Spring 1980

The Arms Control Process: Its Development And Linkage

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THE ARMS CONTROL PROCESS:
ITS DEVELOPMENT AND LINKAGE

Submitted in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for
Graduation with Honors to the Department of Political Science
at Carroll College, Helena, Montana

Michael Patrick Manion
March 31, 1980
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This thesis for honors recognition has been approved for the Department of Political Science.

Dr. Donald Roy

Mr. Dennis Wiedmann

Dr. Richard Lambert

March 31, 1980
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

After committing myself to writing this thesis, I began to ponder the wisdom of my decision. Everything that had been written in the newspapers, magazines, and books suddenly did not seem so straightforward. The numbers, acronyms, and contradictory statements all combined to present a formidable barrier to the successful conclusion of this research project.

However, I received some indispensable help that propelled me to the finish. Certainly the aid of Dr. Donald Roy, my thesis advisor, was crucial to the success of this thesis. In addition my father, Dr. James Manion, constantly propped up my confidence during moments of despair. Also Mr. Dennis Wiedmann and Dr. Richard Lambert were generous enough to take time out from their busy schedules to act as readers for this thesis.

To all of these individuals I am greatly indebted. Without them, this thesis would have remained a dream.
GLOSSARY OF TERMS

AIR-LAUNCHED CRUISE MISSILE (ALCM): A cruise missile designed to be launched from an aircraft.

AIR-TO-SURFACE BALLISTIC MISSILE (ASBM): A ballistic missile launched from an airplane against a target on the earth's surface. For the purposes of SALT II, an ASBM is considered to be such a missile capable of a range in excess of 600 kilometers when carried by an aircraft.

AIR-TO-SURFACE MISSILE (ASM): A missile launched from an airborne carrier against a target on the earth's surface.

ANTI-BALLISTIC MISSILE SYSTEM: A system of missiles and radars designed to defend against offensive intercontinental ballistic missiles.

ASBM CARRIER: An airborne carrier for launching a ballistic missile capable of a range in excess of 600 kms against a target on the earth's surface. For the purposes of SALT II, only bombers may be equipped for ASBMs. Bombers so equipped are then considered to be heavy bombers which themselves are not counted in the aggregate limits imposed by the Treaty (unless they are also equipped with gravity bombs or long-range ALCMs), although each ASBM is so counted.

BACKFIRE: The NATO designation of a modern Soviet two-engine, swing-wing bomber. It is currently being deployed to operational units for use in a theater or naval strike role as a replacement for older Soviet medium bombers. Backfire has characteristics which fall between the characteristics generally attributed to existing heavy bombers and those of medium bombers. Under certain flight conditions, the Backfire is assessed to have an intercontinental capability.

BALLISTIC MISSILE: Any missile designed to follow the trajectory that results when it is acted upon predominantly by gravity and aerodynamic drag after thrust is terminated. Ballistic missiles typically operate outside the atmosphere for a substantial portion of their flight path and are unpowered during most of the flight.

BOMBER: An aircraft designed to deliver bombs or missiles.

CRUISE MISSILE (CM): A guided missile which uses aerodynamic lift to offset gravity and propulsion to counteract drag. A cruise missile's flight path remains within the earth's atmosphere.

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CRUISE MISSILE CARRIER (CMC): An aircraft equipped for launching a cruise missile. The limitations of SALT II apply to those CMCs equipped for cruise missiles capable of a range in excess of 600 kilometers.

DATA BASE: As an adjunct to SALT II, the U. S. and the U.S.S.R. have agreed on a Memorandum of Understanding which lists, for each side, the numbers of strategic offensive arms by category subject to the limitations provided for in the Treaty. This data base will be periodically updated in the Standing Consultative Commission (SCC).

FIXED ICBM LAUNCHER: There are two categories of ICBM launchers, fixed and mobile. Fixed ICBM launchers have traditionally been referred to as either "soft," whereby the missile and most of its launch equipment remain above-ground, or "hard," whereby the missile and most of its launch equipment are contained in a hardened underground silo. In both cases the launcher—the equipment which launches the missile—is in a fixed location.

FLIGHT-TEST: For the purposes of SALT II, a flight-test of a missile is an actual launch of the missile (as distinct from a static test) conducted for any purpose, including for development of the missile, for demonstration of its capabilities, and for training of crews.

FRACTIONATION: The division of the payload of a missile into several warheads. The use of a MIRV payload is an example of fractionation. The term "fractionation limits" is used to describe the Treaty limitations on the maximum number of reentry vehicles per missile.

GROUND-LAUNCHED CRUISE MISSILE (GLCM): A cruise missile launched from ground installations or vehicles.

HEAVY (BALLISTIC) MISSILE: For the purposes of SALT II, ballistic missiles are divided into two categories according to their throw-weight and launch-weight: light and heavy. Heavy missiles (ICBMs, SLBMs, and ASBMs) are those missiles which have a launch-weight greater or a throw-weight greater than the launch-weight or throw-weight of the Soviet SS-19 ICBM.

HEAVY BOMBER: The term used in SALT II to describe those aircraft included in the aggregate limitations of the agreement. Heavy bombers consist of four categories of airplanes:
(a) current types are the B-52 and B-1 for the U. S. and the TU-95 (Bear) and Myasishchev (Bison) for the Soviets;
(b) future types of bombers which can carry out the mission of a heavy bomber in a manner similar or superior to that of the bombers listed above;
(c) types of bombers equipped for cruise missiles capable of a range in excess of 600 kilometers; and
(d) types of bombers equipped for ASBMs.

ICBM SILO LAUNCHER: An ICBM silo launcher, a "hard" fixed ICBM launcher, is an underground installation, usually of steel and concrete, housing an intercontinental ballistic missile and the equipment for launching it.
INTERCONTINENTAL BALLISTIC MISSILE (ICBM): A land-based fixed or mobile rocket-propelled vehicle capable of delivering a warhead to intercontinental ranges. Once they are outside the atmosphere, ICBMs fly to a target on an elliptical trajectory. An ICBM consists of a booster, one or more reentry vehicles, possibly penetration aids, and, in the case of a MIRVed missile, a post-boost vehicle. For the purposes of SALT II, an ICBM is considered to be a land-based ballistic missile capable of a range in excess of 5,500 kilometers (about 3,000 nautical miles).

LAUNCH-WEIGHT: The weight of the fully loaded missile itself at the time of launch. This would include the aggregate weight of all booster stages, the post-boost vehicle (PBV), and the payload.

LIGHT (BALLISTIC) MISSILE: For the purposes of SALT II, ballistic missiles are divided into two categories according to their throw-weight and launch-weight: light and heavy. The Soviet SS-19 ICBM is recognized as the heaviest of the existing light ICBMs.

MOBILE ICBM LAUNCHER: Equipment which launches an ICBM and which can move or be moved from one location to another. Mobile ICBM launchers could include ICBM launchers on wheeled vehicles, launchers on vehicles which travel on rails, and launchers which are moved among launch-points which might themselves be "hard" or "soft."

MULTIPLE INDEPENDENTLY-TARGETABLE REENTRY VEHICLE (MIRV): Multiple reentry vehicles carried by a ballistic missile, each of which can be directed to a separate and arbitrarily located target. A MIRVed missile employs a post-boost vehicle (PBV) or other warhead-dispensing mechanism. The dispensing and targeting mechanism maneuvers to achieve successive desired positions and velocities to dispense each RV on a trajectory to attack the desired target, or the RVs might themselves maneuver toward their targets after they reenter the atmosphere. For the purposes of SALT II, MIRVed ICBMs, SLBMs, and ASBMs are defined as those which have been flight-tested with two or more independently-targetable reentry vehicles, regardless of whether or not they have also been flight-tested with a single reentry vehicle or with multiple reentry vehicles which are not independently targetable.

MULTIPLE REENTRY VEHICLE (MRV): The reentry vehicle of a ballistic missile equipped with multiple warheads where the missile does not have the capability of independently targeting the reentry vehicles—as distinct from a missile equipped for MIRVs.

NATIONAL TECHNICAL MEANS OF VERIFICATION (NTM): Assets which are under national control for monitoring compliance with the provisions of an agreement. NTM include photographic reconnaissance satellites, aircraft-based systems (such as radars and optical systems), as well as sea- and ground-based systems (such as radars and antennas for collecting telemetry). SALT II provides that the sides undertake not to interfere with the NTM of the other party nor to use deliberate concealment measures which impede verification by NTM of compliance with the provisions of the agreement.
NEW TYPE OF ICBM: The U. S. and the U. S. S. R. have agreed, for the period of SALT II, to limit each side to only one new type of ICBM. Specific technical criteria have been established to distinguish between new types of ICBMs. These criteria include such physical parameters as missile length, maximum diameter, throw-weight, launch-weight, and fuel type.

NON-CIRCUMVENTION: SALT II provides that each Party undertakes not to circumvent the provisions of this Treaty, through any other state or states, or in any other manner. This provision simply makes explicit the inherent obligation any state assumes when party to an international agreement not to circumvent the provisions of that agreement. This provision will not affect existing patterns of collaboration and cooperation with our allies, including cooperation in modernization of allied forces.

PAYLOAD: Weapons and penetration aids carried by a delivery vehicle: in the case of a ballistic missile, the RV(s) and anti-ballistic missile penetration aids placed on ballistic trajectories by the main propulsion stages or the PBV; in the case of a bomber, those bombs, missiles, or penetrators carried internally or attached to the wings or fuselage.

PENETRATION AIDS (PENAIDS): Devices employed by offensive weapon systems such as ballistic missiles and bombers to increase the probability of penetrating enemy defenses. They are frequently designed to simulate or to mask an aircraft or ballistic missile warhead in order to mislead enemy radar and/or divert defensive anti-aircraft or antimissile fire.

POST-BOOST VEHICLE (PBV): Often referred to as a "bus," the post-boost vehicle (PBV) is that part of a missile's payload carrying the reentry vehicles, a guidance package, fuel, and thrust devices for altering the ballistic flight path so that the reentry vehicles can be dispensed sequentially toward different targets (MIRVs). Ballistic missiles with single RVs also might use a PBV to increase the accuracy of the RV by placing it more precisely into the desired trajectory.

RAPID RELOAD: The capability of a launcher to fire a second missile within a short period of time after an initial missile firing.

REENTRY VEHICLE (RV): That portion of a ballistic missile which carries the nuclear warhead. It is called a reentry vehicle because it reenters the earth's atmosphere in the terminal portion of the missile trajectory.

SEA-LAUNCHED CRUISE MISSILE (SLCM): A cruise missile launched from a submerged or surface ship.

STANDING CONSULTATIVE COMMITTEE (SCC): A permanent U. S.-Soviet commission first established in accordance with the provisions of the SALT I agreements. Its purpose is to promote the objectives and implementation of the provisions of the various treaties and agreements achieved between the U. S. and the U. S. S. R. in the SALT negotiations. The SCC meets at least twice a year. The Commission deals with matters such as questions of compliance with the provisions of the treaties and agreements, and the working out of procedures to implement the SALT agreements. The SCC will continue these functions with respect to SALT II.
SUBMARINE-LAUNCHED BALLISTIC MISSILE (SLBM): A ballistic missile carried in and launched from a submarine. For the purposes of SALT II, SLBM launchers are launchers installed on any nuclear-powered submarine or launchers of modern ballistic missiles installed on any submarine, regardless of its type. "Modern" SLBMs are, for the U.S., missiles installed in all nuclear-powered submarines; for the U.S.S.R., missiles of the type installed in nuclear-powered submarines made operational since 1965; and for both parties, any SLBM first flight-tested since 1965 and installed in any submarine, regardless of its type.

THROW-WEIGHT: Ballistic missile throw-weight is the useful weight which is placed on a trajectory toward the target by the boost stages of the missile. For the purposes of SALT II, throw-weight is defined as the sum of the weight of:
(a) the RV or RVs;
(b) any PBV or similar device for releasing or targeting one or more RVs; and
(c) any anti-ballistic missile penetration aids, including their release devices.

VERIFICATION: The process of determining, to the extent necessary to adequately safeguard national security, that the other side is complying with an agreement. This process of judging adequacy takes into account the monitoring capabilities of existing and future intelligence-collection systems.

WARHEAD: That part of a missile, projectile, torpedo, rocket, or other munition which contains either the nuclear or thermonuclear system, the high-explosive system, the chemical or biological agents, or the inert materials intended to inflict damage.
I. INTRODUCTION

This thesis will discuss the major nuclear arms control efforts that have materialized between the United States and the Soviet Union. The discussion will be both an historical account of and a commentary on these nuclear arms control attempts.

First, a sketch of the major efforts from 1946 to 1969 will be presented to the reader. The trials and tribulations of the Soviet Union and the United States during this period will become very apparent. The conclusion that is drawn is that the failure to control nuclear armaments during these nascent stages was due to a lack of technological development in terms of national technical means of verification (NTM) and due to the absence of nuclear arms parity between the two countries.

This dismal environment that prevailed abated with the development of NTM and with the realization that any nuclear war, no matter the scale, would be very destructive. The Strategic Arms Limitations Talks (SALT) were born out of these latter realities. In 1969, SALT I was the first step made by the Soviet Union and the United States that seriously considered the reduction of nuclear armaments.

SALT I was signed by both parties in Moscow in May of 1972. Many Americans, however, were not satisfied with the quantitative advantages that were given to the Soviet Union in the treaty. Quantitative advantages were thought to be equivalent to an overall strategic advantage. This persistent belief, however, was contrary to the actual strategic environment. The United States still maintained a position of nuclear
superiority vis-a-vis the Soviet Union. And, indeed, this was the Soviet perception. The Soviet Union regarded the quantitative advantages as necessary advantages, advantages in the long run that would allow the Soviet Union and the United States to ultimately codify the principle of parity or equality.

This position of parity or nuclear equality is defended in this thesis. This type of environment is really the only one that is conducive to significant cuts in the nuclear stockpiles of both the United States and the Soviet Union. This is the case because a position of nuclear superiority breeds a lethal nuclear arms competition--a competition that the world cannot afford. On the contrary, parity breeds security; parity sets the stage for meaningful nuclear arms reductions.

Hence SALT I was necessary to allow the Soviet Union to "catch-up" with the United States. SALT I, however, was not a panacea for all of the problems that were extant between the United States and the Soviet Union. SALT I, as it was inherently designed to do, eased the nuclear arms threat; it was designed to do nothing else.

But Henry Kissinger, President Nixon's national security advisor and later Nixon's Secretary of State, believed that SALT I could be linked to the overall improvement of Soviet-American relations. Thus a very important principle had made its debut. The linkage of a SALT treaty to the overall Soviet-American relationship would continue to plague these nuclear arms negotiations through the Carter Administration. Specifically, many individuals like Kissinger would continue to advocate after SALT I a linkage designed to enhance the overall Soviet-American relationship. On the other hand, individuals such as Senator Henry Jackson would advocate a type of linkage that makes the passage of a SALT treaty contingent upon the
good deportment of the Soviet Union. Finally, others, like President Carter, at least at the beginning of his administration, would advocate a non-linkage policy. This position, advocated in this thesis, espouses the belief that a SALT treaty should be considered on its own merits regardless of Soviet geo-political behavior.

Linkage also found its way into the intricacies of the negotiations themselves. That is, one item of negotiation was linked to another item of negotiation. More specifically, two types of weapons linkages are emphasized in this thesis. The first, a subtract linkage, is a beneficial linkage. The United States, for example, will link the reduction of one of its weapons systems to a reduction of a comparable Soviet system. A subtract linkage brings about a mutual agreement to lower specific nuclear weapons. The second type of weapons linkage, add linkage, does not possess the admirable characteristics of subtract linkage. In terms of add linkage, the building of a particular weapons system by one country stimulates the other country to build a comparable or superior system. This type of linkage does nothing but fuel the nuclear arms competition and hence breaches the very design of an arms control agreement. Fortunately, however, the records of SALT I and SALT II reveal that for the most part subtract linkages were the dominant type of linkages negotiated.

The Vladivostok accords that were negotiated in 1974 were an improvement upon the SALT I negotiations. For the first time, parity between the two countries was codified. However, the Vladivostok accords never became a treaty between the two superpowers. The obstacles seemed to be too great to allow both sides to come to an agreement before the United States' presidential elections in 1976.
Jimmy Carter was the choice of the American people in 1976, and he made it abundantly clear to the Soviet Union that a new phase of arms control had arisen. More comprehensive agreements were to be the rule, not the exception, of this new phase.

