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References To St. Augustine In The Prima Pars Of The Summa Theologica Of St. Thomas Aquinas

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REFERENCES TO ST. AUGUSTINE IN
THE PRIMA PARS OF THE
SUMMA THEOLOGICA OF
ST. THOMAS AQUINAS

by

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A Dissertation
submitted to the Department of Philosophy
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Introduction

St Augustine was born November 13, 354 A.D. at Thagaste, an episcopal city of Numidia, North Africa. He was reared in an age of formidable heresies and in a place that they were rampant. In this age he stood out as a bulwark for the Church against the inroads of heresies and as a defender of the Church. He stood out, not merely as the Church's great defender, but as the keen discriminator between Christianity and all the cunning simulations of heresy. Willfully he would never go wrong. He was the first great Christian philosopher. That there were true thinkers before his day who were Christians, and also could be styled philosophers is not to be denied, and yet it was Augustine who first wrought out a real synthesis of Christian wisdom as combined with what was true and best in the richest elements of Greek philosophy. Augustines chief concern was God and in the omnipotence, eternity and immutability of God the ultimate solution to his greatest problem. He wrote fifteen books on the Trinity. His great aim was to strengthen the Church's position and to do this he attacked her enemies and assailants
He refuted and battled the heresies that were rampant at the
time. He vigorously assailed Arianism, Manicheanism, the Don-
atist, and the Pelagians. Augustine's is not a system nor a
method. It is a spirit which stems from the intuitive wisdom
of such a great personality. The love of God and of charity are
the ultimate source of the Augustinian spirit. He begins with
the soul and ends with God. His chief aim was to ward off the
attacks of the enemies of the Church and to strengthen the
Church's position and thus his method and approach will be
different than that of Thomas.

Saint Thomas' aim in writing was altogether different. His
aim was to synthesize all Catholic Philosophy and Theology for
the use of students and the clergy. In other words he was
writing a handbook for students and thus his method and approach
is different. Thomas gathered all the doctrines of the ancient
and sacred doctors and molded them into a whole. He arranged
them logically and increased them with additions. He handled
all parts of philosophy with acuteness and solidity.

All this work is permeated with references to Augustine for
in doing this he quoted Augustine over a thousand times. He has
absorbed all the vital germs of Augustine. He has sought to cov-
er with all possibility courtesy the exaggerated spiritualism of
Augustine. He did not hesitate to take a contrary position on
questions which he did not find consonant with truth. In this
thesis I will attempt to show how he uses Augustine in answering
objections and questions. I have arranged this dissertation
according to the arrangement of Saint Thomas in the prima pars
which it is my intention to treat. In doing this I have omitted all articles that have no specific reference to Augustine. In this work there are references to the theology of Augustine which are of little bearing on the whole.
All the following quotations are from the prima pars

Question 1
Whether sacred doctrine is a science?
Augustine says, "To this science belongs that whereby saving faith is begotten, nourished, protected, and strengthened."
Thomas says sacred doctrine is a science because it proceeds from principles established by the science of God.
Therefore he proves sacred doctrine is a science.
( a. 2, c, ad 2m. )
Whether this doctrine is the same as wisdom?
Augustine says wisdom is said to be the knowledge of divine things.
Thomas says that sacred doctrine treats essentially of God as the highest cause not only so far as he can be known through creatures but also as far as He is known to Himself alone and revealed to others.
Therefore he proves that sacred doctrine is especially called wisdom.
( a. 6, Resp. )

Question 2
The existence of God.
Whether God exists?
Augustine says, "Since God is the highest good, He would not allow any evil to exist in His works, unless His omnipotence and goodness were such as to bring good even out of evil."
Thomas says the existence of God can be proved in five ways.
He has used Augustine to refute the arguments of his opponents who claim that due to the fact of the existence of evil in the world there is no God.
Question 3

Whether God is altogether simple?

Augustine says, "God is truly and absolutely simple." Thomas says the simplicity of God may be shown in many ways. He uses Saint Augustine to prove that God is truly and absolutely simple and to refute the arguments that a composite is better than a simple element.

(a. 7, c.)

Whether God enters into the composition of other things?

Augustine says, "The word of God, which is God, is an uncreated form."

Thomas says the word is an exemplar form; but not a form that is part of a compound.

He uses Saint Augustine to prove that God is a form but not in composition with anything and to refute the arguments that God is a part of some compound. Also to prove that God is not a world soul.

(a. 8, obj. 2, ad 2m.)

Question 5

Of goodness in general

Whether goodness differs really from being?

Augustine says, "Inasmuch as we are good we are good."

Thomas says goodness and being are really the same, and differ only in idea.

Hence anything that is must be good for anything that is is a being.

(a. 1, c., Resp.)

Whether goodness has the aspect of a final cause?
Augustine says, "We exist because God is good."

Thomas says we exist because God is good has reference to the final cause. He who has a will is said to be good, so far as he has a good will.

Thus it is established that we are good due to the goodness of God and all goodness is reducible to God.

(a. 4, obj. 3, ad 3m.)

Whether the essence of goodness consists in mode, species and order?

Augustine says, "Measure fixes the mode of everything, number gives it species, and weight gives it rest and stability. These three are common good things in everything that God has made."

Thomas says these three only follow upon being, so far as it is perfect; for in that way only is it desirable. A thing is said to be perfect if it lacks nothing according to the mode of perfection and these three are parts of the perfection.

Hence the essence of goodness consists also in mode, species and order. Evil is a privation of mode, species and order.

(a. 5, obj. 1, c., ad 1m, resp.)

Question 6

The goodness of God

Whether God is the supreme good?

Augustine says, "The Trinity of the divine persons is the supreme good, discerned by the purified mind."

Thomas says that everything is good and that God is the supreme good for good is attributed to God. Also good is in God as the cause of all things.

He shows that God is the supreme good and he refutes the
the arguments that God can not be called the supreme good in relation to others.

( a. 2, c. , resp. )

Whether all things are good by divine goodness ?

Augustine says, " This and that are good; take away this and that, and see good itself if thou canst; and so thou shall see God, good not by any other good, but the good of every good."

Thomas says that everything is good by that very good which is God. All things are called good according as they are directed by God.

He uses Augustine to show the basis and cause of all good is God.

( a. 4, obj. 1, resp. )

Question 8

Is God in all things ?

Augustine says, " That in Him things are, rather than He is in any place."

Thomas says God is in things as containing them and it is said all things are in God. God is in all things indeed but not as part of their essence but as an agent is present to that upon which it works.

Hence he refutes the argument that God is not in all things and clearly establishes the fact of God's imminence and omnipresence.

( a. 1, obj. 2, ad 2m. )

Whether to be everywhere belongs to God alone ?

Augustine says, " The soul is whole in the body, and whole
in every one of its parts. The soul feels where it sees, and
is where it lives."

Thomas says if there were one animal only its soul would
be everywhere primarily. When it is said that the soul sees
anywhere this can be taken in two senses. But it follows the
soul is not everywhere. To be everywhere belongs properly to
God alone.

Hence it is clear that God and God alone is everywhere.
(a. 4, obj. 5, obj. 6, ad 5m, ad 6m.)

Question 9
The immutability of God
Whether God alone is immutable?
Augustine says, "The creator moves Himself neither by time
nor by place.

Thomas says that God is altogether immutable and movement
belongs in no way to Him.

He shows that Augustine speaks the same as Plato calling
every operation a movement even the acts of understanding. He
clearly establishes the fact that God doesn't move and doesn't
acquire anything new.
(a. 1, obj. 1, ad 1m.)

Whether to be immutable belongs to God alone?
Augustine says, "God alone is immutable; and whatever things
He made, being from nothing they are mutable."

Thomas says God alone is immutable, whereas, every creature
is in some way mutable.
(a. 2, c., resp.)
Question 10

The eternity of God.

Whether God is eternal?

Augustine says, "God is the author of eternity."

Thomas has a different opinion for he explains Augustine's definition whereby he differs and shows that Augustine means participated eternity. He communicates His eternity to things. God is eternal only and is His own eternity.

Hence it is clear and certain that God and God alone is an eternal being. Eternity is nothing but God Himself.

(a. 2, obj. 1, ad 1a.)

Whether to be eternal belongs to God alone?

Augustine says, "As regards the vision of the Word, no changing thoughts exists in the saints."

Thomas says those who see God are said to have eternal life; according to the text, "This is eternal life, that they may know Thee the only true God, etc. " (John xvii. 3.).

Thus it follows that no other thing is eternal but, participate in heaven in the eternity once they have attained their final end but all have had a beginning except God.

(a. 3, resp.)

The difference of aeviternity and time

Augustine says that God moves the spiritual creature through space. That to be moved through time is also to be moved by affections."

Thomas says aeviternity differs from time and from eternity. The difference is that eternity had no beginning nor end while aeviternity had a beginning but will have no end. This is an accidental difference only.
Things are measured by aeviternity and they have a share of eternity. Eternity is not compatible with eternity.

(a. 4, obj. 1, ad 1m.)

Question 12

How God is known to us

Whether the essence of God is seen by the created intellect through an image?

Augustine says, "When we know God some likeness of God is made in us. That when the apostle says "We see through a glass and in an enigma " by the term "las " and enigma certain similitudes are signified by him, which are accommodated to the vision of God."

Thomas says that Augustine is speaking of knowledge of God here on earth. He denies and says the opposite of the opinion of Augustine that we see through a similitude God.

(a. 2, obj. 2, c., ad 2m, resp.)

Whether the essence of God can be seen by the corporeal eye?

Augustine says, "No one has ever seen God either in this life, as He is, nor in the angelic life, as visible things are seen by the corporeal eye."

Thomas says it is impossible for God to be seen by the sense of sight or by any other sense or faculty of the sensitive power.

It is clear that God can not be seen by man with his limited faculties. The imagination can give us a representation though imperfect of Him though it can not represent His essence to us.

(a. 3, c., resp.)

Whether any created intellect can comprehend the essence of
God?

Augustine says, "That is comprehended which is so seen as a whole, that nothing of it is hidden from the seer. It is impossible for any created creature to comprehend God; yet for the mind to attain to God in some degree is some great beatitude."

Thomas says using the words of Augustine for the mind to attain to God in some degree is a great beatitude. Thus it is impossible for the intellect to comprehend God. He says that God is called incomprehensible because He is not seen as perfectly as He might be seen.

This is impossible for God is incomprehensible and thus we can not see Him perfectly as He might be seen.

( a. 7, obj. 2, c., ad 7m. )

Whether God can be known in this life by natural reason?
Augustine says, "The weak eye of the human mind is not fixed on that excellent light unless purified by the justice of faith."

Thomas says that knowledge of God belongs to the good only, knowledge of Him by natural reason can belong to both good and bad.

It follows that we can not know of God's essence but we can know of God and of His existence.

( a. 12, obj. 3, ad 3m. )

Question 13
The names of God.
Whether any name can be applied to God substantially?
Augustine says, "The being of God is the being strong, or the being wise or whatever else we may say of that simplicity whereby His substance is signified."

Thomas says negative names applied to God signifying His relation to creatures manifestly do not at all signify His substance but rather the relation of creatures to Himself. These names signify the divine substance are predicated substantially of God, although they fall short of full representation of Him.

The negative names applied to God do not signify His substance but rather the relation of creatures to Himself.

( a. 2, c. resp.)

Question 14

Of God's knowledge

Whether God understands Himself?

Augustine says, "We are like to God in our intellect because we are images of God in our mind."

Thomas says that God is pure act in the order of existence, as also in the order of intelligible objects; therefore He understands Himself through Himself.

Hence it is manifestly clear that God comprehends Himself.

( a. 2, obj. 3, ad 3m.)

