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Person, Character, and Personality

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PERSON, CHARACTER, and PERSONALITY

by

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A Dissertation

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Approved

James R. DelRue

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INTRODUCTION

In common language and even in philosophical circles, the terms of person, character, and personality are greatly confused. Indeed there are those who would deny that man is a person properly so-called. There are philosophers in our universities who take all the meaning and romance out of life by teaching that man is no better than an animal subject to the stimuli of his surroundings or a machine linked irresistibly to circumstance.

This latter fact makes it all the more necessary to restate a philosophy of person which is the inheritance of Scholastic philosophy. Our definition of person, based as it is on a strong metaphysical foundation, cannot be weakened by the sundry definitions of the day. Even the man on the street, though he may not be able scientifically to formulate his belief, recognizes that person is so-called because it is peculiarly the property of a rational being. The basic principle of the dignity of person, for even the unlearned, consists in the fact that person is an autonomous being.

Recently, modern psychologists have begun to question the claims of experimentalists, and to demand recognition of other methods of approach to their problems. Thus, several schools of psychology have arisen. Though differing among themselves as to the nature of person, they all agree that person is not to be explained by experimental methods alone. In assuming this attitude, these psychologists are at one with our view. Yet, because they treat of man as a "thing" whereas
he is essentially a person, they are deprived of any fundamental principles that would support a true definition of person.

Thus our first chapter will trace the genesis of the metaphysical concept of person. It is an indispensable condition for any study of character or personality to first prove the objectivity of our concept of person. For, if there be a weak foundation, the structure built upon it will be weak. Further, we maintain that for any development of character three conditions must be fulfilled. There must be a terminus a quo-person-one who has the innate power to acquire this principle of action that we call character. This presupposes a terminus ad quem; that is, it is directed towards some purpose or end—the realization of some ideal. Any study of character must take into account that there is a diversity of faculties in man. For example, thought and will are basic activities of man, but they are not identical. The development of one does not necessarily imply the development of the other. Our final chapter will bring out the concept of personality as defined by various neo-scholastic philosophers. It will be shown that just as every human being is a person and has a definite character, so, too, the person is again unique because of personality.

In short, then, the purpose of this essay is to establish once again the true concept of person, to examine the nature of character and its relation to person, and analyze philosophically the concept of personality.
CHAPTER I

Person

In order to properly understand the notion of person, we must not be content with explanations that will not be universally applicable. We must not be satisfied with any passing fancy. Without definite metaphysical principles the study of human life is impossible. Likewise our foundation must be adequate and in order to be termed adequate, our study must take recourse to rock bottom principles—true metaphysical principles.

There is a science (says Aristotle) which studies being inasmuch as it is being, and its essential attributes. This science is not to be confounded with any of the so-called particular sciences, for each of these sciences does not consider in general being as such, but cuts off a certain part of being, and it is of this part alone that it considers the essential attribute; such is the case of the mathematical sciences. But since we seek the first principles of being, and the causes most elevated, it is evident that there exists necessarily some reality to which in virtue of its proper nature these principles and these causes appertain. If they, the philosophers who seek the elements of whatever is, seek for these same principles, the result will necessarily be found to be that the elements of whatever is, will be found to be the elements of being, not of accidental being, but of being as such. (1)

"All beings have an ideal essence, to which are to be attributed their existence, their reality, their laws, their end, their activity." (2)

(1) Joseph T. Casey, Primacy of Metaphysics, The Catholic University of America, 1936, p. 78
(2) Franz De Hovre, Catholicism in Education, tr. Jordan, New York, Benziger Bros., 1934, p. 78 41%
Metaphysics studies and evidences these basic principles. It deals with the ultimate general facts and truths to which real being is reducible and in which real being is unified for the adequate grasp of the mind. As the term metaphysics implies, this science goes beyond the physical properties and deals with the ultimate foundations of their properties; metaphysics treats of that which comes after, or lies beyond, the separate objects grasped by the senses and the sciences which treat of such objects. (3) There is an interesting legend which explains the origin of the term metaphysics. It is said that when Andronicus of Rhodes collected and edited the works of Aristotle, he grouped together Aristotle's books on the natures of things in this visible world and termed them or studies on material or bodily natures. He placed after these studies, and the Greek word meaning after, the studies of Aristotle on the nature and properties of reality in its most general aspects as is found in non-material being and in non-material modes of being. (4) The latter writings for want of an accurately descriptive name, were labeled . So the term metaphysics came into existence and use.

Wherever reality exists, metaphysics exerts its influence, man rises from being to the reasons of being. St. Thomas says, "The intellect naturally knows being and whatever essentially belongs to being as such, and on this cognition, the knowledge of first principles is found ........" (5)

(3) Cf. Paul Glenn, Ontology, St. Louis, B. Herder Book Co., 1937, p. 2
(4) Ibid. 2
(Quotation from Obiati-Lubun, Key to Study 4, Nov. 24)
Needless to say, our study is a rational one; sensism is ruled out. Only intelligence enables us to rise from sense findings and arrive at abstract notions such as substance, subsistence, and so forth, that enter into our concept of person.

Adopting the standpoint of intelligibility of being we will be led to a concept of essence; in turn, taking the standpoint of existence, we will be led to the concept of substance; finally, centering our attention on the viewpoint of action, we will be led to a concept of nature. (6) Our plan will follow this triadism of essence, substance, and nature. Thus will we gradually and progressively arrive at the object of our quest; that is, the concept of person.

The essence of a thing is that which makes the thing what it is, constitutes it in basic reality, establishes it as a definitely specific kind of thing. (7) "The essence is signified by the definition since a definition tells us what a thing is." (8) If a reality is composed of distinct constituent parts, the enumeration of these parts defines the physical essence of the reality, the concrete essence. Thus body and rational soul defines the concrete essence of man. If we consider an essence in the fundamental realities which explain it to the understanding mind, the enumeration of these real aspects of the essence defines the abstract or metaphysical essence. If the intellect looks upon the reality in itself, it is the essence that it is conceived as the ultimate principle of being. Essence expresses those notes that are logically primordial and fundamental.

(7) Cf. Glenn, op. cit., 96
(8) St. Thomas Aquinas, Quaestiones Disputatae De Potentia Dei, English Dominican trans., Burns, Oates & Washbourne, LTD., London, 1958, Q. 9, a. 1
Considered from the static point of view, a being, in so far as it is, is an essence. Essence expresses what a thing is primarily. (9) The metaphysical essence expresses reality in man, and is no mere mental figment. If there were no essence, knowledge would be impossible. For when we know an object, there is a re-presence of the essence in the mind.

Let us now turn to the problem of substance. Here we assume the standpoint of existence. The nominal definition of substance reveals it to be the support of accidents, to stand under accidents (sub and sto). If we experience some bodily reality outside of us, we immediately advert to the fact that it is something; that is, let us say white or black, or with a certain form, hardness, movement, etc. We begin to distinguish between qualities or phenomena which come and go, and the subject that remains during these changes. This abiding reality we shall see is the substance while the various qualities are accidents. Thus we see that an accident is regularly unsuited for existence itself or by itself, but is fitted to be a mark, modification, characteristic, or qualifier of something else. This 'something else' will always be, proximately or ultimately a substance. We may define substance as "a reality which is fitted for existence itself (or in itself, or by itself) and which does not require some other thing in which it is to have being as a mark, modifier, qualification or characteristic." (10) The essential point about a substance is that it is existible per se.

(9) Cf. J. Donat, S. J., Ontologia, ed. 4, vol. 3, Oeniponte (Innsbruck), Typis et Sumptibus Feliciani Rauch, 1921, p. 151
(10) Glenn, op. cit., 220
Indeed Mercier says that "the substance of a being is the collection of those notes which are so necessary to the individual that were all or any of them absent, the individual would not be able to exist." (11)

Of course, it is a fact that we come to know the existence and nature of substance through accidents.

In contradistinction to our notion is the false doctrine of Hume. (12) He maintained that the idea of substance is nothing more than a collection of simple qualities unified by the imagination and assigned a particular name. Also in opposition to our notion of substance is the Kantian doctrine that the idea of substance is innate, subjective, a priori. According to Kant the phenomena perceived by the senses are joined together under the concept of substance. Our concept of substance must not be thought of as an inert substratum underlying accidental features and activities. Descartes thought substance to be an inert substrate. Descartes defined substance as self-existent reality, and thus made God the only true substance. Substance is not inert though we study it under static aspects. Again substance is not defined by its activity for a substance as active is called a nature. Leibnitz confused substance with nature. Spinoza made substance an uncaused being and thereby fell into pantheism. (13)

Now that we have given a definition of substance, we may inquire into the origin of this concept. As previously stated, external experience furnishes us with a basis for forming our concept. We notice a subject remaining while its qualities are changing—again by external experience, the notion of substance is conceived.

For we ourselves know that our thoughts are continually changing, our attitudes differing from time to time, yet we are aware that we ourselves remain as the subjects.

We form a second notion of substance as a being in itself, by itself, or a being which does not need a subject in which to inhere as an accident. (14) Our first apprehension of this note comes when we apprehend ourselves as beings that stand in themselves. Since we cannot imagine how qualities can exist in themselves, we assert that there is some substrate supporting them. This substrate is called substance. Numerous examples can be given of substances—gold, silver, coal, man, angel, God, Shape, size, position, however, exist in things—or in substances. Following Aristotle, we call these modifications accidents. (15)

The question is brought up as to the validity of our concept of substance. Do substances really exist? In our proof it must be kept in mind that it is not essential for substance to possess accidents. As long as a being exists in itself and not in another, it must be termed a substance.