The Carter Administration, indeed, was not joking. A comprehensive proposal, the boldest arms control plan ever devised, was presented to the Soviet Union in March of 1977. The Soviets, however, summarily rejected the proposal. They had counted on signing something similar to the Vladivostok accords, not on signing something that bore no resemblance at all to Vladivostok. The Carter Administration was thus rudely introduced to the realism of arms control negotiations.

The administration, however, did not succumb to this adversity. And their perseverance was rewarded with the signing of the SALT II treaty in Vienna June 18, 1979. SALT II was in essence an embellished version of the Vladivostok accords. The treaty in addition was basically free of any linkage to Soviet geo-political behavior. Of course, there were many individual weapons linkages present in the treaty. The fact that the Carter Administration eschewed linkage in the Kissinger sense, in any sense for that matter, while negotiations were going on was very significant. At last a treaty was to be considered on its own merits.

This ray of hope, however, was quickly extinguished. After the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in January of 1980, the Carter Administration and, indeed, the entire American public felt that Senate considerations of the SALT II treaty should be deferred until the Soviet Union removed its troops from Afghanistan. The administration and the American people had thus taken a giant step backwards.
Certainly, I do not disguise my advocacy of the SALT process. My reasons for accepting in particular the SALT II treaty are based on the rationale presented in the question and answer forum in the last chapter of this thesis.

In conclusion, there is nothing more important than controlling the proliferation of nuclear weapons. Controlling Soviet geo-political behavior is not as important as controlling nuclear weapons. This must eventually be the conclusion that is drawn. If it is not the conclusion drawn, then the SALT process will continue to get tossed around thoughtlessly while the nuclear stockpiles of both superpowers grow at an alarmingly fast rate. It is best, therefore, to handle each area, the strategic and non-strategic, separately. If there happens to be a nuclear confrontation and if up to that point the SALT process has made gains, then the results of this nuclear insanity, hopefully an ephemeral insanity, will be less tragic.
II. THE TATTERED LEGACY

Immediately after the Cuban missile crisis, Soviet Deputy Foreign Minister Kuznetsov commented in a very stern, direct manner to U. S. diplomat John J. McCloy that, "You Americans will never be able to do this to us again."\(^2\) Of course, what Kuznetsov was referring to was the humiliating Soviet withdrawal of offensive nuclear weapons from Cuba. The United States because of its second-to-none nuclear capability was able to force the Soviet Union to back down from its aggressive posturing. The turgid pride of Khrushchev could not compensate for his country's deficiency in nuclear armaments. Possibly in an earlier historical period when pride and determination were certainly more of a key to a country's military success, Khrushchev's type of behavior would have been more efficacious. However, a new geo-political order that had been wrought out of the nuclear age did not adhere to these saber-rattling tactics.

Peace through strength, primarily nuclear strength, was never more relevant than during the Cuban missile crisis. The peace between the two countries and the peace among the countries of the world was maintained because of the nuclear strength of the United States. A pompous Soviet foreign policy could not challenge that significant factor.

The lesson of the Cuban missile crisis did not pass on deaf ears in the Soviet Union, as Kuznetsov's comment reveals. The Soviet leaders fully

realized what nuclear strength could do for their particular country. Uppermost in the leaders' minds, of course, was that with nuclear strength the Soviet Union would never have to back down in the future to the United States or any other country because of nuclear inferiority. If the Soviet Union were to back down in the future, this maneuver would be the result of a rational decision to save the Soviet Union and the world from utter obliteration, and not out of the necessity that nuclear inferiority dictates.

Thus, because of this unshakeable determination on the part of the Soviet Union, that country devoted itself in the short run to reaching a position of parity or equality with the United States in both conventional and nuclear arms and in the long run to reaching a position of conventional and nuclear superiority relative to the United States. At an almost frenzied pace, the Soviet leaders cranked out decisions favorable to military enhancement, and in turn the Soviet industrial complex metamorphosized these mere ideas into viable military products.

The swiftness with which the Soviet Union developed this overall capability is an important reflection on that country's military bureaucracy and in addition the United States' military bureaucracy. The Soviet military bureaucracy follows whatever the Politburo establishes as policy. However, in the United States if the president suggests a general military policy, it is just that, a suggestion. The State Department, the Department of Defense, the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency (ACDA), the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), the Congress, and many other less significant groups all have an important say as to what the military policy will look like in its final form. In addition, the president of the United States must balance domestic concerns with military concerns much more delicately than the Soviet leaders, especially in a situation in which there is an absence of a
visible, external crisis. Social programs have a way of eating at military programs in such an environment. The president, therefore, must put up a formidable fight to control this military budget erosion. Thus it can be concluded that the Soviet military bureaucracy is essentially unitiered and the United States' military bureaucracy is essentially multitiered. A unitiered system is characterized by alacrity; a multitiered system is characterized by plodding deliberation.

This type of unitiered system, therefore, was well suited for what the Soviet Union desired—quick solutions to threatening problems. The results of this unitiered alacrity manifested themselves in many forms. For example, in 1964 the Soviets developed the Tallinn system, a high performance long range air defense system based on the SA-5 missile. This system, although air defense, had the capability according to some individuals to be upgraded to an impressive anti-ballistic missile (ABM) system.\(^3\) Also the Soviets developed heavy intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) during this catch-up period. Eschewing the concept later espoused by Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara that light missiles were much more efficacious in terms of accuracy, the Soviets developed a series of SS ICBMs that were very heavy, i.e., great launch weight and throw weight. These first generation missiles consisted of the SS-7 and the SS-8. The United States at this particular time had developed the Titan missile, a relatively heavy missile in terms of the United States' ICBM arsenal, and the Minuteman II missile, a light missile. In 1968, the Soviet Union developed a very crude form of a multiple independently targetable reentry vehicle missile, in Pentagon jargon a MIRVed missile. This SS-9 triplet or multiple reentry

\(^3\)U.S., Congress, Senate, Committee on Foreign Relations, Hearings, Briefing on SALT I Compliance, 96th Cong., 1st sess., 1979, pp. 49-50.
vehicle missile (MRVed missile) was a sure indication that the Soviet Union was not going to be satisfied with the second-strike capability that it had developed during the mid-1960s; indeed, the Soviet Union was seeking, most assuredly, a first strike capability. And, finally, in 1969 the Soviets were developing what is known as the TU-26, or the Backfire bomber. This two-engined, swing-wing bomber greatly enhanced the intercontinental capabilities of the Soviet Union.

The Soviet Union with these many developments seemed to be adequately fulfilling Kuznetsov's prophecy. But the United States during this period after the Cuban missile crisis was not standing still. The military developed a genuine MIRVed missile in 1968, United States' submarine-launched ballistic missile (SLBM) forces remained superior to anything the Soviet Union could offer, and United States' intercontinental bomber forces were very capable.

In essence, an action-reaction environment seemed to exist between what were now the two superpowers. That is, one country would develop a new strategic system and the other country would respond if not in kind then in lethal potential. This "keeping up with the Joneses" philosophy was certainly a dead-end mentality. The levels of lethality were increasing with each strategic development and neither side seemed to be really gaining anything. What is possessing the ability to destroy the world ten times over? It is nothing in terms of gaining a real advantage over your adversary. It is something if your goal is to find new ways to kill human beings or to maintain the world perception that your country will not be outdone. It is something if you adhere to the words of Francis Jeffrey, a 19th Century Scottish critic and jurist:
War, my lord, is of eternal use to human kind, for ever and anon when you have Pass'd a few dull years in peace and propagation, the world is overstocked with fools, and wants a Pestilence at least if not a hero.4

It seems that since the blast-off of the nuclear age, the Soviet Union and the United States have not been proponents of the philosophy that is revealed through the words of Jeffrey. But it also must be emphasized that these two superpowers have not been growing olive branches with an impassioned zeal. The first efforts to put a lid on nuclear proliferation were not very significant, a characterization that some people feel applies to SALT II.

The first effort to control nuclear weapons was initiated by the United States. The Baruch plan, an arms control proposal developed by Truman advisor Bernard Baruch, called for an International Atomic Development Agency that would claim ownership of all atomic energy activities that threatened world security.5

At the time Baruch offered this plan, 1946, the United States was the only country that possessed viable nuclear weapons. The Soviet Union, not wanting to get locked into a situation that limited their nuclear arsenal vis-a-vis the United States, did not accept the Baruch plan. The Soviets believed that this proposal would do the very thing they abhorred--codify Soviet nuclear inferiority; therefore, the Soviet Union summarily rejected the Baruch plan. This rejection was the first, certainly not the last, manifestation of a Soviet foreign policy characteristic that refuses to consider any arms control plan that significantly limits in the Soviet Union's eyes their nuclear options.


August 23, 1949, however, was a day that altered the Soviet Union's diplomatic track, at least temporarily. On this day, the Soviet Union exploded its first nuclear device, an action which meant that the Soviet Union was basically at parity or equality with the United States--a Soviet conclusion not a world conclusion.

Parity in the nuclear field seems to carry with it certain concomitant responsibilities. The Soviet Union believed that it should devise an arms control plan like the United States had done in 1946, since it now shared a unique position with the United States.

World perceptions are very important in foreign policy; a country does not want to create a war-mongering image. Realizing this diplomatic necessity, therefore, the Soviet Union proposed its own arms control plan, the Stockholm Appeal of 1950. This proposal naively hoped to ban all atomic weapons. Of course, the Soviet Union realized the naivete of their plan, but again the Soviet Union was not interested in viability, only perceptions. The Soviets were satisfied with the Stockholm Appeal as long as other countries of the world perceived, falsely in this case, that the Soviet Union was genuinely concerned with nuclear proliferation. It is correct to evaluate the Soviet Union's intentions as specious in this case because nuclear development in the Soviet Union did not slow down at all before, during, or after the Stockholm Appeal.

During the Eisenhower Administration, nothing substantial was accomplished in the arms control field. The 1940s and early 1950s seemed to establish a precedent for the way in which arms control was to be dealt with in the future by both superpowers.

President Eisenhower sought to enhance the United States' nuclear arsenal by emphasizing "more bang for the buck" while at the same time
submitting in 1955 the "open skies" proposal which stipulated that the United States and the Soviet Union exchange military blueprints and the flight plans each country had devised for surveillance flights across the other's territory.

The Soviet Union, although it did not develop a catchy phrase that summarized its nuclear arms program, continued to improve upon its nuclear arsenal. In addition, the Soviets submitted on May 10, 1955 a proposal that would have terminated nuclear testing and also would have established foreign control personnel at "large ports, at railway junctions, on main motor highways and in aerodomes."^6

Needless to say, these ambivalent foreign policies, American and Soviet, rendered any serious arms control efforts totally helpless.

The key to understanding why these early arms control proposals were fruitless is to be aware of the great mistrust that existed and still exists between the United States and the Soviet Union. Mere trust between the two countries to ensure compliance with an agreement was not enough; the ideological hiatus was and is simply too great. The xenophobia on both sides during these early years of attempted arms control could have been tempered only if there had existed some mechanism that superseded mere trust. That mechanism, as it now plays a crucial role in the strategic arms limitations talks (SALT), is known as national technical means of verification (NTM). NTM renders mutual trust irrelevant; NTM makes meaningful arms control efforts possible. Therefore, it can be concluded that these early arms control efforts were doomed to fail because verification satellites, listening posts, and air-craft based systems, those constituent elements of NTM, had not yet been developed.

^6Ibid., p. 11.
Besides adequate verification, the real threat of a nuclear war has been a major contributor to relatively successful arms control agreements. The adversaries who even dare to confront one another with nuclear weapons soon begin to reflect on the living hell that the earth can be reduced to if bombarded with these nuclear weapons. The opposing sides cannot help but graphically picture the tragic scene described by Futuba Kitayama, a 33-year-old housewife who witnessed the atomic explosion at Hiroshima:

Under the bridge were floating, like dead dogs or cats, many corpses, barely covered by tattered clothes. In the shallow water near the bank, a woman was lying face upward, her breasts torn away and blood spurting. A horrifying scene...I wondered if the hell that my grandmother had told me so much about in my childhood had fallen upon the earth.7

The Cuban missile crisis, though it did, indeed, stimulate increased nuclear arms production on the part of the Soviet Union, was the key event that revolutionized Soviet foreign policy.8 The crisis rudely awakened Khrushchev to the reality that bully tactics and saber-rattling combined with nuclear arms was a pernicious combination. The missile crisis shifted Soviet foreign policy from a bully position to a position of peaceful coexistence, a position characterized by civility and diplomatic aplomb.9 Peaceful coexistence, even with all of its deficiencies, was an improvement of great proportion upon initial Soviet foreign policy positions.

Peaceful coexistence immediately influenced Soviet-American relations after the Cuban missile crisis. The Nuclear Test Ban Treaty was signed in the summer of 1963, an agreement that hopefully in the words of President

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9 Ibid., p. 386.
Kennedy would "... lead to further measures to arrest and control the dangerous competition for increasingly destructive weapons."\(^{10}\)

The treaty, negotiated for the United States by Ambassador Arthur H. Dean from 1958 to 1962 and Secretary of State Averill Harriman in 1963, stipulated that no nuclear testing be done in the atmosphere, outer space, and underwater by the United States or the Soviet Union, and that these two countries should not encourage such tests by other countries.\(^{11}\) The treaty did not include underground nuclear tests because the Soviet Union detested onsite inspection,\(^{12}\) the verification method utilized that called, for example, for the United States to send inspectors to the Soviet Union to ensure that the Soviets were complying with the terms of the treaty. Atmosphere, outer space, and underwater tests did not require onsite inspection; mechanical verification means were adequate for these tests.

The outstanding question, of course, is why the Soviet Union was afraid of onsite inspection. It seems, and this is a very consistent pattern in Soviet foreign policy even with the advent of peaceful coexistence and later detente, that the Soviet Union is simply shackled by a xenophobic mentality.\(^{13}\) This mentality, developed over centuries, makes individual Soviet citizens and the Soviet government very wary of any foreigner, no matter the foreigner's reasons for staying in the Soviet Union. Another reason for the Soviet Union's distinct dislike for onsite inspection, certainly a reason less abstract than xenophobia, is that the Soviet military bureaucracy is very protective of its military secrets.\(^{14}\) In terms of onsite inspection

\(^{10}\)Ibid., p. 384, quoted from U.S., Congress, Senate, Committee on Foreign Relations, Hearings on Nuclear Test Ban Treaty, 1963, p. 2.

\(^{11}\)Ibid., p. 381.

\(^{12}\)Ibid., pp. 366-367.

\(^{13}\)Ibid., p. 367.

\(^{14}\)Ibid.
for the Nuclear Test Ban Treaty, the Soviet military leaders believed that the United States' inspectors would not only scrutinize the Soviet Union's compliance with the treaty but also scrutinize the Soviet Union's missile sites and other military components for the purpose of planning a nuclear strike against the Soviet Union. This military reason, more than xenophobia, has served to make onsite inspections impossible in the SALT process.

After the signing of the Nuclear Test Ban Treaty on August 5, 1963, the two countries and, indeed, the world were anticipating more comprehensive agreements in the future. Specifically the two countries were hoping to come to terms in regard to limiting offensive and defensive nuclear weapons. However, this type of treaty was certainly more difficult to construct than a mere treaty that only partially banned nuclear testing. Offensive and defensive nuclear weapons are the very heart of a nation's nuclear capability and thus these weapons can be very resistant to any efforts to limit their capabilities. This is not to suggest that the United States and the Soviet Union regressed to the arms control mentality of the 1940s and early 1950s. The suggestion is only that a new, more significant plateau was being contemplated by both countries and that great steps are not always accomplished in a short period of time. Certainly the Nuclear Test Ban Treaty was a breath of fresh air for the United States, the Soviet Union, and the world. But the strategic complexities at that time were so great that the spirit of the summer of 1963 was hard pressed to disseminate its hope throughout the whole strategic environment. The negotiations to control nuclear arms were only to get harder, not easier. That is a fact that had to be boldly confronted, not timidly avoided.

\[15\] Ibid.
This difficulty in reaching the new arms control plateau immediately manifested itself in 1964. President Johnson instructed Assistant Deputy Director of the ACDA, Adrian Fisher, to propose a plan to the 18-nation Disarmament Conference that would force the United States and the Soviet Union to eliminate at the rate of 20 per month an equal number of American B-47s and Soviet TU-16s. This may sound like a small but significant first step to limit strategic weapons. Actually, it was no step at all. These planes were not strategically significant and both countries were thinking of eliminating them anyway.