Whether God comprehends Himself?

Augustine says, "That whatever comprehends itself is finite as regards itself. The whole is comprehended when seen, if it is seen in such a way that nothing of it is hidden from the seer, everything that understands itself comprehends itself."

Thomas differs from Augustine in saying that God is not to be comprehended by Himself in this sense for the reason that no-
thing in Himself is hidden from Himself. Whence it is manifest that He knows Himself as much as He is knowable; and for that reason He perfectly comprehends Himself.

From the statements of the two it is manifestly clear that God explicitly comprehends Himself.

( a. 3, obj. 1, c., ad 1m. )

Whether the act of God's intelligence is His Substance? Augustine says, "In God to be is the same as to be wise." Thomas says the act of God's intellect is His substance. It follows that as the act of God's intellect is His substance, the act of understanding must be His essence and His existence.

( a. 4, c., resp. )

Whether God knows things other than Himself? Augustine says that "God does not behold anything out of Himself." Thomas differs with Augustine on this point and says but that what is outside God He does not see except in Himself. But God necessarily knows things other than Himself.

It is clear from the statements that God does know things outside Himself.

( a. 5, obj. 1, ad 1m. )

Whether the knowledge of God is discursive? Augustine says that God does not see all things in their peculiarity or separately, as if He saw alternately here and there; but He sees all things together at once."

Thomas says in divine knowledge there is no discursion. God sees all things in one, which is Himself. Therefore He sees all things together and not discursively.
He sees effects in Himself as in their cause and sees the effects of created causes in the cause themselves and thus sees all things at once.

(a. 7, c., resp.)

Whether the knowledge of God is the cause of things?

Augustine says, "Not because they are, does God know all creatures spiritual and temporal, but because He knows them, therefore they are.

Thomas says that the knowledge of God is the cause of things. This is called the knowledge of approbation.

His knowledge is the cause of things as long as His will is joined to it. But it is clear that the knowledge of God is the cause of things.

(a. 8, c., resp.)

Whether God knows evil things?

Augustine says, "Evil is a privation of good. The divine essence neither is the likeness of evil, nor is evil contrary to it; for nothing is contrary to the divine essence."

Thomas says God knows evil not by privation existing in Himself, but by the opposite good.

Hence God knows evil since it is opposed to the effects of God and by their opposite.

(a. 10, obj. 1, ad lmr.)

Whether God can know infinite things?

Augustine says, "Whatever is comprehended by knowledge, is bounded by the comprehension of the knower; although we can know we can not number the infinite, nevertheless, it can be comprehended by Him whose knowledge has no bounds."
Thomas says to know the infinite according to the mode of the infinite is to know part after part. God knows all things simultaneously and thus He knows the infinite but not part after part and His knowledge extends to infinite things even as distinct from each other.

God knows the infinite due to knowing things actual and possible to Himself.

( a. 12, obj. 1, c., ad 1m, resp. )

Question 15
Of ideas
Whether ideas are many?
Augustine says, "Each thing was created by God according to the idea proper to it, from which it follows that in the divine mind ideas are many." Thomas says it must necessarily be held that ideas are many. It is clear that God understands many particular types of many things, and these are many ideas.

Hence there are many ideas.
( a. 2, Resp. )

Whether there are ideas?
Augustine says, "Such is the power inherent in ideas, that no one can be wise unless they are understood."

Thomas says ideas are understood as the forms of things existing apart from the things themselves thus we must suppose ideas.

It is necessary to suppose ideas in the divine mind and they must exist in the world.
( a. 1, c., resp. )
Whether there are ideas of all things that God knows?

Augustine says, "There are no ideas of these according to Plato's teaching."

Thomas says that ideas are types existing in the divine mind as is clear from Augustine. But that God has the proper types of all things that He knows; and therefore He has ideas of all things known by Him.

He shows that God knows all things according to their proper type and thus there are ideas of all things that God knows but they exist in the divine mind.

(a. 3, obj. 4, ad 4m.)

Question 16

Of truth

Whether truth resides in the thing or only in the intellect?

Augustine condemns definitions of truth and defines truth as that is true which is, truth is that whereby is made manifest that which is. Truth is a supreme likeness without any unlikeness to principle.

Thomas says truth denotes that towards which the intellect tends. Although the truth of our intellect is caused by the thing it is not necessary that the truth should be there primarily any more than health should be in medicine.

Hence according to Aristotle the thought or word is true from the fact that a thing is, not because a thing is true, thus he uses Augustine to refute the arguments that truth rests primarily in the intellect.

(a. 1, obj. 1, resp.)
Whether good is primarily prior to truth?
Augustine says, "That virtue is a good quality of the mind."
Thomas differs from Augustine for he calls that virtue which is called truth is not truth in general, but a certain kind of truth according to which man shows himself in deed and word as he really is. He shows the true must be prior in idea to good.

Although the good and true are convertible with being they differ logically. We can not argue from truths in particular to truth in general. The true must be prior in idea to the good.

(a. 4, obj. 3, ad 3m.)

Whether God is truth?
Augustine says, "Truth is a likeness to the principle."
Thomas says truth is in God also that He is truth itself and the sovereign and first truth. The truth of our intellect is according to their conformity with the divine intellect. This can not be said of divine truth.

It follows that God is the truth and all things are true according as they agree with His intellect.

(a. 5, obj. 2, ad 2m.)

Whether there is only one truth?
Augustine says, "Nothing is greater than the mind of man except God."
Thomas says nothing subsisting is greater than the rational soul except God. Although the essences or forms of things are many, yet the truth of the divine intellect is one, in conformity to which all things are said to be true.

God is the one truth according to which all things are true. If they do not conform with His standards they are false.
( a. 6, obj. 1, resp. )

Whether created truth is eternal?

Augustine says, "Nothing is more eternal than the nature of a circle, and that two and three make five."

Thomas shows that Augustine is wrong in this for they are created truths and these are aeviternal. The eternity they have is in the mind of God. The only thing that is eternal is God. If no intellect were eternal no truth would be eternal. Now because the divine truth only is eternal, in it alone truth has eternity.

It is clear that created things can not be eternal for the only thing that can be eternal is God. Before the created things was God and thus they can not be eternal.

( a. 7, obj. 1, resp. )

Whether truth is immutable?

Augustine says, "Truth and mind do not rank as equals, otherwise truth would be mutable as the mind is."

Thomas says that Augustine is speaking of divine truth. The truth of the divine intellect is that according to which natural things are said to be true and this is altogether immutable.

The thing which is true can not change though things which due to false opinions are said to be true are can change.

( a. 8, obj. 1, ad Im, resp. )

Question 17

Concerning falsity

Whether falsity exists in things?

Augustine says, "If the true is that which is, it will be concluded that the false exists nowhere; whatever reason may
appear to the contrary. Things do not deceive; for, they show nothing but their own species. Every body is a true body and a false unity; for it imitates unity without being an unity. We call those things false that appear to our apprehension like the true."

Thomas says a thing compared with the intellect is said to to be true in respect to what it is; and false in respect to what it is not. Things do not deceive by their own nature, but by accident. Since true and false are opposed we must needs seek falsity where primarily we find truth that is to say in the intellect.

Falsity depends upon the intellect which is erroneous. Thus falsity does not exist in the thing for ontological error is impossible for a thing has to be what it is.

( a. 1, obj. 1, obj. 2, c., ad 1m, ad 2m, resp. )

Whether there is falsity in the senses?

Augustine says, "If all the bodily senses report as they are affected I do not know what more we can require of them. It appears that the senses entrap us into error by their deceptive similitudes.

Thomas says the affection of the senses is its sensation itself thus we are not deceived in the judgement by which we judge that we experience sensation. Falsity is not to be sought in the senses except as truth in them. Falsity exists in the senses due to apprehending things to be other than they are.

He uses Augustine to refute the arguments falsity is said to be proper to the senses. The senses can not be de-
received as to their proper object

The falsity exists due to apprehending things as they are not.

(2.2, ob. 1, c., ad 1m, resp.)

Whether falsity is in the intellect? Augustine says, "Everyone who is deceived, understands not that which he is deceived." The intellect shows in what point Augustine is off for one can be deceived in the operation of his intellect. The intellect can not be false in its knowledge of simple essences, but it either understands nothing at all. Falsity of the intellect occurs accidentally in that operation of the intellect whereby it knows the essence of a thing, in so far as the composition of the intellect is mixed up in it for the essence of a thing is the proper object of the intellect. He uses Augustine to show falsity is not in the senses and that no one is ever deceived in any operation of the intellect.

Thomas says truth and falsity as opposites of contraries, and
not, as affirmation and negation. He denies Augustine's statement
that truth, because a tragedian would not be a false Hector, if he
were not a true tragedian. Nothing is contrary to the divine
substance. It is clear that truth and falsity are contrary.

God there is no contrariety. Augustine says, "Truth is that which is. Falsity is in truth, because a tragedian would not be a false Hector, if he
were not a true tragedian. Nothing is contrary to the divine
substance. It is clear that truth and falsity are contrary.

Whether true and false are contraries?

Thomas says truth and falsity as opposites of contraries, and
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that truth, because a tragedian would not be a false Hector, if he
were not a true tragedian. Nothing is contrary to the divine
substance. It is clear that truth and falsity are contrary.
Question 18
The life of God
Whether all things are life in God?
Augustine says, "A living substance is better than a substance that does not live."

Thomas says anything actual is more perfect than a potential being for potentiality denotes a certain lack of perfection. ACTuality is needed to make the thing perfect.

It belongs to human nature to be material which existing in the mind of God it does not. All things in Him are divine life.

Question 19
The will of God
Whether any cause can be assigned to the divine will?
Augustine says, "Who would venture to say that God made all things irrationally. Every efficient cause is greater than the thing effected."

Thomas says that the will of God is reasonable in so far as He wills one thing to be the cause of another. In no way has the will of God a cause. Since the will follows from the intellect. He will this to be as a cause to that but He does not will this on account of that.

He uses Augustine to refute the arguments that God made all things irrationally. God has made all things rationally. God by one act understands all things and He wills all things by one
act his goodness.

( a. 5, obj. 1, c., ad im, resp. )

Whether the will of God is always fulfilled?

Augustine says, "God wills all men to be saved that are saved, not because there is no man whom He does not wish to be saved, but because there is no man whose salvation He does not will."

Thomas says the will of God must needs always be fulfilled. He shows everything in so far as it is willed by God is good. Thus it is clear that whatever God simply will takes place; although what He wills antecedently may not take place.

It naturally follows that whatever God wills is good and takes place. The wicked fall back into that order whence they have strayed due to the fact they will be punished by justice.

( a. 6, ad lm. )

Whatever the will of God wills imposes necessity on the thing willed?

Augustine says, "No man is saved, except those whom God has willed to be saved. He must therefore be asked to will it; for if He wills it, it must necessarily be."

Thomas disputes these words of Augustine and says we must understand a necessity in things willed by God that is not absolute, but conditional. The divine will imposes an necessity on some things willed but not on all.

The necessity in the things willed by God is conditional for He has willed things necessarily and contingently.

( a. 8, obj. 1, ad lm. )

Whether God wills evil
Augustine says, "Although evil in so far as it is evil is not a good, yet it is good that not only good things should exist, but also evil things. Evil properly ordered and disposed, commends the good the more evidently in that good is more pleasing and praiseworthy when contrasted with evil. No wise man is the cause of another man becoming worse. Thus God who is infinitely good cannot cause evil."

Thomas says some have said that although God does not will evil, yet He wills that evil should be or be done. This, however, is wrong. Since evil is opposed to the good, it is impossible that any evil, as such should be sought for by the appetite but it may be sought accidentally. God in no way wills the evil.