Our first argument is based on reality and the concept of substance just given. (16) We must admit the existence of actual beings. Without doubt we gain percepts of bodies and various events outside of ourselves. To deny the existence of actual beings is to assert their existence. If we were to deny our own existence, we would prove it, for it is impossible to make a denial if one does not exist. So we can conclude that actual beings exist. Therefore, if actual beings exist, they must exist in themselves (a substance) or not in themselves.

(14) Cf. Donat, op. cit., 169
If the first alternative is admitted, we have settled the question.

Those who deny the existence of substance and asset that whatever exists exists in another inadvertently posit the idea of substance. Since to exist in the other, they must necessarily posit the other which is a substance.

There are some who would maintain that every accident exists in another, the second accident in a third, etc. (17) This would give us a series of supporting accidents. If this series is finite, there must be a last one having no other in which to exist, and this last one is a substance. An infinite series is absurd for we can show that an infinite series must exist in itself or in another. If such an infinite series exists in another, then we have a number greater than infinite and this is contradictory. Therefore, substance exists.

In any case, it is not just a question of number, ultimately anything cannot exist in something else.

Our second argument is based on the conscious Ego and the concept of substance. (18) We can conceive of substance as our own which we call the Ego. Everyone can distinguish between the abiding Ego and its accidents, such as ideas. It is evident that there are modifications which affect and inhere in the Ego. (19) It is evident that our Ego is the permanent subject of our willing, thinking, walking, resting, etc., in a word, of all our modifications, both bodily and mental. (20) We know that the Ego is not an act or a state or a modification of some other underlying subject.

(17) Cf. Bittle, op. cit., 255
(18) Cf. Ibid. 255
(19) Cf. Donat, op. cit., 161
(20) Cf. Bittle, op. cit., 256
How could anything but an abiding substance go through the process of reasoning, judging, etc.? How could one think? The Ego is the ultimate reality and it has no other to exist in. Any and all actions of ours are referred to the Ego as its possessor because we experience nothing that could be designated as the ulterior possessor of the Ego. Hence it follows that the Ego is a being existing in itself and not in another. Thus substance exists, for the Ego is befitting our definition of substance.

Thus we conclude that the Ego is a real substance, and we can cross over to the extra-mental field and conclude that there are subjects for the varied and multiplicity of changes in the world about us. There can be no extension without something extended; there can be no result of action, if there be no actor; there can be no squareness or roundness without there being something square or something round; there can be no motion without there being something moving; there can be no heaviness without there being something heavy. These qualities are phenomena, but the something qualified must be a substance. This is a legitimate conclusion based on our internal experience and carried over to the extra-mental field. A word must be said about the predication of substance to God.

When, therefore, we apply the terminology which belongs in strictest sense to creatures only, it is inevitable that we should attribute to the Infinite Being the more perfect, and not the less perfect, mode of existence. We say that God is a substance. For, while God is not merely fitted to exist Himself, but is the Necessary Being which exists itself and of itself (hence causelessly), we use the term substance as the best we have, and the nearest in meaning, to express the Divine mode of existence. (21)

(21) Paul J. Glenn, Theodicy, St. Louis, B. Herder Book Co., 1939, pp. 231-232
Now that we have shown that substance truly exists, we can classify substance under four different headings: (1) primary and secondary; (2) complete and incomplete; (3) single and compound, and (4) material and non-material. (22)

A primary substance is an existing, individual substance. "The first substance (οὐσία πρώτη) is the individual, which can neither exist in another nor be predicated of another." (23) Examples of primary substances are tree, car, Elizabeth, Mary, etc. A secondary substance is a substance conceived abstractly and universally by the mind. Thus the idea of man is the idea of a substantial reality and is predicatable of things other than itself. In brief, a primary substance is concrete, individual, actually existing substance; a secondary substance is the essence of a substantial reality conceived universally in the mind.

A primary substance is complete when it is a finished nature, not ordinated towards another substance for substantial union. An incomplete substance demands a union with a substantial co-principle in order to constitute a complete substance. As regards incomplete substances, they may be incomplete in two ways—in the line of specific perfection and in the line of substantiality. (24)

In the line of specific perfection, a substance is incomplete if it can, when alone, perform some but not all the activities proper to the complete substance. For example, the detached human soul can perform some functions proper to man (thinking and willing) while other operations like nutrition and sense-perception cannot be performed by the soul alone.

(22) Cf. Glenn, Ontology, 223
(23) Wm. Turner, History of Philosophy, Boston, Ginn & Co., 1929, p. 133
(24) Cf. Bittle, op. cit., 247
A substance is incomplete in the order of substantiality, when it cannot perform any functions of the complete substance alone; but must always be united with its substantial co-principle. Such are primary matter and substantial form which unite to constitute a bodily substance.

Our third class of substance embodies the simple and compound. A simple substance is not made up of parts; that is, it is not made up of two or more incomplete substances. A plant soul is a simple substance though it is incomplete. An angel is a complete and simple substance. A compound substance is made up of two or more incomplete substances. A man composed of body and soul is an example of a composed substance. "A composite substance is a complete substance of incomplete substantial parts, entitatively distinct among themselves, in such manner that their union results in a single, unified nature." (25) Every composite substance is, then, a substantial unit. Lastly there are material and non-material substances. A material substance is either composed of matter or it is dependent upon matter for its existence and operation. Such a substance is a tree, or a life-principle of a tree (26). A non-material or spiritual substance is neither composed of matter nor is it dependent on matter for its existence and proper operation. The merely simple substance must not be confused with the spiritual substance. Every spiritual substance is simple but not every simple substance is spiritual. Thus the plant life-principle is simple but not spiritual; the soul of man is simple and spiritual.

(25) Bittle, The Domain of Being, 247
(26) O. Glenn, op. cit., 228
To summarize: By a substance we understand that reality which exists in its own right, as it were," as the old Scholastic definition puts it—Substantia est id quod per se stat, seu id quod existit in se. That the concept of substance is objective is demanded by internal and external experience no less than by reason itself.

Now to proceed with the second member of the threefold consideration of Being; viz., Nature, which we shall consider from the viewpoint of action. The term Natural is used variously by some writers. Needless to say, we do not mean by Nature the totality of all objects in the universe, or the sum of all forces operating in these bodies or objects. We are here speaking of that concrete basic reality which must account for the operative and dynamic qualities of a reality, whether the reality be material or non-material. Our purpose is to arrive at the metaphysical basis of nature, and metaphysically speaking we understand nature to be the ultimate principle of all operations in an individual being. (27) The principle of direction, orientation, and activity of a thing must be found within the being, it must be intrinsic to the being itself. We know what a thing is by knowing what it does; we know that it acts in accordance with some principle and indeed in accordance with some very definite and constant principle. These activities are determined by some thing. Since the being is concrete, an infinite regress back to a more and more deeply rooted principle is impossible. There must be an ultimate, intrinsic principle of activity. This determining principle is called a nature—the one, single, and ultimate * substantial principle of activity in each and every being.

* (We are using ultimate in a relative sense.)
** (We take for granted all along, however, that all substances depend for existence on God, the First Cause.)

(27) Cf. Bittle, op. cit., 214
For example, the force which sends a stone flying through the air is an extrinsic principle of this movement in space. Yet the stone has a nature which can receive and react to this impulse, and this capacity for reacting is indwelling in the body; it is intrinsic to the body. Consider an example from the spiritual realm. That a man can think is owing to a nature equipped with power for this operation; the act proceeds from a power or faculty indwelling in the man, or intrinsic to him. The nature of a body is thus bound up with the very being of the body. (28) It is intrinsic. "Natura est principium internum ultimum operationum, quibus res in suum finem tendit." (29) By the same token, animals act in their own way by instinct—it is their nature to do so. Rational beings act in such a manner that instincts can be controlled. It is of man's nature that he can fully actuate his impulses. If there were no intrinsic principle of activity in man, then man would not be an efficient cause. Man would not be responsible; moral codes would be meaningless, and civilization based as it is on morality would perish. But since there are effects brought about by man, these effects cannot be attributed to chance. For chance, after all, is an unforseen effect or the name applied to unknown causes. It is so clear indeed that things act in accordance with their individual natures that we know what to expect from certain beings in certain circumstances. We know that we cannot absolutely predict man's activity because his nature is free.

(28) Cf. Paul J. Glenn, Cosmology, St. Louis, B. Herder Book Co., 1939, p. 293
To summarize: nature designates a substantial reality considered as a principle of action and of rest. Everything that exists, exists for an end. Hence, unconscious bodies tend toward their end by their nature. It is clear then that the nature of a body is the very essence of the body considered as a source of activity. The same holds true for a spiritual entity of the substantial order.

As previously remarked, a consideration of reality brings us face to face with three closely allied concepts; viz., essence, substance, and nature. (30) In so far as their reality is concerned, substance, nature, and essence are identical, yet the three are nevertheless conceptually distinct. "Essentia est principium quo res est id quod est; substantia antem quatemus existit in se et non in alio." (31) "Natura est principium motus et quietis in eo in quo est, primo et per se, et non secundum accidentem." (32) In short, substance expresses the mode of existing in itself and is opposed to being in another; essence expresses what a thing is primarily; substance, in so far as it is a principle of action, is a nature. Thus in the concrete when we use the term nature, we add to the substantia prima the dynamic note; substance refers to existence, nature to action.