Following this debacle, more serious efforts were made, particularly by the United States, to limit strategic weapons. But these efforts certainly did not come off with a great deal of ease. An old problem incessantly thrust itself into the picture only to scramble and frustrate the positive items that had been accomplished. This major problem, bureaucratic in-fighting, revealed in no uncertain terms that the United States, in contrast to the Soviet Union, had to fight two battles when it proposed any arms control action. The first battle for the U.S. was with the Soviet Union and its opposing Weltanschauung. The second battle involved its own military bureaucracy. Again, this multitiered policy-making structure considerably complicates matters for the United States whenever it proposes arms control plans.

From 1964 through 1967, this bureaucratic in-fighting greatly reduced the effectiveness of the arms control efforts in the United States. The State Department and the ACDA, under the direction of Dean Rusk and William Foster, respectively, consistently opted for those arms control plans that

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limited the development of newer, more lethal weapons systems. For example, when the ABM issue was being acrimoniously debated, especially from 1965 to 1969, the State Department and the ACDA came out categorically against the ABM system. On the other hand, the armed services, who play an important role in the arms control policy-making process, were totally supportive of the proliferation of ABMs. Obviously, the ABM system was an armed services program and hence the Army, Navy and Air Force were not going to look a gift horse in the mouth. Were the armed services, therefore, genuinely interested in controlling nuclear arms at this period of time? Not really. Program procurement was more important than a more stable geo-political order. Another point of contention between the ACDA-State Department and also in this case CIA coalition, and the armed services, who were represented by the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS), was the issue of verification. The former coalition believed that verification of ICBMs and ABMs was possible with available instruments. However, the JCS was extremely doubtful. The JCS, relying on persistent rumor that the CIA was too optimistic concerning verification, would not back off from its position; thus, the stalemate persisted.

The Committee of Principles formed in 1964, and composed of Dean Rusk, William Foster, General Wheeler, Chief of the JCS, and W. W. Rostow, Assistant to the President for National Security, was thus reduced, in effect, to a committee of non-action. The main body that was supposed to develop a viable United States arms control plan could not dissolve the pervasive self-interest.

Hope was not a feeling, however, that was totally foreign to the arms control policy-making structure. Morton Halperin, who later would devise the structure for the National Security Council, was one individual who
was not satisfied with the state of affairs. Working through Paul Warnke's International Security Affairs division of the Pentagon, Halperin almost single-handedly cut through the self-interest that abounded. Delicately balancing the interests of those groups whose consent to any plan was imperative, Halperin in August of 1968 came up with the first comprehensive arms control plan ever devised by either the United States or the Soviet Union.

The plan that Halperin proposed consisted of five parts: (1) there was to be a limit, if indeed one uses that word in the loosest sense, of between 100 to 1000 ABM launchers; (2) a freeze on long range missiles, including ICBMs and SLBMs; (3) the external configuration of missiles could not be altered; (4) mobile missiles were banned from being developed; (5) the freedom to mix nuclear components was not to be allowed; that is, if for example, a total of 1200 ICBMs and SLBMs was allowed, then no country could feel free to reach that total of 1200 with any combination of ICBMs and SLBMs it desired. Certain sublimits for ICBMs and SLBMs would be established.

In terms of the substance of this treaty, most of the elements were too demanding for that particular stage in nuclear development for both countries to accept. The ABM part of the treaty, however, was not too absolute. In fact, the range of 900 launchers was so lenient that both countries could work very comfortably within this framework. Thus the ABM part of this plan was certainly not arms control. The freeze on long range missiles was much, too much, to ask. Both countries at this particular time would have only agreed to a proposal that limited long range missile development, not put a freeze on it. The United States from the period 1965-1970 was developing the Minuteman III missile and the Soviet
Union was developing the SS-9, SS-11, and SS-13. Neither side would have foregone building these missiles. In terms of not allowing a change in the external configuration of a missile, this was an element that the Soviet Union would never have accepted because it would have disallowed the placement of SS-9 missiles in older missile silos. The ban on mobile missiles, though it certainly would have eliminated a very impressive weapon, may have been the only element, besides the ABM part of the proposal, accepted by both countries. Since neither country had an advantage in this field, neither side would have been frozen into an inferior position. The ban on freedom to mix was also a proposal that the Soviet Union would never have acceded to, particularly at that time period. Since the Soviet Union was strategically inferior to the United States, the Soviet military leaders would never have agreed to a proposal that froze their options.

These criticisms of this proposal are not intended to suggest that this was a worthless, sloppy effort. On the contrary, the Halperin proposal was very beneficial and, indeed, very comprehensive. The proposal, whether or not it was accepted by the two countries, generally delineated the United States' arms control philosophy and established a base from which to work and goals to strive for—a small but nonetheless imperative step. These were proposals, unlike earlier arms control efforts, that had specificity and thus promise.

But these comments really are meaningless considering the actual fate of the proposal in 1968. Several factors which I consider peripheral to the negotiation of arms control agreements, a minority view in 1968, were linked to the introduction of the Halperin arms control plan. That is, the Halperin plan would only be considered by both countries if the state of affairs in the geo-political and strategic environment was to their
liking. Unfortunately for the two countries and for the world, the geo-political and strategic environments in 1968 were not in an acceptable condition to warrant the consideration of the Halperin plan. Linkage in this case made all the difference in the world; the Halperin arms control plan was never to be heard of again.

The situations that were linked to the Halperin plan in 1968 were:

--The Soviet Union was not willing to enter into negotiations unless it possessed parity in terms of ICBMs with the United States. ICBM parity was achieved by the Soviet Union in 1969.17

--The Soviet Union's military bureaucracy had not yet in 1968 determined how the Soviet Union would fare under a plan that limited ABM development.18

--The two countries would not consider the Halperin proposal because of the friction caused by the Middle East war in 1967.19

--The United States would not enter into negotiations with the Soviet Union because of the Soviets' invasion of Czechoslovakia August 20, 1968.20

Thus, 22 years had passed since the Baruch plan had sparked an ephemeral optimism in the world community. And, indeed, ephemeral optimism turned out to be the only consistent, positive element that characterized arms control during these disappointing years. The United States and the Soviet Union were simply not ready to commit themselves to an arms control agreement. Suspicions were too great; apathy was too easy a crutch to lean on.

But it must also be mentioned that certain other strategic conditions existed that made the conclusion of any arms control agreement impossible.

17 Senior Specialists Division, Library of Congress, op. cit., p. 444.
18 Ibid.
19 Ibid.
20 Ibid.
National technical means of verification had not yet been developed, a fact which made any arms control proposal, whatever the intention of that proposal, a wish, a hope, not a practicable blueprint for action. Also, and this certainly is a legitimate caveat on the part of the Soviet Union, the Soviet military bureaucracy would not genuinely consider any arms control plan until parity, particularly ICBM parity, had been achieved. The Soviets were very concerned that any agreement would, in effect, be a codification of the Soviet Union's strategic inferiority. Finally, linkage was an integral part of both the Soviet Union's and the United States' strategic philosophy. No agreement was to be signed unless certain other conditions were satisfied.

Consequently, these ideological differences and strategic caveats combined to create a very sterile arms control environment from 1946-1969. The dawn of the 1970s, however, ushered in a new set of circumstances that dissolved, or at least should have dissolved, the many problems that hitherto had strangled arms control proposals. National technical means of verification became viable, the Soviet Union achieved ICBM parity with the United States, and the lethality of strategic weapons had increased to such a degree that linkage should have become unimportant. The very survival of the world was now at stake, a situation that dwarfed ideological differences.

From 1946 through 1969, no legacy had been left to the modern arms control negotiators that would help guide them through the perilous jungle that characterizes arms control negotiations. The post-1969 arms control venture was an unfamiliar, tense journey--a journey, however, that had to be made. That journey, so named in 1968 the Strategic Arms Limitations Talks (SALT) by Robert Martin of the State Department's Bureau of Political Military Affairs, was the ray of light for the world. SALT, hopefully, was going to be a sane break on the insane, runaway nuclear arms development machine.
III. CHARGE! THE NIXON BRIGADE IS COMING

The Nixon Administration had come to the White House riding on white
horses. This administration if not in words then in actions had design-
nated itself the foreign policy administration. Domestic affairs would be
handled by the bureaucrats, even by liberal bureaucrats such as HEW head
Caspar Wineberger; but foreign policy was turf to be monopolized by the
White House. Heavily influenced by Henry Kissinger, Nixon's right-hand
man in foreign policy, and certainly an individual who garnered great
respect, the administration firmly believed that bureaucratic politics was
too petty to be involved with foreign policy. Kissinger in his book A World
Restored commented that "the spirit of policy and that of bureaucracy are
dramatically opposed... It is dangerous to separate planning from the
responsibility for execution."21 In effect, this philosophy was in no
uncertain terms telling, at least in theory, the State Department, ACDA,
Pentagon, and the CIA that any arms control action was to be formulated,
negotiated, and consummated by the White House. These groups could help
out, certainly, but it was not to be mistaken who was the leader and who
were the followers.

Since SALT was the major foreign policy item on the White House's
agenda, it received the greatest attention. No longer were arms control
proposals going to be tossed about the military bureaucracy. SALT was

21Henry A. Kissinger, A World Restored (New York: Grosset and Dunlap,
p. 44.
not going to be the victim of bureaucratic imperialism.\textsuperscript{22}

The United States' interagency SALT apparatus certainly reflected this anathema for bureaucratic disorganization. The National Security Council, an executive agency, was the body primarily responsible for communicating United States' arms control policy to American citizens and to the world. Underneath the NSC there were six expert groups on arms control that fed the necessary information to the NSC. Such groups as the Verification Panel, the Under Secretaries Committee, and the SALT Backstopping Committee were indispensable to the NSC because there was such a voluminous amount of information that no one group could possibly collect and coordinate all of this vitally important data.

This tight-knit SALT structure, of course, did not totally eliminate the input from the military bureaucracy. For example, on the Verification Panel, a group that in reality considered many more things than merely verification dilemmas, sat the Assistant to the President for National Security, the Deputy Secretary of State, the director of ACDA, the director of the CIA, and the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. These individuals, who represented certain groups in the military bureaucracy, could make appropriate suggestions but could not dominate the process. Their power was diluted by the Assistant to the President for National Security, Henry Kissinger.

A structure such as this certainly was necessary for the United States if, indeed, it was going to realize some sort of success in arms control negotiations. The amorphous apparatus that had existed up through 1968 was

simply not adequate to render a comprehensive, coordinated arms policy. Though the Halperin proposal was a relatively good proposal, it still was a patchwork product inspired primarily by one individual.

The new SALT apparatus reversed this patchwork trend. A relatively consistent arms policy was now a possible achievement for the United States. Again, however, we must not lose our perspective. This change in the arms control making structure did not eliminate its multitiered trademark, most likely a disappointment to the Nixon Administration. The military bureaucracy and the Congress would still play a vital role in the formulation of arms policy. As a result, the Nixon Administration and other subsequent administrations would still have to fight the two-front battle. But there is no question that the fight with the military bureaucracy was mitigated because of the new SALT structure. Therefore, the structural realignment was one of degree and not one of kind. And, indeed, this was sufficient. A newly found consistency was developed and the pluralism that characterizes a democracy was also maintained.

Thus the Nixon Administration in late 1969 was ready for the SALT process to commence. Fully realizing that as each day slipped by more nuclear weapons had been developed, the administration reasoned that any further delay would simply complicate matters for the two countries. But was the Soviet Union ready? Did it feel that it was imperative to start SALT as soon as possible?

The Soviet Union, it first must be reiterated, was still pursuing what the United States considered a very frustrating non-sequitur; that is, peaceful coexistence was coupled with a massive strategic buildup. The Soviets were still striving to realize that very egocentric dream: communist domination of the world. But whatever the logic or illogic of this
double-track philosophy the Soviet Union was, indeed, prepared to enter into SALT negotiations. In fact, even before Nixon was sworn into office, the Soviets had intimated that they might be interested in arms talks. This fact demonstrates perfectly the Soviet Union's double-track foreign policy. Only in 1968 had the Soviet Union rejected an invitation to discuss the Halperin proposal. But yet only a short time after this they once again expressed interest in arms talks. This latter interest, ephemeral though it could have been, thrust the Soviet Union into the SALT picture with the United States.

SALT was thus on its way. First, however (and it seems there is always a caveat of caveats that burden arms control negotiations), there had to be an agreement on the objectives that were being sought after. The basic objectives agreed to consisted of the following:

--Both countries wanted to maintain a stable strategic deterrent through limitations on both offensive and defensive weapons.\(^{23}\)

--Both countries accepted the principal of parity as the desired strategic relationship.\(^{24}\)

--It was agreed that every measure should be taken to eliminate the risk of nuclear war that might manifest itself because of an accident.\(^{25}\)

After these objectives were agreed to, the negotiating teams for both countries descended on Geneva, one of two cities (the other being Vienna) that was chosen by both the Soviet Union and the United States. The United States' chief negotiator was Gerard Smith who was also head of the ACDA. The Soviet delegation was led by the experienced, cautious Vladimir Semenov.


\(^{24}\) Ibid.

\(^{25}\) Ibid.
This first meeting was basically a "getting to know you" affair and as a result, nothing substantive was accomplished. However, the Soviet Union, never one to forego an opportunity to voice its grievances against the United States, brought up a couple of issues. First of all, the Soviets expressed their intense dislike of heavy ABM deployment. Since the United States possessed a distinct advantage in ABM deployment, this was a logical move on the Soviet Union's part. Secondly, the Soviet Union made it clear that it wanted United States' forward based systems (FBS) included in any ceilings that were established. These two issues would become very important in subsequent SALT I negotiations.

The next round of SALT I commenced April 16, 1970 in Vienna and lasted a total of 120 days. Perhaps the key issue that was discussed during these frustrating, intense 120 days was what to do about MIRVs. The Soviet Union, not wavering one bit from its position concerning onsite inspection, made it very clear from the outset that it would not allow United States inspectors to examine MIRV compliance. Again, the Soviet Union was concerned, nay paranoid, that Americans would seek to uncover Soviet targeting strategy. In addition, the Soviets did not find the prospect of parading many of their inferior systems vis-a-vis the United States in front of the world a very pleasing one. These reasons, though they certainly are relevant in explaining much of the Soviet Union's behavior concerning onsite inspection, probably in this case assumed the role of camouflaging the Soviet Union's actual feelings about MIRVed missiles. As a matter of fact, the Soviet Union did not want to accept any limitations on MIRVed missiles because an acceptance would be equivalent to legalizing the Soviet Union's MIRV inferiority. The Soviets wanted to have the field of MIRV development open to them in order that they could achieve at least parity, most likely
superiority, in this area vis-a-vis the United States. MIRVed technology is a must if a country is thinking about first strike capability; the Soviet Union was definitely thinking. . . .

The problem with MIRVs is really a classic dilemma that has plagued the SALT process. The problem is this: the United States because it possesses technological superiority over the Soviet Union normally develops nuclear systems before the Soviets; therefore, a quantitative and qualitative edge immediately manifests itself in favor of the United States. The Soviet Union within a relatively short period of time then mirrors the United States' development and often exceeds the United States in quantitative terms. What has each side gained by maneuvering in such ways? In reality, nothing is gained. However, a great deal has been forsaken. Both sides by acting then reacting have for all practical purposes given up the chance to control new, more lethal weapons systems. As in the MIRV case, once the United States has established superiority in some nuclear arms area the Soviet Union will not accept limitations on the area until parity has been achieved.

The solution to this maddening problem is to place limits on the technology as soon as it is developed. This primarily is a responsibility that must be borne by the United States. For example, when the United States developed the MIRV in 1968 and the Soviet Union followed with its SS-9 triplet, the United States government should have immediately contacted the Soviet government to discuss MIRV limitations. Since no real advantages had been gained, the Soviets may have been receptive, probably not to a ban on development, but to some limitations, limitations that would have placed a break on frantic MIRV deployment. Some people counter that the Soviet Union would never have accepted such limitations and,
therefore, it would have been a waste of time to propose any such thing. I say we cannot make such unwarranted assumptions and that anything possible must be tried to stop any weapons development. Success in any endeavor is only achieved if an effort is made to grasp that success. This must be the philosophy that guides arms control; if not, if we assume the attitude that the Soviet Union will not listen, then we are committing ourselves to a losing battle.

