the unfortunate Hogan affairs.23

The Seattle contingent left Butte on or about June 5, and their movements were no longer traced by local newspapers. A train stolen east of Helena on June 7, and one stolen in mid-June in Bismarck, North Dakota, may have some connections with this group. Jeffries arrived in Washington, D.C. after demonstrations were halted, and he was ordered to be transported to Chicago, Indianapolis, or Kansas City, protesting that he "did not care to stop at any city east of Minnesota," for only the western cities were hospitable.24

The Tacoma contingent traveled in small groups through Idaho and Montana without Cantwell, who having money for fare, preferred to ride trains and make arrangements for the others. Jumbo visited Great Falls, Montana, on May 25, then traveled to Fort Benton to make arrangements to float some of his men down the Missouri River with the Butte army. James Rowe, a rancher who lived twelve miles below Fort Benton, offered the site of old Fort Brule for the men to build their boats. Returning to Great Falls, Cantwell participated in a parade with two hundred of his army on May 29. Delivering one of his powerful speeches,
Jumbo persuaded a rancher to donate a carload of sheep to feed his hungry commonwealers. Traveling to Helena, Cantwell gained the financial support of Governor Rickards and Mayor Weed for his Missouri float trip. When Hogan's forces left Fort Benton on June 6, the Seattle army had completed only five boats. But it is possible that the forces merged, as there were reportedly four hundred Butte Coxeyites in St. Joseph, Missouri, on July 9, and the Butte army was not that large when they left Fort Benton. 25

However, all the members of the Tacoma contingent did not take the river route. Many industrials traveled across northern Montana, through Kalispell and Havre, along the Great Northern lines. Cantwell and three hundred of his army were in Minneapolis, Minnesota, on June 16. This group stole a stock train in La Crosse, Wisconsin, and rode to Milwaukee. The area police locked the industrials in the train and drove them a few miles south of town. Escaping the authorities, Cantwell continued to Chicago and Fort Wayne. Cantwell again left his troops and rode to Washington, D.C., while six hundred of his group marched across Michigan. 26

Cantwell and a portion of his army reached Washington in time for the Fourth of July Commonweal parade, in which Jumbo led all the representatives of the western armies. The Coxeyites in Washington were particularly glad to see the Tacoma army, for they brought four barrels of flour, a treasure to the hungry unemployed. Cantwell also helped enlarge the commissary by "a recitation with dramatic effect" which inspired a listener to donate a load of provisions. 27

On the first of August, Cantwell and several other army leaders, acting in the absence of J. S. Coxey, made one last attempt to deal with Congress. Their "Petition of the Unemployed" represented the
desires of the authors, not of Jacob Coxey. Their request included employment on public works, as Coxey had preached; free coinage of silver, as the west demanded; halting of immigration until such laborers were needed, representing the west coast demands; and the extremely radical idea of nationalizing the leading industries of the country, and distributing the product at cost to the consumer, which represented the thinking of Morrison L. Swift and the New England Armies.28

Though nothing came of the petition, and Cantwell did not call Cleveland a traitor, Coxey's army, through the influence of Cantwell and others, came to represent far more than a desire to build roads at $1.50 a day. The army represented a desire of the people to work through the government to achieve the goals of the working man, and demanded that the people were the government, whom the representatives were bound to serve.

The lack of a strong labor organization, as seen in the weakness of Seattle's Western Central Labor Union, made the organization of Coxey Armies more difficult in Washington, but also much more necessary. Without unity, the unemployed had no strength, and therefore, no voice. Seattle's contingent, under the leadership of Henry Shephard, spoke only for the goals announced by Coxey himself, although the Army was not initiated by Coxey or in direct contact with him. The goals of the Seattle Army were altered when E. J. Jefferies became the leader. Jefferies announced to the citizens of Butte that he would ask Congress for free coinage of silver. It is uncertain whether this was a personal goal, or merely a means to gain support from the silverite community. Either way, this incident points to the fact that the leaders of the armies reserved the right to set their own goals, rather than to be pledged to support only Coxey's bills.
Frank T. Cantwell was one of the strongest leaders involved in the Coxey movement, and had the greatest effect on Washington City of any of the leaders from the Pacific Northwest. His leadership ability may also be detected in the numerous goals he presented to Congress. His plans for reform included more than free silver or inflationary money in the economic sphere. His demand for a government financed free education is probably the most outstanding of any Armies' goals. Cantwell was interested in the total welfare of the citizen, not only his ability to find food and employment. Cantwell's goals rise above the basic human needs probably because Cantwell himself was not unemployed, desperate, and hungry.

Dr. James Dolphin, like Henry Shephard, appears limited in his ability to devise reform measures suitable to present to Congress. However, Dolphin, and his successor, J. W. Kelly, may have stated certain goals that were not reported by the conservative Spokane press.

It is interesting to note the change in attitudes in Montana once the Washington Armies began marching through the state. Marshal McDermott moved quickly to stop the advance of Coxeyites who had not professed a crusade for free silver, even though he had deliberately stalled his posse to prevent their capturing the Butte free silverites. On the other hand, Governor Rickards, who had effected the halt of the Butte Army, gave financial support to Cantwell to send his men down the Missouri River. Public outcry against the governor's earlier actions may have caused him to support the Armies to gain a favorable public image. And the citizens of Butte, still avid Coxeyites, financially supported Jeffries army, but were no longer willing to attempt to deal with the railroad officials to gain transportation.
In spite of the different goals of the three Armies, or the five leaders in the State of Washington, and their success or failure in reaching Congress, one point remains central to the movement. That the Armies believed they had a right to petition Congress, and a right to petition in person, is shown by the fact that all were marching to Washington. This fact supports the assumption shared also by Montana and Oregon Armies, that the government was responsible for the welfare of the citizens and should enact reform legislation for their benefit. Since these five armies from the three states did actually march toward or to Washington with their various measures for relief, we may further assume that they all believed Congress would act to alleviate their distress, once their requests had been made known. Although the American system of representative government had failed to provide for the needs of the people during the beginnings of the depression, the Coxeyites were still willing to work within the existing system by directing it toward their needs.
Footnotes


2Seattle Post Intelligencer, Seattle, Washington, April 8, 1894, as in Heriford, pp. 2-3; Donald L. McMurry, Coxeys Army (Seattle and London: University of Washington Press, 1929), pp. 216-17. McMurry spells the name as Shepard, and believed the army contained fifteen hundred men by the end of March.

3Heriford, pp. 4-5; River Press, Fort Benton, Montana, March 14, 1894. Mrs. Lease was Populist orator and outspoken advocate of women's suffrage.

4Seattle Post Intelligencer, April 23, 1894, as in Heriford, p. 5; Heriford, pp. 4-5; Henry Vincent, The Story Of The Commonwealth (Chicago: W. B. Conkey Co., 1894), p. 201; McMurry, pp. 216-17.

5Heriford, p. 5.

6Seattle Post Intelligencer, April 6, 1894, as in Heriford, pp. 5-6.

7McMurry, p. 222; Heriford, p. 6. "A regiment is up to 1055 men.

8Heriford, p. 7.

9Telegrams, Hanford to Olney, April 24, 1894, Olney to Drake, April 25, 1894. Drake to Olney, April 26, 1894, Olney to Drake, April 27, 1894, Senate Executive Documents, 53rd Congress, 2nd Session, no. 120; Heriford, p. 7.

10Heriford, pp. 8-9.

11Heriford, p. 9.

12Heriford, pp. 10-11; McMurry, p. 222.

13Butte Miner, Butte, Montana, May 5-26, 1894; River Press, May 16, 1894; Telegram, Drake to Olney, May 29, 1894, Senate Executive Documents, as above.

14Butte Miner, May 12-13, 1894; River Press, May 16, 1894; McMurry, p. 222, says 300 or more were arrested, and two hundred stranded men were starving.

15Heriford, pp. 12,14.

16Heriford, p. 14; Butte Miner, May 9, 1894; Telegram, Hill to Cleveland, May 5, 1894, Cleveland Presidential Papers, Library of Congress.

17Heriford, pp. 8, 15.
Butte Miner, April 27, May 13, 18-24, 1894; River Press, May 16, 23, 1894; William Joseph Gaboury, "Dissention In The Rockies: A History of Idaho Populism" (Unpublished Ph.D. Dissertation, University of Idaho, 1966), pp. 107-108; Heriford, p. 10. The Great Northern Railroad was not in receivership, so the deputy marshals and the U.S. Court played no role in this arrest and trial.


Telegram, McDermott to Olney, June 15, '1894, Senate Executive Documents, as above. Butte Miner, Great Falls Tribune, Helena Herald, River Press, May through June, 1894.

Butte Miner, May 19-20, 1894; Gaboury, pp. 107-108.

Butte Miner, May 22 through June 3, 1894.

Butte Miner, May 26 through June 4, 1894.

Telegram, McDermott to Olney, June 7, 1894, Senate Executive Documents, as above. Butte Miner, June 5, 21, 1894; McMurry, p. 259.