God does not will evil things; He merely allows them to be, He neither will evil to be done, nor wills it to be an object of the appetites. He merely permits evil to be done.

(a. 9, obj. 1, obj. 2, c., ad lm, resp.)

Whether five expressions of will are rightly assigned to the divine will?

Augustine says nothing is done, unless the Almighty wills it to be done, either by permitting it, or by actually doing it."

Thomas says the same five are sometimes denominated with regard to the divine will, as the expression of that will.

The five expressions of the will are rightly assigned to the divine will.

(a. 12, resp.)

Question 20

God's love
Whether God loves all things equally?

Augustine says, "God loves all things He has made, and amongst them rational creatures more, and of these especially those who are members of His only begotten Son; and much more than all, His only-begotten Son Himself.

Thomas says since to love a thing is to will it good, in a twofold way anything may be loved more or less. Since God's love is the cause of goodness in things no one thing would be greater than another, if God did not will greater good for one than for another.

In one way on the part of the act of the will itself God does not love some things more than others because He loves all things by an act of the will. In another way on the part of the good itself that a person wills for the beloved. In this way we are said to love that one more than another for whom He wills a greater good. Hence the will of God varies.

( a. 3, c., resp. )

Whether God always loves more the better things?

Augustine says commenting on the words, "Simon, son of John, lovst thou Me?" By this very mark is distinguished from the other disciples, not that He loved him only, but that He loved him more than the rest."

Thomas says Augustine interprets it mystically. God loves more the better things due to His willing for these things the greater good. He says absolutely speaking Peter was the more beloved.

The will of God is the cause of goodness in things and the ordered arrangement of things shows that God loves some things better than others and He loved the better the more.

Question 22
Whether everything is subject to the providence of God? Augustine says, "Almighty God would in no wise permit evil to exist in His works, unless He were so almighty and so good as to produce good from evil." Thomas says certain persons totally denied the existence of providence. Others state that only corruptible things are subject to His providence. All things must of necessity come under His orderings; as all things wrought by art are subject to the orderings of that art. He uses Augustine to show all things exist only due to the goodness of the almighty.

(a. 2, ad 2m.)

Whether God has immediate providence over everything? Augustine says; "It is better to be ignorant of some things than to know them, for example, vile things." Thomas says it is better for us not to know low and vile things because by them we are impeded in our knowledge of what is higher and better; and because the thought of evil sometimes perverts the will towards evil.

Thus this does not hold for God Who sees everything simultaneously at one glance and whose will can not turn in the direction of evil. Thus it is advisable for us to avoid all things evil for we may be turned towards this.

Question 24
Of predestination
Whether the foreknowledge of merits is the cause of predestination.

Augustine says, "Predestination is the purpose to have
mercy. Why He draw and another He draws not, seek to judge, if thou dost not wish to err."

Thomas says since predestination includes the will the reason of predestination must be sought for in the same way as the reason of the will of God. It is manifest that what is the effect of predestination is contained in the notion of predestination. Predestination has its foundation in the goodness of God as regards its effects in general.

Merit is not the cause of divine predestination as regards the act of the predestinator. Predestination has its foundation in the goodness of God and that there is no injustice on the part of God in making one thing better than another.

( a. 7, obj. 2, ad 2m, ad 3m. )

Whether predestination is certain?
Augustine says, "Another will not receive, unless this one were to lose."

Thomas says the crown may be said to belong to a person in two ways; first by God's predestination, and thus no one loses his crown; secondly by the merit of grace; for what we merit, in a certain way is ours; and thus anyone may lose his crown by mortal sin. Thus he who is substituted for another in the state of grace. He also receives the crown of the fallen. Predestination most certainly takes place, it is a part of providence.

He uses Augustine to show that the predestined will be saved and for every fallen person there is one to take his place. Predestination is a thing that is certain and infallible.

( a. 6, obj. 1, ad 1m. )

Whether the number of predestined is certain?
Augustine says, "The number of predestined is certain. This
This is certain to God that is to say the number of the pre-
destined is certain formally and materially by reason of His
deliberate choice and determination. To God alone is known the
number for whom is reserved eternal happiness.

Thus it is certain that God knows the number that are pre-
destined. Both formally and materially the number of the predest-
ined is certain.

( a. 7, c., resp. )

Question 24
The book of life

Whether the book of life is the same as predestination ?

Augustine says, "The book of life is a certain divine energy
by which it happens that to each one his good or evil works are
recalled to memory."

Thomas differs from Augustine in his description for he
says the book of life may be that by which we are called to life
or in another way it may be the inscription of those things
which lead us to life. The book of life is taken in a metamorph-
ical sense in God. Hence the knowledge of God by which He firmly
remembers that He has predestined some to eternal life is called
the book of life.

Thus the book of life may be taken in two senses. If it is
taken in God it must be taken in a metamorphical sense.

( a. 1, obj. 2, ad lm. )

Whether anyone may be blotted out of the book of life ?
Augustine says, "God’s foreknowledge, which cannot be de-
ceived, is the book of life."
Thomas says the act of blotting out does not refer to the book of life as regards God's foreknowledge, as if in God there were any change; but as regards things foreknown, which can change.

It is according to how you take the attempt at explanation. Thus if you commit mortal sin in a way you are blotted out.

( a. 3, obj. 1, ad 1m. )

Question 25
The power of God
Whether the power of God is infinite?
Augustine says, "God does not cause instantaneous movement, but moves the spiritual creatures in time, and the corporeal creatures in place and time."

Thomas says the greater the power of the moving body, the more quickly does it move; the necessary conclusion is that if its power were infinite it would move beyond comparison faster, and this is to move without time which is a contradiction to the statement of Augustine. The divine essence through which God acts is infinite thus it follows that His power likewise is infinite.

( a. 2, obj. 3, ad 3m. )

Whether God can make the past not to have been?
Augustine says, "Whosoever says, if God is almighty, let Him make what is done as if it were not done, doesn't seem that this is to say: if God is almighty let Him effect that what is true, by the very fact that it is true, be false."

Thomas says that the past should not have been implies a contradiction. Only the possible falls under the power of God and that the past should not have been implies an impossibility.
He uses Augustine to show why this involves a contradiction and God can do all things but He does not do the impossible such as making a square circle.

( a. 4, resp. )

Whether what He makes He could make better?

Augustine says, "Each thing that God made is good, and, taken all together they are very good; because in them all consists the wondrous beauty of the universe. If God could, but would not, beget a Son His equal, He would have been envious."

Thomas says the universe, the present creation being supposed, can not be better, on account of the most beautiful order given to things by God; in which the good of the universe consists yet by adding something to the present creation, He could make another and better universe. It is of a nature of a son that he should be equal to his father, when he comes to maturity. Nothing created should be better than it was made by God. Hence the comparison fails.

Hence due to the fact that God's power is infinite and all things are possible to Him thus He could make a better universe. Yet it is not the nature of anything created that it could be better.

( a. 6, obj. 2, obj. 3, ad 2m, ad 3m. )

Question 26

Of the divine beatitude

Whether God is the beatitude of each of the blessed?

Augustine says, "Blessed is he who knoweth Thee, though he ought know else."

Thomas says beatitude is a created thing in beatified creat-
ures; that he understands God.

He uses Augustine showing God is the beatitude of each of the blessed for He is the only beatitude.

(a. 3, resp.)

Question 28
The divine relations
Whether relation in God is the same as His essence?

Augustine says, "Not all that is said of His substance, is said of God for we say some things relatively, as Father in respect to the Son; but such things do not refer to the substance. Every relative expression is something besides the relation expressed, as master is a man, and slave is a man."

Thomas says that the words of Augustine do not imply that paternity or any other relation that is in God is not in its very being the same as the divine essence; but that it is not predicated under the mode of substance, but as a relation. It does not follow that there exists in God anything besides relation in reality; but only in the various names imposed by us. God's relation and essence do not differ from each other, but are one and the same.

(a. 2, obj. 2, obj. 1, ad lm, ad 2m.)

Question 29
The divine persons
Whether this word person signifies relation?

Augustine says, "When we speak of the person of the Father, we mean nothing but the substance of the Father, for person is
said in regard to Himself, and not in regard to the Son. When we say that there are three who bear witness in heaven, the Father, the Word, and the Holy Ghost, and it is asked, Three what? the answer is, Three persons."

Thomas says the word person is said in respect to itself, not to another; for as much as it signifies relation not as such, but by way of a substance - which is hypostasis. In that sense Augustine says that it signifies the essence. The term what refers sometimes to the nature expressed by the definition, and sometimes to the suppositum. The word person means relation not only by use and custom but also by force of its own proper signification.

Thus it is clear that the word person implies a relation.

(a. 4, obj. 1, obj. 2, ad 1m, ad 2m.)

Question 30
The plurality of persons in God
Whether there are more than three persons in God?
Augustine says, "To those who ask, three what we answer three persons."

Thomas says when we speak of the number of things as applied to the person in God, the notion of measure has no place, because the magnitude of the three persons is the same and the same is not measured. There can be only three persons in God.

With the aid of Augustine it is established that there are only three persons in God because a real distinction can come only from relative opposition.

(a. 2, c., resp.)
Whether this term person can be common to the three persons? Augustine says, "When we ask, Three what? we say, Three persons because what a person is is common to them." Thomas says the very mode of expression itself shows that this term person is common to the three when we say three persons. This term person is common in idea to the three divine persons. Thus it has been clearly established that the term is common to them all.

(a. 4, c., resp.)

Question 31
Of what belongs to the unity or plurality in God
Whether the Son is other than the Father?
Augustine says, "When we speak of the three persons, we do not mean to imply diversity. There is one essence of the Father and the Son and the Holy Ghost, in which the Father is not one thing, the Son another, and the Holy Ghost another although the Father is one person, the Son another, and the Holy Ghost another."

Thomas says we cannot say that the Son is diverse from the Father, although He is another. We can say that the Son is other than the Father because He is another suppositum of the divine nature, as He is another person and hypostasis.

Diversity requires a distinct substance in the sense of essence and thus we cannot say that the Son is diverse from the Father. They all have the same essence although the Father is one, the Son another, and the Holy Ghost another. They have the distinction of suppositum.

(a. 2, obj. l, c., ad lm, resp.)

Whether the exclusive word alone should be added to the essential term in God?
Augustine says, "We must consider the opinion that the Father is not a true God alone."

Thomas says nothing prevents the term alone being joined to any essential term in God, as excluding the predicate from all things but God; as if we said, God alone is eternal, because nothing but God is eternal.

This term may be used when applied to God and may be used in two senses.

(a. 3, obj. 2, resp.)

Whether an exclusive diction can be joined to the personal term?

Augustine says, "We say the Father alone, not because He is separate from the Son, or from the Holy Ghost, but because they are not the Father together with Him."

Thomas says this diction alone, properly speaking, refers to the subject, it tends to exclude another Person rather than other things. Hence such a way of speaking is not to be taken too literally, but it should be piously expounded, whenever we find it in an authentic work. He says that Augustine's way is not the usual way of talking.

This is true according as how you take it. It is true if taken in the neuter sense.

(a. 4, resp.)

Question 32

The knowledge of the divine persons

Whether the Trinity of the divine persons can be known by natural reason?

Augustine says, "I have read in their works, not in so many words, but inferred by many and various reasons, that in the be-
ginner was the Word, and the Word was with God, and that Word was in God. He proceeds to prove the Trinity of persons by the procession of the word and of love in our own mind.

Thomas says in the Platonic books are in the beginning was the word meaning the ideal type whereby God made all things and which is appropriated to the Son. It is impossible to attain to the knowledge of the Trinity by natural reason though by natural reason we can know what belongs to the unity of the essence, but not what belongs to the distinction of the persons.