ABMs were also discussed during this second round of SALT I. The United States' negotiating team was instructed to pursue the possibility of an agreement that would establish an ABM national command authority (NCA) at each country's capital. NCA would have been the entire allocation of ABMs that each country could have had. That is, for example, the United States would have had to dismantle their ABM installations at Grand Forks, North Dakota and Malmstrom Air Force Base outside of Great Falls, Montana if the proposal were accepted by the Soviet Union.

The proposal was accepted by the Soviet Union. And, indeed, the Soviets had a very good reason for accepting this proposal so readily. Their NCA would have not only protected Moscow but also 300 ICBMs located within the effective radius of the system. This fact becomes significant when it is coupled with the realization that the United States' NCA would have given minimal protection to Washington, D. C. and an insignificant parcel of the Atlantic Ocean. In addition, the funds to build the NCA were not guaranteed. The Congress, maintaining an earlier enmity against ABMs in general, was not at all interested in spending money on any ABM system let alone one that possessed dubious capabilities. Henry Kissinger,

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27 Ibid.
fully cognizant of the doubts that dominated the Congress, attempted to sell the ABM system by arguing that this system would offer defense against the Soviet SS-9 ICBM. The arguments barely dented the impregnable anti-ABM mentality.

Thus the United States seemed to be stuck between the Scylla and Charybdis. When the second round of SALT I adjourned on August 14, 1970, the United States was still holding that NCA debacle in its hands. The Soviet Union was doing the same but only relishing the gem that was thrust upon them. It was scramble time for the United States' negotiating team, and, indeed, much scrambling was done during the third round of SALT I to rectify the NCA blunder.

Historically, ABMs have always given the United States trouble. From the period of 1965 through 1968, there raged an argument, as was mentioned earlier, between the State Department-ACDA coalition and the military services concerning the building of ABM systems. The Department of Defense, represented by Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara, advocated the building of a thin population ABM defense to protect ostensibly the country against a Chinese attack.

The system that finally won out was the anti-Chinese Sentinel system. However, this system was not free of trouble. The major problem was that the Soviet Union would find it very hard to distinguish between an anti-Chinese system and an anti-Russian system.28 This dilemma has an appropriate contemporary analogue. The Soviet Union has said that it does not at all intend to use the Backfire bomber intercontinentally, only on missions, for example, to China. Do we in the United States accept this statement? Hardly. Likewise, the Soviet Union found it very difficult to accept that

28Ibid., pp. 81-82.
the Sentinel system would only be used against the Chinese. Though McNamara was very adamant in his view that the United States should not build an anti-Russian system because such a move would only heighten the tension between the two countries, he seemed to be impervious to the problems that faced the Soviet Union with the building of the Sentinel system. This was a major mistake on McNamara's part. As long as the Soviets perceived that the anti-Chinese system posed a possible threat, whether it was a correct perception or not, that was enough for them to respond by either increasing their ABM deployment or increasing their heavy ICBM deployment. Soviet perceptions should have been the factor that McNamara observed. Instead, McNamara chose to insulate himself inside the cocoon of American rationale that adamantly maintained the system was anti-Chinese and not anti-Russian. Rose-colored glasses were certainly in vogue in Washington, D. C. during this period.

Public opinion was not dormant during ABM debate. However, the public did not really assert itself until 1969, the year the Nixon Administration came to office. Immediately, Nixon felt the pressure of the public's voice, a voice that certainly did not resound with encomia for the Sentinel system. And this displeasure with the Sentinel ABM system was certainly justified. After all, the system was a population defense system, not an ICBM defense system, which meant that the ABM missiles and radars would be located around certain cities. The thought of bringing a nuclear way closer than it had to be was not the public's idea of defense.

Therefore, because of the public's opinion, Nixon ordered production of the Sentinel system to be terminated. In its place, Nixon proposed the Safeguard system, an ABM defense complex that was designed to protect not cities but Minuteman missile sites. The system was to consist of two types
of radars, perimeter acquisition radar and missile site radar. The former radar was designed to track ICBMs up to 1500 miles, and the latter radar was designed to track ICBMs closer than 1500 miles. In addition, the Safeguard system utilized two ABM missiles. The first missile, known as the Spartan, was a 55-foot long, three stage missile designed for large areas. The final stage of the missile yielded a four-megaton nuclear device. The second missile, the Sprint, was 27 feet long and was designed to be effective against specific places.

All of these facts and figures make the Safeguard system sound like an impregnable installation. Indeed, the third stage warhead of the Spartan missile exceeded the megatonnage of the Minuteman I and II missiles put together. But these figures are very deceiving and they could not alter the undeniable fact that the Safeguard system as a whole possessed one-tenth the blast resistance of the ICBM missiles they were supposed to protect.29

In other words, that which was designated to be protected (ICBMs) was more capable of resisting an SS-11 assault than the so-called designated protector (Safeguard system)! This being the case, a hardening of missile sites would have been much more efficacious than building a new system.30

But this information did not sink home adequately enough to stop the building of the Safeguard system. On August 6, 1969, the Congress by one vote approved the Safeguard bill. However, there is no question that the future of ABM systems in the United States was very tenuous. Therefore, it was incumbent for the SALT negotiators to propose an ABM limit to the Soviet Union and further to get that limit into the treaty in order to avoid a situation in which the sky was the limit for ABM development, a

29Ibid., p. 156.

30Ibid., p. 155.
situation the Soviet Union could have taken full advantage of while the United States most likely could have not. This nervous attempt to get some sort of ABM limitation, any limitation, produced the NCA blunder.

The third round of SALT I turned out to be a tremendous disappointment for the United States. The Soviet Union, not changing its basic philosophy, insisted, once again, that the United States include its FBS in the treaty. The United States refused to even consider this proposal. Without blinking, the Soviets then proposed that offensive weapons not even be included in the treaty. There was, however, one item that both sides agreed to. Amidst an environment that was filled with the talk of arms control and the benefits that both countries would receive from arms control, the Soviet Union and the United States agreed that both sides should be allowed to deploy mobile, land-based ICBMs. This round convened on December 18, 1970, just 46 days after the United States had hoped this round would render some final commitments on the part of the Soviet Union. The rose-colored glasses, after round three, began to lose their tint.

Round four of SALT I in Vienna that began March 16, 1971 still dripped with the pessimism that was engendered in round three. The United States opened up this round by offering, as an alternative to NCA, a plan that would have granted the United States four ABM systems to the Soviet Union's one. Obviously, this was merely a plan that was designed to put the ABM discussion in a holding pattern until the United States could figure out an alternative to NCA. However, there was ground gained in terms of limiting offensive nuclear weapons. The Soviet Union seemed to be impressed with the proposal that would given them a 1.6 to 1 advantage in ICBMs. In fact they were so impressed that they agreed to turn over the FBS bone of contention to a forum that would be attended by Warsaw Pact and NATO nations.
Also in the dying moments of round four the Soviet Union conceded (a word which really is in their vocabulary) NCA for an equality of ABMs.

In addition both sides agreed to discuss limitations on both offensive and defensive weapons. Though both sides were very reserved in commenting about this new direction in the talks, it was clear that this was one of the most significant breakthroughs in SALT I. It was particularly important for the United States; the Soviet Union had been building up both its ICBM and SLBM forces. In fact the Soviet Union was at this time quantitatively ahead in ICBMs and was closing the gap in terms of SLBMs. Indeed, the Soviet Union was building nuclear submarines at the rate of eight per year, a rate which would have given the Soviet Union twice the number of SLBMs vis-a-vis the United States in a mere five years. Therefore, a limitation on offensive nuclear weapons was a sine qua non for American negotiators.

Round five of SALT I, basking in the success that seemed to now characterize the talks, saw the United States and the Soviet Union modernize the Hotline Agreement originally signed in 1963 and agree to a set of measures that would decrease the risk of an accidental outbreak of nuclear war. No other matters of significance were resolved during this round which ended September 24, 1971.

The time was creeping up on the negotiators when the substantive matters had to be taken care of. Both sides had offered many ABM options but none seemed to be acceptable. The United States alone had offered three proposals: NCA, aero ABMs for both sides, and a 4-1 United States ABM advantage. The Soviet Union, on the other hand, protecting its expanding SLBM and ICBM forces, was not receptive at all to freezes on these intercontinental missiles. In fact, the Soviets resurrected in round five the FBS issue, a direct contradiction to their promise in round four, in response
to the United States' desire to place a freeze on SLBM development. Thus these issues were volleyed back and forth, a process that manifested many different proposals, none acceptable.

Hence there was one thing that could be counted on—disappointment. This type of environment immediately scuttled the euphoria that had persisted at the end of round four and through round five. The French have a saying, _le plus ça change, le plus c'est la même chose_. This statement adequately characterized the progress on the substantive issues. No doubt there had been some successes, but the final step seemed to be a very difficult one for both countries, a state of affairs that both realized could not persist. This realization began to break some of what seemed to be the perpetual ice in round six of SALT I. November 15, 1971 was thus the beginning of the day of reckoning, a reckoning that would not only affect the American and Soviet citizen, but every citizen who inhabited the transformed earth, a transformation compliments of the scientific revolution.

In round six, the Soviet Union agreed to limit SS-9 production. As is commonly the case, the Soviets did not offer this proposed reduction gratis. For their reduction, the Soviet Union expected that the hard-liners in the United States would temper their position. The hard-liners responded favorably, at least for a time. In terms of the ABM disagreement, it was proposed by the Soviet Union that there be a limit of 200 ABMs, 100 located near the capital of each country and the remaining 100 located at an ICBM site. The United States countered with the same numbers, 2-2 arrangement. But both of the United States' installations would protect ICBM fields, Grand Forks and Malmstrom Air Force Base, while the Soviet Union would have to be satisfied with one installation at Moscow and the other at an ICBM site. The Soviet Union summarily rejected the United States' proposal
because it would have allowed the United States to protect twice as many ICBMs. But the United States was not finished proposing. If the Soviet Union accepted a limit of SLBMs, then the United States would accept the Soviets' 2-2 arrangement. Chewing on this offer, the Soviets kept their feelings to themselves as the sixth round ended February 4, 1972. It appeared, however, that something would break as the seventh round commenced March 28, 1972, in Helsinki, the final round as it turned out.

The break that everyone had hoped for did, indeed, manifest itself in the seventh round. However, the venture for this momentous occasion was not Helsinki, but rather Moscow. President Nixon had travelled to Moscow with hopes of personally resolving the outstanding issues. He certainly was buoyed by the words of Kissinger who told Nixon before he departed for the summer: "If the summit meeting takes place, you will be able to sign the most important arms control agreement ever concluded."31 Kissinger's optimism was based on the secret negotiations he had had with Soviet leader Brezhnev in April of 1972.

At first, things were rather cool between the two leaders, a result of the United States' bombing of Hanoi and Haiphong. However, the imperative nature of the occasion seemed to abate this animosity, certainly a good omen.

The United States hoped to resolve two issues besides the SLBM problem. Namely, the United States wanted to get a firm commitment on ABM radars and ICBM mobile missiles. In terms of the missiles, the two sides had agreed in round three to permit deployment of mobile missiles, but the United States had altered its course after that agreement. The Soviets, however, had not

altered their course; they remained very adamant. Therefore, the United States unilaterally stated that it would not deploy mobile missiles, and that it expected the Soviet Union to follow suit. But if the Soviet Union found it expedient to deploy mobile missiles, then the United States would find it expedient to abrogate SALT I. Nixon was also concerned with ABM radars such as perimeter acquisition radar and missile site radar. The two sides readily resolved this issue, however, by agreeing that an ICBM field could have a maximum of two heavy and 18 light radars and that six modern ABM radar establishments could operate 90 miles from the capitals of each country.

This latter agreement set the stage for the discussion that both the United States and the Soviet Union felt had to bear fruit if the SALT I treaty was to be signed. This pressure-packed discussion, of course, centered on the ABM-SLBM tug-of-war. Actually, however, one-half of this dilemma was being resolved in Helsinki where the SALT negotiators for both countries continued to work. The two sides had finally come to an agreement that would allow the countries to have 200 ABMs each, 100 located at an ICBM and the other 100 near the capitals of the two countries. This agreement was reflected in the ABM radars agreement resolved in Moscow. Now it was just the SLBM barrier, granted a very substantial barrier, that stood between the United States and the Soviet Union. The odds for an agreement, however, looked good since the United States had accepted the Soviet Union's ABM proposal.

Indeed, this turned out to be the case. After much offering and counter-offering, the Soviet Union agreed to accept a limit of 950 SLBMs to the United States' 710. But there was a caveat on the Soviet Union's 950. If the Soviet Union exceeded the figure of 740 SLBMs, then they
would have to dismantle an equal number of SS-7s, SS-8s, or H-class submarines.

The final agreement signed May 26, 1972 in St. Catherine's Hall in Moscow thus looked something like this:

**ABM Treaty**

*32*  

**May 1972**

1. Treaty of unlimited duration;

2. Required ratification by two-thirds of U.S. Senate, but U.S. and USSR pledged immediate adherence to terms;

3. U.S. and USSR limited to two ABM complexes, one for national command centers of Moscow and Washington, and second for one field of ICBMs. Each site to consist of 100 ABMs, with a total of 200 for each country. U.S. ICBM protection site at Grand Forks, North Dakota, Soviet's at unidentified site at least 800 miles from Moscow.*

**Offensive Strategic Weapons Agreement**

*32*  

**May 1972**


2. Executive agreement (requiring majority approval by Congress).

3. Limited all ICBMs to those under construction or deployed at time agreement signed:  
   (a) USSR - 1,618 including only 313 SS-9s;  
   (b) U.S. - 1,054 including 1,000 Minuteman and 54 Titan missiles;  

4. Froze SLBM construction at 1972 levels:  
   (a) U.S. - 710 SLBMs on 44 nuclear-powered submarines;  
   (b) USSR - 950 SLBMs on 62 submarines;  

5. Further construction could be undertaken only if an equal number of older ICBMs or SLBMs were dismantled.

*Subsequently amended to one site each.

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IV. OF LINKS AND CHIPS

It is very easy to get caught up in the figures and other details of SALT I to such an extent that one neglects to look at the major stimuli that produced these figures and details. These stimuli are really the key to an understanding of not only SALT I but also Vladivostok, and SALT II. There are two very important stimuli that were extant during SALT I: the concept of the bargaining chip, and the principle of linkage.

The bargaining chip is a tool that has been used almost exclusively by the United States to get the Soviet Union to make deals. The United States has monopolized this technique mainly because of the technological advantage that it has enjoyed over the Soviet Union during most of the SALT negotiations.

The bargaining chip works something like this: if the Soviet Union remains adamant on a particular item that the United States would like to see resolved, the United States negotiators will relay to the Soviet negotiators that the United States will develop that advanced system, it matters not whether it is an advanced ICBM, SLBM, or bomber. Obviously, the intent of the bargaining chip, then, is to give the Soviet Union only one option—the option of dissolving their adamance and accepting the United States' position. It also becomes obvious why the Soviet Union had not exploited the bargaining chip to its fullest advantage: they simply have not had any distinct advantage over the United States in any strategic area to make the bargaining chip a viable negotiating tool.
In SALT I, the Nixon Administration felt it was totally advantageous to utilize the bargaining chip. In January of 1969 the first opportunity to use the bargaining chip presented itself and the Nixon Administration did not forego the chance. The administration immediately told the Soviet Union that the United States was testing a MIRV missile for Minuteman III ICBMs. This bargaining chip was not aimed at gaining anything specific from the Soviet Union, but was used to send a message to the Soviets that if the negotiations did not go well then all-out MIRV deployment would be for certain. Also Secretary of Defense Laird in January of 1969 supported the Safeguard ABM system for bargaining chip reasons. In March of 1970, during the second round of SALT I, Secretary Laird announced that the United States would deploy the Minuteman III ICBM. President Nixon in February of 1971 told the Soviets that if they continued to deploy the SS-9 the United States would reciprocate by developing the B-1 bomber and the Trident nuclear submarine.

The bargaining chip was thus used a great deal by the United States during SALT I; however, the results of this usage were not that significant. Though the Safeguard ABM system was successful in scaring the Soviet Union into negotiating limits on ABMs, the other attempts were failures. As a matter of fact, the bargaining chips changed from an instrument of peace to an instrument of war. For example, the MIRV bargaining chip simply solidified the Soviet Union's intention to develop its own MIRV.