Butte Miner, May 29, June 20, 1894; Great Falls Tribune, May 26, 1894; River Press, May 23, 30, June 6, 1894; Thomas A. Clinch, "Coxey's Army In Montana." Montana, The Magazine of Western History XV (October 1965), 2-3; Burned and deserted, Fort McKenzie was renamed Fort Brule.

McMurry, p. 248.

McMurry, pp. 253-55.
Chapter VI
Conclusion

Jack A. Casey could not possibly have been the true leader of the thousands of unemployed who swarmed toward Washington in the spring of 1932. Casey's ideas were too provincial in origin to have national appeal. Casey's understanding of the situation of the unemployed was based on his own experiences when he had to let go during the depression. The goals of the movement were directed toward the need in California for both better roads and a new state bank. Finally, his ideas on trust and banking were derived from the Mexican banks. With such a myopic view of the situation, Casey was incapable of responding legislatively to benefit the suppressed business conditions of the country. In single line or individual, he was, truly, just the Industrialist movement. Nor do and Greek northern urban free citizen of color, Washington State's unemployment laws for unemployed railroad slowly, a meal & RioNegro, restricted immigration and development of farm lands, while labor and modern cities condemned the need for irrigation. The Industrialists must agree, however, that the unification of heavy industry. The goals of such groups were to provincial in nature to Casey's himself.

Not all those impatiently oriented groups of workers intended to campaign in Washington. Here is where Casey's role is apparent. Casey provided the stimulus for the unemployed to petition Congress. He was the symbol of the idea that the people had a right to personally appeal to their representatives in Washington, and that their voice should be heard. But he was only a symbol. The Better Farmer argued that four-fifths of the California, California districts had never heard of Casey, and the citizens of Better knew little more about him, edition
Jacob S. Coxey could not possibly have been the true leader of the thousands of unemployed who streamed toward Washington in the spring of 1894. Coxey's ideas were too provincial in origin to have national appeal. Coxey's understanding of the situation of the unemployed was based on his own employees whom he had to let go during the depression. The goals of his reform movement were directed toward the need in Massillon for both better roads and a new court house. Finally, his ideas on credit and banking were derived from the Massillon banks. With such a myopic view of the situation, Coxey was incapable of proposing legislation to benefit the depressed business conditions of the country. No single idea or individual, in fact, truly led the Industrial movement. Montana and Oregon marchers wanted free coinage of silver, Washington State's contingent asked for government financed education, a canal in Nicaragua, restricted immigration and development of farm lands, while other western armies emphasized the need for irrigation. The industrialized east coast added demands for the nationalization of heavy industry. The goals of each group were as provincial in nature as Coxey's himself.

But all these independently oriented groups of marchers intended to converge on Washington. Here is where Coxey's role is apparent. Coxey provided the stimulus for the unemployed to petition Congress. He was the symbol of the idea that the people had a right to personally appeal to their representatives in Washington, and that their voices should be heard. But he was only a symbol. The Butte Miner noted that four-fifths of the Oakland, California division had never heard of Coxey, and the citizens of Butte knew little more about him, espec-
ially after Major Camp's speech. Knowing precisely who Coxey was remained of little importance to the marchers. What mattered most was that Congress and the nation should hear the pleas of the unemployed.

If all the men who marched under the Coxey banner had reached Washington, they might have been successful in persuading Congress to act decisively on their behalf. It is unlikely that Coxey's fiat money scheme or the restoration of silver would have been enacted, yet the total force of the unemployed might have pushed the passage of reform legislation which really dealt with the needs of the unemployed. The failure of Coxeyism to secure its goals was also the failure of society and the government in not providing a suitable substitute to alleviate the depressed conditions.

The government's first priority was to stop the Coxeyites, rather than dealing with the causes of the movement. The President, terrified by this uprising of the unemployed, used the full authority of his power to crush the discontented. His use of secret service agents, and the deployment of troops to the capital were justifiable security measures, but the injunctions against riding trains amounted to thinly disguised political repression. It is estimated that sixty to seventy thousand marchers were prevented from traveling to Washington by these means.

It was the threat to the established protocols of government, which in large part, proved fatal to the Coxey movement. As New York's Governor Flower stated: "In America the people support the government; it is not the province of the government to support the people." But the Populists argued that providing the means for self help was not paternalistic. Thorstein Veblen sympathized to the point of admitting that fiat money to aid the unemployed was no more paternalistic than fiat
prosperity by means of the tariff to aid business and banking interests. Labor as well as capital had a right to make claims on the government. 2

The Populists believed that the government was responsible for the common welfare of the citizens. Not all Populists, including the Congressmen from the mid-west, believed Coxey's bills would prove to be panaceas, but they insisted that Congress do something to speed recovery from the depression. The Coxeyites were the only ones who actively demonstrated the need for proposed legislation directed specifically at alleviating the depressed conditions. 3

The Coxeyites marching their petition to Congress were armies of peaceful, law-abiding citizens, with their one exception of train stealing. The custom of riding free of charge was well established along railway lines before the advent of Coxeyism. Groups of unemployed men traveled the rails looking for work or returning to their homes. This movement has been described by Samuel Resnick as representing "the eastward ebbing of the tide of western migration as well as the nation-wide impact of depression." No one desired to stop these wandering vagrants. In fact, local authorities sought to move them on. In Denver, for example, whole train loads were shipped eastward free of charge, or at nominal fare. 4

The first western Industrial Armies were pushed eastward in the same manner. Citizens and police officers loaded Charles T. Kelly's fifteen hundred man army from Oakland, California, into a Southern Pacific train and sent them to Sacramento and eastward into Utah. From Ogden they captured a Union Pacific train and rode to the eastern terminals at Omaha, Nebraska, unmolested by law enforcement officers or officials of the road. Lewis C. Fry's Los Angeles Army likewise rode
trains successfully until they were stranded by the Southern Pacific near Sierra Blanca in the southwestern Texas desert.

It was not until William Hogan's Army took a train in Butte, Montana, that Coxeyites were arrested as train thieves, and the rash of train stealings and subsequent arrests began. Hogan's Army believed they would be treated no differently than Kelly's or Fry's Armies. They felt assured by city officials that no one would oppose their taking a train. Marshal McDermott, an advocate of free silver, delayed his posse in hopes that Hogan could not be stopped. It was the action of Governor Rickards, calling upon President Cleveland for federal troops, that stopped Hogan, and led the government into its role of oppressing the discontented marchers. From this point in the history of the movement, injunctions were issued by federal courts to halt the progress of the armies. The federal government spent enormous sums of money for deputies, troops, and care of the prisoners that could have been better used to aid the unemployed, had the authorities been so inclined. The only ones to prosper from this action were the "blood suckers and rounders" or criminal element, who, serving as deputies, bled the government at the rate of five dollars a day.

Aside from the actions of the President and his staff, the inaction of Congress was deplorable. The legislators rejected Kansas Senator Peffer's suggestion to form a committee of nine to hear the petition of the unemployed, yet on April 20, they received one thousand Philadelphia workingmen who came to protest the Wilson Tariff Bill. Nebraska Senator Allen's resolution to allow the army to assemble on the capitol steps and deliver their grievances was rejected on the grounds that it was unnecessary, for no law prohibited the citizens from coming to the Capitol. Yet Coxey was arrested attempting to speak from the
Capitol steps. Responding to the outrage of Coxey's arrest, Senator Allen and Representative Johnson from Ohio requested that a committee of five be appointed to investigate the arrests and the conduct of the police force during the May 1 parade. Though few objections were raised, the committee apparently did not act. The last appeal of the Industrial Armies, presented by Senator Peffer, comprising a variety of demands from all the armies, also fell on deaf ears. The law makers had no intention of listening to the demands of "anarchists".

One reason for Congressional refusal to hear the Coxeyites may be due to Coxey's and Browne's public image. Considered as cranks, impractical visionaries, radical religionists, both comic and dangerous, Congress believed they had nothing to learn from these men. To Coxey, the march was not jest. He believed from "the depths of his soul" that conditions must be changed. So enthralled was Coxey over his fiat money scheme that he named his son "Legal Tender". Ray Stannard Baker, correspondent for the Chicago Record, believed Coxey and Browne were "living in an unreal world of their own feverish enthusiasm." Coxey he felt, was the "balance wheel" that kept operations moving smoothly, but Browne was "child-like", caught up in his own world of "make-believe". Browne, holding complete faith in himself, was the victim of his own "word-intoxication". He was arrogant, bossy, and authoritarian.

"Everything he knew he said, and much that he did not know," yet in all his ignorance, he maintained authority. That is, until the failure of the army to deliver their petition on the steps of the capitol. Sitting on his cot in the cell, Browne "sobbed like the child he really was."