Needless to say, the discussion that has gone beforehand is a development of what common sense indicates about an introduction to the concept of person. It is necessary to include all these basic elements that can be discerned in person. The Latin word person was originally used to denote the mask worn by an actor.

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(30) Supra 5

Gradually it came to be applied to the role or part the actor played, and finally it came to designate any human individual. The term person is not as vague in meaning as are the other terms—substance, essence, nature. These latter concepts are more frequently misused in common parlance. Although we know the group to which the term is applied, there are many false theories as to what basically constitutes person. There, therefore, arises the necessity of appealing to metaphysics for a sound foundation for our definition.

A person is not a mere inorganic being; and such realities are never styled persons; the term is never used in speaking of plant life, and a brute animal is never styled a person. Yet every being above the level of a brute is called a person. It logically follows, then, that there must be something in the inorganic plant and animal realms and the presence of something in being above brute life. What, then, is this "something", this specific element—lacking in the inorganic plant and animal realms—wherein the person is differentiated? It cannot be materiality for God and the spirits are not material beings; it cannot be unity, for every being is one; it cannot be mere individu-
ality for everything, if it be one thing is an individual; it cannot be simplicity for man is a composite; it cannot be infinite perfection, for man is finite; (33) it cannot be substance or essence or nature because all individual things possess these modes of reality. There is one element we have not considered; namely, the intellectual. Intellectuality is common to all—God, man, spirits, and in turn is lack-
ing in all things below the level of man.

(33) Cf. Bittle, Domain of Being, 220
Boethius gives us the following definition of person: "A person is an individual substance of a rational nature." (34) St. Thomas Aquinas adds to this definition the adjectival concepts of "complete" and "subsisting in itself." (35)

Thus we must explain supposit (hypostasis) and subsistence first of all. In this essay we use supposit and hypostasis interchangeably. Our apology is based on a closer conjunction between the real and nominal definition of supposit and hypostasis. Derived from the Greek, hypostasis signifies that which stands under a being; supposit etymologically means to place under. Clearly, then, the substantia prima is called an hypostasis, an individual being, which expression implies self-sufficiency for existence and action. An hypostasis is rightly defined as a substance that is singular, complete, self-contained. (36) It is called a substance because it exists most perfect in itself and for itself; it is in no manner in another or of another. Accordingly such a substance is singular for the universal as such exists only in the mind. What actually exists is a nature individuated by quantified matter. It is called a complete substance because it does not pertain to another nor is it a substantial part of another. By saying that the substance is tota in se (self-contained) every other mode is excluded by which a singular complete substance can be in another. (37)

(36) Cf. Donat, Ontologia, 163
(37) The meaning of hypostasis is made more clear by adverting to the fact that the Human nature of Christ is not a supposit or hypostasis.
Therefore, we have rightly defined hypostasis because we have shown that accidents belong to their substance and inhere in it. They do not exist completely in themselves. Universal substances are communicated to and predicated of the individual substances; substantial parts belong to the whole of which they are parts and so do not exist completely in themselves. (38) An individual concrete substance exists completely in itself. Hence, it is by nature incommunicable to any other being; it does not belong to another. It is the whole containing all the parts. It is the ultimate reality to which all functions, powers, and perfections of that being are referred. The individual is its own possessor. In a word, it is the individual who acts in his own right.

An hypostasis, then, is nothing but a substance considered as sui juris, so self-contained that it cannot be united substantially to any other substance. (39) It follows then that an hypostasis is in itself of the highest grade for it does not inhere in another, nor is it part of another, nor is it communicable as a universal substance is, nor does it subsist in another supposit. Now what in last analysis makes an hypostasis to be an hypostasis?

This question leads us to the concept of subsistence. Subsistence is that perfection by which an individual and actual substance stands, so to speak, ready to function as a rounded nature, as an hypostasis. That substance which has its own autonomy or way of acting has subsistence.

Indeed the Human nature of Christ is a complete, singular substance but it exists in the Divine Word. The concept total in se is excluded because the Human nature of Christ is assumed by a higher hypostasis that is Divine. Cf. De Potentia, q. 9, a.2 ad. 13.

(38) Cf. Bittel, op. cit., 266
(39) Cf. Esser, Metaphysica Generalia, 156
Sometimes the terms hypostasis and subsistence are used interchangeably, but a distinction must be strictly held. Subsistence is that objective reason by which substance becomes total in itself and utterly incommunicable to another supposit. Esser states: "Subsistentia est actus substantialis ultimus reddens substantiam incommunicabilem alteri." (40) The most perfect, thoroughly fitted, substance is called hypostasis and the formal reason by which a substance is an hypostasis, is its subsistence. (41)

What then must a reality have to be subsistent? We answer that it must be a substance an individual substance, a complete substance, an autonomous substance. St. Thomas brings out the distinction when he says:

Although nothing subsists but the individual substance which is a hypostasis, it is not said to subsist for the same reason; it is said to subsist as not existing in another, and to subsist inasmuch as other things are in it. Hence, if there were a substance that exists by itself without being the subject of an accident, it would be called a subsistence, but not a substance." (42)

This distinction then between substance and subsistence is seen to be a logical distinction with a foundation in reality. While we are aware that in the natural order this foundation is imperfect, yet in any created substance two positive aspects can be distinguished by reason: Under one aspect, the reality of a created substance can be considered as the subject and principle of operation, and of its properties: it is that which exists in itself and in which accidents inhere; under the second aspect, substance is a supposit which is actually whole in itself and which tends toward no substantial union with another.

(40) Op. Cit., 168
(41) (The two great mysteries of Faith; namely, that there are two natures in one Christ, and three Divine Persons in one substance, warn us that a distinction must be made between substance and hypostasis. Cf. Donat, op. cit., 162)
(42) St. Thomas Aquinas, Questiones Disputatae De Potentia Dei, Q. 9 a. 1, ad. 4
Clearly the concept of a principle of operation that demands existence in itself, and the concept of a reality as being altogether complete are formally distinct. It is possible to show and explain one without the other. *

Actual subsistence is imperfect if the being subsists in itself, and yet is ordained for union with another co-principle. Such is the human soul. If the substance can subsist in itself and if it be not ordained for union with another being, its subsistence is perfect. In brief, to be complete in itself, to be self-sufficient, is the formal reason of subsistence, and it consists in this—that the hypostasis be complete in self, alike for action and existence, and that it has not need or possibility of communication. **

In reality, hypostasis is identical with substance, essence, and nature, but the three differ in concept. Hence, we may call a concrete, individual being a substance, an essence, a nature, or an hypostasis, according as we take different viewpoints in our consideration of the concrete reality.

The foregoing analysis, filled though it is with distinctions and brought through it may seem (superficially viewed) with difficulties, is utterly necessary for any real solid, and metaphysical concept of person.

We maintain that when an hypostasis is rational, it is a person. A person is rightfully an hypostasis because we do not attribute the term person to a nature existing in another.

* (Again we note that the human nature of Christ does not have its own subsistence. Hence, it is metaphysically possible for a substance to be without its own proper subsistence.)

** (i.e., in the natural order)
Sometimes in literature we attribute "person" to animals, but we understand that it is but a figure of speech. Since person is an hypostasis, it must be a substance sui juris; since person is the author of its free actions and the ultimate center of responsibility, it must be rational. St. Thomas, perfecting the doctrine of Boethius, (43) hands over to us the notion that person is a substance, individual and rational which exists per se, and acts per se so that it is master of its acts and incommunicable. (44) The definition of Boethius indeed embraced all these notes implicitly, but it was necessary to declare them explicitly. Thus in the mind of St. Thomas, a person is a "substantia, singularis et complete, sui juris, et intellectu praeclita." (45) Person is a singular substance because it is an individual as is any other supposit; person is a complete substance because it does not need to be united to another substance for its completely rounded nature; person is sui juris for its subsists in itself and for itself incommunicably. It is the person to whom all operations that it elicits are referable; it is the principle that acts and to whom all actions are ultimately attributed. The concept of rationality is the specific difference by which person is differentiated from all other supposites. Thus every person is in the first place an individual, but also much more than an individual. We speak of person only in the case of an individual substance considered as possessing a certain nature/dignity of its own. A man, then, is distinguished from individuals of any other species by the fact that he is master of his acts.

(43) Cf. Sister Mary Joan of Arc, Problem of Solidarism, in St. Thomas, 88
(44) Cf. Tanquery, Synopsis Theologiae Dogmatiae, 342
(45) Ibid, 343
Others are acted on by natural forces. He alone acts in the fullest sense of the term. Ultimately we are persons because we are the works of a person. (46) St. Thomas says: "Accordingly by describing (person) as a substance, we exclude accidents from the notion of (person) and by adding individual we exclude genera and species in the genus of substance, since they cannot be called persons; and by adding of rational nature we exclude inanimate bodies, plants, and dumb animals which are not persons." (47) Why should an individual in the genus of substance have a special name? The Angelic Doctor replies: "Again it is reasonable that among individual substances, the individual of rational nature should have a special name, because it belongs to it truly and properly act by itself." (48)

Thus a rational hypostasis is more perfect than an irrational hypostasis because it is more perfect in itself and acts for itself. (49) A person is master of its own acts and is not necessitated as is an animal. A person is not an instrument of others as is an animal. A person is a proximate end in itself. Still further, a person alone is subject to moral law and gains perfect liberty under reasonable law. Yet animals are freed only by serving others. The person excels other supposita because of rationality. The superior properties proceed from its rational nature and establish its dignity. We must keep in mind that these properties do not constitute the final essence, but that the essence is perfected by them.