The Soviet Union also agreed to limit SS-9 production, and it is questionable whether the B-1-Trident bargaining chip was the stimulus for this agreement, but it did not agree to limit SS-11 development. In other words, the Soviet Union compensated for the 313 SS-9 limit with the development of a new ICBM, the SS-11.
Consequently, the bargaining chip was not that effective a negotiating device against the Soviet Union. The device may have been effective in other strategic contacts but not in the SALT context. The normal Soviet reaction was and is to deploy the very weapon that the United States had used as the bargaining chip. It seems, therefore, that the United States is one step too late in attempting to receive concessions from the Soviet Union. That is, the United States should offer to place a ban on or limit a particular weapon system before it has been developed. I mentioned earlier this should have been the case with the MIRV system. It is much easier to get meaningful agreements on weapons systems when both sides have not yet developed them. The problem of getting frozen into a strategically inferior position, the main reason for the Soviet Union's rejection of a MIRV limit, simply does not arise if the negotiation before development technique is utilized. The military lobby, however, makes it very difficult to place a limit on the development of advanced strategic weapons.

The other stimulus, probably the most important in SALT I and throughout the entire SALT process, is linkage. No major agreement within the context of the treaty itself was reached without there being linkage involved. And, indeed, the very raison d'être for SALT was intricately involved with linkage.

There really is nothing very mysterious about this principle. The Webster Encyclopedia of Dictionaries defines linkage to mean to be coupled, and this is exactly what it means in the strategic sense. One item of negotiation is coupled with another item of negotiation. The Soviet Union, at least in terms of the component parts of the treaty itself, bases its whole negotiating philosophy on linkage. One item is never considered by itself; it is always coupled with another item. Thus the
United States could not avoid being involved with linkage. And as the SALT process matured, the Americans became very proficient at utilizing this very important principle.

Basically, there are two types of linkages that have manifested themselves in the SALT process. The first type of linkage refers to weapons. The second type of linkage refers to behavior outside of the SALT context.

The most obvious example of weapons linkage in SALT I was the overall ceilings for ICBMs and SLBMs. It can be readily ascertained that the Soviet Union was given a numerical advantage in both ICBMs and SLBMs. What was the reason for this? Simply, since the United States had advantages in terms of MIRVs, bombers, and forward-based systems the Soviet Union demanded numerical compensation in ICBMs and SLBMs. The United States' advantage was linked to the Soviet Union's disadvantage. The linkage was attempting to compensate the Soviet Union for the United States' lead in technological resources. Parity was not fully achieved, but the result was closer than had been the case before the process began. The United States' clear advantage in MIRV technology still maintained American superiority. There was no question about that, at least in this writer's mind.

Senator Henry Jackson, however, had doubts about the numerical advantages. In fact, his doubts were so great that he formulated an amendment that eventually passed that called for any future SALT treaty not to allow the United States to accept levels of strategic inferiority. The assumption by Jackson is obvious; that is, numerical inferiority is equivalent to overall strategic inferiority. This, however, is not the case. As has already been mentioned, the United States still possessed nuclear superiority vis-a-vis the Soviet Union after the signing of SALT I.
In effect, the Jackson Amendment places great burdens upon United States SALT negotiators. To get an agreement that is equivalent numerically in all aspects is a next-to-impossible task. For example, in SALT II the negotiators did achieve overall numerical equality in terms of ICBMs, SLBMs and bombers, but did not achieve equality in terms of throw-weight--the Soviet Union maintained an advantage over the United States. Senator Jackson thought this was a serious flaw in the treaty because it was counter to his amendment and recommended that, inter alia, this throw-weight discrepancy be corrected. The negotiators had two options to work with if they were to renegotiate this item: first get the Soviet Union to agree to allow the United States to build 308 heavy missiles, the limit placed on Soviet heavies; secondly, reduce the number of Soviet heavies from 308 to 150. The first option is not really an option because it is counter to United States' strategic policy: the United States does not consider heavy missiles to be that important to its overall capability. The second option is also not practicable because the Soviet Union would never have accepted a reduction in their major nuclear component, SS-18 heavy missiles. Realistically, therefore, this demand by Jackson could never be fulfilled in the SALT II context. Hence, you either go without a SALT II treaty or accept the treaty with the throw-weight discrepancy. Since the throw-weight difference did not give the Soviet Union a superior advantage, the latter option is much more favorable.

The SLBM-ABM linkage, of course, was also very significant. If there had not existed an opportunity to balance the SLBM limits with the ABM limits, the treaty may never have been signed.

The Soviet Union also attempted to link just about everything with the United States' FBS. These F-111Es and F-4s located in various areas
in Europe and the A-4s and A-6s based on carriers of the sixth and second fleets posed what the Soviet Union considered to be a great threat to their country. Though the FBS issue was later dropped from the SALT context, it presented many crucial moments during the period when it was a contentious issue.

The discontinued building of the SS-9 was also wrought out of the principle of linkage. The Soviet Union, wanting to abate the hard-line mentality in the United States so very well represented by Henry Jackson, believed that it was in their ultimate interest to limit their SS-9 production. Therefore, the limitation on SS-9 development was linked to a reduction of the abrasive attitude toward the Soviet Union extant in the United States. Further, the SS-9 limitation was linked to the later Soviet deployment of the SS-11, and further up the road the SS-19. That is, the Soviet Union linked their SS-9 limitation to the go-ahead with these other ICBM programs--a linkage that the United States felt violated the spirit of SALT. The Soviets were not fazed by the complaint.

A weapons linkage that was made before the SALT process had begun, but nevertheless was a very significant coupling that was to be later dealt with in SALT I, was the building by the United States of the MIRV system and the ABM system. During the mid-1960s United States intelligence had detected the Soviet Union building the Galogh ABM system and the Tallinn long range air defense system. Since the United States had not developed its ABM system, this news was rather distressing. Therefore, the United States developed its ABM system, the Sentinel, and also developed its MIRV system which had the potential of rendering the Soviets' ABM system ineffectual. Hence the rationale for building a MIRV system and an ABM system was based on a linkage with the Soviet Union's ABM deployments.
Finally, and certainly not the least important, was the linkage of defensive weapons to offensive weapons in SALT I. The New York Times had doubts about this linkage. It commented: "It would be self-defeating to endanger a possible ABM agreement by insisting that offensive weapons limitations must be linked to it." The Nixon Administration, however, did not heed these words and persisted to get an agreement on offensive weapons. And, indeed, this persistence paid off very handsomely.

The pattern then is very consistent. Linkage played a major part in every major arms agreement contained in SALT I. If used wisely, linkage can be a very important tool for negotiations in order to achieve meaningful limits. If, however, the principle is used in the manner similar to a bargaining chip, then its effectiveness is limited.

This certainly implies that there is a difference between a bargaining chip approach and the principle of linkage. A bargaining chip is normally used as an ultimatum and thus is a power move; true linkage, on the contrary, does not present ultimatums and thus is a diplomatic move. The bargaining chip approach, historically, has fueled the arms race; linkage, historically, has served to enhance sanity in the negotiations. A bargaining chip is often merely a disguise for a program the military desires; linkage, in its truest sense, dissembles nothing. It is the result of a genuine attempt to resolve seemingly unsolvable dilemmas.

Thus linkage misused is certainly synonymous with the bargaining chip approach as in the MIRV case. Linkage, however, in its truest sense, as used in the SLBM-ABM coupling, has nothing in common with the bargaining chip approach.

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chip approach. As is commonly the case, an art is distinct from an activity that requires mere brute strength.

In its second sense, linkage was engendered out of a philosophy that maintained SALT I could not be considered in a vacuum. Those who subscribed to this feeling believed that SALT I should not only enhance the strategic environment but the entire environment that encompassed United States-Soviet relations. In other words, it was concluded that SALT I should be linked to an overall improvement of the superpower relationship. SALT I, it was believed, should enhance diplomatic, economic, and scientific cooperation between the two countries. In essence, therefore, SALT I was not to be merely a strategic arms limitations treaty. On the contrary, SALT I was to be the major stimulus that launched the Soviet Union and the United States into diplomatic seventh heaven.

Henry Kissinger, at least, believed that was the way SALT I should be utilized. Commenting before the Boston World Affairs Council in March of 1976, Kissinger stressed:

... we have sought with the Soviet Union to push back the shadow of nuclear catastrophe--by settling concrete problems such as Berlin so as to ease confrontations and negotiating on limitation of strategic arms so as to slow the arms race. And we have held out the prospect of cooperative relations in the economic and other fields if political conditions permit their implementation and further development.34

This positive linkage, as Stanley R. Sloan, a specialist in European affairs for the Congressional Research Service of the Library of Congress, has described Kissinger's approach, thus guided the Nixon Administration through the SALT negotiations and, indeed, guided the administration in

dealing with the Soviet Union outside of the SALT context. The message positive linkage imparted was saturated with a step-lightly philosophy. If the Soviet Union happened to create minor geo-political disturbances, then positive linkage dictated that the United States not over-react to these maneuvers. Thus it was the case with Cuban troops in Angola. It was believed that there had been built a significant bridge between the superpowers through positive linkage and that American interests and world interests would only suffer if this bridge were destroyed by bickering over Angola. Hence the United States bit its lip for the sake of positive linkage. But was it worth it?

It seems apparent that it was not worth it. Positive linkage for all of its theoretical advantages simply did not fare well when confronted with reality. The Soviet Union developed the idea that the United States, because it had done nothing substantive in the series of African moves, was no longer pursuing an aggressive containment policy. Positive linkage and the Vietnam psychosis served to buttress this Soviet belief. In reality, therefore, American foreign policy did not begin to atrophy when President Carter assumed office; it began to atrophy when positive linkage became important to the United States.

What, then, was the answer if not positive linkage? Certainly not more linkage is the first thing that must be concluded. Kissinger should have dealt with the strategic problems separately from any other considerations. SALT was much too important to be entangled with these other matters. But that is exactly what happened. As soon as the leaders in the United States realized that the Soviet Union viewed positive linkage in a different manner, these statesmen began to reconsider the validity of SALT I.
This was a fundamental mistake. Certainly the trend of non-strategic American foreign policy vis-a-vis the Soviet Union and the world should have been reanalyzed. The Vietnam experience seemed to tell everyone that America should assume a relatively isolationist foreign policy, what some individuals would pejoratively call an appeasement policy. But was this really the message of Vietnam? It certainly was not. Vietnam should have imparted this message: The United States was no longer capable of policing the entire globe in an attempt to contain communism. American strength had dissipated because of the multipolarity that characterized the new geo-political order. Former colonies had rid themselves of the shackles of colonialism and had burst on the geo-political stage as new powers to be contended with. Thus because of this new environment United States foreign policy had to be more selective. The foreign policy had to distinguish between those communist moves that did not threaten world security and those that did threaten world security. Indeed, a very fine nuance, but a nuance nevertheless that had to be distinguished.

Basically, the nuance presented itself in this manner: If a particular country had developed communism indigenously, then American foreign policy should not in any manner attempt to redirect the inevitable. If, however, a country was besieged by communism, i.e., Soviet invasion, then American foreign policy should assert itself, diplomatically at first, militarily if the aggression advanced according to the domino theory. If a situation combined these two elements, indigenous elements and Soviet or proxy troop elements, then this situation should be monitored very closely, but no aggressive action should be taken. The Soviet Union should be asked to remove itself in order to ascertain whether the particular country was genuinely interested in communism.
This was the type of reflection that should have characterized the thought of those involved in foreign policy. The thought should not have centered on whether SALT I was valid and, indeed, whether the whole SALT process was valid. SALT I and the whole process were valid; SALT was the best hope for the superpowers and the world. However, SALT was not a panacea for non-strategic ills. It should never have been promoted as the panacea that would heal all superpower problems. The result of such unwarranted hopes is that SALT gets tossed around with every foreign policy problem. SALT, the best thing going between the Soviet Union and the United States, becomes a mere pawn for the two countries.

This, as a matter of fact, was the result of positive linkage. Americans felt betrayed that SALT I did not bring about a change in Soviet philosophy; Americans felt, therefore, that SALT I had failed its mission. SALT I, however, did not fail its mission. On the contrary, SALT I was very successful. It was, to be reiterated, non-strategic foreign policy that had failed the American people. SALT I, considered as a strategic treaty qua strategic treaty, made great strides. American non-strategic foreign policy wallowed in an environment dominated by misinterpretations of Vietnam. If the two areas had been considered separately, then the problems with American foreign policy today would not have presented themselves in such a severe manner.

Of course, this is not to say that the Soviet Union would have accepted a fairly aggressive non-strategic foreign policy. If they did not accept it and further responded by holding SALT hostage, then that is a matter they would have to rectify in their conscience. The United States would have done what it could have to enhance the strategic environment without a foolish linkage. Moreover, and most importantly, the United States would have done what was right.
The Soviet Union before, during, and after SALT I demonstrated that it too understood the principal of linkage very well. In 1969, the worst year up to that point of Sino-Soviet relations, the Soviet Union made it clear to the United States that it would not consider SALT I until a halfway respectable rapprochement was reached with China. After Ho Chi Minh's funeral in September of 1969, Alexei Kosygin, head of the Soviet government, and Chinese Premier Chou en Lai met to discuss the border questions which were causing the rift between the two communist giants. After the conclusion of this meeting, Kosygin seemed to be pleased with the results--SALT I negotiations commenced in November of 1969. During SALT I, the Soviets seemed to understand linkage so well they knew when it was not applicable. The Soviets very well could have linked United States' bombing of Haiphong and Hanoi to SALT I, but they did not. If, therefore, someone wanted to find one case in which the Soviet Union facilitated the SALT I process, they could indeed do that. The Soviet Union also demonstrated that it understood linkage very well by simply accepting the benefits of United States' positive linkage. One does not look a gift horse in the mouth--that was the philosophy of the Soviet Union after SALT I and the Soviets hoped they could keep on espousing that philosophy for a long time to come.

Salt I - Conclusions

SALT I was a treaty that faced many difficulties during its negotiation. The uncertainty and suspicion of both sides combined with the technical nature of the subject matter was a recipe for frustration and despair. However, these barriers were ultimately overcome and a responsible treaty was the product of the conquering of the first stage dilemmas.
SALT I, if it did anything, revealed that no substantial cuts in nuclear armaments could be achieved until absolute parity had been established between the two countries. The Soviet Union was not willing to forego building of its programs until that sought-after position was reached. This, therefore, explains why the limitations in SALT I were not that significant in an absolute sense.

But there still remained hope. The hope lay in the future when both sides had achieved parity, a condition that meant neither side would feel as if it were being frozen into an inferior position if a particular weapon system were eliminated from the stockpile or the drawing board. The hope thus lay in a continuation of the SALT process. After SALT I, it was up to Vladivostok to continue the progress and to further the belief that man does indeed have control over his destiny.
V. AT LONG LAST--PARITY

Six months after the signing of SALT I, both sides agreed that it was imperative to continue the SALT process. Moreover, at least from the United States' point of view, it was imperative that subsequent negotiations tend toward one thing: codification of the principle of parity. That is, the Jackson Amendment seemed to be placing pressure on the negotiators, primarily Chief negotiator U. Alexis Johnson who had succeeded Gerard Smith, not to accept anything other than equal numbers across the board. Jackson and, indeed, a large majority of the Congress, made it very clear that numbers like those in SALT I would be immediately rejected.

Jackson, however, extended his definition of parity as has been mentioned. Not only should the numbers be equal, but every strategic measure should be equal--including Soviet throw-weight. Again, this was a major task for Johnson and his negotiators because the strength of the Soviet Union's strategic capability lay in their huge ICBM force, translated into a tremendous amount of throw-weight. Thus it was next to impossible to ask Johnson to get such an agreement on this matter, at least from a realistic point of view. Therefore, with an earful from Jackson and his cohorts and with a wary eye on the Soviet Union's strategic operations, Johnson cautiously entered into SALT II negotiations with the Soviet Union--a more powerful Soviet Union.
On this negotiating level, the United States and the Soviet Union found the going very difficult. Particularly distressing was the contentious matter of MIRVs. Neither side wanted to give up any ground, both feeling that MIRVs were too essential to their strategic component. Also the Soviet Union, abrogating their promise made during SALT I to defer this matter to another forum, resurrected with full vengeance the FBS matter. Assuming the same behavior as it demonstrated in SALT I, FBS blocked almost every effort by both sides to produce substantive agreements.