In spite of Browne's psychological problems, Baker felt "a kind of admiration" for him, for in all, Baker believed that he was sincere. Coxey, too, was sincere, and continued to preach his fiat money and non-interest bond schemes. But Coxey's loyalty to conviction was
totally overshadowed by his bizarre, eccentric and often irrational partner, Carl Browne.7

The failure of Coxey's "petition in boots" can be traced to the government's injunctions and use of troops, and a Congress tied to the interests of business and banking, who refused to deal with the marchers. But the greatest reason for failure was their lack of central leadership and solidarity of cause. As mentioned earlier, each army marched for different reasons, and Coxey was only the symbol of their right to march. Unfortunately for the unemployed, no capable leader or sound program for reform faced Congress in 1894. But for this lack of leadership and program, we still cannot dismiss the Armies of the unemployed as mere follies. Their troubles were great, and their interests were sincere. They were the average, common citizens, the masses of America.

Coxeyism cannot be explained in terms of fiat money to hire the unemployed on public works projects. This was Coxey's program which he presented to Congress, but it was not the Coxeyism that swept across the continent in 1894, stirring thousands of unemployed to march to Washington. The basic ideology, that the people had a right to petition Congress, and the right to petition in person, which Coxey introduced to push for the passage of his bills was the ideology that represented Coxeyism to the American people. Stressing the conception of a government responsible to its citizens, Coxey inspired the many goals which others carried to Congress.

If the fiat money scheme, then, is not central to Coxeyism as a national movement, and the right to petition Congress in person is the central idea, then perhaps we can say that Coxeyism still exists
in our country today. In 1914 and 1932, similar groups, partly in-
spired again by Coxey, marched on Washington. In 1941, A. Philip
Randolph proposed a march of blacks on Washington to ask for their
fair share of the growing wartime prosperity. Again in 1968, the poor
people marched to Congress to petition for reform legislation to alle-
viate their distress. Research in the areas of these marches may pos-
sibly show that the basic assumptions are derived from Coxeyism.

If this proposition is true, though Coxey cannot truly be called
the leader of the 1894 march of the unemployed, his ideology may have
had a far greater impact on twentieth-century thinking than we have
attributed to him. Perhaps each time we write or visit a representa-
tive, march or carry a sign bearing our convictions, we too, are prac-
ticing Coxeyism.
Footnotes


5McMurry, pp. 131-3, 149, 151-4, 160-1.

6Senate Miscellaneous Documents, 53rd Congress, 2nd Session, Nos. 151, 163, 171, pts 1-2, 251; Congressional Record, 53rd Congress, 2nd Session, pp. 4060, 4334-5, 4442-3; McMurry, p. 109.

Appendix A

On May 1, 1890, J. S. Camp endeavored to address the Army Hospital people who desired to hear him speak from the central stage at read the petition of the comrades. He was refused the privilege and desired the following:

The Constitution of the United States guarantees to all citizens the right to peacefully assemble and petition for redress of grievances, and, furthermore, declares that the right of free speech shall not be abridged.

We stand here today to ask the protection of our Constitution. We choose this place of assembly because it is the property of the people to peacefully assemble upon their own premises and with their petitions has been shielded by the passage of laws in direct violation of the Constitution, we are here to show the eyes of the nation to this shameful fact.

Here, rather than at any spot upon the continent, it is fitting that we should come to now hear our dead liberators, and by our protest against the tyrant effort to such action as would rescue the Constitution and resurrect our liberty. Upon those steps where we stand has been spread a carpet for the royal feet of a fallen princess, the feet of whose lavish entertainment was taken from the public treasury without
J. S. Coxey's Petition

What He Would Have Said If It Had Not Been for Police Interference.

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A Peaceable Petition, Sought to be Presented by a Peaceable Citizen, Prevented by an Armed Force.

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On May 1, 1894, J. S. Coxey endeavored to address the many thousand people who desired to hear him speak from the capital steps and read the petition of the commonwealers. He was refused the privilege and issued the following:

The Constitution of the United States guarantees to all citizens the right to peacefully assemble and petition for redress of grievances, and, furthermore, declares that the right of free speech shall not be abridged.

We stand here today to test these guarantees of our Constitution. We chose this place of assemblage because it is the property of the people to peacefully assemble upon their own premises and with their petitions has been abridged by the passage of laws in direct violation of the Constitution, we are here to draw the eyes of the nation to this shameful fact.

Here, rather than at any spot upon the continent, it is fitting that we should come to mourn over our dead liberties, and by our protest arouse the imperiled nation to such action as shall rescue the Constitution and resurrect our liberty. Upon these steps where we stand has been spread a carpet for the royal feet of a foreign princess, the cost of whose lavish entertainment was taken from the public treasury without...
the consent or the approval of the people.

Up these steps the lobbyists of trusts and corporations have passed unchallenged on their way to committee rooms to which we, the representatives of the toiling wealth producers, have been denied. We stand here today in behalf of millions of toilers whose petitions have been buried in committee rooms, whose prayers have been unresponded to, and whose opportunities for honest, remunerative productive labor have been taken from them by unjust legislation, which protects idlers, speculators and gamblers. We come to remind Congress here assembled of the declaration of a United States Senator "that for a quarter of a century the rich have been growing richer, the poor poorer, and that by the close of the present century the middle class will have disappeared, as the struggle for existence become fierce and relentless."

We stand here to remind Congress of its promise of returning prosperity should the Sherman act be repealed.

We stand here to declare by our march of over 500 miles through difficulties and distress, a march unstained by even the slightest act which will bring the blush of shame to any, that we are law-abiding citizens, and as such our actions speak louder than words. We are here to petition for legislation which will furnish employment for every man able and willing to work, for legislation which will bring universal prosperity and emancipate our beloved country from financial bondage to the descendants of King George.

We have come to the only source which is competent to aid the people in their day of dire distress. We are here to tell our representatives, who hold their seats by grace of our ballots, that the struggle for existence has become too fierce and relentless. We come and throw up our defenseless hands and say, "Help, or we and our loved
ones must perish." We are engaged in a bitter and cruel war with the
enemies of all mankind - a war with hunger, wretchedness and despair -
and we ask Congress to heed our petitions and issue for the nation's
good a sufficient volume of the same kind of money which carried the
country through one awful war and saved the life of the nation. In
the name of justice, through whose impartial administration only the
present civilization can be maintained and perpetuated, by the powers
of the Constitution of our country, upon which the liberties of the
people must depend, and in the name of the Commonweal of Christ, whose
representatives we are, we enter a most solemn and earnest protest a-
gainst this unnecessary and cruel act of usurpation and tyranny, and
this enforced subjugation of the rights and privileges of American citi-
zenship. We have assembled here, in violation of no just laws, to en-
joy the privileges of every American citizen.

We are under the shadow of the Capitol of this great nation and
in the presence of our national legislators are refused that dearly-
bought privilege, and by the force of arbitrary power prevented from
carrying out the desire of our hearts, which is plainly granted under
the great Magna Charta of our national liberties.

We have come here through toil and weary marches, through storms
and tempest, over mountains and amid the trials of poverty and distress,
to lay our grievances at the doors of our national legislators and ask
them in the name of Him whose banners we bear, in the name of Him who
pleads for the poor and the oppressed, that they should heed the voice
of despair and distress that is now coming up from every section of our
country; that they should consider the conditions of the starving unem-
ployed of our land and enact such laws as will give them employment,
bring happier conditions to the people and the smile of contentment to
our citizens.

Coming as we do, with peace and good will to men, we shall have to submit to these laws, unjust as they are, and obey this mandate of authority of might which overrides and outrages the law of right. In doing so we appeal to every peace-loving citizen, every liberty-loving man or woman, every one in whose breath the fires of patriotism and love of country has not died out, to assist us in our efforts toward better laws and general benefits.

J. S. COXEY
Commander of the Commonweal of Christ.
STATEMENT OF MR. J. B. CONWAY, OF MARSHALL, OHIO.

Committee on Ways and Means.
Tuesday, January 8, 1875.

The subcommittee of the Committee on Ways and Means, having under consideration the subject of local issues, this day met, Hon. William J. Bryan in the chair. Mr. J. B. Conway, a resident of Marshall, Ohio, appeared before the committee in the capacity of the following bill:

A BILL to provide for public improvements and employment of the citizens of the United States.

Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, That whenever any State, Territory, county, township, municipality, or incorporated town or village, deems it necessary to make any public improvements, they shall deposit with the Secretary of the Treasury of the United States a non-interest-bearing twenty-five year bond, not to exceed one-half of the assessed valuation of the property in said State, Territory, county, township, municipality, or incorporated town or village, and said bond to be retired at the rate of four per centum per annum.

SEC. 2. That whenever the foregoing section of this act has been complied with, it shall be mandatory upon the Secretary of the Treasury of the United States to issue engraved and printed Treasury notes in the denominations of one, two, five, and ten dollars each, which shall be Full legal tender for all debts, public and private, to the face value of said bond, and deliver to said State, Territory, county, township, municipality, or incorporated town or village ninety-three per centum of said notes, and retain one per centum for expenses of engraving and
STATEMENT OF MR. J. S. COXLEY, OF MASSILLON, OHIO.

Committee on Ways and Means.  
Tuesday, January 8, 1895.