(47) St. Thomas Aquinas, op. cit., Q. 9, a. 2
(48) Ibid.
(49) Cf. Donat, Ontologia, 165
A summary of these properties will be given. (50) Firstly, only a person is conscious of its own unity and distinction from all other things. Secondly, person alone can fully determine its own acts by exercising power over its faculties. Irrational beings react to impressions from without by necessity. The ancient axiom states: "Function follows essence." Thus, in the light of its functions, a rational hypostasis is seen to be more perfect in itself than an irrational hypostasis; since persons have control over their own actions, they can control themselves and others. In the third place, though irrational creatures have an immediate end of their operations, they do not determine this end for themselves. Fourthly, since rational beings can freely choose, they are subject to law and duty.

To put the whole matter in another way, we must here the concept of a reality; a rational being—enjoying, first, an utter and complete autonomy in its own order and secondly, an unparalleled, complete creational incommusicability. With regard to the incommunicability, we write a threefold conclusion. The notion of person excludes communicability of universal to inferiors, and also of part to whole. Further, it excludes assumption of inferior by a superior. For a development of this note of exclusiveness, we must recall the nature of subsistence.

Subsistence is that which makes an hypostasis to be an hypostasis. (51) Now in a higher order, that which makes a person to be a rational hypostasis is a higher type of subsistence. The Human substance (in individual) constituted in its essential structure and read for its connatural operations is an individual human nature.

(50) Cf. Esse, Metaphysica, Generalis, 169
(51) Supra 19
To this individual human nature, subsistence adds something real, positive, and intrinsic which makes the individual a supposit of the rational order. (52) There is, therefore, a virtual distinction between the individual nature and its subsistence, between nature and person. For nature, although complete, is not of itself sui juris, nor is it the center of attribution. Nature is but the principle by which one acts while person is the one who acts and to whom all acts are attributed. (53)

It is the human composite resulting from the union of body and soul whom we call the person. This individual can be considered under different aspects. That according to which he is patterned, so to speak, is the essence; that according to which he is made as an acting, subsisting being is his nature; that which makes him one, rational supposit is his person, and the person is not the soul alone nor the body alone, for the composite is the result of the union of body and soul. Let us conclude by making certain deductions from this concept of person. A person is a free agent, master of his own actions, and is thus morally responsible. He is the sole material being that is conscious of individuality. St. Thomas explained: "... in a more special and perfect way, the particular and the individual are found in the rational substances which have dominion over their own actions; and which are not only made to act, like others, but which can act of themselves; for actions belong to singulars." (54) That which hypostasis signifies in the whole genus of substance, person, considered in the absolute, signifies in the genus of rational substances. (55)

(52) Cf. Glenn, Ontology, 240
(53) Cf. Tanquary, op. cit., 242
(54) St. Thomas Aquinas, I Q. 28, a.1, 0
(55) Cf. Mercier, A Manual of Modern Scholastic Philosophy, 484
A person has the physical ability of acting for himself and of using his powers consciously for his own ends. A person may dispose of himself in any way not forbidden by God. (56) A person is by nature not subordinated to the individual interests of others but has by nature all irrational things subordinate to himself. Because a person is a supposit, he is one, sui juris, and can never be repeated. As St. Thomas stated: "Inasmuch as person adds nothing but the rational nature to the hypostasis, it follows that hypostasis and person are absolutely the same in rational nature; thus seeing that man adds rational to animal, it follows that a rational animal is a man." (57)

To be oneself, to have a being all one's own, to be self-master, and in no way under the dominion of another, and to be an independent whole and not a part, is to be a person. This is why St. Thomas said that person signifies that which is must perfect in the whole of nature. (58) It is right here that we can appreciate the place of eminence accorded to man in the visible universe. Truly he is, in a secondary sense, the lord and master of creation. How inept, and at the same time tragic, is any concept of person which essentially form our concept outlined above.

Let us briefly examine and criticize a few examples of erroneous views in the matter. All these false theories take rise from a false concept of substance or a denial of substance. We can, therefore, classify them easily. Descartes (1596-1650) disrupted philosophy by postulating an antithesis between mind and matter.

(57) St. Thomas Aquinas, Quaestiones Disputatae De Potentia Dei, Q. 9, a.1, ad. 1
(58) Cf. St. Thomas Aquinas, I Q. 29, a. 3 corpus
Because Descartes defined substance as that which can subsist solely by itself, God was made the only substance. (59) As a result there could be no human person. Consciousness alone would constitute the person. Spinoza (1632-1677) a contemporary of Descartes, likewise formulated a false theory of substance. For Spinoza, substance is the necessary reality; everything in the universe is one and identical; the one substance is infinite; mind and matter were merged into the infinite substance and pantheism was the result. Spinoza's concept of reality as all-embracing whole inspired the philosophy of the monistic idealists of the late eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. Accordingly, concrete individual things, including person, are but attributes of the Divine substance. Hume (1711-1776) denied the existence of all substances, material and spiritual; hence, there is no foundation for person. Locke (1632-1704) teaches that person is constituted by consciousness of the past. With Kant (1724-1804) we meet the German philosophy of Idealism that mutilated the concept of man. True it was that great emphasis was placed on the "subject" the "self," but the organic unity of the concept of person was destroyed. (60)

Granted that erroneous views are not few in number, we should note that most philosophers realize the need of striking some "Root of unity."

Doubtless, analytic psychology is inclined to carry its analyses too far, " says Walker, "and in consequence seems almost to treat the human mind as if it were a bundle of faculties each independent and distinct. Kant, for instance, in his desire to bring together the transcendental unity of apperception and the manifold of sense, freely multiplied human powers of knowing, and marked off the function of inner and outer sense, of imagination, of undertaking, of practical and theoretical reason, and of will with such absolute precision that the unity of man seemed lost in the multifarious details of his differences.

(59) Cf. Outlines of Christian Philosophy, Part II, Cosmology, Dayton, Ohio, St. Mary's Institute, 1904, p. 107
(60) Cf. De Havre, Catholicism in Education, 405
In contrast with an exaggerated faculty-psychology of this kind the stress which is laid on the unitary character of human personality in Humanism, in Personal Idealism, and more notably still in the psychology of M. Bergson, stands out all the more clearly, and as an antidote, may serve a useful purpose.

As Dr. Schiller remarks, however, 'attempts at unification are not new,' there has always been a protest against the disintegrating tendencies of Kantian psychology. Kant himself suggested that the "two stems of human knowledge, sensibility and understanding, may perhaps have a common but unknown root," and Hegel, too, declared that "the chief aim of a philosophy of mind can only be to reintroduce unity of idea and of principle into the theory of mind..... Our sense of the mind's living unity (he says) naturally protests against any attempt to break it up into different faculties, forces, or what comes to the same thing, activities conceived as independent of each other." (61)

For Kant, consciousness constitutes person. However, the concept of person fared little better with Herbart (1776-1841) who lost sight of the autonomy of the person. Hegel (1770-1831) recognized no such thing as personality properly so-called, and recognized only that man must be essentially a thinker.

In England, absolute idealism was first manifested through the poet Coleridge, Thomas Carlyle, and J. H. Sterling. In America, this monistic thought, detrimental to concept of person, was defended by Watson and Harris. The later representatives of monistic philosophy were Josiah Royce (1855-1916) and Mary Whiton Calkins. In philosophy of Royce, the ultimate reality is the Absolute Self wherein man plays the part of a minor self; the world is a conscious self of which we are parts. It is not our purpose here to refute monism, but merely to note the font from which springs these false theories of person. The mere recent monism is for the most part derived from a study of consciousness.