Henry Kissinger was fully cognizant of the problems that were plaguing the SALT negotiators. His answer to dissolving the plethora of snags was to arrange a summit meeting between President Gerald Ford and Soviet leader Brezhnev. Reflecting on the success that had been realized in SALT I through the conduit of the summit format, Kissinger hoped that this summit to be held in the Siberian city of Vladivostok would yield similar successful results.

But certainly this was merely a hope, a dream on the part of Kissinger. Indeed, the summit was described by American officials merely as "a way of breathing new life into the Soviet-American relationship at a time of perilous uncertainty."\(^{35}\) Obviously, this was a euphemistic way of describing an event that was not expected to be anything very significant.

So much for the speculation of American officials. Vladivostok materialized into something very special indeed. The two sides agreed to accept an aggregate of 2400 for offensive nuclear weapons and a sub-ceiling of 1320 for MIRVed weapons. The importance of these Vladivostok ceilings is not to be found in the numbers themselves, but in the fact that the

Soviet Union finally accepted equal aggregates. No longer, therefore, would the Soviet Union have to be compensated for its inferiority with unequal aggregates.

That the ceilings themselves were not that significant was revealed in the fact that the Soviet Union's MIRV program would not be inhibited.\(^{36}\) In other words, the 1320 limit was far above what the Soviet Union had at that time. In terms of the 2400 limit, the Soviet Union only transgressed that ceiling by a small margin.\(^{37}\) The United States in relation to both ceilings was not at all threatened.\(^{38}\)

Thus Vladivostok may seem like a fraud. Many people would conclude that an agreement such as Vladivostok is worthless, nor worth the time put in. However, comments such as these are actually premature; they reveal the human tendency of wanting to accomplish something all at once. Certainly Vladivostok in an absolute sense was not that significant. But in a relative sense it was very significant. Relative to the earlier SALT I ceilings that were asymmetrical and relative to what would have transpired if Vladivostok had not continued the SALT process, these Vladivostok accords accomplished a great deal. Now if these same limits or higher equal limits were present 15 years after Vladivostok, then individuals would have a right to complain, nay call for the termination of the SALT process. But to complain when the two countries had just broken new ground is very hasty, and in the final analysis counter-productive.

Linkage, of course, was a ubiquitous item throughout the Vladivostok Summit. In terms of weapons linkages, there were not that many made simply because the negotiations did not get that fine. However, there was

\(^{36}\)Ibid.

\(^{37}\)Ibid.

\(^{38}\)Ibid.
one major linkage, indeed a saving linkage, that was negotiated. The Soviet Union agreed to drop its FBS paranoia if the United States would link that to dropping of its paranoia over Soviet heavy missiles; the United States agreed.

Linkage, obviously, is not something that is to be accepted on face value. It cannot be over-emphasized that linkage, like many other good principles, can be exploited to such an extent that it absolutely loses all of its advantages. The FBS-heavy missile linkage, some concluded, was a classic example of the exploitation of linkage. The Soviet Union, it was claimed, gained a tremendous advantage with the dispensing of the heavy missile issue without giving up much of anything because the Soviets had already countered FBS with intermediate range ballistic missiles (IRBMs) targeted for Europe. 39

These certainly are legitimate arguments. But the logic of these arguments fails to come to grips with the negotiating reality. Again, the Soviet Union would never have thought of giving up any of their heavy missiles. As a result, the United States may as well have linked this incorrigible item to another item that continually plagued the negotiations--FBS. Certainly the Soviet Union had promised to terminate their haggling over FBS in the past only to renege on this promise. But the FBS-heavy missile linkage was qualitatively different from the promises made in the fourth round of SALT I. The Soviet Union was aware that if it brought up FBS in the near future then the United States would stage a renaissance of the heavy missile complaints, a tangle that would have effectively halted the SALT process. It cannot be doubted that the Soviet Union wanted SALT as much as the United States did. Therefore, the linkage was essential

39Ibid., p. 141.
to keep the process going. At that particular time keeping the process going was fundamentally important because it was necessary for both sides to codify parity and feel comfortable with that situation before major reductions could be made, the ultimate goal of the whole SALT process. In addition, the United States got the Soviet Union to agree to MIRV limits. Though the limits were not earth-shattering, they established a precedent for future reductions of one of the most destabilizing of all weapons systems. Controlling MIRVs is more important than controlling heavy missiles if tradeoffs have to be made. Hence the advantages of the FBS-heavy missile linkage outweighed the disadvantages.

Throughout Vladivostok and SALT I, parity was one of the goals that the United States and the Soviet Union sought to reach. It was believed that if this goal were reached then a much safer world would be the result. But this is not a universally held belief by any means. Individuals at the time this goal was established and individuals in the 1980s simply refuse to accept parity. Instead, these individuals, many of them Americans, accept the principle of nuclear superiority. The reason why Americans assert this nuclear policy is due to the fact that America has consistently out-achieved the Soviet Union in weapons development. These individuals conclude, therefore, that the United States, if it utilized its technological capacity, could perpetually claim nuclear superiority over the Soviet Union. Of course, nuclear superiority brings along with it a superior geo-political status.

This is an old world view. The United States could not, repeat could not, establish a position of nuclear superiority relative to the Soviet Union. The Soviets, though they probably will always be behind the United States in some technological developments, have advanced technologically
to such a degree that they can compete with anyone. Since the Soviet Union also does not have to satisfy economic needs to the extent that the United States must, the Soviets can plow more resources into military products. Even if it were possible to achieve sustained nuclear superiority, the economic costs to the United States would be too prohibitive. Our society would not accept a policy of nuclear superiority. In addition, the security interests of both countries and, indeed, the world would be greatly harmed. Both superpowers would engage in a frantic race to reach an impossible position, a race characterized by the development of weapons far more lethal than are now extant. Certainly, it would have to be concluded, that other countries would abrogate the Non-Proliferation Treaty signed in 1968 that stipulated that the non-nuclear weapons states would not acquire nuclear devices. How could these non-nuclear states continue to adhere to such a treaty if the superpowers were engaged in the race for nuclear superiority? They could not. Hence abrogation of the Non-Proliferation Treaty by the non-nuclear states would be certain.

Is this the type of environment that is desired by the inhabitants of the earth? It certainly cannot be. Would anyone sign their own death certificate? Again, certainly not. A policy of nuclear superiority is inhuman, thoughtless policy—it cannot be considered otherwise. Parity, therefore, is the only answer for the superpowers and for the world. Though the negotiations to achieve parity and to achieve parity at lower levels are very laborious and at times fruitless, these negotiations must continue and hopefully prosper. When nuclear weapons were not the tools of destruction, military superiority was not such a threatening condition. However, nuclear weapons drastically change that situation. With nuclear
weapons, nobody wins, everybody loses. In such a situation, nuclear superiority seems like a terrible joke... is a terrible joke.

Vladivostok thus began the codification of a necessary condition. If Vladivostok did anything, it did do this. But still there was a long way to go. New issues were left outstanding that had to be resolved. The Soviet Union and their Backfire bomber were causing problems for the United States. The Soviets insisted that this twin-engined, swing-wing bomber was only an intermediate range plane rather than a heavy bomber, an intercontinental range plane; the United States insisted otherwise. For the Soviet Union, the United States' cruise missile caused much grief. This missile produced such emotion because it possessed hard target capability and in addition could fly underneath Soviet radar. The cruise missile thus replaced FBS as the Soviet Union's major concern after Vladivostok.

Indeed, the cruise missile and the Backfire bomber seemed to be so important that they were the subject of a linkage in January of 1976. U. Alexis Johnson, after receiving the word from Vladivostok that a SALT II treaty should be ready by the end of 1975, immediately began to step up the pace of the negotiations, and with some success. The two parties agreed that if a missile had been tested with a multiple warhead then all missiles of that type would be counted as MIRV missiles. Also both sides agreed that storing spare missiles and utilizing rapid re-load systems would be banned. However, Johnson and Semyonov could not come to terms concerning the Backfire and the cruise missile. Hence it was left up to Kissinger to resolve this crucial linkage. He went to Moscow in January of 1976 with the hope of not only resolving the Backfire-cruise imbroglio but also with the hope of concluding a treaty.
Kissinger opened up the negotiations by suggesting that the Soviet Union could have 120 Backfire bombers "free," but any in excess of the 120 the Soviet Union would have to count against the 2400 Vladivostok limit of offensive strategic weapons. The Soviet Union thought this proposal was atrocious. Kissinger, not missing a beat, then proposed that the Soviet Union limit their Backfire production to 275 over a five-year period while the United States would be allowed to place cruise missiles on surface ships while accepting some limitations on submarine-launched cruise missiles. The Soviet Union did not quite like this proposal either. What was it the Soviet Union was looking for? What the Soviet Union was so greedily holding onto was the proposal that would count United States cruise missiles against the 1320 MIRV sublimit. In addition, the Soviet Union wanted the B-52 bomber armed with cruise missiles to count as one against the sublimit and the B-1 bomber armed with cruise missiles to count as three against the sublimit. The Soviet rationale behind the bomber differentiations was that the B-1 would get to the Soviet Union quicker than the B-52.  

Nothing definitive really came out of these hurried negotiations though the two sides basically agreed to accept the counting of United States cruise missiles for some restrictions on Backfire bombers. This, however, was the extent of the linkage. Presidential politics in the United States limited Kissinger's ability to negotiate any further.  

Indeed, the politics became so aggressive that the agreement Kissinger had thought he had come to with the Soviets concerning Backfire and the cruise seemed to

40 Ibid., p. 37.
41 Ibid.
have been forgotten by everyone. In effect, Kissinger's linkage was pigeon-holed by the multiple interests that the presidential campaign rendered. Kissinger and the Soviets were nonplussed; their agreement had been squelched—at least for that moment.42
VI. SALT II - A TOUGH PEANUT TO CRACK

When it came into office, the Carter Administration had a great deal in common with the disgraced Nixon Administration. This common element that united the two administrations was the way they both approached foreign policy. Both felt it was going to be their destiny to change what seemed to be the dreary course of arms control negotiations. The Nixon Administration had experienced some success; the Carter Administration had expected to be the world's hero. Naivete was a glaring weakness that characterized the early years of the Carter Administration.

This naivete made its debut in the arms control area in the form of a comprehensive proposal submitted by the Carter Administration in March of 1977. This proposal completely revamped Vladivostok; indeed, the proposal was of such a nature that had never been seen before. The proposal limited total strategic weapons to an 1800-2000 total; MIRVs were cut to 1100-1200 ceiling and MIRVed ICBMs were held to a figure of 550; Soviet heavy missiles could not exceed 150; flight testing of existing ICBMs was to be limited; mobile missiles were not to be allowed; United States' cruise missiles were limited to a 2250 kilometer range. There is no question, therefore, that if anything this comprehensive proposal was original, bold, and shocking.

Certainly, the Soviet Union did not attempt to dissemble their consternation. The Soviets had considered the Vladivostok accords the only legitimate treaty they would sign.\textsuperscript{43} When Secretary of State Cyrus Vance

\textsuperscript{43}Ibid., p. 41.
went to Moscow in March of 1977 to present the comprehensive proposal to the Soviets, the Soviets did not back down from their feeling that Vladivostok was the only treaty they would sign. Soviet Party leader Brezhnev hinted that he might accept a 2,200 limit on offensive strategic weapons, but that he would never agree to a 2000 limit. That latter limit was out of the question. Brezhnev also commented that he might pursue further negotiations with the Carter Administration if the cruise missile were counted against the 1320 MIRV sublimit and if the Backfire bomber were not limited at all. Brezhnev made himself quite clear that this was not an either-or proposition—both sides of the matter had to be satisfied. With that proposition, Brezhnev immediately decimated the linkage that had been established between the cruise and the Backfire bomber. In essence, Brezhnev was simply venting his outrage at the Carter Administration's naive SALT policy.

As a result of the Soviets' reaction, the grand mission ended on a very bitter note. The White House, Foggy Bottom, and the Department of Defense had all learned a very important lesson: the Soviet Union does not like to deal with surprises. There is a Russian word that characterizes how the Soviet Union does like to deal—bezopasnost. This word means lack of danger or total safety and it was in conflict with the demeanor of the comprehensive proposal. The Carter Administration thus had to go back to the drawing board. The administration, however, knew one essential fact: they could not formulate a SALT II treaty that reflected a totally different mentality than that presented in Vladivostok. The Vladivostok accords were the tree. What the Carter Administration would add to that tree would be

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44 Ibid., p. 70.
45 Ibid.
essentially characterized as ornaments that were wrought out of the frustrating reality of arms control negotiations.

And in fact this was the reality. When the SALT II treaty was finally signed at Vienna on June 18, 1979, the essentials of the treaty did not differ that significantly from Vladivostok. The two sides basically agreed to a three-tiered structure that was designed by William Hyeard, a NSC senior staff member, and Leslie Gelb, director of the State Department Bureau of Politico-Military Affairs. The first tier was the treaty itself, the second tier was the protocol, and the third tier the statement of principles.

The first tier limited both sides to 2400 offensive strategic nuclear delivery vehicles--ICBMs, SLBMs, heavy bombers, and air-to-surface ballistic missiles (ASBMs). The Vladivostok figure of 2400 would be lowered to 2,250 in 1981. In addition, an equal sublimit of 1320 MIRVed ballistic missiles and heavy bombers with long range cruise missiles was established. Breaking up this 1320, a limit of 1200 MIRVed ballistic missiles was set and of this 1200 only 820 could be MIRVed ICBMs. A ban on construction of additional fixed ICBM launchers was agreed to. New ICBMs were limited to 10 MIRVs, SLBMs were limited to 14 MIRVs and ASBMs were limited to 10 MIRVs. The number of long-range cruise missiles per bomber was limited to an average of 28 per bomber and 20 per existing heavy bomber. There were limits set on the launch weight and throw-weight of strategic ballistic missiles. Specifically, any missile larger than the SS-19, 7,000 pounds of throw-weight, was considered a heavy missile, and any missile larger than the SS-18, 15,000 pounds of throw-weight, was banned. Relevant to these Soviet missiles, the SS-18 was limited to 10 MIRVs, the SS-19 6 MIRVs, and the SS-17 4 MIRVs. Rapid reload systems were banned as were
new weapons such as ballistic missiles on surface ships, and ballistic missile launchers on the seabeds. Finally, a data base was agreed to by both countries.

The second tier, or the Protocol, was negotiated to last until December 31, 1981. During the life of the Protocol, neither side was to deploy mobile ICBM launchers. Development of these missiles was allowed. Sea-launched cruise missiles (SLCMs) and ground-launched cruise missiles with ranges in excess of 600 miles could not be deployed. But again, development of these two systems was allowed without range restrictions. ASBMs were prohibited from being flight-tested and deployed.

The third tier, the Joint Statement of Principles, documented the two countries' responsibility to continue the process of limiting nuclear armaments.

This, then, is the substance of the SALT II treaty. The most significant limitation is the 820 limit on MIRVed ICBMs. This weapon is by far the most destructive and any kind of effort to stop its deployment must be lauded.

Of course, the SALT II treaty was pregnant with individual weapons linkages. The following discussion will concentrate only on some of these more important linkages.

The Soviet Union's ICBM forces have always given United States' negotiators a great deal of trouble. In SALT II, this situation did not alter. The SS-16, SS-17, SS-18, and SS-19, all developed during the period from 1970-75, were surely the most accurate and lethal generation of ICBMs the Soviet Union had developed. The SS-16 in addition had the capability to be deployed in a mobile mode. Therefore, because of the dangerous environment that these particular missiles created, the United States felt
at the least it should control the MIRV capability of these missiles. The decision to attempt to place a lid on MIRVs was not an easy one by any means. Surrounded by individuals who demanded that the Soviet Union reduce its ICBM forces, particularly SS-18s from 300-150, a demand that the Soviet Union incessantly avoided acknowledging, the Carter Administration found the going very treacherous indeed in convincing individuals that MIRV control was the best and most practicable option available. In the end, these individuals, such as Senator Henry Jackson, did not even acquiesce to the Carter Administration's MIRV move. The administration nevertheless went ahead. As was mentioned before, this was an intelligent move. A half a loaf of bread is better than no loaf at all.

The United States, of course, was not going to expect the Soviet Union to agree to a fractionation or MIRV limit without some linkage. Specifically, the United States knew exactly what the Soviet Union demanded for a fractionation limit: limitation of long range cruise missiles on bombers. The Soviet Union made it a point to always try to limit the United States' cruise missiles. The United States believed that this Soviet objective was possible if the MIRV fractionation limits were agreed to.