It is clear that the only way we can arrive at a knowledge of the Trinity is by faith which gives us positive knowledge.

Whether it is lawful to have various contrary opinions of notions?

Augustine says, "No error is more dangerous than any as regards the Trinity."

Thomas says that a false opinion is a heresy and involves heresy especially if held obstinately.

Thus it is clear that we can not have various opinions concerning faith and the dogmas of faith but if they are not notions of faith we may have diverse opinions.

( a. 1, obj. 1, obj. 2, ad lm, resp. )

Question 33
Of the person of the Father
Whether it belongs to the Father to be the principle?

Augustine says, "The Father is the principle of the whole Deity."

Thomas says that the word principle signifies only that whence another proceeds, as the Father then is the one whence another
proceeds, it follows that the Father is a principle.

He gives Augustine's statement and then goes on to clarify it and to solve the question.

( a. 1, obj. 1, resp. )

Whether it is proper to the Father to be unbegotten?

Augustine says, "Unbegotten imports the negation of passive generation. For he says that unbegotten has the same meaning as "not a son."

Thomas says that it does not belong or follow that unbegotten is not the proper notion of the Father; for the primary and simple things are notified by negations; as for instance, a point is defined as what has no parts. But as the principle, not from a principle He is known by fact that He is not from another; and this belongs to the property of innascibility, signified by the word unbegotten.

The name unbegotten applies to the Father.

( a. 4, ad 1m, resp. )

Question 34.

Of the person of the Son.

Whether word in God is a personal name?

Augustine says, "The word is knowledge with love. Therefore do we speak of the Word of God, and not of thought of God, lest we believe that in God there is something unstable, now assuming the form of word, now as putting of that form and remaining latent and as it were formless. As the Son is neither related to the Father, so also is the Word to Him Whose Word He is. Whoever can understand the Word, not only before it is sounded, but also before thought has clothed it with imaginary sounds, can already see some likeness of that Word Whom it is said..."
In the beginning was the Word."

Thomas says the name of Word in God, if taken in the proper sense is a personal name, and in no way an essential name. The term Word, according as we use the term strictly of God, is to be taken as said not essentially, but personally.

Thus it is clear that the name Word must be taken personally.

( a. l, obj. 2, c., ad 2m, ad 3m, resp. )

Whether Word is the Son's proper name?

Augustine says, "By Word we understand the Son alone." He refutes the heresy of Valetian which said the Son proceeded from the Father by way of utterance. Word and Son express the same.

Thomas says Word said of God in its proper sense, is used personally and is the proper name of the person of the Son. The Son's nativity is signified by different terms to express His perfection in various ways.

He uses Augustine to prove nothing belonging to the intellect can be applied to God personally, except word alone. The term is taken personally and is applied to the Son. The Son alone is properly called the Word in God.

( a. 2, obj. 2, c., resp., ad 3m. )

Whether the name Word imports relation to creatures?

Augustine says, "The name word signifies not only relation to the Father, but also relation to those beings which are made through the Word, by His operative power. The word of God contains no less than does the knowledge of God."

Thomas says the name Word implies relation to creatures.

( a. 3, c., ad 5m, resp. )
Question 35
Of the image
Whether image in God is said personally?
Augustine says, "The Godhead of the Holy Trinity and the Image whereunto man is made are one. One egg is not the image of another, because it is not derived from it."

Thomas says image includes the idea of similitude and hence the name image is a personal name.
Thus the term image is used personally.
( a. 1, obj. 1, resp. )

Whether the name of image is proper to the Son?
Augustine says, "The Son alone is the image of the Father."

Thomas says there is nothing to prevent there being one image of the Father and the Son, inasmuch as they are one; since even man is one image of the whole Trinity.
Thus it is clear from the foregoing that the Son is the image of the Father.
( a. 2, c., resp. )

Question 36
Of the person of the Holy Ghost
Whether this name Holy Ghost is the proper name of one divine person?

Augustine says, "When we ask three what? we say three persons. Because the Holy Ghost is common to both, He Himself is called that properly which are both called in common. For the Father is also a spirit; and the Son is a spirit; and the Father is Holy and the Son is holy.

Thomas says because the divine persons proceed by way of the love whereby God is loved, that person is most named the
Holy Ghost.

The name Holy Ghost does not imply an relation, still it takes the place of a relative term, inasmuch as it is accommodated to signify a Person distinct from the others by relation only. Thus the name is the proper name of one of the divine persons.

(a. 1, c., resp.)

Whether the Father and Son are one principle of the Holy Ghost?

Augustine says, "The Father and the Son are not two principles, but one principle of the Holy Ghost."

Thomas says that the Father and the Son are in everything one. Since there is no relative opposite between them as the principle of the Holy Ghost it follows that the Father and the Son are one principle of the Holy Ghost.

Thus from the reasoning of Thomas and Augustine it follows that the statement is true.

(a. 4, c., resp.)

Question 37

Of the name of the Holy Ghost - Love

Whether Love is the proper name of the Holy Ghost?

Augustine says, "As the Father, Son, and Holy Ghost are called Wisdom, and are not three Wisdoms, but one; I know not why the Father, Son and Holy Ghost should not be called Charity, and all together one Charity."

Thomas says the name Love can be taken essentially and personally. If taken personally it is the proper name of the Holy Ghost; as Word is the proper name of the Son. He shows that Augustine is speaking of charity as it means the divine essence.
(a. 1, obj. 1, resp.)

Whether Love is the proper name of the Holy Ghost?

Augustine says: "The Holy Ghost is He whereby the Begotten is loved by the one begetting and loves His Begotten. The Father is not wise by the wisdom begotten."

Thomas says the name of love in God can be taken essentially and personally. If it is taken personally it is the proper name of the Holy Ghost; as Word is the proper name of the Son.

It follows from the use of Augustine in clarifying the idea and his explanation that Love is the proper name of the Holy Ghost.

(a. 2, obj. 1, c., resp.)

Question 38
Of the name of the Holy Ghost, as Gift.

Whether Gift is a personal name?

Augustine says, "As the body of flesh is nothing but flesh; so the gift of the Holy Ghost is nothing but the Holy Ghost. The Holy Ghost is so given as God's gift, that He also gives Himself as God."

Thomas says the word gift imports an aptitude for being given. The name gift imports a personal distinction, in so far as gift imports, something belonging to another through its origin, nevertheless, the Holy Ghost gives Himself, inasmuch as He is His own, and can use or rather enjoy Himself. The word Gift imports an aptitude for being given. And what is given has the aptitude to be given. Thus a divine person can be given and can be a gift.

He uses Augustine to show that the Holy Ghost gives Himself and in this case gift is the same as giver. Thus gift as a name
can be given to the Holy Ghost.

( a. 1, obj. 1, c., resp. )

Whether Gift is a proper name of the Holy Ghost?

Augustine says, "As to be born is for the Son, to be from the Father, so, for the Holy Ghost, to be the gift of God is to proceed from the Father and Son."

Thomas says Gift must be taken personally to be the proper name of the Holy Ghost.

It is clear that the name Gift is a proper name of the Holy Ghost due to the donation being given gratuitously is the love.

( a. 2, c., resp. )

Question 39

Of the persons in relation to the essence.

Whether in God the essence is the same as the person?

Augustine says, "When we say the person of the Father we mean nothing else but the substance of the Father."

Thomas says relations as referred to the essence does not differ therefore really, but only in our way of thinking; while as referred to the opposite relation, it has real distinction by virtue of that opposition. There is one essence and three persons.

It is clearly seen that there is three persons but only one essence.

( a. 1, c., resp. )

Whether it must be said that the three persons are of one essence?

Augustine says, "We do not say that three persons are from one essence lest we should seem to indicate a distinction between the essence and person in God. The word which the Council of Nicea
adopted against the Arians means that the three persons are of one essence.

Thomas says divine things are named by our intellect in a way that belongs to a created substance. In God the essence is taken as the forms of the three persons, according to the mode of signification. In God the persons are multiplied but not the essence. We speak of one essence of three persons and the three persons of the one essence provided that these genitives be understood as designating the form.

He has clearly shown that three persons are of one essence using Augustine with this purpose in mind.

( a. 2, obj. 5, c., resp. )

Whether essential names should be predicated in the singular of the three persons?

Augustine says, "The things that are the objects of our future glory are the Father, Son and the Holy Ghost." 

Thomas says so far as it is referred to the substance, it is predicated in the singular.

Thus it is predicated in the singular if it refers to the substance but in the plural if it is predicated of the relations.

( a. 3, obj. 3, ad 3m. )

Question 40

Of the persons as compared to the relations or properties Whether the hypostases remain if the relations are mentally abstracted from the persons?

Augustine says, "Unbegotten is not the same as the Father; for if the Father had not begotten the Son, nothing would prevent Him being called the unbegotten."

Thomas differs with Augustine in regards to this, saying this
would seem impossible, since being unbegotten says nothing positive and is only a negation, as he himself says. Abstraction is by the intellect in two ways when the universal is abstracted from the particular for example or when the form is abstracted from matter. To have hypostasis and not person, it would be necessary to abstract the rationality from the nature, but not the property from the person.

Hypostasis of the Father would not remain as unbegotten if His paternity were removed as if inascibility were the thing that constituted and distinguished the hypostasis of the Father, for this would be impossible.

( a. 3, obj. 3, ad 3m, resp. )

Question 41
Of the persons in reference to the notional acts
Whether the notional acts are attributed to the persons ?
Augustine says, "Everything that is said of God, is said of Him as regards either His substance, or relation. It is a property of the Father to beget the Son but to beget is an act."

Thomas says nevertheless we can not speak of divine and intelligible things except after the manner of sensible things, whence we derive our knowledge, and wherein actions and passions and therefore it was necessary to signify the habitudes of the persons seperately after the manner of act and relations. In the divine persons distinction is founded on origin.

Therefore it is clear that to signify the order of the origin in the divine persons, we must attribute notional acts to the persons. We must attribute rational acts to the persons.
Whether notional acts are voluntary?
Augustine says, "The Father begot the Son neither by the will nor by necessity."

Thomas says we must assert that the Father begot the Son not by the will but by nature.
It follows clearly that the notional acts are voluntary.

Whether the notional acts proceed from something?
Augustine says that the three persons are not from the same essence; because the essence is not another thing from the person. "God the Father, of His nature, without beginning, begot the Son equal to Himself. When I say of the Father Who is essence, it is the same as if I said more explicitly, of the essence of the Father."

Thomas says in the act of generation we must suppose the power of generating, and in the act of spirating the power of spirating, he uses Augustine to show the Son is begotten of the same substance as the Father and the Father communicates His whole nature to Him and the Son was begotten of the essence of the Father.

Thus the notional acts proceed from something as has been proved.

Whether in God there is a power in respect of the notional act?
Augustine says, "If God the Father could not beget a co-equal Son, where is the omnipotence of God the Father."

Thomas says as notional acts exist in God so must there also
be a power in God regarding these acts. In every generator we must suppose the power of generating, and in the spirator the power of spirating.

He uses Augustine to help show that in God there is a power in respect to the notional acts.

(a. 4, resp.)

Whether several persons can be the term of one notional act? Augustine says, "The Son did not beget a creator: not that He could not, but that it behoved Him not."

Thomas does not mean to say by these words that the Son could not beget a Son, but that if He did not, it was not because He could not.

Hence there can be but one subsistent filiation in God; just as there could be but one subsistent witness.

(a. 6, obj. 2, ad 2m.)

Question 42

Of equality and likeness among the divine persons

Whether there is equality in God?

Augustine says, "If an image answers perfectly to that where of it is an image, it may be said to be equal to it; but that which is represented cannot be said to be equal to it."