(61) Theories of Knowledge, ed. 2, London, Longman's, Green & Co., 1910, pp. 186-87
Regarding Mr. T. H. Green:

The personality of man disappears. In so far as he becomes the vehicle of eternal consciousness, he is identical with that consciousness, and his human character is gone. His thoughts and actions are not his at all, but the thoughts and actions—whether true or false, moral or immoral, it does not matter—of the Supreme Being who, for a longer or shorter time, actuates the so-called organism. And in so far as he is not the vehicle of that consciousness, what is he? Nothing but a conglomeration of relations which have no existence of their or of his, but exist merely for some other consciousness.... Man's body and his consciousness or soul in any other theory but Green's are one being, but in Green's theory they are wholly different and unconnected, in so far as things can be different and unconnected in absolutism.... but his body and his sensations, in so far as they are not the instruments or objects of his thoughts—and for the most part they are not, are not his at all, but are merely "names for substantiated relations between phenomena, relations to which an existence on their own account is fictitiously ascribed, but which, in truth, only exist for, or through the action of, the unifying and self-distinguishing spiritual subject," and apparently of any other finite self-distinguishing subject which happens momentarily to be conscious of them. Thus, not only the personality and humanity, but also the unity of man is destroyed. (62)

Hence reality is "in its innermost nature a single individual or person which differentiates into the manifold personalities and objects of the world as empirically described." (63)

To conclude, we will criticize these false theories of person without advertting to their specific originators. Indeed all philosophers and psychologists of a phenomenalist trend object to our view very strongly. Some admit the existence of phenomena, but deny, as before stated, the objective validity of the concept of substance. Logically following their basic assumption, they can find nothing to explain person but his internal states. (64)

(62) Walker, op. cit., 282
(63) Mary Whiting Calkins, Persistent Problems of Philosophy, 411
(64) Cf. Esser, Metaphysica Generalis, 168
To them person is actual consciousness, states, or association of the person. They say that the substance of any being cannot be clearly known or that it cannot be known at all. We do not say that person cannot be suitably described by its operations and by the law of its mental life. Again we do not deny that man is a certain unity of ideas, of emotions, of operations that can be empirically described. Certainly person is this, but this does not explain the ultimate constitution of person. Their failure lies in their inability to distinguish between the ontological and empirical aspect of the Ego. Man is a complete substance that exists in himself. Man can know that he is a subsistent person. Thus, according to these modern false theories, person consists in self-consciousness. Consequently, if a human being lacks consciousness, it is not a person. Human beings, however, are not always conscious of themselves; e.g., infants, those under the spell of alcohol, etc. This theory would do violence to our concept of person. It is certainly false to claim that normal human beings are only persons when they are aware and cease to be persons when in any other condition. Furthermore, self-consciousness is an operation, a function. According to our opponents, this passing state would constitute person because they deny substance. We have already shown that substance does exist. We know that underlying all internal states there is a substance which possesses these modifications. Hence, this theory is false; namely, that consciousness constitutes person.

Some philosophers say that a human being may remain habitually self-conscious and thus remain a person at all times. However, can an unborn child have habitual self-consciousness? No one can reasonably answer in the affirmative. Habits are acquired and what can be acquired can be lost.
Hence, a person would cease to be a person did he lose this habit. In any case, such a theory fails to account for the basic foundation of person. It must be termed erroneous.

Our concept of person is the only one that can preserve the true dignity of the person. The false theories, here presented, would if led to their logical conclusion, strip man of all rights and reduce him to the level of brute life.

A long way the best plan is to keep to the theory that the person of man is the composite nature, body and soul, left in its completeness and sui juris; the soul being substantially unchangeable, though variable in its accidental states, the body being constantly changed as to its constituent particles, yet preserving a certain identity, describable only by reciting what are the facts of waste and repair in an organism. (65)

Without a doubt, our insistence that the person is the individual composed of body and soul has raised a question in the mind of the reader. "How reconcile this Scholastic doctrine of person with the immortality which the soul enjoys prior to its re-union with the body, since we know this to be a personal immortality?" (66)

The problem is more apparent than real. In accordance with our Scholastic view, we answer that the detached soul is not a person for it is an incomplete substance and demands union with the body to exercise all its powers. So great indeed is the destruction wrought by death that but for the highest metaphysical principles, it is to all appearances an annihilation of the person. (67)


(66) For a treatment of the Question of Resurrection from the viewpoint of reason alone, the reader is referred to a Bachelor's Thesis, "What Reason Indicates Regarding a Resurrection of the Body" by John Patrick Miller, Carroll College, Helena, Montana, 1940

Nevertheless in the state of separation, the soul possesses itself after the manner of a person since it is a rational nature and is sui juris. Indeed the root or basis of person must, in the nature of the case, be in the soul. Certainly, it is not in matter; although matter is the principle of individuation, the means whereby we distinguish one person from another, it is such because it is itself made individuating by reason of the form or soul. (63) The root of person must be that which can apply to God, angels, man. Thus, with spiritual beings, matter is not the root of personality for they have no matter. Each angel is a person by reason of form, by reason of specific essence. (69) So with man, the proper root of person is the essence, the formal cause of his being a specific kind of a reality; i. e., a person.

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CHAPTER II

Character

The word "character" is of Greek derivation, and has a curious history. The verb καθαρονι means to make sharp, engrave, furrow. Χαρακτήρ the noun, has the meaning of stick, post. Now, then, it meant a stick of wood marked in a certain way, carved in a certain characteristic manner. The name character was used for the old Greek theatre, being applied to a particular thing. The meaning apparently widened, coming to connote a recognizable sign of anything. So as time passed, the term was applied to an actor's mask. With the coming of Shakespeare, character meant something peculiar to the individual and representative of him. (70) Later, in ordinary speech character connotes something in a person that is individual, peculiar to himself, limited in time to himself, and incapable of repetition. Thus we see that character is something connected with the individual man.

To appreciate the character of man, it is necessary to concentrate on what he does. We must assume that his aims and ideals will conform with his actions. In short, all the factors that go to make up the general term "conduct" form the basis of our evaluation of character. We are not concerned with involuntary forms of behavior.

It is only when we attempt to distinguish one person from another that we are brought face to face with character. The behavior of each human being is the result of a complex collection of elements or habits, principles, mannerisms, etc. Just as outside garments distinguish men from men, character distinguishes their behavior. The most character can be is a factor of person. Character is indicated by relation of a person to the world; i.e., by his actions. There is strong evidence for the view that a man's actions at any given time is an expression of the whole man; (71) that a single observation should enable us to classify the man. An objection might arise, namely, that we are compelled to observe some men over a long period of time in order to interpret their character. We answer that it is due to a lack of skill on our part to deduce at first glance what is truly characteristic of the man. Yet we cannot be too hasty in distinguishing character, for any number of individual traits does not constitute character. Character is a unity, a whole, and not a mere assemblage. (72)

For character, it is enough to show that it springs from an appropriate action. (73) Actions start with the awareness of a situation. Knowledge of values is the starting point of all actions. Every action is meant to realize a state of value higher than the state of value in the actual situation. Every higher value calls us to be realized by our actions. There is no one who doubts that all human actions are guided by this principle that the subjectively higher value has precedence over the lower.

(71) Cf. Allers, op. cit., 8
(72) Cf. Allers, op. cit., 8
(73) Ibid. 8
Every action implies a movement or at least the taking up by the Ego of a position in relation to the non-ego. Such subjective taking up of a position as a decision or an opinion is not without its effects on the external world; they are antecedents of acts. Insofar as every action or disposition causes a change in the world, it becomes a cause producing effects and consequences. This aspect of action increased responsibility because the person is an efficient cause. Furthermore, since this responsibility depends on men's conduct, he assigns himself by his acts to a status in society to which he belongs. (74) Man then belongs to the realm of persons, to the family, church, state as an intelligent being. His position is determined by his actions. Again we may view action as concerned with the subject of responsibilities whose manifestations are self-approved or self-condemned.

Now every action finds expression in the external world for this expression is an aspect of action that reveals conduct. Still further, another aspect of action can be termed completion since every action completes the cycle from the world through the subject and back to the world again. Summarizing, every action involves the ego and the non-ego; by action man is represented in the collectivities of being that condition him.

We can now present some preliminary notions concerning character. These concepts of character are taken from leading Scholastic psychologists. We will conclude this section of the chapter by giving the definition of Allers whom we are following more precisely in this essay.

(74) Cf. Allers, op. cit., 23
Maher has described character as a "completely fashioned will." (75)

It would be more accurate to say that character is natural temperament completely fashioned by the will. Barrett maintains that character is a resultant of the combination of our acquired habits grafted on to our original disposition. (76) If a man yields to evil inclinations and forms bad habits, he becomes a depraved character; if he controls his inordinate desires and forms good habits, he fashions an upright character. Now, we maintain that an individual has but one character, so we measure his character on all occasions by his behavior for it dictates all his actions. Therefore, because man's conduct comes from fixed convictions recognized as basic truths about what human conduct should be, character must be a principle of action.

"Character is, accordingly, nothing else but this general rule of principle of behavior; this principle is based on the idea one has of the order of values. We may define character as the common principle underlying a man's action, which principle refers to values." (77)

Every law of preference in accordance with which an individual determines his course of action is nothing else than what we call his "character." The character of a man, then, is the justification of his action, something in the nature of a rule or maxim. (78)

Clearly, then, according to our definition, character is not an integral part of the person. Character is revealed by actions, but actions are of the supposit or person. Thus person must first be understood in order to achieve a more clear idea of character.

(76) Cf. Jas. F. Barrett, Elements of Psychology, Milwaukee, Bruce Publishing Co., 1940, P. 214
(77) Rudolph Allers, Self Improvement, New York, Benziger Bros., 1939, P. 54
(78) Allers, Psychology of Character, p. 32

Our first chapter shows what person is. The new-born child is a complete person; he possesses all the capabilities that he ever will or can show. The original endowment is there. The nature of a human individual is fully determined by the soul which develops matter into a living organism and a reasonable being. (79) Here we invoke the principle of act and potency. For example, the person is the actor who fulfills the potentialities inherent in the person. The person possesses all the inherent potentialities from the beginning; a babe can walk, can talk, etc., but these perfections can only appear later. These must be present in a latent state in order to be actualized later. Accordingly, we need a strong metaphysical basis for the concept of character. We must recognize that "individual nature existing in reality, including all the actual and potential features, is called person." (80) The person is essentially immutable. The potentialities may appear realized or not, but the ultimate substrate, the rational supposit remains the same. The actualization of these potentialities will be treated under personality. If there be a faulty view of person, there will be a corresponding lopsided view of character. Hence, our reason for establishing our concept of person which holds true in every human individual.