After a great deal of offering and counter-offering, the two sides finally came up with the linkage. The Soviet Union would limit its SS-18 to 10 MIRVs, SS-19 to 6 MIRVs, and its SS-17 to 4 MIRVs if the United States limited its bombers to an average of 28 cruise missiles and its existing heavy bombers to 20 cruise missiles.

This was a good linkage. It eased the Soviet Union's phobia, at least ephemerally, of cruise missiles and it allowed the United States to control MIRV proliferation, a little late but better late than never.
Under the terms of this linkage, the United States would be able to build 6 new wide-bodied cruise missile carriers with an average of 28 cruise missiles before 1985 if that became a strategic option. Also in terms of verifying the Soviet Union's compliance with the fractionation limits, the United States would not face insurmountable barriers. Possibly, if the Soviet Union were to place 11 MIRVs on an SS-18, the verification instruments could not pick this up. However, any attempt to equip, for example, an SS-18 with 12 MIRVs could be detected. Therefore, no strategic advantage could be gained by the Soviet Union if it cheated with impunity. One additional MIRV per SS-18, a total of 308 MIRVs, does not add up to a strategic advantage.

There are two small towns in the Ukraine in the Soviet Union that seem very unassuming, a description which befits most small towns anywhere. However, to the individual who has ICBM missiles on the brain, these two towns, Derazhnya and Pervomaisk (D and P), presented some problems during the SALT II negotiations--problems for the United States.

The fact that makes these two towns very assuming is that there are ICBM fields located near them. Prior to the signing of SALT I, the Soviet Union had built 60 SS-11 silos at each site. Now this did not present such great difficulties for the United States. But after the signing of SALT I the Soviet Union built 30 additional silos at each site. These new silos were designed to hold MIRVed SS-19 missiles, not SS-11 missiles. The basic problem for the United States was that it could not tell whether any single silo contained an unMIRVed SS-11 or a MIRVed SS-19. One Defense Department official commented that the United States "... had no confidence in our ability to verify in the future the Soviet claim that

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46 Ibid., p. 271.
those 120 launchers weren't MIRVed. Therefore it was our position that all 180 launchers at D and P must count as MIRVed.\(^{47}\) Paul Warnke, SALT II head negotiator for the Carter Administration for approximately two years, however, objected to this kind of reasoning. He felt that if the United States forced the Soviet Union to count all the silos as MIRVed silos then they would in fact put SS-19s in the SS-11 silos. Harold Brown, Secretary of Defense, opined that the United States was simply getting a head start on the inevitable.\(^{48}\) Warnke ultimately lost the debate.

As was said, most towns do not offer themselves as great attractions to strategic experts, excepting those towns that are located near ICBM fields. Great Falls, Montana, specifically Malmstrom Air Force Base near Great Falls, was the D and P for the Soviet Union. The Soviets objected that their verification instruments could not ascertain whether the silos at Malmstrom were MIRVed or unMIRVed. In addition, the Soviets complained that the shelters the workers were using to protect themselves from the Montana winter while hardening the silos obstructed Soviet verification of the missiles. As a result of this problem, Soviet Foreign Minister Gromyko made it clear that if the United States was going to demand that all 180 missile silos at D and P were MIRVed, then the Soviet Union would demand the same thing of the missiles at Malmstrom. The linkage thus manifested itself.

In December of 1978, Gromyko and Vance met in an attempt to resolve the issue. And apparently both sides after the meeting thought they had

\(^{47}\text{Ibid.},\ p.\ 112.\)

\(^{48}\text{Ibid.},\ p.\ 114.\)
resolved the problem: the taking down of shelters linked to D and P. However, both sides did not get straight the matter concerning the distinguishability of Minuteman II and Minuteman III missiles, the missiles located at Malmstrom. Therefore, what appeared to be a resolution of the linkage was no such thing. Malmstrom still remained outstanding.

In May of 1979, the issue came to a head. However, the Soviet Union also added an additional item. The Soviets demanded that the maximum number of MIRVs that the Minuteman III could carry be codified in SALT II. The Carter Administration had wanted the matter to remain open because a MIRV test code-named Paved Pepper had successfully equipped the Minuteman III with 7 MIRVs. The Soviets would not budge on the issue. Finally, Secretary of State Vance in a state of frustration agreed to take down the shelters, to codify the three MIRVs that the Minuteman III could carry, and to reveal the number of Minuteman IIs and IIs, 450 and 550 respectively. This satisfied the Soviet Union and they then dropped the Minuteman distinguishability bagatelle, and, of course, accepted, implicitly, a matter everyone seemed to have forgotten about, the United States' proposal concerning D and P. After this, Vance could be safe when he said, "I hope I never hear the word Malmstrom again as long as I live."49 That word would not come back to haunt him.

The following linkages are not the kinds of linkages that should be negotiated. Instead of linkages that are used to reduce weapons, such as the Soviet ICBM fractionation limit linked to the heavy bomber cruise missile fractionation limit, linkages are made that have the potential of increasing weapons. This latter type of linkage is an add linkage, contrasted to the beneficial subtract linkage.

49 Ibid., p. 231.
One of the most important add linkages centered around the Backfire bomber. Since the Carter Administration had breached the Backfire-cruise linkage negotiated by Kissinger in January of 1976, the Soviets refused to include the Backfire in any way in SALT II. This refusal seemed to be a graphic manifestation of the Soviet Union's dissatisfaction with their being run aground after the Carter Administration had taken office. As a result of this obstinacy on the part of the Soviet Union and fully realizing the pressure that was coming from Capitol Hill, the Carter Administration decided to counter the Backfire. David Aaron, deputy to National Security Advisor Zbigniew Brzezinski, suggested that the United States make it clear to the Soviet Union that the United States possessed the right to build a bomber like the Backfire. Specifically, what Aaron had in mind was the supersonic FB-111 medium bomber. This linkage served to dissolve much of the concern over the Backfire, though it still would remain a very contentious matter.

Since the late 1960s and the early 1970s, the United States realized that its Minuteman forces would become vulnerable to the Soviet Union beginning in 1982, a problem the strategic experts call the "window of vulnerability." What this means is that the Soviet Union would theoretically be able to destroy all of the Minuteman's missiles in a first strike. The resulting situation would leave the American president with few options. Therefore, as a measure to eliminate this vulnerability the strategic planners designed a new missile, the MX (missile experimental). The MX is a mobile ICBM that can be moved around to different launch sites and thus is a missile that would make it much more difficult for the

\[^{50}\text{Ibid., p. 214.}\]
Soviet Union to successfully wipe out the United States ICBM forces in a first strike attack. The MX seemed to be the United States' ace in the hole. First, it would eliminate the ICBM vulnerability problem and second, it would aggravate the Soviet Union's ICBM vulnerability problem, a dilemma that the Soviet Union would have to face up to during the mid-1980s. Thus the MX was the savior; it was the answer. But was it really?

If all the consequences are examined and all minds are cleared of the apprehension caused by the Minuteman vulnerability problem, it becomes very clear that the MX missile is not the answer. This building of the MX linked to the vulnerability problem is a no-win situation. This is the case for three reasons. First, the building of the MX will simply escalate the arms race to new lethality plateaus. The direction of the arms program should be towards weapons that are less destructive, not more destructive. In this regard, the United States instead of developing the MX missile should deploy the Trident II SLBM, the most powerful SLBM in the world but not as destructive and lethal as the MX. Another alternative is simply to make the Minuteman III a mobile missile by mounting it on specially designed trucks. Secondly, the MX missile will probably become vulnerable in a matter of years after it is deployed.\(^{51}\) This is especially the case if the SALT process in the future does not render greater decreases in MIRVed ICBMs. Thirdly, the Soviet Union, seeing that the United States has deployed a mobile missile, will complete the action-reaction scheme by building its own mobile missile. This certainly is not a desirable situation; this is not arms control.

\[^{51}\text{U.S., Congress, Senate, Committee on Foreign Relations, Hearings, The SALT II Treaty, Part 2, 96th Cong., 1st sess., 1979, p. 100.}\]
As the MX issue evolved, not only was the missile linked to the vulnerability problem, but the missile was linked to the ratification of the treaty. That is, some individuals expressed the viewpoint that if the MX were not built then they would not vote for the SALT II treaty. This type of linkage cannot exist. It is counter-productive; it has no place in an arms control treaty.

Hence, there were some beneficial linkages constructed in SALT II and some detrimental linkages constructed. However, these weapons linkages, detrimental and beneficial, were rendered insignificant because of the linkages that were made relative to the Soviet Union's geo-political behavior. Linkage to Soviet behavior in Cuba and ultimately in Afghanistan proved to be the demise of SALT II, at least for the time being. Even the Carter Administration, which had not advocated any sort of linkage of SALT II to Soviet behavior because they considered it, as Zbigniew Brzezinski commented, "a chicken's way out,"\(^52\) bent under the tremendous pressure that had accumulated. Senator Howard Baker, senator from Tennessee and Republican candidate for president, was one such individual who put the pressure on the Carter Administration. Commenting on the Soviet troop infestation in Cuba in September of 1979, Baker retorted: "During the entire SALT proceedings, both the Soviet Union and the U.S. have argued that there is no linkage between SALT II and adventurous Soviet policy throughout the world. Now at least, on the basis of what is happening in Cuba, there is linkage."\(^53\) Senator Frank Church, Chairman of the Foreign Relations Committee, an individual who had wholeheartedly supported SALT II

\(^{52}\)"The Storm Over Cuba," *Time*, September 17, 1979, p. 21.

\(^{53}\)Ibid., p. 15.
during the hearings confessed: "There is no likelihood that the Senate would ratify the SALT II treaty as long as Soviet combat troops remain in Cuba." 54

Linkage thus was no longer merely a principle that was advocated by hard-liners. On the contrary, linkage became the key to whether or not the SALT II treaty was rejected or accepted. All of a sudden the dilemmas of Soviet heavies, Soviet throw-weight, the MX missile, and verification were shoved in the background. Soviet behavior became the major discussion at Foggy Bottom, the White House, the Defense Department, and, indeed, in every household in America. SALT II was being held hostage by this Soviet behavior.

Certainly this high-pressure linkage, as Stanley R. Sloan refers to it, was not a new policy. 55 In 1974, the Jackson-Vanik Amendment linked the liberalization of Soviet emigration policy to the United States' granting most favored nation status to the Soviet Union. In the summer of 1978, Senator Jackson, never one to forego an opportunity to exploit high-pressure linkage, called for the Carter Administration to shut off the sales of high technology equipment to the Soviet Union for the Soviet government's actions against three dissidents. Again, Senator Howard Baker commented that the president should "pick up the telephone and call the Russians and say, 'Look, we are really upset about this... We ain't going to be pushed around this way. And just so you know that it's all linked together, we are going to temporarily suspend the SALT talks, we

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54 Ibid., p. 12.

are going to suspend any other talks we can lay our hands on."

In February of 1979, the Republican Party demanded that the president apply high-pressure linkage to the Soviet Union's behavior around the world.

The Carter Administration, however, remained very adamant. It refused to link SALT II to the Soviet Union's actions around the world, although there were times, specifically Soviet assistance to proxy troops in Ethiopia in 1978, that the Carter Administration felt that linkage should be applied. But these linkage desires did not manifest themselves in Carter Administration policy.

The Carter Administration certainly felt that the Soviet Union should reciprocate on this non-linkage policy. If, therefore, the United States pursued a human rights policy or if it pursued a normalization of relations with China, it then expected the Soviet Union not to link these policy moves to SALT. President Carter made this point very clear during a press conference held on February 8, 1977:

> I think we come out better in dealing with the Soviet Union if I am consistently and completely dedicated to the enhancement of human rights not only as it deals with the Soviet Union, for instance, in reducing dependence upon atomic weapons and in also seeking mutual and balanced force reductions in Europe.57

The Soviet Union, if their statements have any substance to them at all, would seem to have been very amenable to the non-linkage policy pursued by the Carter Administration. Secretary-General Leonid Brezhnev had always lauded any efforts to approach the SALT II treaty qua strategic

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56 Ibid., p. 11.
57 Ibid., p. 8.
treaty. However, it seems when the Soviet Union's interests are threatened linkage appears to be a very viable policy.

The Soviets reacted very strongly to the human rights policy pursued by the Carter Administration. Citing the principle of non-interference in each other's internal affairs, Brezhnev commented in the spring of 1978 that SALT had stagnated because of the human rights policy. In addition, the Soviet Union considered the United States' advances towards China to be very detrimental to the SALT process. A Pravda article did not mince words on this matter:

Alignment of the United States with China on an anti-Soviet basis would rule out the possibility of cooperation with the Soviet Union in the matter of reducing the danger of a nuclear war and, of course, of limiting armaments.

It became quite clear, therefore, that the Soviet Union would use linkage whenever it felt it had to. Thus the Soviets were certainly not anti-linkage as they had always characterized themselves. What was revealed was that the Soviets were opportunists of first rate ability. If linkage was beneficial in a particular situation, then the Soviet Union would exploit linkage to the fullest extent possible. On the other hand, if linkage was not a beneficial policy, then the Soviets would not exploit it. Hence the Soviets, and maybe they cannot be blamed, were during SALT I and SALT II very conscious of linkage. As was mentioned earlier, the Soviets understood linkage very well.

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58 Talbott, Endgame: The Inside Story of SALT II, p. 70.
Was this non-linkage policy advocated by the Carter Administration a good policy? From all that has been concluded in this paper thus far, this non-linkage policy was the policy that should have been applied throughout the entire SALT process. To consider strategic matters on their own merits and to consider other foreign policy matters on their own merits is really, in the long run, they only way in which the arms control process can be perpetuated. Certainly, some gains can be had if linkage is applied, whether it be positive or high-pressure linkage. However, a linkage policy in the long run can only mean a fragmented SALT process. Both positive and high-pressure linkage, therefore, cannot co-exist with a homogeneous, ultimately fruitful SALT treaty.

The reasons for drawing this conclusion are self-evident. Neither country is going to radically alter its geo-political behavior because of a SALT treaty. This is a long run consideration, not a short run consideration. That is, for example, the Soviet Union may say it will reduce or even terminate its imperialistic demeanor to get a SALT II treaty from the Senate of the United States. But after the treaty is signed the Soviet Union will resume its behavior. The American government and its people will thus have been suckered. In addition, the SALT process will have been grossly exploited. The SALT process, a process that is the only hope for a truly peaceful world, will have become a mere pawn in the positioning game between the United States and the Soviet Union. High pressure linkage and SALT thus become laughing-stocks, defunct policies. This scenario is not unreasonable. The Soviet Union has demonstrated over and over again that it will not dispossess of its dream to destroy capitalism. Thus when the Committee on the Present Danger, a group that violently opposes SALT II, says that the United States should not consider
negotiating a treaty until the Soviet Union changes its philosophy it is effectively signing the death certificate for SALT. The SALT process would be no more.

Is this so terrible? Indeed, it is. A policy like the one advocated by the Committee on the Present Danger would not only destroy SALT but it would also greatly heighten the danger of a nuclear war disaster. Any conflict, unfolding in an environment without arms control, would be game for a major nuclear confrontation, threatening not only the two superpowers but also the entire world. Is this the type of environment that people would like to inhabit? Is this the price that we must pay for a 'get-tough' policy? No to both questions. On the other hand, if a non-linkage policy is utilized, then the world will not only be a safe place for democracy but for every other political ideology. In this type of situation, you may not have changed the Soviet Union's Weltanschauung, but you would have controlled nuclear proliferation, an important, vital accomplishment. Again, half a loaf of bread is better than no loaf at all.

President Carter, therefore, was absolutely correct in using a non-linkage policy; it is the only way. And the Carter Administration was correct in espousing a human rights policy. The United States must make its policies felt throughout the world. The world, particularly the Soviet Union, must know where the United States stands. In essence, a totally up-front policy, advocating those ageless principles that have stood America in good faith, must be a characteristic of the American government. It is realized that this aggressive policy may upset the Soviet Union and thus jeopardize SALT. But that is the risk that must be taken. The value of the SALT process has been tirelessly extolled throughout
this entire paper, and this important value is not being belittled
by proposing that the United States make its policies known. But what
is being said is that there is something of greater value that the SALT
process: United States' policy integrity. If the United States must
be mute in order to ensure that the Soviet Union is in a good mood for
SALT, then that price is not worth it. SALT is important, but United
States' policy integrity is more important.