Thomas says we must admit equality among the divine persons and this equality may be designated in two ways.

With the aid of Augustine he clearly shows that there is equality and likeness among the divine persons.

(a. 1, obj. 3, resp.)

Whether in the divine persons there exists an order of nature? Augustine says, "Not that whereby one is prior to another, but whereby one is from another."
Thomas says there must be priority according to origin without priority and this is called the order of nature.

He uses Augustine to show that there is an order existing in the divine persons.

(a. 3, resp.)

Whether the Son is equal to the Father in greatness?

Augustine says, "There can be no inequality or dissimilitude arising from the distinction of relations."

Thomas says that the Son is necessarily equal to the Father in greatness. For the greatness of God is nothing but the perfection of His nature which is in the Father, in the same way that it is in the Father Himself.

Thus with the aid of Augustine it is clearly established that the Son is equal to the Father in greatness.

(a. 4, ad 2m.)

Whether the Son is equal to the Father in power?

Augustine says, "Were He unable to beget one equal to Himself. Where would be the omnipotence of God the Father?"

Thomas says as the essence is paternity in the Father, and filiation in the Son. The Son is necessarily equal to the Father in power. Power of action is a consequence of the perfection of nature, hence it follows that the Son is equal to the Father in power; and the same applies to the Holy Ghost in relation to both.

Thus with the aid of Augustine it is clearly established that the Son is equal to the Father in power.

Question 43

The mission of the divine persons

Whether the invisible mission of the divine persons is only
according to the gifts of the Holy Ghost?

Augustine says, "The Son, when temporally perceived by the mind, is sent. The Holy Ghost proceeds temporally for the creatures sanctification."

Thomas says although the Son can be known to us according to other effects, yet neither does He dwell in us, nor is He possessed by us according to those effects. He exists newly in us and He is given as possessed by anyone; and neither of these is other than sanctifying grace. The divine person is sent, and proceeds temporally only according to sanctifying grace.

Thus the question is clear.

( a. 3, obj. 3, c., ad 3m, resp. )

Whether the Father can be fittingly sent?

Augustine says, "The Father alone is never described as being sent. The Father, when known by anyone in time, is not said to be sent; for there is no one whence He is, or from whom He proceeds."

Thomas says the Father is not from another, and in no way is it fitting for Him to be sent; but this can only belong to the Son and to the Holy Ghost, to Whom it belongs to be from another.

Thus the Father can not be fittingly sent.

( a. 4, c., resp., ad 2m. )

Whether the invisible mission is to all who participate grace?

Augustine says, "The Son is sent to each one when He is known and perceived by anyone, so far as He can be known and perceived according, to the capacity of the soul, whether journeying towards God, or united perfectly to Him. The invisible mission of
of the Son is in man and with men. This was done in former times with the Fathers and Prophets. "

Thomas says now every creature that has grace is always sanctified. Therefore the invisible mission is to every creature. Thus with the aid of Augustine he established that the invisible mission is to all whom participate grace.

( a. 6, ad 1m, ad 2m. )

Whether it is fitting for the Son to be sent invisibly? Augustine says, "The Son is sent to anyone invisibly, whenever He is known and perceived by anyone. The word we speak of is knowledge with love; and the Son is sent, whenever He is known and perceived by anyone. "

Thomas says it is clear it therefore it belonged to both of them to be sent invisibly.

It is clear that the question is answered and that it is fitting that the Son be sent invisibly.

( a. 5, ad 2m. )

Whether it is fitting for the Holy Ghost to be sent visibly? Augustine says, "Whatever is done visibly by God is dispensed by the ministry of the angels. "

Thomas says the Son has been sent visibly as the author of sanctification, the Holy Ghost as the sign of sanctification.

Thus whatever is done visibly by God is dispensed by the ministry of the angels. The Holy Ghost is sent visibly as the sign of sanctification. And in this way it is fitting.

( a. 7, obj. 5, resp. )

Whether a divine person is sent only by the person whence He proceeds eternally?
Augustine says, "The Father is sent by no one because He is freed from no one."

Thomas says the divine person is sent only by the one whence He proceeds eternally though there are two opinions concerning this question, if however the person sending is understood as the principle of the effect implied in the mission, in that sense the whole Trinity sends the person sent.

Thus it is evident from the above from the way you look at the question will you answer but it is more probable that the divine person is sent only by the person whence He proceeds eternally.

( a. 8, obj. 1, resp. )

Question 44

The procession of creatures from God, and of the First cause of all things.

Whether primary matter is created by God?

Augustine says, "Two things hast Thou made, O Lord; one nigh unto thyself, the others nigh unto nothing."

Thomas says it is necessary to say that God created primary matter. It naturally follows the statement of Augustine that God had to create primary matter for to Him alone is the power of creating

God alone has created primary matter.

Whether the exemplar cause is anything besides God?

Augustine says, "Ideas are the master forms, which are contained in the divine intelligence."

Thomas says that God is the first exemplar cause of all things. Moreover in the things created one may be called the exemplar of the other by reason of its likeness thereto or by
analogy of some kind of imitation.

Thus it is clear that God is the first exemplar cause of all things.

( a. 3, c., resp. )

Question 45

The mode of emanation of things from the first principle? Whether to create is to make something out of nothing?

Augustine says, "To make concerns what did not exist at all. But to create is to make something from what was already." Thomas differs in the description of the term and says that Augustine uses the word create in an univocal sense. He says that to create is to make something out of nothing.

Thus the common definition of creation is clarified. This is the accepted definition of the word create.

( a. 1, obj. 1, ad lm. )

Whether it belongs to God alone to create?

Augustine says, "Neither the good or bad angels can create anything."

Thomas says that it sufficiently appears at first glance that to create can be the action of God alone.

With the aid of Augustine he explains what is practically self-evident though there have been those that have denied this, the power of creation belongs to God alone. For it is an act of much greater power to make a thing from nothing than to make it from its contrary.

( a. 5, c., resp. )

Whether in creatures is necessarily found a trace of the Trinity?
Augustine says, "Creation distinguishes the work of propagation which is a work of nature, from the work of creation. Traces of the Trinity appears in all creatures."

Thomas says in all creatures there is found the trace of the Trinity, inasmuch as in every creature are found some things which are necessarily reduced to the divine persons as their cause.

Thus it is clearly established that a trace of the Trinity is found in all creatures.

(a. 7, c., resp.)

Question 46

Of the beginning of the duration of creatures.

Whether it is an article of faith that the world began?

Augustine says, "The opinion of the philosophers who have asserted the eternity of the world was twofold. Some state the substance of the world is not from God and this is an error. Others state the world was made by God it has a beginning, not of time, but of creation."

Thomas says this is not an article of faith. By faith alone do we hold that the world did not always exist. Hence that the world began to exist is an object of faith.

It is clear to anyone that the world had a beginning and Thomas shows the fact we have to believe that God created the world and this is an article of faith.

(a. 2, ad 1m.)

Question 47

Of the distinction of things in general.

Whether the inequality of things is from God?

Augustine says, "What can be more foolish than to say that
the divine Architect provided this one sun for one world, not to be an ornament to its beauty, not for the benefit of corporeal things, but that it happened through the sin of one soul; so that, if a hundred souls had sinned, there would be a hundred souls in world. From the Father, to whom is appropriated unity, the Son proceeds, to Whom is appropriated equality, and then from Him the creature proceeds, to which equality belongs. "

Thomas says the universe would not be perfect if only one grade of goodness were found in things. The divine wisdom is the cause of the distinction of things for the sake of perfection of the universe.

It is evident from the above that all inequality of things comes from God. This is done for the perfection of the universe.

( a. 2, resp., ad 2m. )

Whether there is only one world?

Augustine says, "It is unfitting to say that God has created things without reason. "

Thomas says that reason proves that the world is one because all things must be arranged in one order, and to one end. Therefore from the unity of order in things is proved the unity of the world, as the thing designed.

It is foolish to claim that two worlds exist for all things point to the contrary.

( a. 3, obj. 1, ad 1m. )

Question 46

The distinction of things in general

Whether evil is a nature?

Augustine says, "The admirable beauty of the universe is
made up of all things. In which even what is called evil, well
ordered and in its place, is the eminent commendation of what
is good. God is so powerful that He can make good out of evil."

Thomas says it can not be that evil signifies being, or any
form of nature. It must be said that by the name of evil is sig-
nified the absence of good.

Thus it is clear that evil is not a nature but a privation.

( a. l, obj. 5, ad 3m, resp. )

Whether evil is in good as its subject?

Augustine says, "Evil exists only in the good. The rule of
dialectics here fail, where it is laid down that contraries can
not exist together."

Thomas says evil imports the absence of good. But not every
absence of good is evil. The subject of evil is good.

It is clear that evil may exist in good and the subject of
evil is good.

( a. 3, c., resp., ad 3m. )

Whether evil corrupts the whole good?

Augustine says, "Evil hurts inasmuch as it takes away good;
that evil can not wholly consume good."

Thomas says evil can not wholly consume good, to prove this
we must consider that good is threefold. Good is not wholly but
partially taken away.

It is evident that good is only diminished by evil and thus
evil does not wholly take away good.

( a. 4, obj. 2, c., resp. )

Whether evil is adequately divided into pains and faults?
Augustine says, "A thing is evil because it hurts." Thomas says every evil is a voluntary thing to be looked upon as a pain or fault.

Hence it is clear that evil is a pain or fault because divine wisdom inflicts pain to prevent fault.

(a. 5, obj. 4, resp.)

Question 49
The cause of evil
Whether the good can be the cause of evil?
Augustine says, "There is no possible source of evil except good."

Thomas says it must be said that every evil in some way has a cause. But only good can be a cause, because nothing can be a cause except inasmuch as it is a being, and every being as such is a good. This follows naturally due to the fact that everything that is a being is good.

Thus good has to be the cause of evil.

(a. 1, c., resp.)

Whether the Supreme Good, God, is the cause of evil?
Augustine says, "God is not the author of evil because He is not the cause of tending to nothing."

Thomas says evil which consists in the defect of action is always caused by the defect of the agent. But in God there is no defect. Thus evil is not reduced to God as its cause.

It clearly follows that in no way is it possible for God to be the cause of evil.

(a. 2, c., resp.)

Question 51
Of the angels in comparison with bodies

Whether the angels have bodies naturally united to them?

Augustine says, "The demons are called animals of the atmosphere, because their nature is akin to that of aerial bodies."

Thomas says that angels haven't bodies naturally united to them. All intellectual substances are united to bodies; but some are quite separated from bodies and these we call angels.

That to declare that angels have bodies united to them is contrary to the teaching of the Catholic Church and from the statements of Thomas it is clear that they do not but can if so designated by God to complete some earthly bidding.

(a. 1, resp.)

Whether angels assume bodies?

Augustine says, "Angels appeared to Abraham under assumed bodies."

Thomas says since the angels do not have bodies naturally united to them, as is clear, it follows that they sometime assume bodies.

Common sense will tell us that angels due to not having bodies united to them must assume bodies.

(a. 2, c., resp.)

Question 52

Of the angels in relation to place

Whether an angel can be in several places at once?

Augustine says, "The soul is in several places at once for
it is entirely in every part of the body."

Thomas says since the angels power is infinite, it does not extend to all things, but to one determined thing. The angel is in only one place at a time.

It is evident from the above that all the angels due to their limited and finite powers can be only in one place at one time.

( a. 2, obj. 1, resp. )

Question 54

Of the knowledge of the angels

Whether an angels act of understanding is his substance?

Augustine says, "Memory, understanding and will are one essence, one life."