The subcommittee of the Committee on Ways and Means, having under consideration the subject of bond issues, this day met, Hon. William J. Bryan in the chair. Mr. J. S. Coxey, a resident of Massillon, Ohio, appeared before the committee in advocacy of the following bills:

A BILL to provide for public improvements and employment of the citizens of the United States.

Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, That whenever any State, Territory, county, township, municipality, or incorporated town or village deem it necessary to make any public improvements they shall deposit with the Secretary of the Treasury of the United States a noninterest-bearing twenty-five year bond, not to exceed one-half of the assessed valuation of the property in said State, Territory, county, township, municipality, or incorporated town or village, and said bond to be retired at the rate of four per centum per annum.

SEC. 2. That whenever the foregoing section of this act has been complied with it shall be mandatory upon the Secretary of the Treasury of the United States to have engraved and printed Treasury notes in the denominations of one, two, five, and ten dollars each, which shall be a full legal tender for all debts, public and private, to the face value of said bond, and deliver to said State, Territory, county, township, municipality, or incorporated town or village ninety-nine per centum of said notes, and retain one per centum for expense of engraving and
SEC. 3. That after the passage of this act it shall be compulsory upon every incorporated town or village, municipality, township, county, State, or Territory to give employment to any idle man applying for work, and that the rate be not less than one dollar and fifty cents per day for common labor and three dollars and fifty cents per day for team and labor, and that eight hours per day shall constitute a day's labor under the provisions of this act.

A BILL to provide for the improvement of public roads, and for other purposes.

Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, That the Secretary of the Treasury of the United States is hereby authorized and instructed to have engraved and have printed, immediately after the passage of this bill, five hundred millions of dollars of Treasury notes, a legal tender for all debts, public and private, said notes to be in denominations of one, two, five, and ten dollars, and to be placed in a fund to be known as the "general county-road-fund system of the United States," and to be expended solely for said purpose.

SEC. 2. That it shall be the duty of the Secretary of War to take charge of the construction of the said general country-road system in the United States, and said construction to commence as soon as the Secretary of the Treasury shall inform the Secretary of War that the said fund is available, which shall not be later than sixty days from and after the passage of this bill, when it shall be the duty of the Secretary of War to inaugurate the work and expend the sum of twenty millions of dollars per month pro rata with the number of miles of road
in each State and Territory in the United States.

SEC. 3. That all labor other than that of the office of the Secretary of War, "whose compensations are already fixed by law," shall be paid by the day, and that the rate be not less than one dollar and fifty cents per day for common labor and three dollars and fifty cents for team and labor, and that eight hours per day shall constitute a day's labor under the provisions of this bill, and that all citizens of the United States making application to labor shall be employed.

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Coxey, if you are ready to proceed we will hear you.

Mr. Coxey said: Mr. Chairman and gentlemen, I think it essential, in order to show the necessity for the passage of these proposed bills, to do as a physician in attending a patient with some dangerous disease. The first thing the physician does is to call in his neighboring physicians and hold a consultation, and diagnose the disease; then the diagnosis will prove conclusively to them the medicine that is necessary to be administered in order to restore the patient to health and vigor again. We find throughout our country today a diseased condition, and I will try to diagnose the disease for you, and it will take us back to the spring of 1893. We find at that time we had $1,500,000,000 of all kinds of actual money in circulation. A thousand millions of that actual money was in the hands of the people, the farmers, the laborers, and miners, and mechanics, and in the merchants' tills, making their exchanges.

After they paid their debts they took their surplus earnings and deposited those earnings in the banking institutions of the country. Then the bankers loaned these deposits or earnings of the people out to the manufacturers or employers of the people. The balance of actual money
amounted to $500,000,000, which was held by the banks as a bank reserve, and upon this bank reserve the banking institutions of the country had created another kind of money, which consisted of commercial paper. That commercial paper is what the manufacturers took in payment for their products. For instance, suppose a steel manufacturer of Pittsburg takes a contract to deliver steel and when he delivers that steel he agrees to take in payment for the steel notes running from three to four months' time. That note is answering the purpose of money, the medium of exchange, because it has exchanged the products from the steel manufacturer to the jobber or consumer who purchases it, just the same as though he had paid the actual money for it.

After delivering the goods and receiving the note in payment, the next thing that the manufacturer does is to go to the banking institution, taking the notes with him, indorsing them, and putting them in his bank book, and the banker takes them and discounts them, deducting the discount, and credits the manufacturer with the balance. Then that is subject to check. Now, the banking institutions in 1893 had discounted $4,500,000,000 of that kind of paper, commercial paper, manufacturers' notes, based upon the $500,000,000 of bank reserve. There was $9 of credit money discounted by the banking institutions based upon $1 of actual money to pay the $9 with. Then, the only money that was being used to exchange our commodities was $1,000,000,000 in the hands of the people and in the banks as bank deposits. The $500,000,000 of bank reserve were to all intents and purposes, so far as the exchange of commodities of the country, out of circulation, because it was held as reserve.

Then, the money or things we used to exchange our commodities were $4,500,000,000 of commercial paper and $1,000,000,000 of actual money -
$5,500,000,000 all told. Then, in the spring of 1893 England threw
$108,000,000 of securities upon our markets, converted them into gold,
and commenced the withdrawal of the gold out of the country. The
great daily newspapers commenced the agitation that the continued pur-
chase of silver under the purchasing clause of the Sherman act was
causing the gold to flow out of the country.

These editorials, starting originally with the papers of New York,
Boston, Philadelphia, Chicago, and all the great daily newspapers of
the country, were taken up by the country newspapers, and the bank de-
positors getting the daily and weekly papers, reading these editorials,
where they saw the number of million dollars leaving the country daily
and weekly, and that the cause of it was the continued purchase of
silver under the purchasing clause of the Sherman bill, and if that
clause was not repealed it would create a panic, because it would drive
every dollar of gold out of the country — as I say, the bank depositors
reading these editorials, their minds were prejudiced and framed, and
they became alarmed and rushed to all the banking institutions and com-
menced to withdraw their deposits out of the banks, so that the latter
part of June and first of July, 1893, we found this condition, that the
manufacturer, who had previous to that made contracts to deliver his
product and take in payment for that product notes running for four
months' time, went to the banking institutions with the notes and the
notes were turned into the bankers, but the banker said: "Self-preserva-
tion is the first law of nature, and we must first protect our deposi-
tors. We can not discount any more commercial paper."

Now, that condition became general in all banking institutions of
this country, and the result was that this confidence money or commer-
cial paper which was being used to exchange products up to that time was
refused by the banking institutions to be any longer discounted, and the manufacturer was compelled to close down his plant.

Now, I want to give two illustrations. I was talking with Mr. Schmick, who is secretary and treasurer of the Cherry Valley Iron Works, of Leetonia, Ohio, where they have quite a large plant and employ a great many men, and he said: "Mr. Coxey, I do not know what caused this business depression, but I know this: when the panic came on the Cherry Valley Iron Company had deposited at Cleveland $40,000 to their credit, and I went two or three days before pay day and drew a check for $10,000 to get the currency to pay the men their money."

"The banker said to me, 'Mr. Schmick, we can not allow you to draw this money out.' 'Why,' I said, 'what is the matter?' 'Why,' he said, 'there have been runs made upon our bank and all the banking institutions of this country, and we have not got the money to cash the check.'" He waited there two days, and at the end of that time the banker, by considerable hustling, raised $6,000. He wanted $10,000, and had $40,000 upon deposit, and when he found he could only get $6,000 he telegraphed to another iron concern in Columbus, Ohio, by the name of King, Gilbert & Warner, to send him by express $4,000 in currency to Leetonia, which they did, and with that $6,000 he got from the bank at Cleveland he went back to Leetonia and was able to pay his men, but he called his men up after paying them and told them what had happened.

He said to them, "I think it would be better to close down our plant, because there is a panic in the country now. It is impossible to get money to pay you, and when the next pay day comes I may not be able to get the money to pay you, and you will be dissatisfied and make trouble for us." The men withdrew and went into their labor organization and held a consultation, and their committee came back and reported
to Mr. Schmick that they thought he should run on if he had orders; that they would work for him, and if he could not get the money for them by pay day they would work and wait until they got it. That is one illustration.

Now, I will give you another one. Russell & Co., a manufacturing concern of Massillon, Ohio, when the panic came on had contracts to deliver steam engines for manufacturing plants throughout the country. They delivered the engines, and after the delivery they received notes in payments for the engines. They took the notes to the banking institutions and were unable to get them discounted, and the result was they could not get money to pay their men, and they were compelled to close down their plant, and after being closed down over six weeks, throwing 800 men out of employment in the city of Massillon, where I live, the only way they could start up their plant was by issuing their own money, and that is what they did. Here is one:

No. 16568

Massillon, Ohio, August 12, 1893.

December, 20, 1893, after date,

For Value Received, RUSSELL & CO.

Promise to Pay J. W. McClymonds, or Bearer,

ONE DOLLAR.