Logically speaking, the question of the properties or attributes of character should come next; i. e., mutability, order of values, ideals, etc. Yet to more fully understand character itself, we must consider the method of study. (81)

(79) Cf. Allers, Self Improvement, 61
(80) Ibid, 61
(81) Cf. Dr. Allers' notes
Some draw any analogy from below between complicated and simpler actions—between reflex actions of the infra-human organisms and human actions. This method is not capable of studying voluntary action for you can draw no analogy in case of unconditioned reflexes. In the lower organism, the stimulus determines the behavior with absolute causality, so it is very superficial, to compare that behavior with man. A second method of studying character is to try from above—to understand simpler actions in man himself, as results of his voluntary behavior. Conscious and voluntary behavior is a combination of simple elementary reactions, like conditioned and unconditioned reflexes. A higher type of human behavior is voluntary behavior and because it is such we become aware of the essential features of higher behavior and study the lower by subtraction. We thus descend to the lowest levels of human behavior. That is our method—conscious behavior at first is wholly voluntary and conscious, and only by successively analyzing this behavior, can we reach certain points left with the behavior features to which we can give a satisfactory interpretation.

Our definition of character gives room for change, be it for better or for worse. We oppose the conception of an inborn character which compels man by fate to take a certain course at the outset. The factors of will and environment play too important a part in character formation to allow such a theory. What the individual receives at birth is the material. This must be modified by external influences, moral conditions, and the example of others. (82)

Evidently then character is not inborn.

(82) Cf. Barrett, op. cit., 220
The establishment of a single case of change of character invalidates the theory of the unchangeableness of character. Experience offers us many cases of change of character. A man may reveal the fact that his character has undergone a complete change in the course of years. This may mean that either two or more characters have manifest themselves successively, or that one and the same character has undergone a gradual change. Between a sudden change and a gradual change of character there is only the difference of rapidity of succession. (83) Nevertheless, we must regard man's life as a whole as far as possible, if we are to gauge his character. Very often an understanding of a new character depends on a knowledge of the original. Thus in conversion, it seems possible to perceive an entirely new character though some elements of the old life remain in the new. Either these elements are the expression of qualities so deeply rooted in man that they modify man's character in its every manifestation; or, they cling to the new character in order not to die out. (84) We can cite a few examples of conversion that will bear witness to our statement. When St. Francis changed his life, he became in many respects an entirely new person. Yet his desire for song and poetry was so firmly established in the soul of St. Francis that it would not disappear. In contrast to this case, we turn to St. Ignatius Loyola. In his case, too, there was an abrupt change. He, too, retained, in his new life, something that had been a characteristic of the old:

(83) Cf. Allers, Psychology of Character, 11
(84) Cf. Ibid, 11
his military spirit. But his militarism was not an integral part of his being and it could have undergone extinction. His life manifests many instances in which none of his martial spirit could be detected. On the other hand, there is no episode in the life of Francois in which there are not to be found some traces of the singer and poet. What we want to stress here is that a complete change of character can occur as the result of conversion. (85) If we have shown that one person only has changed his character, we have proved our point that character is mutable. Apart from these two types of changes, there remains a third group of phenomena—multiple "personality." Adhering to our concepts of personality and character, we should rather say 'multiple characters.' In this essay, we do not deny that there are many various meanings of personality. For the sake of logical thought, we give a precise definition which is accepted by Scholastic philosophers. Personality, in this essay, means, "the sum total of actual features of a person." (86) Multiple characters occur because the abilities of the person or his expressions are thwarted, given the wrong direction by some particular cause. In double or multiple character, then there is manifest in the same individual two or more apparently distinct series of conscious states. (87) Such multiplicity may be experienced in alternative periods or simultaneously.

We must insist that the person is essentially immutable. It must be noted that these cases of multiple character are abnormal whereas the nature of character must be determined by a study of the normal individual.

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(85) Cf. Allers, op. cit., II
(86) Allers, Self Improvement, 53
Likewise it must not be permitted to infer a multiple character even in these exceptional cases as long as the phenomena can be explained as the symptom of disease. The cause of many abnormal states is uncertain. Multiple character would prove striking evidence for the fact that one can show a multiplicity of characters were it not that this evidence is diminished by knowledge of psychotherapy. Pathology offers great help to normal psychology by its conclusions derived from observation of the normal as well as abnormal. Successful mental treatment by psychiatry often results in change of character. Striking differences are very often noted when the individual proceeds from childhood to adolescence.

Now the work of pathology gives us support for our distinction of person and character. In general paralysis of insane, a person at first appears completely different from what he was in normal times; the brain may be said to have undergone complete decay, yet after recovery the patients show themselves exactly as they were before. From this we conclude that the person, the possessor of character, cannot be affected by destructive disease of the brain. Such disease only checks the development and means of expression and cannot change or destroy the "kernel of man's being." (88) Indeed there is a change of character in cases in which mental processes are abnormal, but which do not affect the integrity of the organism. The principle of the mutability of character then has been established without doubt. We know that an individual is not bound up with a definite character which is permanent in essentials. The fact that there is such a fact as multiplicity of character lends great weight to our principle.

(88) Allers, Psychology of Character, 19
Hence, we say that man can change his character. We know that we need no change of being to change our character. Our opponents, who say that character is immutable, do not act according to it. If a man were fully convinced of the immutability of character, he would never try to influence other people and make them different. The fact that mankind has always believed in education which is based on the principle of mutability of character, makes us suspect that there must be truth in it. It seems improbably that an utterly wrong idea would persist throughout all the centuries that man has lived. (89)

Evidently then, if character can be changed, it certainly is not bestowed; it is not inherited; it does not merely happen. There are three factors; viz., birth, environment, and will that notably influence the formation of character. Heredity plays a part in character formation, for each person must build his own character upon the foundation of his native endowment. By birth, we inherit the structure of our body, nervous system, capacities for knowledge, feeling, action. (90) The native endowment will determine to some extent how the individual will react to the environment. Everyone has from early infancy a predominating disposition and a number of accessory dispositions. These are called the natural endowment or simply, the temperament of the person. (91) For example, some persons have from early childhood a predominating mild disposition, others a predominantly earnest disposition, etc. Hence, if there would be no other influences, they would have such a character. Ancient philosophers distinguished four classes of temperaments, and this classification is retained to the present day.

(89) Cf. Allers, Self Improvement, 8
(90) Cf. Wm. A. Kelly, Educational Psychology, ed. revised, Milwaukee, Bruce Publishing Co., 281
A melancholic temperament is the rather earnest and pensive disposition inclined to suspicion and sadness; the Phlegmatic temperament is the mild, easy going, quiet disposition; the Sanguine temperament is the joyful, easily influenced disposition, but rather quickly discouraged; the final type, the Choleric temperament, is the fiery, enduring, enthusiastic disposition. (92)

The factors of heredity are important but their influence has to be evaluated. It is necessary today to show the relative importance of heredity because there are those who would contribute character entirely to heredity. Certainly one can learn only to the extent that his faculties can inform him of things. Yet what he will learn depends upon his will and his environment. (93) Therefore, environment and will cannot be neglected. All hereditary qualities are not apparent at birth. What is inherited is the total of potentialities which can later manifest themselves. Heredity enables the individual to respond to external influences. Although this original endowment is given to us independently of our will, we ourselves play an important part in the molding of our character. As a result we are responsible for living up to moral standards.

Now environment plays a more important role in character than does heredity because it provides the opportunity for growth and development of hereditary capacities. Environment includes all the factors, conditions, and influences which modify the growth and development. The individual who would realize to the greatest extent his potentialities should seek the most favorable environment.

(92) Cf. Duerk, op. cit., 146
(93) Cf. Barrett, Elements of Psychology, 219
The most advantageous condition for development of intellectual capacities is supplied by environment. It must be stressed that environment factors cannot condition a change of innate faculties nor can they influence the constitution of the organism. Since character is changeable, it cannot be considered as the result of heredity. Many consider human nature as if it were subject to laws of heredity or environment in a merely mechanical fashion. They neglect the fact that man is free and capable of choosing for himself. There is a special reason why this latter theory of character has been met with such great approval. This idea that character is determined by immutable laws of heredity supplies an excuse for not attempting any change.

That man has free will need not be proved here. If heredity bestows the capacity while environment provides the opportunity, it is the will that realizes the inherited capacities and utilizes the environmental opportunities. The person is the epitome of rationality. Metaphysically speaking, if a character is really going to develop, it must be in a connatural way. Therefore, the will is most important for freedom flows from rationality. Will lies so deeply-rooted in the moral life of man that without it, character would be non-existent; the will improves or rejects what environment presents. By the faculty of will man can direct and restrain thought, action, emotion. Because the will extends to all the faculties of man, it is the controlling factor in the direction of conduct.
This is the work of self-discipline which lies before every man who through carelessness, self-indulgence or sin has lost in any degree the power of self-command. His faculties have got out of control and wandered after their own fancies; they must learn that they can only be of service in the kingdom of the soul as they obey the sovereign authority of the will, and co-operate with all the other powers for its well-being. But he must let these undisciplined faculties know that they have their place and their work, and when they have learnt control they will do better work and have a deeper satisfaction in it and a larger freedom than they ever had in the days of their wildest license. (94)

Thus whatever the birth or environment may be, it is the will that molds the character. "In the choice processes a man reveals himself completely. Choice implies acting on motives, and nothing gives a deeper insight into man's nature than the knowledge of his motives, for they show us whether sense of duty or hedonic attraction plays the chief part in his life." (95)

In turn, therefore, because character is a principle of action, and because a being always seeks a good,—in this case the will seeks the good—then the manner in which the individual appreciates values, ideals, and moral principles determines his character. In Man, the end is intellectually known; the will is attracted to the good and sets the various faculties in motion toward the active possession of that good.