Thomas says it is impossible for the action of any angel, or any other creature, to be its own substance. He says that Augustine's statement is interpreted differently by the philosopher. The angels understanding is not his substance.

Hence the only being whose understanding is His substance is God due to being pure act. His substance is the same as His existence and His action.

( a. 1, ad 2m. )

Whether an angel's power of intelligence is his essence?

Augustine says, "God made the angelic nature nigh unto Himself, while He made primary matter nigh unto nothing."

Thomas says the operative power of the angel is not the same as essence. The angel's essence is not his power of intelligence.

The same thing applies and is inferred from the statement of Thomas as was inferred from claiming that the angel's act of
understanding is the angels essence.

( a. 3, obj. 3, resp. )

Whether there is only intellectual knowledge in the angels? Augustine says, "In the angels there is life which feels and understands."

Thomas says the memory can be allowed in the angels although it can not be part of the sensitive soul. Of the souls powers only intellect and will belongs to them. Yet the angel knows things yet not through the senses.

Therefore there is more than intellectual knowledge in angels.

( a. 5, obj. 1, resp. )

Question 55

Of the medium of angelic knowledge

Whether the angels understand by species drawn from things?

Augustine says, "The other things which are lower than the angels are so created that they first receive existence in the knowledge of rational creature, and then in their own nature; as the type, according to which the creature is fashioned, is in the word of God before the creature which is fashioned, so the knowledge of the same type exists first in the intellectual creature, and is afterwards the very fashioning of the creature."

Thomas says the species whereby the angels understand are not drawn from things, but are conatural to them.

He uses Augustine to show that angels are utterly free from bodies and subsist immaterially and in their own intelligible nature and attain their perfection through intelligible out-pouring. Thus they do not understand by species drawn through things.

( a. 2, resp., ad Im. )
Question 56
Of the angel's knowledge of immaterial things
Whether an angel knows himself?
Augustine says, "The angel knows himself when he was established, that is, enlightened by truth."
Thomas says since the angel is an subsisting form he is actually intelligible. Hence it follows that he understands himself by his form which is his substance.
It is clear from the use made by Thomas of Augustine that the angels know themselves.
(a. 1, c., resp.)
Whether one angel knows another?
Augustine says "Such things pre-existed from eternity in the word of God came forth from Him in two ways first into the angelic mind and secondly so as to subsist in their own nature."
Thomas says the nature of the angel does not hinder him from knowing the other angelic natures. Thus they can know each other.
It is clear from the above that the angels can know each other.
(a. 2, resp.)

Question 57
Of the angel's knowledge of things.
Whether the angels know future things?
Augustine says, "God moves the spiritual creatures according to time."
Thomas says the mind of an angel, and every intellect, fall far short of God's eternity. Hence the future as it is in itself can not be known by any created intellect.
It is clear due to the statement of Augustine that there
is succession in the angelic intellect and the statements of Thomas that the angels can know the future.

(a. 3, ad 3m, resp.)

Whether the angels know secret thoughts?

Augustine says, "Demons sometimes with the greatest facility learn man's disposition not only when expressed by speech, but even when conceived in thought, when the soul expresses them by certain signs in the body."

Thomas says a secret thought can be known in two ways: first, in its effects. In this way it can be known by an angel.

Thus from the above it is clear that angels can know men's secret thoughts.

(a. 4, resp.)

Whether the angels know the mysteries of grace?

Augustine says, "This mystery was hidden in God through the ages, yet so that it was known to the princes and powers in heavenly places."

Thomas says the angels have a knowledge whereby they see the Word and things in the Word. By such a vision they know the mysteries of grace, but not all mysteries; nor do they know them equally the higher knowing the better.

He uses Augustine to help establish the point that the angels know the mysteries of grace.

(a. 5, obj. 1, resp.)

Question 58

Of the mode of the angelic knowledge

Whether an angel can understand many things at the same time?
Augustine says, "The spiritual faculty of the angelic mind comprehends most easily at the same time all things that it will."

Thomas says that by that knowledge wherewith the angels know things by innate species, they can at the one time know all things which can be comprised under one species; but not such as are under various species.

With the aid of Augustine it is easily seen that the angels can comprehend many things at the same time.

( a. 2, c., resp. )

Whether the angels intellect is sometimes in potentiality, and sometimes in act?

Augustine says, "Since the angels were created, in the eternity of the Word, they enjoy holy and devout contemplation."

Thomas says with regards to things divinely revealed to them there is nothing to prevent them from being in potentiality; because even the heavenly bodies are at times in potentiality to be enlightened by the sun.

Thus it is manifest that the angelic intellect is sometimes in potentiality.

( a. 1, c., resp. )

Whether there can be falsehood in the intellect of the angel?

Augustine says, "That nothing but what is true can be the object of intelligence."

Thomas says no falsehood, error or deception can exist in the minds of the angels.

( a. 5, c., resp. )

Whether there is morning and evening knowledge in the angels?

Augustine divides the knowledge of angels into morning and evening knowledge.
Thomas says these terms were devised by Augustine on the basis of the six days when God made all things as one day, namely the day of angelic knowledge as directed to the six classes of things. Thus according to this the angels have morning and evening knowledge.

Hence from the above it is clear that the angels have morning and evening knowledge.

( a, 6, c., resp. )

Whether the morning and evening knowledge are one?

Augustine says, "There is a vast difference between knowing anything as it is in the word of God, and as it is in its own nature; so that to the former belongs day, and to the latter evening."

Thomas says if it being called evening knowledge, in so far as though innate ideas they know the being which things have in their own natures, thence the morning and evening knowledge differ. Thus Augustine seems to understand it when he assigns one as inferior to the other.

Thus morning and evening knowledge differ.

( a, 7, c., resp. )

Question 59

The will of the angels

Whether there is a will in the angels?

Augustine says, "The image of the Trinity is found in the soul according to memory, understanding and will."

Thomas says since the angels by their intellect know the universal aspect of goodness, it is manifest that there is a will in them.

He uses Augustine to help show that necessarily we must place a will in the angels.
Whether there is an irascible and concupiscible appetite in the angels?

Augustine says, "Universally speaking none of these things is said of the angels, as by way of passions."

Thomas says since there exists in the angels only an intellective appetite their appetite is not distinguished into irascible and concupiscible, but remains undivided; and it is called the will.

Thus it is evident that the angels do not have irascible or concupiscible appetite.

( a. 4, ad 2m. )

Question 60

Of the love or dilection of the angels

Whether there is natural love or dilection in an angel?

Augustine says, "There is natural love and knowledge in the angels."

Thomas says that we must necessarily place natural love in angels since an angel is an intellectual nature, there must be a natural love in the will.

Hence it follows that there is love in the angels.

( a. 1, c., resp. )

Whether an angel by natural love loves God more than he loves himself?

Augustine says, "Two loves have made two cities; namely, the love of self unto the contempt of God has made the earthly city; while the love of God unto contempt of self has made the heavenly
Thomas says so far as God is the universal good of all, every thing loves God more than self.

It is apparent for if they did not, love would be perverse and love would be destroyed by charity. God is the object of every ones love.

(a. 5, obj. 5, ad 5m.)

Question 61

Of the production of the angels in the order of natural being

Whether the angels have a cause of their existence?

Augustine says, "The angels were not passed over in that account of the first creation of things, but are designated by the name of heavens or light."

Thomas says all things existing owe their existence to God.

It is manifest that that of necessity the angels were made by God as was everything else.

(a. 1, ad 1m.)

Whether the angels were produced from eternity by God?

Augustine says, "The soul is incorruptible by the fact that the mind is capable of truth."

Thomas says God alone, Father, Son and Holy Ghost, is from eternity.

This is a doctrine of faith and has to be held unless you want to be guilty of heresy.

(a. 2, obj. 3, resp.)

Whether the angels were created in the empyrean heaven?

Augustine says, "The angels were created in the upper atmosphere: therefore not in the empyrean heaven."
Thomas differs from Augustine in this opinion as he says if that is the title applied to the highest place.

It is according to what name you give the highest place or what you mean by empyrean heaven. He explains why he differs in opinion with Augustine.

(a. 4, obj. 2, ad 2m.)

Question 62

Of the perfection of the angels in the order of grace and glory

Whether the angels were created in beatitude?

Augustine says, "The angels were in beatitude from the very beginning of creation. The corporeal creature straightway from its creation was made perfect and complete; nor did its lack of form take precedence in time, but only in nature."

Thomas differs in opinion on this point with Augustine and says the angels did not have from the beginning of their creation that ultimate beatitude which is beyond the power of nature; because such beatitude is no part of their nature, but its end; and consequently they ought not to have it immediately from the beginning.

There seems to be a divergence on this point. It is clear from Thomas that they could not have the beatitude from the beginning.

(a. 1, obj. 2, obj. 3, resp.)

Whether the angels were created in grace?

Augustine says, "The angelic nature was first made without form, and was called heaven; but afterwards it received its form, and was then called light. But such formation comes from grace."

Thomas says as then in Augustine's opinion it is contended
that the seedlike forms of all natural effects were implanted in the creatures when corporally created, so, straightaway from the beginning the angels were created in grace.

Thus it has been shown that the angels were created in grace.

(a. 3, obj. 1, resp.)

Whether a beatified angel can sin?

Augustine says, "In the holy angels there is that nature which can not sin."

Thomas says the beatified angels can neither will nor act, except as aiming towards God. Now whoever will or acts in this manner can not sin.

The angels due to their nature and place can not sin.

(a. 8, c., resp.)

Whether the beatified angels advance in beatitude?

Augustine says, "God makes use of us for our own gain, and for His own goodness. The same thing happens to angels, whom He uses for all spiritual ministrations; since they are ministering spirits, sent to minister for them that shall receive the inheritance of the salvation."

Thomas says therefore there must be some determined thing to which every rational creature is directed as to its last end.

He uses Augustine to show angels are brought to a determined degree of beatitude. When they have attained that degree, they cannot pass to a higher degree.

(a. 9, obj. 2, resp.)

Question 63

The malice of the angels with regard to sin

Whether the devil was wicked by the fault of his own will in the first instant of his creation?
Augustine says, "The demons were wicked by sin of their own will because as soon as he was made, the devil refused righteousness."

Thomas says in the first instant of their creation some of the angels were made blessed and some sinned. It cannot be said that the devil was wicked in the first instant of creation.

This is contrary to the nature of God for He creates nothing bad or evil. Thomas has shown that the devil was good at the instant of his creation but sinned and thus became evil. He uses Augustine's help to establish this point.

(a. 5, resp.)

Whether only sin of pride and envy can exist in the angels?

Augustine says, "The demons delight even in the obscenities of carnal sin."

Thomas says that it is wholly through envy that the demons take pleasure in all sorts of human sins, so far as they are hindrances to man's good. The first sin of the angels were pride. So after the sin of pride there followed the sin of envy in the sinning angels and these are the only spiritual sins that are found in the angels.

(a. 2, obj. 1, ad 1m, resp.)

Whether any of the demons are naturally wicked?

Augustine says, "There is a class of demons of crafty nature, pretending that they are God's and the souls of the dead. He rebukes Porphyry for saying that the demons are naturally evil and maintains that they are not so."

Thomas says since the angels are intellectual substances, they can in no wise have an natural inclination towards any evil whatsoever.
Thus it has been clearly shown that the demons have no inclination towards evil and can not be naturally wicked.  
( a. 4, obj. 1, resp. )

Whether the highest angel among those whom sinned was the highest of all?

Augustine says, "The highest of those whom sinned was not set over the terrestrial order."

Thomas says there might be some motive for sinning in him also was the chief of the lower angels. It existed in the higher more than the lower than the lower.