At their office, with interest at 6 percent, to maturity only.

C. M. RUSSELL, Sec'y.  J. W. McClymonds. Treas.

I am not presenting this as making any fight against Russell & Co., only to corroborate what I say is the cause of the present business depression. They closed down their plant and the only way they could start it up was with yellow backs instead of greenbacks. Now, let me
say something else in that connection which I think is strong proof of my claim as to the cause of the present business depression. J. W. McClymonds, treasurer of Russell & Co., is also president of the Merchants' National Bank. C. M. Russell, who signs himself as secretary of Russell & Co., is a director in the Union National Bank of Massillon. Now, you all know that the presidents and directors of banking institutions say whose paper shall be discounted in their institutions.

Now, if those two men connected with Russell & Co., delivered products and took in payment notes - you know that all of the property of the men giving the notes is back of the notes - and then indorsing these notes with the name of Russell & Co., that puts Russell & Co. back of that, and when they take these notes to a banking institution which they control and are unable to get their own notes discounted in their own institutions, how can you expect a manufacturer who has no influence with a banking institution to get notes discounted? Does it not corroborate and prove conclusively that that which has closed the manufacturing plants down is on account of the manufacturers not being able to get their paper discounted and to get actual money to continue their business? If that is the case, the issue which was fought last fall on a fear of the repeal of the tariff was a false issue. That is the point I make, and it was simply done, I believe, to divert the minds of the people from the real cause - the money question.

Now, there is something else in connection with Russell & Co., and that is this: Mr. Russell told me within the last three weeks that they had a million dollars of farmers' notes in their safe. They also manufacture threshing machines and they take in payment the notes of the farmers and whoever will buy of them; and he said they had a million dollars in their safe and he could not tell anything about the value of
them whatever. He did not know whether he would get 10 per cent, or 25 per cent, or what; and he also told me something else in connection with it - that they had mortgages upon the crops of farmers in Oregon and that the price of the product was so low they did not harvest the product but allowed it to rot upon the field. That is something else which I think deserves the attention of you gentlemen.

Now, let us see how that has affected the price of the products of the country - the fact of the manufacturing plants being closed down. It has created an army of unemployed numbering from 3,000,000 to 4,000,000 of people - say 4,000,000 of people. Now, 4,000,000 of people as heads of families means from 15,000,000 to 16,000,000 people dependent upon those 4,000,000, and adding the two together you have 20,000,000 of people who used to be consumers and producers of commodities out of the market; because, when a laborer is thrown out of employment upon which he depends for a livelihood, he can not purchase the money to buy the necessaries of life. Is there any further reason for the fall in the price of wheat down to 50 cents a bushel, and the same way with wool to 12 cents a pound, because these 20,000,000 of people have been stopped from purchasing and consuming?

Then, the question of horses comes up. The farmer wonders why the price of his horses goes down and thinks there may be an overproduction. But that is not the case. Let us look and see who it was who purchased the farmer's horses four or five years ago, when he got $200 and $225 for a horse. It was the manufacturer. What did the manufacturer do with the horses? He used them for conveying the raw material from the railroad to his plant and the finished product from his plant to the depot. They were the people who were buying them, and in anticipation of the wants of the manufacturers of this country the farmers commenced
to raise and produce horses and get them ready for the market, and in 1893 they had them ready to sell, but when the farmers put them upon the market, who did they find were their competitors? Why, the very men whom he anticipated would be the buyers!

The manufacturer is now his competitor because he is a seller, not because he is producing horses, but because he has no longer use for horses, as his plant remains idle for a number of months and his interest account must be cut down in some way, and so he sells these things; he realizes upon them upon the open market, and when the farmer goes to sell a horse he comes in competition with the man whom he supposed would be a purchaser. Then, of course, the demand being taken away for the horse, the price is bound to fall. It is true with every branch. You will find it in the steel business, in the iron business, in the wool business, in the clothing business, and in every branch it will be affected the same, because you have taken the purchasing power away from the consumers. Now, you have seen this system fail. Why? Because we had business based upon $1 of actual money and $9 of credit money, and I am not taking into consideration the hundreds of millions of commercial paper that lie locked up in the safes of the manufacturers that are not used at all, but simply from the view of the statement of $1,500,000,000 of discount.

Now, then, I claim the necessity for these two bills which have been referred to your committee is apparent. The reason I claim the necessity for the passage of these bills is this: We should get down to a system of actual money instead of credit money or confidence money, and that will bring it about. The first bill is called the good roads bill, and is known as that. That calls for Congress to authorize the issue of $500,000,000 of full legal-tender Treasury notes, making them
full legal tender for all debts, public and private, and appropriate to each State and Territory pro rata with the number of miles of road in each State and Territory at the rate of $20,000,000 per month to set these 4,000,000 of idle and unemployed people to work in macadamizing the roads all over the United States. I know they are needed pretty badly at Pittsburg, and I know they are needed nearly as badly in the vicinity where I come from.

There is a provision in this bill which says that all labor shall be done by the day, and not by contract labor, and that the rate of wages shall not be less than $1.50 for a day of eight hours, and $3.50 a day for a team and labor. This, in my opinion, would settle the eight-hour question, because it would bring about this condition: that the Government would stand ready at any and all times to give employment to the idle and unemployed at a rate of not less than $1.50 for a day of eight hours, and thus no manufacturer or firm would be able to hire a single individual for less than what the Government would be willing to pay, which would be $1.50 a day for a day of eight hours.

Now the other bill, the noninterest bearing bond bill, calls for Congress to grant to the States, counties, townships, municipalities, towns, or villages the right to issue bonds, without interest, not to exceed one-half of the assessed valuation of their property, to run for twenty-five years, and to deposit those bonds with the Secretary of the Treasury at Washington as security for the repayment of the money. Then that it shall be mandatory upon the Secretary of the Treasury to authorize the issue of the face value of these bonds in full legal-tender money keeping out 1 per cent, the actual cost of making the money, and forwarding 99 per cent to the State, county, municipality, township, or village which issues its bonds and deposits them with the Secretary of the
Treasury as security for the repayment of the money, they agreeing to pay this money back to the General Government at the rate of 4 per cent per annum, all payments to be applied upon the principal, and in twenty-five years the bonds will be canceled and the municipality will be free of debt. Now, I would like to illustrate —

Mr. DALZELL. What is the amount contemplated will be issued by that?

Mr. COXEY. Not to exceed one-half of the assessed valuation of the property.

Mr. DALZELL. Have you any idea, or can you give us any approximate figures, of the amount that will be issued? Take the last census, for instance?

Mr. COXEY. No; I can not.

Mr. DALZELL. You have not looked into that?

Mr. COXEY. I can not do that for this reason: My idea of the money question is simply this; we should furnish a sufficient volume of money for the demands of trade, and you will see, as I go along, I will take up that question and make an illustration which, I think, will make it clear to you.

Mr. DALZELL. I am trying to understand this thing, and I understand that under your first bill we will have $500,000,000, and I would like to know how much additional we will have under the second bill.

Mr. WHITING. I understand that would be determined upon what the municipalities would decide to do, as to whether they would issue bonds or not. Only townships which would want to improve the roads would take advantage of the law, and other townships might say that they did not care for them, and so it would lay entirely with the judgement of the township?
Mr. COXEY. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. As I understand, the only limit is one-half of the total assessed valuation of all property in the country?

Mr. COXEY. Yes, sir.

Mr. DALSELL. That, I suppose, is to be determined at the time the bonds were issued?

Mr. COXEY. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Do you allow the counties to issue and also allow the municipalities within the counties——

Mr. COXEY. Yes; I will reach that point——

The CHAIRMAN. Then, will there not be danger of duplication?

Mr. COXEY. I will answer this way, Mr. Chairman. I do not anticipate a changing of the present bond system only as far as to abolish the interest. Our present system allows all towns, villages, townships, municipalities, counties, and States to issue their bonds bearing interest.

Mr. DALSELL. A matter of regulation by State law.

Mr. WHITING. Not to exceed 5 per cent.

Mr. COXEY. There are different regulations in different States. In order to illustrate this I will take a municipality that is assessed $200,000; then it would be allowed to issue bonds not to exceed one-half of the assessed valuation, which would be $100,000, and without interest, running twenty-five years. They would forward that bond to the Secretary of the Treasury and deposit it with him as security for the repayment of the money, which is similar to what the national banking institutions are doing now with the Government bonds. Then he would authorize them to issue $100,000 of full legal-tender money on this bond, keeping out $1,000 to pay the engraver, printer, paper manufacturer, etc., for making
the money, and he would forward $99,000 to the treasurer of the municipality, to be paid out for making all manner of public improvements, such as street-car lines, electric-light plants, waterworks, putting in sewers, paving streets, building schoolhouses, market houses, and making every manner of public improvements that would be a convenience and a comfort to the people of the municipality where the bond was issued. Now the question arises—-

Mr. McMILLIN. How do you provide for the redemption of these bonds?