As a matter of fact, the values that the human being may convert into motives of conduct are almost infinitely varied and they are not all of equal dignity. Hence, there is need for some kind of hierarchy among them. Sensory values, such as the mere desire for pleasure, the craving for food and drink and sex gratification have a place as motives of human behavior, but if these longings become dominant forces in a man's life, they cause him to sink down toward the level of the brute with whom he shares them. If such impulses are not to disgrace him, they must be regulated and controlled by his rational will. (96)

(94) E. W. Maturin, Self Knowledge & Self Discipline, London, Longmans, Green & Co., 1913, p. 69
(95) E. Boyd Barrett, quoted by J. F. Barrett, op. cit., p. 14
(96) Raphael McCarthy, C.S.J., Training the Adolescent, Milwaukee, Bruce Publishing Co., 1936, p. 70
Man must make thoroughly reasoned judgments in order to set up a standard for directing his actions. By applying these reasoned principles constantly and habitually, human conduct is given consistency. Because man is a rational being, he is subject to the moral law. From the moral law certain principles are deduced. These moral principles become standards for directing man's conduct. In a developed character, therefore, life is dominated by principles as distinguished from life dominated by mere impulse. (97)

Consequently, every action, every feeling, every thought, contributes to character for good or for evil. Immediately we see the importance of ideals. Ideals are described "as those pictures fashioned by man of what he should be and how he should act." To stimulate the growth and development of character, a knowledge of true and worthy ideals is necessary. Ideals must be the controlling motives for acting. Ideals are necessary in order that the individual may properly classify and use values for his conduct. A value does not owe its validity to the fact that pleasure is associated with it. Pleasure is a by-product of doing one's duty, not the purpose of our action. Thus the importance of ideals cannot be underestimated. Ideals must be fostered so that habits will be organized in relation to them.

For the development of a strong character, it is essential to establish firm, well-organized habits. Habits are the result of choice. Because the will chooses only what is good, and can be moved only by all that appears to it as of value, proper ideals must be had so that habits can be deliberately acquired as a result of choice.

(97) Cf. Kelly, Education of Psychology, 279
(98) Allers, Psychology of Character, 186
Persons of good character possess a number of well-organized habits which help to fulfill their purpose in life. Yet life is more than habit. We must adhere to our organic conception of man, for man is not all will nor all intellect. Back of many activities of man are feelings and emotions. All thinking and all acting are colored by feelings and emotions. These emotions must be developed harmoniously. Emotions should be directed into constructive activity. Self-control may be described as the control of the emotions by the will. (99) "The exercise of will power should culminate in self-control, since nothing is nearer to us than this gem of the soul. It is the energy of the soul which we must apply to ourselves in order to live according to right reason and an irreproachable conscience." (100) We must act from thought, from principles, from purposes rather than from impulses. It is only the will that can make man center his attention on acts and principles. Thus he who has contracted the proper use of self-control finds daily life not too difficult. Though self-control is severely tried at times, new advantages can be gained for future actions.

Summarizing, we may say that the development of character depends on various factors. There are elements in character that are both constant and inconstant. Some elements must be constant because of inherited tendencies while others are inconstant because they are derived from environment and personal self-discipline. (101)

(100) Duerr, *Catholicism of Psychology for Nurses*, 133
In short, all three basic factors—birth, environment, will—must be considered in analyzing character. To stress one to the exclusion of the other is unscientific and indicative of viewing man not in his full comprehension. Any analysis must take a comprehensive viewpoint, for man is not all will nor all intellect nor all emotions. We have borne this fact in mind throughout. "Since knowledge is composed of intellectual habits, and habits are elements of character, it would seem that a perfectly integrated character, one that is not divided up into 'scientific selves,' mutually exclusive, can be attained only by a philosophy of life...." (102) Our justification for the two concepts of person and character is now clear. Allers sums up the matter by stating: "Character represents a fundamentally variable 'something' common to the actions and behavior-pattern of man, something that must be regarded as an added property of person rather than a something congenital, simple, and unchangeable." (103)

The question may have occurred to the reader whether or not there can be a science of character. Science means not only knowledge but a special field of knowledge. Science has been defined as knowledge through causes or reasons. This is the fundamental meaning of the term. Now a science is any defined branch of knowledge. We might have a true science of human nature, but not exact. It is impossible to form general rules in character study. Science is based on general laws.

(102) M. H. Maher, The Philosophy of Teaching of St. Thomas Aquinas, Bruce Publishing Co., 1929, p. 132
(103) Allers, op. cit., 20
Character study is always the study of the individual character. In character delineation up to a certain point, we make use of general laws. (104) The laws such a science could formulate could be only approximate generalizations expressive of tendencies. (105) For Aristotle, we know there is no science, save that of the universal. "When St. Thomas says that there is no science of the particular, he does not mean, as Aristotle does, that in itself the particular is not a possible object of science, but that it is not so for us." (106) In itself, and absolutely, a science of the particular is possible, since God in fact possesses it. To the extent that there exists universal laws for character formation, we may suggest a science of character. A true science of character would have to predict character which is difficult because of the factor of free will. In short, if we should prescind from the universal, and say that there exists but one individual character—we could use the term science of character.

(104) Cf. Dr. Allers' notes, 10
(105) CMaher, op. cit., 586
(106) Gilson, The Spirit of Medieval Philosophy, 464
CHAPTER III

Personality

Just as every human being is a person in possession of a definite character, so too is every human being a personality, and the rational being is again unique because of personality. A stone exists but has no personality; an animal has feeling, but no one speaks of animal personality. Personality is attributed only to a living, feeling, intellectually knowing substance that is responsible for its acts. Personality will mean that one has lived himself into the realization of his own noble self, the worth which is his own personal reproduction of his own personal likeness to his own personal ideal. (107)

In the present study, we use the term personality in one of its philosophical meanings. It does not suggest, as it does in much popular writing and discussion, a kind of impressiveness, a power to influence others. And philosophically speaking, we find different meanings attached to the term, and this even in Scholastic philosophy. Hence, we find personality sometimes used to denote the abstract notion of person. Then, too, some consider the term as quite synonymous with character. Without quarreling with acceptations of the term, we shall follow that group of neo-Scholastic philosophers who conceive of personality as something quite distinct from either person or character.

(107) Cf. J. F. McBell, Readings in Ethics, Chicago, Loyola University Press, 1926, p. 292
Among these Scholastics are Rudolf Allers, Father James, and Father Raphael McCarthy.

The term personality means being person just as honesty means being honest. Hence, human personality means "manifesting one's self through thought, word, deed, and in fact in every possible human activity, in accordance with one's powers, capacities, and development." (108) Personality is a quality attaching to a being in virtue of the fact that the being is a person, and has attained to a certain development. It is the center from which all actions radiate, the instrumental outfit, as it were, through which men act. Father Raphael McCarthy states: "Viewed psychologically the word personality does, indeed, express the qualities by which people differ, but it embraces, also, those in which they agree. When taken in this sense personality consists of the sum total of all the natural and acquired traits that an individual possesses... Briefly the personality embodies all the factors which a man externalizes in his behavior and thus makes manifest to others." (109) Accordingly, personality is the name we give to the sum total of actual features of a person. (110)

Many misconceptions of personality have arisen among modern psychologists and non-Scholastic philosophers. It is, for example, suggested that personality is a kind of abstract essence which can be imprisoned in a formula. "Personality is no such thing. It is embodied in a concrete, living individual, and strictly speaking there is no formula for the individual" (111)

(108) Kelly, Educational Psychology, 280
(110) Cf. Allers, Self-Improvement, 53
The sine qua non of personality is person. Any achievement of personality must posit person as a first perfection. Now, the Form, the soul, the spirit is the root of person. "Being more perfect than the lower forms, man cannot come nor develop from them; for the more perfect cannot come from the less perfect." (112) Thus in man's personality there are the formal and material constituents, namely, body and soul." Spirit imparts to man that abundance of life in virtue of which he can become all things and yet remain self-possessed. The body, as a material constituent of human personality is for the spirit and takes its meaning from the spirit as the organ of its life. " (113) In a word the body belongs to personality because the spirit, which animates, lays hold upon it as its own. Without spirit, man would be merely a thing among other things, and while we do not identify personality with spirit alone, we do maintain that the spiritual is one of the ultimate conditions of human personality. Without spirit there could be no self-possession and autonomy.

Needless to say, we are outlining the development of a worthy personality only. We are aware of the fact that a personality can develop, in view of acting on wrong principles. Now the person does not become richer in qualities nor poorer. The qualities given originally may stay on in the state of potentiality, or they may become actualized and real. Man has not a personality given to him; it is not bestowed, but must be developed.