If, therefore, the Soviet Union wants to link United States policy,
human rights policy, for example, to SALT then that is their choice.
The United States would have done all it could have by advocating a non-
linkage policy and by espousing its policies in other foreign policy
matters. The Soviet Union would have breached the trust, not the
United States.

The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, however, has altered the Carter
Administration's non-linkage policy. The Carter Administration now feels
that it should delay the SALT debate in the Senate until the Soviets have
made amends for their actions. This policy change is a mistake. There
is no question that the United States should assert itself because of
the Soviets' bold move, but it should not include a linkage of the SALT II
treaty as a manifestation of this assertion. What good will it do?
Maybe, just maybe, the Soviet Union will think SALT II is important
enough to withdraw from Afghanistan. But, once again, this will be a
short-run Soviet policy; the Soviets' long-run policy will not alter.
Again, and this cannot be emphasized enough, the Carter Administration
should have separated SALT from Afghanistan. If the Soviets do not suffer
from the linkage, the world certainly will.
Ironically, however, even with a non-linkage policy a postponement of the SALT II vote was imperative. Because of the intensity of the linkage feeling in the Senate, the SALT II treaty would not have been given a fair shake. As a matter of simply diffusing the linkage mentality, therefore, a postponement was necessary. The end of the postponement, of course, is contingent on the relative diffusion of the linkage mentality. It is not contingent on the Soviet Union's behavior around the world. There exists a tremendous difference between the two contingencies.
VII. SOME TOUGH QUESTIONS, SOME CONTENTIOUS ANSWERS

The following is a question and answer forum on some of the more contentious issues raised by the SALT II treaty:

1. Question: Why did the United States accept such limits in the Protocol on its ground-launched and sea-launched cruise missiles? Was not this a major mistake made by the United States?
   Answer: Actually, when the matter is fully examined it was not a mistake on the United States' part. These missiles will not be able to be deployed until after the Protocol has expired. Thus the cruise missile program is not at all hampered. Honestly, therefore, the Protocol does not possess that much value. It places limits on missiles that will not have been deployed until after the December 31, 1981 expiration date.

2. Question: Why does the United States suffer with a Minuteman vulnerability problem? Did the SALT process cause this vulnerability?
   Answer: Any time you are dealing with fixed assets, like weapons systems, obsolescence is a fact of life. This is the basic problem with the Minuteman missiles. These missiles have not kept pace with the development of Soviet ICBMs and thus have become theoretically vulnerable to a first strike. This problem was not in any way a manifestation of an inequality in SALT I. The United States within
the SALT I context could have very well upgraded its ICBM forces, but it chose not to. The Soviet Union chose to. Increased military spending was not in vogue after the Vietnam War. The United States ICBM forces suffered for that myopic mentality.

3. **Question:** Did not the Soviet Union cheat during the tenure of SALT I and won't they continue to do so if SALT II is implemented?

**Answer:** After an examination of all sources, it becomes clear that the Soviet Union did not cheat in SALT I. Those cases which individuals have pointed to as examples of Soviet cheating have not been proven. For example, many individuals claimed that the Soviet Union cheated in terms of SALT I when it built its SS-19 missiles. This was not the case. The United States had made a unilateral statement maintaining that any missile exceeding 70 cubic meters could not be built. A unilateral statement has no effect on the Soviet Union. The Soviet building of the SS-19 may have violated the "spirit of SALT" but it did not violate the "letter of SALT." Cheating is only a violation of the "letter of SALT."

Another case in which the Soviet Union has been accused of cheating involved the dismantling of SS-7 and SS-8 ICBM launchers if the Soviet Union exceeded 740 SLBMs. From all accounts given by authoritative individuals, such as Robert W. Buchheim, U.S. Commission to the Standing Consultative Commission (SCC), the Commission that oversees U.S. and Soviet compliance with the SALT I treaty, and Sidney N. Graybeal, former U.S. Commissioner to the Standing Consultative Commission, the Soviets did indeed violate the terms of the SALT I treaty by not dismantling a requisite number of ICBM launchers. However, the Soviet Union reported in early 1976 this violation to the SCC and stated that
they were behind schedule because of technical problems in the amount of 51 launchers. After the recognition of this problem, the Soviets corrected their difficulties and dismantled the requisite number of launchers. This matter hardly constitutes cheating.

The ABM treaty had strictly stipulated that "each Party undertakes: (a) not to give missiles, launchers, or radar, other than ABM inter- ceptor missiles, ABM launchers, or ABM radars, capabilities to counter strategic ballistic missiles or their elements in flight trajectory, and not to test them in an ABM mode...."60

The United States in 1972 and 1974 had noticed the Soviet Union testing an SA-5 surface-to-air missile system with what seemed to be an ABM radar tracking device. Upon bringing this matter to the attention of the Soviet Union, the Soviets countered that this was a non-ABM radar used for range safety and instrumentation, a system allowed by the treaty. After this matter was aired, the Soviets discontinued this type of ambiguous testing.

Thus it seems to be quite clear that the Soviet Union has not violated the terms of the SALT I agreement. In cases where there has been some question, the United States and the Soviet Union have resolved the matter to the adequate satisfaction of both sides. The preceding cases mentioned were the major problems areas. Other matters brought to the Soviet Union's attention by the United States, such as the propriety of launch control facilities, concealment measures, Soviet reporting of ABM test launcher dismantlement, and Soviet radar at Kamchatka Peninsula, have been adequately resolved.

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60 Newhouse, Cold Dawn: The Story of SALT, p. 274.
4. **Question**: Can the United States adequately verify the Soviet Union's compliance with the SALT II treaty?

**Answer**: This is a question, at least for those who do not have access to classified material, that is very hard to answer. As a result of this lack of definitive information, many individuals have conflicting views about U.S. verification abilities.

If one examined the ability of the United States to verify Soviet compliance with the SALT I treaty, it would become obvious that the United States was well-equipped. There is no reason to believe that this verification ability has atrophied even with the loss of listening posts in Iran. Therefore, the United States should be able to adequately verify Soviet compliance with the SALT II treaty.

The Soviet Union certainly could not cheat on the number of SLBMs or ICBMs. These missiles are simply too large to escape the penetrating eye of a verification satellite. In terms of being able to verify whether or not the Soviet SS-20 IRBM, a two-stage model of the SS-16 mobile ICBM, a missile prohibited in SALT II, was in fact upgraded to the SS-16, the U.S. should indeed be able to verify that transformation. The SS-16 would have to be tested and U.S. verification could pick up those SS-16 test flights.

In terms of verifying MIRV capabilities, it is not a situation of the United States having great verification capacities but the lack of technology that characterizes the Soviet Union's situation. At the present time the Soviets do not possess the subtle technology to transfer a MIRV payload to an unMIRVed ICBM. And in the future MIRVed systems will be so much different from older unMIRVed systems that one transferrence would also be impossible.
The problems with verification will primarily manifest themselves in the future. The most pressing problem in this regard will be the verification of cruise missiles. At the present time, the Soviet Union does not possess the cruise missile technology to press United States' verification instruments. The Soviets do possess some sea-launched cruise missiles (SLCM) that do surpass the 600 kilometer limit established in the Protocol by 250 kilometers. But these missiles are rather cumbersome and the Soviet Union could not attempt to build additional SLCMs without being caught by U.S. verification. The verification problem in the future with cruise missiles presents itself in terms of not being able to detect a nuclear-armed cruise missile from a conventionally-armed cruise missile by other than external observation. In addition, it is not now possible to be able to verify the ranges of cruise missiles. These dilemmas posed by the cruise missile will manifest themselves after 1985.

As it stands now, therefore, the United States should be able to adequately verify all aspects of the SALT II treaty. The verification instruments of the United States, however, cannot remain in a sterile position in terms of advancement. These instruments must continue to improve their capabilities if the SALT process is going to continue. As was mentioned earlier, adequate verification is the major reason that any treaty can be successfully consummated. Hence, if verification becomes inadequate, any meaningful arms control treaty will be an impossibility.

5. Question: Is the promise made by Brezhnev concerning the limitation on building Backfire bombers something to be relied on?
Answer: First of all, the United States was extremely lucky to get any restriction from the Soviet Union concerning the Backfire bomber after the cruise missile-Backfire linkage was destroyed by the frenzy of the 1976 presidential election. Though this statement to limit Backfire production to 30 per year was not a part of the treaty, the United States considers it as such. The United States would consider any reneging on this Backfire statement to be commensurate with a reneging on any term within the text of the treaty itself. The Soviet Union understands this to be the case. Therefore, if the Soviet Union values the SALT II treaty, and it is apparent that they do, they will not breach the agreement reached.

6. Question: What is the status of United States' nuclear forces relative to the Soviet Union's nuclear forces?
Answer: Again, an answer to this question is very hard to come up with because of classified information. But some judgments nevertheless can be rendered.

There is no question that the Soviet Union has outpaced the United States in nuclear arms development over the past decade. However, the Soviets had a great deal of catching up to do. The conclusion that can be drawn from this Soviet buildup and the soporose American condition is that the Soviet Union reached a position of parity with the United States. The United States did not become inferior to the Soviet Union in the strategic area! This conclusion considers the state of the Minuteman ICBMs. United States SLBMs, cruise missiles, and heavy bombers could render complete destruction on the Soviet Union military-industrial complex even without ICBMs. If the Minuteman missiles
did get through, a good possibility, the damage would be even more
catastrophic. Thus the damage that the United States' forces can do
to the Soviet Union is not inferior damage--far from it.

7. Question: Does not Article XII, the Non-Circumvention clause,
prohibit the United States from transferring cruise missiles technology
to our allies in Europe?
Answer: Article XII specifically states that "each Party undertakes
not to circumvent the provisions of this treaty, through any other
state or states, or in any other manner." This statement is fairly
clear and, therefore, should not cause any problems.

But it continues to do so. This article does not say that it is
illegal to transfer weapons, or whatever it is to be transferred,
that are not prohibited in the treaty. By merely giving our allies
cruise missile technology, particularly technology for ground-launched
cruise missiles (GLCM), and not a functional GLCM, the United States
would not be doing anything illicit. The treaty allows both parties
to test these missiles but not to deploy them.

Many individuals, however, are still concerned that the Soviet Union
would not consider these exchanges legitimate. What the Soviet Union
thinks, in this case, matters little. The Soviets simply do not want
our allies to obtain cruise missiles because of the potential danger
those missiles represent to the Soviet Union. The Soviets make
statements concerning Article XII without examining Article XII itself.
The statement is clear; cruise missile technology transference is allowed.

61 U.S., Department of State, Bureau of Public Affairs, SALT II
Agreement, No. 12A (1979), p. 43.
VIII. CONCLUSION

The SALT process has been liberally praised in this thesis; there can be no argument about that. Therefore, as a result of this confidence in SALT, a confidence engendered out of the security that has been enhanced by the arms control process, it is advocated that SALT be legitimated over time. Of course, the most immediate goal that must be reached in order to achieve this legitimation is a ratification of the SALT II treaty and an initiation of negotiations that would lead to a signing of a SALT III treaty.

As was emphasized in the body of this thesis, SALT III is really the key treaty that will reveal if one or both countries has concealed any unsavory motives such as achieving nuclear superiority. Since NTM is now sufficient and since both countries will have had time to adjust to an environment of basic nuclear parity, there should be no reason why major reductions cannot be had in a SALT III treaty. An agreement similar to the comprehensive proposal of March, 1977 would be most fitting and satisfying to most individuals. More specifically, a SALT III treaty will have to resolve the matter concerning the Soviet Backfire and the matter concerning Soviet IRBMs. Possibly a subtract linkage involving Soviet IRBMs and the newly-placed NATO Pershing missiles in Europe can be negotiated. In addition, a subtract linkage involving Soviet Backfire bombers and United States cruise missiles is a possibility that would alleviate a great deal of paranoia that exists on both sides.
Linkage, of course, is very significant and it will continue to be as long as the SALT process continues. In terms of weapons linkages, subtract linkage is the best possible negotiating tool. Weapons on both sides are reduced and as a result the security of the world is enhanced that much more.

Weapons linkages, however, though certainly important, do not seem to attract the attention of the American people. Rather, it is the overall linkage of SALT to Soviet geo-political behavior that attracts the diverse opinions of the American public.

Certainly, positive linkage is not the policy that Americans would like to see their government pursue. Reflecting on Kissinger's usage of positive linkage, the American public cannot be blamed. It seems that a linkage of SALT to Soviet behavior is the policy that is now in vogue. The invasion by Soviet troops of Afghanistan has certainly not served to dampen this enthusiasm for a linkage of SALT to Soviet geo-political activity. Indeed, this enthusiasm has been significantly buttressed by the statements of many Congressmen and unfortunately by the statements of the Carter Administration.

It would hardly seem necessary to repeat the position that has been continually emphasized in this thesis concerning linkage. The important consideration would seem to be whether or not the position taken is a feasible option within the realm of political reality. Is the idea merely a collection of thoughts that thrives in an untested academic milieu? Or does this advocacy of a non-linkage policy possess the ability to survive the many challenges that the political environment would surely present it with?

When the Carter Administration assumed a policy of non-linkage at the beginning of SALT II negotiations, this was the best news that could have
been reported. Further, the basic maintenance of this non-linkage policy throughout the negotiations demonstrated that such a policy could indeed survive in the political world. Of course, this was not the most severe test that would confront the Carter Administration's non-linkage policy. During the negotiations, the Soviets in terms of geopolitical activity acted in a very exemplary manner. Thus the non-linkage policy was not really tested. But, as everyone knows, that situation drastically changed. The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan was the true test of the non-linkage policy. And, as the test confronted the Carter Administration, it appeared to be the decisive test. Apparently forsaking its earlier advocacy of non-linkage, the Carter Administration seemed to buckle under the tremendous political pressure that was applied by the Congress and by the American public.

This buckling seemed to become very apparent when the administration asked the Senate to defer consideration of the SALT II treaty. It seems clear that the request was made not out of a desire by the Carter Administration to save the treaty from being voted on in an emotionally charged environment. On the contrary, the request was made to demonstrate to the Soviet Union that the American government was not going to remain stoical given the Afghanistan move. Non-linkage was thus forgotten; political pressure made certain of that.

The pressure did not have to produce these results. As was mentioned in the body of this thesis, a postponement of the SALT II vote was certainly necessary to avoid an emotional vote. However, during this hiatus the Carter Administration, while pursuing some sort of policy that would in no uncertain terms let the Soviet Union know that the United States did not accept the Afghanistan move, should have initiated an educational
process designed to persuade Congress and the American public to accept a non-linkage policy. This after all is the job of a statesman. A statesman must use his rhetoric to point out the effectiveness of one policy as opposed to the ineffectiveness of another policy. Since this educational policy has not yet been pursued, it is not really known whether a non-linkage policy was really viable. This thesis concludes that a non-linkage policy properly explained would be politically possible even considering the reality of an aggressive Soviet foreign policy.

There is no question that aggressive Soviet behavior is a reality. The Soviets simply do not see detente in the same light that Americans do. Should American foreign policy simply look the other way when the Soviets go out on these "national liberation" forays? No, they should not. The SALT process will hopefully prevent a nuclear war. But the process will not prevent the breakout of other lesser conflicts. This is why it is essential that strong conventional forces are maintained. It is much more desirable to confront a hot spot with conventional forces rather than nuclear forces. In order to have that option, a conventional force build-up must be advocated.

The United States has a tremendous responsibility. It must be the protector of the free world in times of peace and in times of war. It must recognize the moves of the Soviet Union more quickly than other countries because of its leadership position. It must discern the difference between those movements that threaten world peace and those that do not. In essence, the United States, as leader of the free world, must pursue a foreign policy that checks Soviet "national liberation" moves and also, at every step, attempts to enhance the security of the world. Many people contend that such a foreign policy would be impossible
to implement. Can a SALT treaty be pursued in an environment in which the United States government is organizing a rapid deployment force, advocating draft registration, and increasing the military budget? Can a SALT treaty be pursued in an environment in which the Soviet Union is aggressively expanding its sphere of influence? These questions may have a hard time finding an appropriate answer. However, to give up on a foreign policy that, if successful, would certainly make the world more secure without sacrificing American interests would be a tragic mistake. The only way to avoid such a tragic mistake is to implement the foreign policy that has been advocated in this thesis. This foreign policy must be tried. If it is not, a legacy of fruitful life could be tragically molded into a legacy of fruitless existence.
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