Mr. COXEY. I will tell you in a moment. The first question that arises in a man's mind is, What is back of this money? That is always the first question when you bring this up. You have issued a bond for $100,000, and back of that bond is $200,000 of assessed property. There is $2 of property back of every dollar you have made and put into circulation before you have made any improvements. Then you start the idle and unemployed to work in creating value in public improvements, and the city treasurer will pay money out to men who render the services and create the value; thus, you expend $99,000 in creating $99,000 of value in the shape of public improvements, which is added to the $200,000 of assessed value, and you have increased the value of your money when you have put it into circulation for services rendered and value created 50 per cent over when you commenced, so when you finish your improvements you have $3 of property back of every dollar of circulation, whereas you had $2 when you commenced.

Now, as to the redemption about which the gentleman on the right asked me. The first year they levy a tax rate to raise 4 per cent per annum to be applied upon the principal, the same as they do now in levying a tax rate of 6 per cent per annum, to be paid in interest while they still owe the principal. You raise the taxes, you send them by an
express package to the Secretary of the Treasury and he takes the amount of taxes there, just the same as the postmaster takes a stamp, and cancels it. The Secretary takes the package, and takes it over to his desk, money has been redeemed, and through taxation—the only true redemption of money. He credits that $4,000, 4 per centum, upon the principal of the bond, which reduces the principal of the bond down to $96,000 the first year, and you still have back of that $96,000 in circulation $299,000 of value.

Mr. McMILLIN. What do you do with the $4,000 sent to the Secretary of the Treasury?

Mr. COXEY. It is canceled and withdrawn.

Mr. McMILLIN. You provide for cancellation after return?

Mr. COXEY. Yes, sir.

Mr. McMILLIN. And you provide no metallic redemption at all?

Mr. COXEY. No, sir; no metallic redemption.

Mr. McMILLIN. In the event a county or municipality defaults in the payment, where do you provide suit shall be brought for the enforcement thereof?

Mr. COXEY. The property belongs to the Government because it has got a bond on it.

Mr. McMILLIN. But you see the Government would want the money; it would not want to run every town in the country.

Mr. COXEY. It is simply a part of the Government. Every municipality and every town is a part of the Government, and it is simply furnishing the people—-

Mr. McMILLIN. But you do not provide where any suit is to be brought or litigation by which they can be forced to pay when they fail to pay?
Mr. COXEY. Not any more than under the present bond system.

Mr. Mc MILLIN. If there should be no provision would not that necessitate the closing of the transaction in the Federal court, as that is the only court of the Government of the United States?

Mr. COXEY. I presume it would.

Mr. DALZELL. All this, if I understand you, proceeds upon the assumption that it is a proper function of the Federal Government to authorize loans by municipalities on various improvements?

Mr. COXEY. I will illustrate that, Mr. Dalzell, right along in this argument. Yes sir; that is the stand I take.

Mr. DALZELL. For instance, under the laws of Pennsylvania, if a municipality is confined in issuing its bonds to 5 per cent of its assessed valuation, you would overturn that law by a Federal law which authorized them to issue 50 per cent?

Mr. COXEY. Yes, sir. Now, the second year they levy another tax rate to raise another 4 per cent, the amount they agreed to pay back to the General Government annually. This is sent to the General Government, to the Secretary of the Treasury, who cancels it, and you have reduced your principal in two years to $92,000 and you still have your $299,000 of value back of the $92,000 in circulation. By continuing that process, paying 4 per cent per annum upon the principal, at the end of twenty-five years your bond is handed back by the General Government, and the General Government says to the States, counties, municipalities, townships, and villages, "you have done your part and we now cancel the bond." They are free of debt.

Take the present system. How does the municipality borrow money? They call the council together and authorize the issue, say, of $100,000 of bonds, if they need that much money, provided they have got property
enough. Of course the limit is smaller than what I give, but I only make that limit so as to furnish the money in case they need it. I do not think they will need it, but I do claim if they need the money they ought to have the privilege of getting the money, and they will not borrow more money than they need from the simple fact they are taxed annually 4 per cent to pay back, but these payments go upon the principal. Now, say the council authorized the issue of $100,000 of bonds and they agree to pay 6 per cent interest upon the bonds and the bonds are to run twenty-five years. They deposit the bonds with some banker or money lender. They receive the money upon the bonds and then they go and tax the people and raise 6 per cent interest upon that $100,000, $6,000 for twenty-five years, and at the end of that twenty-five years they have paid $150,000 in interest, and then they are just where they started, because they still owe $100,000.

Now, if the municipality under the present law can issue bonds and tax the people to pay 6 per cent interest upon those bonds for twenty-five years, it strikes me it should be able to pay 4 per cent upon the principal without interest, and under this system, I believe, if adopted, it would go a long way toward abolishing municipal taxation. You take large cities like Philadelphia, New York, Pittsburg, and the majority of the great cities, the revenues from the street-car lines, waterworks, electric and gas plants would more than pay the running of the municipality and pay back to the General Government this 4 per cent per annum upon the amount that they borrowed from the General Government to pay for these expenses, and therefore it will not only lower the tax rates, if not altogether abolish the tax rates in municipalities throughout the country, but it would have a beneficial effect upon the city administration, because my friend here in front realizes this fact, that a
great many manufacturing plants are driven out of large cities on account of excessive taxation.

They are driven to seek places in the country, on the suburbs of the city, that are inconvenient to people who want to go to the plant and inconvenient to the plant to get material and repairs and all that kind of thing, and this will take away that bad feature of driving the manufacturers out into the country. Now, you can go to a township under this bill and borrow money from the General Government and use the money to build a schoolhouse and make township roads. You can go into the counties and put out county bonds and deposit those bonds with the Secretary of the Treasury and build a courthouse and make improvements, and I would like to illustrate that, because in my own county, Stark, our county commissioners have authorized the issue and have issued $200,000 of bonds, bearing 5 per cent interest, to run twenty years. They have sold those bonds, and they have the cash and the money to be paid out to build a courthouse.

Now, they will tax the people of Stark County 5 per cent on the $200,000 for the next twenty years, which will be $200,000 and we will be where we are today, because we will still owe the $200,000 of principal, and I do not know where we are going to get the money to pay it. Now, under my plan you would issue bonds running for twenty-five years without interest, deposit the bonds with the Secretary of the Treasury, and receive the face value of that bond in full legal-tender Treasury notes, keeping out $2,000, the actual cost of making the money, and the Secretary of the Treasury would forward $198,000 to the county treasurer of Stark County to be paid out for building that courthouse. Then they would tax back out of the county $8,000 each and every year to be paid and applied upon the principal, and at the end of twenty-five years our
bonds would be cancelled. Now we are taxing out of the people of Stark County $10,000 each and every year, and at the end of twenty years we will still owe the $200,000 in bonds. That illustrates the county loan. You go up to the States and see how beneficial it would be to the States.

The great issue, I believe, which is before the American people today is whether the railroads are going to own this Government or the Government is going to own the railroads. I can show you plainly under this how you can buy up the railroads of every State and Territory, and pay for them, and the people will not be taxed one cent to pay for the railroads, and in order to do that I will illustrate how they organize a railroad corporation, because I think it essential to do so. It requires half a dozen men to organize a railroad corporation. They get together and organize it. The next thing is, they go to the State capital and get a franchise, and that franchise gives the right of way through every man's property to the railroad.

They start an engineer to surveying the railroad, and he goes to the farm of a farmer, and he gets over the fence and orders a stake put here and a stake put there, and probably one put right up to the house, and by that time the farmer comes out and he says to the engineer, "What are you doing here?" The engineer says, "I am staking out a railroad." The farmer says, "Where are you going to run it?" And the engineer replies, "I am going to run it right straight through your house." The farmer becomes angry, and he drives the engineer off his farm. The engineer goes and reports to the railroad corporation, and states that they can not go through the farm. The attorney of the company goes to the court and petitions the court to appoint a jury or commission to assess the value of the farm. They do that, and they go back and render
a verdict of $700 damages done to the farmer against the railroad
company. What does the railroad company do? They take $700 of lawful
money issued by the General Government and tender that in court and say
to the man, "Now move out." And if he does not move out they get a
sheriff and move him, and the law gives them that right. Now, that man
had a deed to the property; he owns it, and where is the law for it?

Under the Constitution and law, which says it is for the common
benefit of the whole people of this country that that railroad should
be built right straight through the farmer's farmhouse. Now, under
the same law and Constitution that guarantees equal rights to all and
special privileges to none, I claim that we can condemn the railroad
property of this country and take it. Now, how can that be done? Go
into the courts after the passage of the noninterest-bearing bond bill
and petition the court to appoint jurors or a commission to go and view
the railroad property of the States and Territories, and after they have
viewed it, to render their verdict in the courts and state the number
of millions of dollars necessary to pay for them, and then tender them
lawful money as issued upon bonds without interest running twenty-five
years, based upon all the value of the States; deposit those bonds with
the Secretary of the Treasury and get the face value of them, less 1 per
cent for making the money, in full legal-tender money, and then take
that lawful money and tender it into the court, which will be lawful
money, and get deeds for these railroads, and then go to the railroad
magnates and tell them to move out, just the same as they told the far-
mer under the same law and same Constitution.