Thus it may be inferred this is the more probable view.
( a. 7, resp. )

Question 64.
The punishment of the demons
Whether the demon's intellect is darkened by privation of the knowledge of all truth?

Augustine says, "The angels knew at their creation the mystery of the kingdom of God. The proper knowledge of the angels is twofold; namely morning and evening."

Thomas says the demons are darkened by the privation of grace, yet they are enlightened by the light of their intellectual nature. Thus it is clear that the demons intellect is darkened by the privation of the knowledge of all truth.
( a. 1, obj. 3, obj. 4, resp. )

Whether there is sorrow in the demons?

Augustine says, "The devil has power over them who despise God's commandments, and he rejoices over this sinister power."

Thomas says there is nothing to hinder a man from being
sorry one thing and joyful for another. Though the passions can not exist in the demons for they are proper to a sensitive appetite, which is a power of a corporeal agent.

Thus there can not exist in the angels sorrow.

(a. 3, obj. 1, ad hm.)

Whether our atmosphere is the demon's place of punishment?

Augustine says, "The darksome atmosphere is as a prison to the demons until the judgement day."

Thomas says that this is not so stating in many words that the demons are in hell.

It is clear that this atmosphere is not the place of the demons punishment and this place of their punishment is called hell.

(a. 4, c., resp.)

Question 65

The work of creation of corporeal creatures

Whether corporeal creatures were produced by God through the medium of angels?

Augustine says, "In the government of things the lower is ruled by the higher in a certain fitting order."

Thomas says in the production of things an order exists but not that such one creature is created by another but rather such that the divine wisdom diverse grades are constituted in creatures. All bodies were created by God immediately.

Only God can create and thus it is impossible that anything should be created by anyone but God. As is clear.

(a. 3, obj 1, ad hm.)

Whether the forms of the bodies are from the angels?
Augustine says, "We must not suppose that this corporeal matter serves the angels at their nod, but rather that it serves and obeys God."

Thomas says the bodies were produced immediately by God, whose bidding alone matter obeys as its own proper cause.

Hence it is clear that the forms of the bodies are from God alone.

( a. 4. c., resp. )

Question 66

On the order of creation towards distinction

Whether formlessness of created matter predated in time its formation?

Augustine says, "The earth was void and empty, or invisible and shapeless, according to another version by which is understood the formlessness of matter."

Thomas says men differ on this point and gives the different opinions held.

It appears there is a divergence of opinions on this topic and no matter that you hold you will be consistent with some great mind.

( a. 1. obj. 1. resp. )

Whether the formlessness of the matter of all corporeal things is the same?

Augustine says, "I find two things Thou hast made, one formed the other formless, and he says that the latter was the earth visible and shapeless, whereby he says, the matter of all corporeal things is designated."

Thomas says that in this Augustine follows the opinion of Plato, who does not admit a fifth essence. Or we may say that
formless matter is one with unity of order, as all bodies are one in the order of corporeal matter. The matter of heavenly bodies and of the elements is not the same except by analogy. The form of corporeity is not the same in all bodies.

It follows from the above that the formless matter of all corporeal matter is not the same.

( a.2, obj. 1, ad lm, resp.)

Whether the empyrean heaven was created at the same time as formless matter?

Augustine says, "That lower bodies are governed by the higher in a certain order. In so far as we mentally apprehend eternal things, so far are we not of this world, for which is clear that contemplation lifts the mind above the things of the world."

Thomas says the empyrean heaven rests on the authority of Strabus and Bede, and also Basil; all of whom agree in one respect, namely, in holding it to be the place of the blessed. They say that as soon as it was created it was gilled with angels. He goes on to state that Augustine doesn't maintain an empyrean heaven in the same sense as understood by modern writers.

It is evident that the empyrean heaven was created at the same time as formless matter.

( a. 3, obj. 2, obj. 3, resp.)

Whether time was created simultaneously with formless matter?

Augustine says, "Both spiritual and corporeal creatures were created at the beginning of time. I find two things Thou didst create before time was, the primary corporeal matter and the angelic nature.

Thomas says that they were created at the same time though this is not the opinion of Augustine who claims that only angelic
nature and formless matter were first created.

It appears that time would have to have been created first for there would have been no measurement of things if there was no time.

(a. 4, obj. 1, c., resp.)

Question 67
Of the work of distinction in itself
Whether light is a body?
Augustine says, "Light is a body and takes the first place among bodies."

Thomas says that light can not be a body and says that Augustine takes one of the four elements.

Light can be in no way a body since it has no place, its movement is simultaneously and instantaneous and not that of the local movement of a body and the third reason is from generation to corruption and thus the idea is repugnant to reason.

(a. 2, obj. 1, resp.)

Whether the word light is used in the proper sense in speaking of spiritual things?

Augustine says, "In spiritual things light is better and surer: and that Christ is not called light in the same sense as He is called the Store; the former is to be taken literally and the latter metaphorically."

Thomas says that any word may be used in two senses. If taken in its common and external use, as applied to manifestations of every kind it may be properly applied to spiritual things.

Thus the word light can be applied to spiritual things.

(a. 1, obj. 1, resp.)
Whether the production of light is fittingly assigned to the first day?

Augustine says, "Moses could not have fittingly passed over the production of the spiritual creature and therefore we read, In the beginning God created heaven and earth, a spiritual nature as yet formless is to be understood by the word heaven and formless matter of the corporeal creature by the word earth. Formlessness did not precede forms in duration; and so we understand the production of light to signify the formation of spiritual creatures."

Thomas says it was fitting, then as evidence of the divine wisdom that among the works of distinction the production of light should take first place, since light is a form of primary body and it is a more common quality.

The production of light is fittingly assigned to the first day.

Question 68

Of the work of the second day

Whether there are waters above the firmament?

Augustine says, "Whatever divides bodies from bodies can be said to divide water from water. It is our business here to inquire how God has constituted the nature of His creatures, not for how it has pleased Him to work on them by way of a miracle."

Thomas says he answers the words of Scripture have more authority than the most exalted intellect. Thus we can not doubt there is water. It is according as how we take the term firmament if we mean the starry heaven this water will not be the same as elemental water. There are however water above the firmament.

He uses Augustine to refute the arguments of the Manicheans
and to show there is water above the firmament according as how we take the firmament to be.

( a. 2, resp. )

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Question 69

On the working of the third day

Whether it was fitting that the gathering together of waters should take place, as recorded on the third day?

Augustine says, "There is no order of duration, but only of origin and nature. Primary matter is meant the earth, where first mentioned, but in the present passage it is to be taken for the elements themselves. The earth is said to have produced, plants and trees in their cause, that is, it received then the power to produce them. He supports this by the authority of the Scripture ( Gen. ii. 4, 5 )"

Thomas uses Augustine to refute the Manicheans and to show that God created water and matter at the same time and on the third day for who can question the doings of Christ.

( a. 1, resp., ad 1m, ad 5m. )

Question 70

Of the work of adornment, as regards the fourth day

Whether the lights ought to have been produced on the fourth day?

Augustine says, "In the second, or work of distinction, the heaven and earth were perfected, either by adding substantial form to matter."

Thomas differs with Augustine in this point and says there
is no difficulty if we follow Augustine in holding that light was made on the first day to be spiritual and that on this day was made to be corporeal. He says that Augustine is not at variance with other holy writers. He says that light could have been produced on the first day.

This is not specifically stated in Holy Scriptures and thus you do not have to hold to the theory or opinion that light was produced on the fourth day.

( a. 1, resp. )

Whether the lights of heaven are living beings?

Augustine says, "Every living being stands higher in the order of nature than one that has not life."

Thomas says there is a difference of opinion but it is only words.

( a. 3, resp., obj. 2. )

Question 71

Of the work of the fifth day

Augustine teaches at first beginning of the world the active principle was the Word of God, which produced animals from material elements either in act as some holy writers say, or virtually.

Thomas shows how Augustine differs from other writers and on the fifth day which corresponds to the second Moses mentions the waters and firmament of heaven.

( a. 1, ad 1m. )

Question 74

Of the seven days in common
Whether these days are sufficiently enumerated?

Augustine says, "Thus, then, the creation of either is set down before there was any day. After all that has been recorded that is assigned to the six days, something distinct is attributed to the seventh, namely that on it God rested in Himself from His works; and for this reason it was right that the seventh day should be mentioned after the sixth."

Thomas says the reason of distinction is clear and shows the days are sufficiently enumerated.

The days are sufficiently enumerated.

(a. 1, ad 1m, ad 5m.)

Whether Scripture uses suitable words to express the works of the six days?

Augustine says, "The person of the Son is mentioned both in the first creation of the world, and in its distinction and adornment but differently in both places. Three phases denote the threefold being of creatures. First, their being in the world; the being in the angelic mind, thirdly, their being in the proper nature.

He uses Augustine to show how things came into existence and why and the different terms to show why, when and how. Thus the scripture uses suitable words to express the words of the six days.

(a. 3, ad 1m, ad 5m.)

Question 75

Of man who is composed of a spiritual and corporeal substance and in the first place concerning what belongs to the essence of the soul.

Whether the soul is a body?
Augustine says, "The soul is simple in comparison with the body, inasmuch as it does not occupy space by bulk."

Thomas says that the soul, which is the first principle of life, is not a body, but the act of a body.

Hence it is clear that the soul is not a body.

(a. l, resp, c.)

Whether the human soul is something subsistent?

Augustine says, "Whosoever understands that the nature of the soul is that of a substance and not that of a body, will see that those who maintain that the soul is of a corporeal nature, are led astray, through associating with the soul those things without which they are unable to think of any nature."

Thomas says it must necessarily allowed that the principle of intellectual operation which we call the soul, is a principle both incorporeal and subsistent.

Thus with the aid of Augustine he has clearly established the soul as a subsistent form.

(a. 2, c., resp.)

Whether the soul is man?

Augustine commends Varo as holding that man is not a soul only, nor a mere body; but both body and soul.

Thomas says that man is composed of body and soul and it is clear that man is not soul only.

Man is a composite of body and soul and one does not function without the other as it is clear from the arguments of Augustine and Thomas.

(a. 4, c., resp.)

Whether the soul is composed of matter and form?

Augustine says, "The soul was made neither of corporeal
matter nor of spiritual matter.

Thomas says the soul has no matter and every intellectual substance is exempt from composition of form and matter.

Thus with the aid of Augustine he has proved the soul which is the first principle of life, is no a composite of form and matter.

( a. 5, c., resp. )

Question 76
Of the union of body and soul
Whether the intellectual principles are multiplied according to the number of bodies?

Augustine says, "If I were to say that there are as many human souls, I should laugh to myself."

Thomas says Augustine denies a plurality of souls for that would involve a plurality of species. He says that it is possible for no man to maintain there is one intellect for all men.

This principle is self evident for if there were only one intellect all men would think in the same way.

( a. 2, obj. 6, resp. )

Whether the intellectual soul is properly united to such a body?

Augustine says, "If however, it be said that God could avoid this, we might answer that in the formation of natural things we do not consider what God might do; but what is natural to things."

Thomas says, "It behoves the intellectual soul to be united to a body fitted to be a convenient organ of sense."

It is fitting for the soul to be united to the body for the soul is the life of the body and one is incomplete without the
the other.

(a. 5, ad lm.)

Whether the soul is united to the animal body by means of a body?

Augustine says, "The soul administers the body by light, that is, by fire, and by air, which are most akin to a spirit." Thomas says if the soul is united to the body as its form it is impossible for it to be united by means of another body. The soul can not be united to the animal body by means of another body.

(a. 7, obj. 1, resp.)

Whether the whole soul is in each part of the body?

Augustine says, "In each part, in each body, the whole soul is in its entirety." Thomas says since the soul is united to the body as its form, it must necessarily be in the whole body and in each part thereof.