(113) James, op. cit., 161
Even in the adult stage there are still many features not yet realized. Human experience tells us that many older people could quite easily learn a new thing were they not handicapped by the conviction that they will never be capable of such an achievement. The sum total of the actual qualities is probably never equal to the totality of those which could become actual. Certainly, personality can undergo many changes; it develops during childhood, it shrinks in old age or in disease. After maturity has been reached, personality does not change very much in average cases, but this does not amount to saying that change is impossible. Thus each individual feels the necessity of offering himself in a position with regard to the world. In assuming this attitude, it is taken for granted that the person uses the powers of his mind in arriving at a true sense of values. There is the responsibility of acting on one's own and accepting the consequences.

Following this trend, we see that personality is no mere automatic development. Man possesses faculties. These powers of action in a person we call faculties. Faculties are capacities for development, for they are capable of improvement. These faculties explain the possibility of developing worth-while habits. Because man's distinctive faculties are spiritual, they are indefinitely perfectable. It is evident, then, why James states: "There is not only the natural growth of the individual, but the higher personal development." (114) If the development follows the direction of the material, man will be carried into the direction of the hateful Ego, he will be enslaved to the material; if he follows the direction of the spiritual, then he will advance in the right direction for the spirit will dominate the passions and the senses. (115)

(114) James, op. cit., 163
(115) Allers, op. cit., 52
Clearly, then, potentialities must be actualized in their proper order if there is to be a completely rounded personality. The actualization of potentialities depends on several factors. Some are inherent in the individual; others are extraneous to him. To the first group belong the "laws of natural development," according to which certain features appear at a certain age, for instance, sexual maturity. The second group of factors comprises all the environmental influences actualizing the potentialities. (116) Physically, man is subject to all laws of growth and development that govern life processes in general. Environment cannot produce anything new; it can only develop into real existence what already existed potentially. For example, the faculty of speech is an essential feature of human nature. It can only become actual by the environmental influence of speaking people. In order to understand the ripeness of maturity, one must meet openly a progressive spiritualization. Man develops by contact with society. It is essential for personality to tend towards communion, for personal life is not only the life lived in solitude but also a life of relations with people. (117) The only reason why the state has care of the common good is because it realizes that social order which will best favor man's personal development. As a rational animal, man is open to communications of knowledge and of love.

(117) Cf. James, op. cit., 163
Hence, man needs society to attain his full life and achievement. (118) Man's needs can be best furnished by society. Man is subject to realities other than himself as the specifying objects of his knowledge and will; he is subject to laws he has not made. Then, too, the natural law is an indispensable means for developing personality. As an animal, man is bound by nature to the conservation of the species and hence some potentialities are actualized through union; as a rational animal, man is inclined to know truth and to live a social life.

Logically following, there are certain lines along which the achievement of personality must take place. Since person is a rational supposit, the capacity for thought is man's highest privilege. (119) In furthering the interests of his achievement, thought is man's first duty. Any piece of workmanship evidences thoughtful planning behind it. So also can life be an achievement of personality only if it be constructive, only if there be planning. We can see how important thought is by observing the close connection between thought and life. Man is the originator of thought but his thoughts end up by fashioning him. By failure to use purposeful thinking, man degrades his position to that of an animal. "Abstraction, from the ontological point of view, is not a development from a lower form in response to needs. It is not our nearness to the beast which makes it necessary; it is our distance from God. Knowledge is not a push from below, but a gift from above." (120) Thought is absolutely necessary.

(118) Cf. Maritain, op. cit., 65
(119) Cf. James, Christian Philosophy, 165
(120) Sheen, op. cit., 107
Yet we cannot neglect the importance of the will. It is the will that efficiently moves the intellect. The will does not make the intellect know, but it can make the intellect turn its attention to this or that duty. The will can withdraw the intellect from an object that engages its attention, and fix it upon another object. The will must be trained so that man will manage his life on an intellectual basis. After thought man's duty is the directing of his capacities toward a system of order in his life. "Order is defined as a fit arrangement of a plurality of things in view of some end to be served or attained." (121) Thus order is essentially a good arrangement; a right balance or fitting together of elements of a reality. That order in life must be such that every element of man's life will be perfectly in accord with the whole. Rightly understood, the ordering of the personality is the directing of the spirit to the proper end. Father James referring to St. Thomas states: "Order is unthinkable without discipline. Discipline consists in integrations of simple capacities trained together to act harmoniously for a single end." (122) In simple terms, discipline is a spiritual exercise in pursuit of virtue. In turn, the third condition of achievement is asceticism or discipline self-imposed. Asceticism postulates an attachment to true personal values. When such asceticism is at its highest, there is a maximum of freedom. In last analysis all real discipline which is not merely external but internal is liberalizing, it frees the soul from the domination of passion and vice. Thus the two concepts are complimentary. (123) Freedom, then, is a condition of the achievement of personality.

(121) Glenn, Cosmology, 306
(122) James, op. cit., 167
(123) Cf. Delhove, Catholicism in Education, 243
The highest type of freedom, the only freedom worthy of man is moral freedom. Such freedom can only be achieved when a person so orientated toward the good that evil does not entice him. It is only then that the man is free. Because man must complete by his will what is sketched in his nature, he must become what he is; in the moral order he must win his freedom. (124)

Rightly, then, to achieve personality, man must set himself to the task of freedom. To accomplish this, man must take store of his natural makeup. To that end, he must know and have the desire to act on his knowledge; he must organize his emotional life. The degree to which his instincts and emotions are so organized will be the measure of his achievement. Briefly, unity of life is governed by unity of purpose because purpose is the soul of action. The type of personality achieved will depend on the end so chosen. For true effectiveness the achievement of personality lies in patterning and directing human capacities to ideals.

We must note that the full perfection of one individual is not the same as that of another. "No one individual contains in itself all the capacities and properties of its species." (125) The term perfection when used with personality must be used in its widest sense. Perfection means not only moral perfection but all kinds of actualized potentialities. All potentialities undeveloped in the human personality are imperfect. Now it is not possible to develop all potentialities because the necessary conditions of actualization are not given to all; because the limit of human nature would not allow the actualization of all potentialities, for there is the danger of their disturbing one another.

(124) Cf. Maritain, op. cit., 169
(125) Herbert Dons, Meaning of Marriage, trans., Sayer, New York, Sheed & Ward, 1939, p. 29
The actualization of our potentialities is brought about in two ways; firstly, more or less passively through organic or environmental influences, and secondly, through our own willful activity. Perfection is possible only if the individual has a true sense of what perfection means, if he knows what is his aim. After all every perfect thing depends on the will and is impossible without corresponding knowledge and we dare not forget the axiom: "nil volitum quin praeognitum."

In short the perfection of personality will be the perfection of the command of action; of bringing the whole man under the sway of reason, of extending those controlled acts that alone are human to every department of man's activity. (126)

We began by pointing out that our study of personality was a philosophical one. Let us conclude by mentioning explicitly something implied throughout our discussion. It is impossible to talk intelligently of personality unless Ideal Personality somewhere exists. There can be no ideal for each human individual, unless there is an ideal for all. It follows, then, that there must be a Perfect Personality which is the archetype of all human beings. Take God away and you bespoil man of his rights; you leave man the product of blind evolution; you make man a mere animal capable only of conforming to law by natural impulse. The perfection of personality makes a person not relative to anything on its level; it is an absolute. "Its magnificence is so great that it has merely to realize itself, to be itself, to fulfill the claims of reality upon it." (127)

(127) James, op. cit., 182
By reason alone we come to the conclusion that God is a Personal Being—totally self-possessed. "It is a demonstrable truth that man cannot come to the full and practised use of his faculties without recognizing the existence of God." (128) We note that the aims of a developed personality is pure perfection. But since all pure perfection, in a transcendent way, must be attributed to God, we have the great ideal of Personality, the ultimate perfection of God to guide the development of our own personality.

(128) Paul J. Glenn, Theodicy, St. Louis, B. Herder Book Co., 1939, p. 237
CONCLUSION

We have seen that three words are used promiscuously in common language which must be kept apart in philosophy. The terms person, character and personality have been carefully considered.

We call person the root source of all his qualities and properties whether actualized or in state of potentiality. No new quality is added to the original endowment in later years. He is the same in all moments of life—in infancy as in old age. Nothing essential is ever changed. We know person through his properties and accidents.

By studying his constant mode of activity, we conceive his character. We do not rely only on what a person tells us. Actions reveal character; actions supply better information about a character than words. Character is nothing else but this general rule of principle of behavior. This principle is based on the idea one has of values—the common principle underlying a man's actions, which principle refers to values. In all one's actions or words, human character will show. Some forms of human activity reveal much; others, little. Yet personality is the same. An individual has only one character, so we measure such by his behavior on all occasions for it dictates all his actions. The values realized are of different kinds, but the character is the same. Only one thing is common—the general formal rule according to which an individual chooses or declines values, the way in which individual conceives orders of value.
Because of this, therefore, the character can be changed. The individual may get another idea of what is good or bad; he may conceive a new idea of values and change his behavior entirely. Character is not, therefore, immutable.

Finally, personality is constituted of the sum total of all the properties which have become actualized in the person. What has become actual once may be hindered but the qualities are still there. Personality comprises all that is actual in the human person. It may change only in the sense of increase or decrease.

We may state the relation between the three terms in a single sentence: "A person acts by the means of his personality according to his character." (129)

(129) Allers, Self-Improvement, 64
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