How beneficial that would be to the manufacturers and business men
and laborers of the country! Under this system you will have abolished
dividends upon railroad stock, including all the water, and also interest
upon railroad bonds. No more interest upon railroad bonds then, and the revenues and freight receipts from the railroads would more than pay the 4 per cent per annum back to the General Government which you have agreed to pay upon the amount borrowed from the General Government, and in twenty-five years your bonds would be canceled and you would be free of debt and the freight rates could be lowered much more, and under that system alone, by abolishing dividends upon railroad stock, interest upon railroad bonds, you stop this drain of gold that is leaving our country now daily and weekly to pay dividends and interest abroad. I say that this Government has the right to make money which would be doing this, and save that $300,000,000 annually to the people of this country.

Now, the next question comes. How are you to put the money in circulation? I claim this noninterest bond-bearing proposition will act in regulating the speed of business of the country exactly the same as the governor does the speed of a steam engine. When I was a young man 16 years of age for ten years I ran a stationary engine in a rolling mill, and we set the governor to run the engine at 60 revolutions a minute. I put the steam on, and the engine commenced to start, and when it commenced to get up to 60 revolutions a minute the governor balls went up and began to close the valve, and when it closed the valve the engine slackened down to 59 revolutions, and then the balls would drop and start to working the valve in the other direction; so it worked up and down, regulating the speed of that engine between 59 and 60 revolutions a minute. This bill will act just the same, and in this way:

There are 4,000,000 idle and unemployed people in this country; 1,000,000 of them always work upon public improvements when they are to be made, but there are none to be made now, because we have not the
money to make them. Three millions of them work in manufacturing plants and upon farms, and they are idle for the same reason that the farms are not profitable; and the same way with manufacturing plants; they are closed down. The 4,000,000 of men will start to work after the passage of this bill, and at the end of the first eight hours they have created, as they get not less than $1.50 a day, $6,000,000 of value in the establishment of public improvements. Now, as you create value by great public improvements you coin that value into a medium of exchange called money of full legal-tender value for all debts, public and private, and you pay those 4,000,000 of men for the services they have rendered in creating that value.

The first evening these 4,000,000 of men take $6,000,000 of the representative of the value they have created in that eight hours and they go to the various stores of the country and they purchase of the surplus products of the country. They take them out of the stores and leave in their place $6,000,000 of legal-tender money; they go to work the next morning; having consumed some of the products - they have had a good breakfast, say the first in a year - they work another eight hours, and at the end of that eight hours they have created another $6,000,000 of value, for which the Government gives them $6,000,000 of full legal-tender money, representing the value of these improvements which they have created, and they purchase another $6,000,000 of provisions. In one month's time they have created $140,000,000 of value in the shape of public improvements, and the Government has coined that into $140,000,000 of medium of exchange, representing the value of the improvements they have created, and these men have purchased and paid for and consumed $140,000,000 of the surplus products of the country.
Now, if we create a demand and work off the surplus products, the merchants will write to the manufacturers and the farmers for more goods, and tell them that they want to pay for those goods with the money; that they do not want any longer to give their notes, running for three or four months. It may be that the manufacturers read that with surprise, because they have been accustomed to do business with tendering notes in payment, and, they say, we can start up now, because we do not have to ask the banks to discount commercial paper, but we will start up and pay manufacturing expenses, and when we deliver the goods we will get the money in payment for them.

They try to start the plant, and they find somebody has hired the men. Where do they find the men? They find 3,000,000 who worked in the plants are now working on public improvements, opening the valve at Washington and letting the money in to start the whole wheels of industry going again, and they have done it. They call 3,000,000 off of public improvements because the engine has gotten up to 60 revolutions per minute with 4,000,000 men on public improvements. They take 3,000,000 men off and they leave 1,000,000 there, which enables the engine to run from 59 to 60 revolutions, and by that system it equalizes the speed and keeps that engine running between 59 and 60 revolutions a minute all the time this bill if left upon the statute books.

Then you have taken away by the adoption of that every chance of any possible money stringency in the future. Why? For this reason: If there is a strike among the coal miners, or the employees of some manufacturing establishment have got a complaint, the men idle and unemployed can go upon the public improvements, and they can then get a fair return for a fair day's work, and if a manufacturing plant burns down they have got a place to go to work and create a demand for the
productions of the country by work on public improvements and consuming the surplus products. They have got a chance to work there and create a demand to supply which these plants will have to be set to work. Another strong feature of this is this question of what we call overproduction, being surplus production, from the simple fact the purchasing power has been taken away from the people. Now, you will give them purchasing power to consume this surplus product instead of producing something that will be put upon the market and come in competition with an already overburdened market. This is not a marketable improvement. You do not sell this or put it upon the market to sell it. It simply improves the States, counties, townships, municipalities, and villages for the general good of all. You do not sell the improvements.

Now, as to the question of money. I wish to touch upon that because they tell you that you have got to have money which is redeemable in gold. Now, the kind of money I have advocated here today is not only redeemable in gold, but in silver, or iron, or copper, or wheat, or rye, or oats, or cotton, or wool, and everything else that is produced in this country, including labor. Then you have got a stronger money than that which is only redeemable in gold, because it is redeemable in gold and everything else. Let us analyze that part. You start two men to work. Say one man works upon a highway and he works eight hours, and at the end of that eight hours he has created $1.50 of value in improvements and the Government coins that into $1.50 of legal-tender money. It pays him at the end of that service $1.50 of full legal-tender paper money, which is the representative of the value that he has created. He has it in his hand. It is an order for all kinds of goods in this country.
Suppose the second man is a man working in a gold mine, and he works eight hours, and at the end of that time he brings up the actual value in his hand what is called the intrinsic value of $1.50 in gold. Now, say those two men start for the grocery store and purchase $1.50 of groceries each. They purchase these groceries and then they are indebted to the grocery man $1.50 each. The man who works on the highway says, "I want to pay for those groceries," and he tenders the legal-tender note of the Government, and the groceryman says, "I will not take it." The man who has the gold tenders his gold in payment to the groceryman, and the merchant says, "I will not take that."

What do they do? They go to that great arbiter, the justice of the peace, who settles any differences of $1.50 and is the agent of the Government to that extent, and the three men, the merchant and the men who have created the value, enter the justice of peace office, and the merchant says to the justice of the peace: "These men have each purchased $1.50 worth of groceries, and they have not paid me for them." The man working upon the highway says: "I wish to pay for mine." And he tenders this full legal-tender paper money that he received from the Government to the squire, and the squire takes it and sees the act of Congress and engraving upon it and the stamp upon it, which says: "This is full legal tender for all debts public and private," and he looks up at the merchant in surprise and says: "Merchant, that settles your account," and the merchant says: "I will not take it." The justice says: "Then your account is settled anyway, because all you can get is what Congress says is legal tender for debts." The merchant changes his mind and takes it then.

How about the man who mines the gold? He says: "I want to pay the groceryman," and he tenders the gold to the squire. The squire looks at
it and says: "What is that?" He says: "That is gold, and that is what Sherman and Carlisle says is money; money is gold, gold is money, and gold is God's money." The justice of the peace says: "Take that to the Philadelphia mint and get the stamp of the Government on it, just the same as the paper has, and then you can tender it in payment of debt, and not until then." He does that, and he brings it back and pays the debt. Now, what was used about that gold and paper money in paying that debt? It was the legal-tender value, and that is all you can use in money.

Now, there is another question comes up, and that is, how about settling foreign indebtedness. Mr. Blaylock, of Blaylock & Blynn, hatters, of Philadelphia, in conversation I said to him, in talking over this question, "Mr. Blaylock, have you not got a lot of accounts back here you would gladly take full legal-tender American money for?" He said: "You are right." I said: "Provided you have got that money for the hats you have sold and you take it over to a bank of deposit, could not you buy a bill of exchange on England in payment of imported goods?" He said: "Certainly." I said: "Where is the necessity of gold for money here? You must part with your labor to buy it, and first part with the labor to buy paper money issued by the Government, because you have got to render services before you can get it. You can not get it like the banks now. They are not rendering services for the money they get; there would have to be services rendered and value created for this money, and then you can get the gold; if we need gold to go to Europe, buy that commodity, because when it leaves this country it simply goes as a commodity, as wheat, or cotton, or any production in this country which is shipped to Europe."
Now, if there are any questions which you gentlemen feel like putting to me on this question, I will gladly answer them to the best of my ability. I do not claim to know everything on the subject, though.

Mr. WHITING. This plan would eliminate interest altogether?

Mr. COXEY. It would, as far as public improvements—

Mr. WHITING. But would it not eliminate all interest?

Mr. COXEY. Well, no; I do not think it would.

Mr. DALZELL. You say it would destroy railroad dividends, and all that sort of thing?

Mr. COXEY. It forces the people who now have their money invested in railroad enterprises, in telegraphs, telephones, to put their money into individual enterprises, in developing the country, for example; and here is one important feature I failed to mention, and that is that there are $5,000,000,000 of English money invested in our different securities, trusts, and combinations here. We are taxed from $250,000,000 to $300,000,000 annually in interest and dividends for the use of a thing that we ought to make ourselves, money. That is what this bill will do. That is the kind of protectionist I am; I want to drive every dollar of foreign money out of this country and make the money to do our own business.

Mr. DALZELL. And buy nothing abroad at all?

Mr. COXEY. Oh, certainly; we will buy something abroad; we will buy more abroad than now. Why? They wonder why the receipts of the Government have fallen off. They find, or at least it does not appear to me they have struck at the root of it. If you stop 20,000,000 people from consuming commodities, some of which undoubtedly come from abroad, that is one thing which would make your imports fall off; it
is simply because you have taken the purchasing power away from
20,000,000 of people altogether, and from probably 30,000,000 more
50 per cent of their purchasing power has been taken away and that
has had an influence upon the subject of imports into this country;
but here is the question of money.

We are at the mercy of English money lenders now. At any time
they can create a panic, if they wish to do so, by throwing $200,000,000
or $300,000,000 of securities on the market, converting them into gold
and taking the gold out of the country. There would be one way of stop-
ning the drain of gold upon the Treasury if the Secretary of the Trea-
sury would use the prerogative that he has, and that is to determine
that he has the right to pay in any kind of lawful money issued by our
Government, and that when there is a legal tender presented to the
Treasury he has got the right to present in payment for that legal ten-
der silver. That would stop the run upon the Treasury if he commenced
paying out in silver.

Mr. DALZELL. Let me ask this question: Why limit the beneficence
of your scheme to municipalities?

Mr. COXEY. I do not.

Mr. DALZELL. Why should not the individual property owner issue
his twenty-five-year noninterest-bearing bond and get 50 per cent of
the value of his property in this money?

Mr. COXEY. I will answer that question in this way: I under this
plan propose to change the system of issuing bonds to borrow money for
municipal improvements. That is a great innovation over the present
system, because it will break the backbone of a monopoly of money in
this country. I might agree with you that that might be a proper
thing to do, and I believe it is, but I am not taking——
Mr. DALZELL. I am not suggesting it, but I am simply asking why you should limit it to municipalities, and why not extend it further?

Mr. COXEY. I realize that a man can be too radical in anything. I am trying to accomplish something here that will be beneficial to the people of this country, and I am satisfied that it will furnish the money that is necessary to do the business of this country upon a cash system.

Mr. WHITING. And you propose to be conservative?

Mr. COXEY. Yes, sir; I do. I propose to substitute a cash system for a credit system, and we have seen the result of the other in the last eighteen months.

Mr. DALZELL. You just draw the line upon municipalities?

Mr. COXEY. No; townships——

Mr. DALZELL. No; I mean municipal institutions, whatever they are; that is where you draw the line between radicalism and conservatism?

Mr. COXEY. Yes, sir.

Mr. McMILLIN. Has it occurred to you there is a danger by the possession, operation, and ownership by the Government directly of all the railroads in the country; of its telegraphs, its telephones, and its means of transportation of every kind that an Administration once in power with such authority in its hands to subvert the Government and prevent it ever being ousted would ultimately result in a subversion of the Government?

Mr. COXEY. No, sir; I do not. I do not understand anything of the kind.

Mr. WHITING. Your idea is that accumulated capital could not lie
idle and receive interest but they would have to engage in business?

Mr. COXEY. Yes, sir; private enterprises.

The CHAIRMAN. Do you not think the 4 per cent you fix would have some effect in determining the rate of interest charged generally?

Mr. COXEY. Yes; there is a taxation of 4 per cent upon the total amount issued, but there will be an automatic valve working so that whatever number of men are thrown out of employment by any means at all that will work this valve and keep regulating it.

Mr. WHITING. You think it would require Government agents to handle this money. Then bankers would have no longer an existence?

Mr. COXEY. Not any more than under the present system. I establish a precedent by the national banks. Under the national-bank act it requires five individuals to organize a national-bank corporation. If they have $100,000 of real estate in this municipality and they conclude to start a national bank, they sell that property and buy $100,000 of money. Then they sell that money and buy another piece of real estate called a Government bond. It is real estate because it covers all the real estate of the country. That bond bears interest, is nontaxable, and they deposit that bond with the Secretary of the Treasury, or the Comptroller of the Currency possibly. He charges them no tax upon the bond, pays them interest, and gives them 90 per cent of the face value of that bond in national-bank notes at a cost of 1 per cent. Now, what have they done? They have deposited their property—real estate—with the Secretary of the Treasury, and received interest upon it and 90 per cent of the face value in national-bank notes to take back to the municipality to loan out to the very men who bought that property, upon their notes bearing interest.
Then how does the municipality get any of that money? Here is this other property which has been sold to buy money, to buy bonds, 90 per cent of the face given to them then; they go back to lend upon that property again, and tax the people 6 per cent interest upon that bond, and the people are borrowing their own money because they have loaned these people 90 per cent of the face value of the bond at a cost of 1 per cent, and they go and pay 6 per cent for the use of that money. This will avoid that, and I take the national banks as a precedent to establish the non-interest bond-bearing bill, because 2 per cent of the people for thirty-one years have had this benefit of depositing this property with the General Government, getting 90 per cent in national-bank notes at a cost of 1 per cent. I do not ask as much as the bankers; I do not ask that they pay interest upon the bonds and pay 90 per cent, but simply to give us the face value less the cost of making the money.

Mr. WHITING. Some bankers have found it cheaper to use the money they had rather than to use the Government money at all.

Mr. COXEY. After they started? After they got deposits?

Mr. WHITING. No; before.

The CHAIRMAN. The present currency plan we are discussing in the House allows a bank, under certain restrictions, to issue 75 per cent in money upon the face of its capital, depositing 30 per cent of greenbacks and Treasury notes, leaving a net advantage to them of a little more than 50 per cent of the capital stock upon which they pay an interest or tax equivalent at most to 1 per cent, one-half of 1 per cent for the regular expenses and one-half per cent for a guarantee fund or safety fund. Your plan does away with notes, and instead of allowing the banks to issue one-half of their capital you allow the municipali-
ties to issue one-half of their capital?

Mr. COXEY. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. So the people, under your plan, get the benefit of the loan, whereas under the proposed currency plan the bankers get the benefit?

Mr. COXEY. Yes; only 2 per cent of the people now.

The CHAIRMAN. And then the banker used the money for whatever he can make out of it?

Mr. COXEY. It allows him the right to charge 6 per cent interest. My scheme is established and precedent on the national-bank system to come and demand under the Constitution equal rights to all and special privileges to none, because it will benefit directly the whole people instead of 2 per cent of the people.

The CHAIRMAN. The rate of interest you have fixed is, of course—

Mr. COXEY. It is not interest; it is simply payments.

The CHAIRMAN. Entirely arbitrary. It can be made 5 per cent for a less term or 2 per cent for a longer term?

Mr. COXEY. Certainly it could. This is simply a matter of compromise with Congress.

The CHAIRMAN. Do you anticipate any danger from the contraction of the currency you speak of caused by the cancellation of this money when it comes in?

Mr. COXEY. No, sir; for this reason. I thought I made that clear to you before but I am glad to answer that question. I claim that if a manufacturing plant is forced to suspend or burn down, or any dire disaster happens that throws a thousand men out of employment by shutting down, they have always got work on public improvements, because you can not draw so far upon your imagination in the future when you
will see a time that there will not be public improvements needed, because as we advance in civilization our wants increase, and as our municipalities increase in size they need more public improvements, and for that reason you cannot draw so far upon your imagination in the future that you will not see a time when improvements will not be needed.

The CHAIRMAN. You claim for your system the advantage of elasticity?

Mr. COXEY. Yes, sir; I do.

The CHAIRMAN. Which is also claimed by the advocates of the proposed currency plan?

Mr. COXEY. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Except they believe that the banks will find it profitable to increase the currency when it is needed, and you claim that the fact that men are out of employment and need work will draw out money when it is needed, and when there is plenty of money out everybody will be employed elsewhere, so it will not be called for from the Government?

Mr. COXEY. Yes, sir; that stops the valve of public improvements. When manufacturing plants are closed down the valve then opens because the men go on public improvements. There is the elasticity; that is the automatic working of the valve.

The CHAIRMAN. You think the plan by which you secure elasticity is a safer one than the banks can provide?

Mr. COXEY. Yes, sir; I do. I think it is a dangerous system to allow 2 per cent of the population of this country to say when you shall have money and when you shall not. I know that from actual experience.
The CHAIRMAN. Do you anticipate that your plan will arouse any opposition upon the part of the banks?

Mr. COXEY. Well, a little, Mr. Chairman and gentlemen, I thank you very kindly for hearing me.

Thereupon the committee adjourned.
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