Due to the fact as it is explained above that the soul is the form of the body it must be in the whole body and every part.

Question 77

Of those things which belong to the powers of the soul in general.

Whether the essence of the soul is its power?

Augustine says, "Knowledge and love are not in the soul as accidents in a subject." Thomas explains Augustine's statement and says the essence of the soul is not its power for nothing is in potentiality by reason of act. Although it is maintained. It is impossible to
admit that the power of the soul is its essence.

The essence of the soul is not its power.
( a. l, obj. 5, ad 5m. )
Whether all the powers of the soul are in the soul as the subject?

Augustine says, "The soul senses certain things, not through the body, in fact, without the body, and some things through the body." 

Thomas says the powers which are the principles of these operations have their subject in the composite, and not in the soul alone. The soul alone is not the subject of all powers.

Thus the principles of the different operations have their subject in the composite and not in the soul alone
( a. 5, obj. 3, resp. )
Whether all the powers remain in the soul when separated from the body?

Augustine says, "As the soul, when the body lies lifeless, yet not quite dead, sees some things by imaginary vision; so also when by death the soul is quite separate from the body." 

Thomas says it is false to say that that these powers remain in the soul after corruption, also to say the acts of these powers remain in the separate soul because these powers have no act apart from the corporeal organ. He refutes Augustine's statement and says that Augustine in this passage is speaking as inquiring not asserting. Therefore he retracted some statements.

The powers do not remain in the soul. Some remain virtually but not actually in the soul as their principle.
( a. 8, Obj. 6, ad 6m. )
Question 78
Of the specific powers of the soul
Whether the interior senses are suitably distinguished?
Augustine describes three kinds of vision namely corporeal, spiritual and intellectual.

Thomas says there is no need to assign more than four interior powers of the sensitive parts.
It is shown that the senses are suitably distinguished.
( a. 4, obj. 6, resp.

Question 79
Of the intellectual powers
Whether the intellect is a passive power?
Augustine says, "The agent is nobler than the patient." Thomas says the agent is nobler than the patient, if the action and passion are referred to the same thing, but not always if they refer to different things.
It is clear that the intellect is a passive power.
( a. 2, obj. 3, ad 3m. )

Whether the intellect is a power of the soul?
Augustine says, "Mind and spirit are not relative things, but denominate the essence, mind is spirit and essence. He places the intelligence and will in the mind."

Thomas says in God alone is His intellect the same as His essence; while in the intellectual creatures the intellect is a powers, thus he disagrees with Augustine.

The intellect is a power of the soul.
( a. 1, obj. 1, obj. 2, resp. )

Whether memory is in the intellectual part of the soul?
Augustine says, "To the higher part of the soul belongs those things which are not common to man and beast."

Thomas says memory if considered retentive of the species, is not common to us and other animals. But the intellect in itself is retentive of species, without the association of any corporeal agent. Therefore the soul is not of the species, not the whole soul, but the intellect.

It would not be possible to admit memory in the intellectual part. Thus it is clear that memory is not in the intellectual part.

( a. 6, obj. 1, ad lm. )

Whether the intellectual part is a power distinct from the intellect?

Augustine says, "Memory, understanding and will are equal to one another, and one flows from another. He assigns to the soul memory, understanding and will."

Thomas says Augustine by memory understands the souls power of retention; by intelligence the act of the intellect; and by the will the act of the will. Intelligence arises from memory, as act from habit. It is clear that memory is not a distinct power from the intellect; for it belongs to the nature of passive power to retain as well as to receive.

Thus it is evident that memory is not a power distinct from the intellect, intelligence is equal to memory but not as a power to a power.

( a. 7, obj. 1, obj. 3, ad lm, ad 3m. )

Whether the reason is distinct from the intellect?

Augustine says, "That in which man excels the irrational animals is reason, or mind, or intelligence, or whatever appro-
plate name we like to give it."

Thomas says reason and intellect in man can not be distinct powers.

It is evident that reason and intellect are the same.

( a. 8, c., resp. )

Whether the higher and lower reason are distinct powers?

Augustine says, "The image of the Trinity is in the higher part of the reason, and not in the lower. The higher and lower person are only distinct by their functions."

Thomas says as the higher and lower are divided according to various acts, the higher and lower reason are called parts; but not because they are different powers. As they are understood by Augustine they can in no way be two powers of the soul. The higher and lower reason are one and the same power.

Thus they are one and the same power.

( a. 9, obj. 1, c., ad ln, resp. )

Whether synderesis is a special power of the soul distinct from the others?

Augustine says, "In the natural powers of judgement there are certain rules and seeds of virtue, both true and unchangeable."

Thomas says these unchangeable notions are the first practical principles, concerning which no man errs; and these are attributed to reason as a power. It is clear that synderesis is not a power but a natural habit.

The synderesis can not be a special power of the soul.

( a. 12, obj. 3, ad 3m. )

Question 81

Of the power of sensuality

Whether sensuality is only appetitive?
Augustine says, "The sensual movement of the soul which is directed to the bodily senses is common to us and beast. He divides sensuality against the higher and lower reason, which belongs to knowledge."

Thomas says by sensual movement we understand the operation of the appetitive power; so that sensuality is the name of the sensitive appetite.

Thus sensuality is the name of the sensitive power and is appetitive.

( a. 1, obj. 1, obj. 2, resp. )

Question 82
Of the will
Whether the will desires something of necessity?
Augustine says, "If anything is necessary, it is not voluntary. All things desire happiness with one will. Therefore the will desires something of necessity."

Thomas says this is called necessity of end, and sometimes also utility. But necessity of end is not repugnant to will for it adheres to the first principle.

The will is free and we can make free choices and our desires are free from restraint.

( a. 1, obj. 1, resp. )

Whether the will desires of necessity, whatever it desires?
Augustine says, "It is the will by which we sin and live well, and so the will extends to opposite things."

Thomas says the will does not desire of necessity whatever it desires.

Thus it is clear that the will is free from all restraint

( a. 2, c., resp. )
Question 83

Whether man has free-will?

Augustine says, "This is therefore the good which man does not when he wishes - namely not to desire against reason."

Thomas says man has a free will and forasmuch as man is rational it is necessary that man have a free will.

It is clearly evident from the nature of man that he has a free will.

( a. l, ad 1m. )

Question 84

How the soul while united to the body understands corporeal things beneath it

Whether the soul knows through the intellect?

Augustine says, "Bodies can not understand by the intellect; nor indeed anything corporeal unless it be perceived by the senses; intellectual vision is of those things that are in the soul by their essences. But such are not bodies.

Thomas says these words of Augustine are to be understood as referring to the medium of intellectual knowledge and not to the object. We must conclude that through the intellect the soul knows bodies by a knowledge which is inmaterial, universal, and necessary.

It is clear that the soul knows bodies through the intellect.

( a. l, obj. 1, ad 1m, resp. )

Whether the soul understands corporeal things through essences?

Augustine says, "The soul collects and lays hold of the images of the bodies, which are formed in the soul and of the soul for in forming them it gives them something of its own substance."
The mind gathers knowledge of corporeal things through bodily senses.

Thomas says Augustine is speaking of imaginary vision. He says that corporeal creatures can not know things through their essences due to having limited intellects.

The power of knowing things through their essences is a power proper to God alone.

( a. 2, obj. 1, c., ad 1m, resp. )

Whether the intellectual soul knows material things in the eternal types?

Augustine says, "Ideas are permanent types existing in the divine mind. If we see both that what you say is true, and if we both see that what I say is true, where do we see this, I pray? Neither do I see it in you, nor do you see it in me; but we both see it in the unchangeable truth which is above our minds."

Thomas says by that Augustine did not mean all things to be known in their eternal types or in the unchangeable truths. The soul in the present state can not see things in the eternal types. Again if we say if a thing is known by the principle of knowledge we can say that the soul knows things in the eternal types.

To answer this question we must ask in what way is the thing known and then we can give the answer

( a. 5, obj. 3, c., resp. )

Whether intellectual knowledge is derived from sensible things?

Augustine says, "We can not expect to learn the fulness of truth from the senses of the body; the body feels not, but the soul
through the body, which its make use of a kind of messenger, for reproducing within itself what is announced from without."

Thomas says these words of Augustine means that we must expect that the entire truth comes from the senses. For the light of the active intellect is needed. It can not be said that sensible knowledge is the total and the perfect cause of intellectual knowledge. Sensible knowledge is not the total and perfect cause of intellectual knowledge. Intellectual knowledge is derived through sensible things and the senses.

Thus it is clearly evident that judgement of the intellect is hindered through suspension of the sensitive powers.

( a. 8, c., resp. )

Question 85
Of the mode of order of understanding
Whether the intellect can be false?
Augustine says, "Everyone who is deceived, does not rightly understand that wherein he is deceived."

Thomas says the intellect may be accidentally deceived in the quiddity of composite things, not by defect of its organs, for the intellect is a faculty that is an independent organ. We can not be deceived about simple objects unless we understand nothing about them.

Thus the intellect can not err in regards to first principles and its objects but it may err accidentally and be deceived accidentally.

( a. 6, c., resp. )

Whether one person can understand one and the same thing better than another can?
Augustine says, "Whoever understands a thing otherwise than it is, does not understand it all. Hence it is clear that there is perfect understanding, than which none other is more perfect: and therefore there are not infinite degrees of understanding a thing. Nor can one person understand a thing better than another can."

Thomas says a thing may be understood more by one than by another.

It is clear that one may understand a thing better than another.

(a. 7, obj. 1, resp.)

Question 86
What our intellect knows in material things
Whether our intellect can know future things?
Augustine says, "The soul has a certain power of forecasting, so that by its very nature it can know the future; hence when withdrawn from corporeal sense concentrated on itself, it shows the knowledge of the future."

Thomas says if the cause be such as to produce a certain result more frequently than not, then can the future be known according as its causes are more or less inclined to produce the effect. Thus in a way it can tell the future but of events that have no cause the future can not be known by men.

Thus in a sense man can know the future in another way he can not.

(a. 4, ad 2m.)

Question 87
How the intellectual soul knows itself and all within itself
Whether the intellectual soul knows itself by its essence?

Augustine says, "The mind knows itself, but it is incorporeal."

Thomas says the mind knows itself by means of itself, because at length it acquires a knowledge of itself, though led there by itself.

Thus the soul knows itself through God and all things within itself.

(a. 1, obj. 1, ad. lm, )

Whether our intellect knows the habits of the soul by their essence?

Augustine says, "Faith is not seen in the wherein it abides, as the soul of man may be seen by another from the movement of the body; but we may know most certainly that it is there and conscience proclaims its existence."

Thomas says faith is perceived by the subject wherein it resides, by the interior of the heart. For no one knows that he has faith unless he knows that he believes. The things are not known by account of habit but habits are known by acts.

(a. 2, obj. 1, ad. lm, )

Whether our intellect knows its own acts?

Augustine says, "I understand that I understand."

Thomas says the first thing understood of the intellect is its own act of understanding. The intellect can understand its own acts.

Hence the intellect can and does know its own acts.

(a. 3, c., resp.)
Whether the intellect understands the act of the will?

Augustine says, "Of the soul’s affections that they are known neither by images as bodies are known; nor by their presence, like the arts, but by certain notions."

Thomas says the affections of the soul are in the intellect as things caused and so Augustine says that the soul’s affection are in the memory by certain notions. Therefore the act of the will are understood by the intellect.

The act of the will is understood by the intellect.

(a. 4, obj. 3, ad 3m.)

Question 33

How the human soul knows what is above it

Whether the human soul in the present state of life can understand immaterial substances in themselves?

Augustine says, "As the mind itself acquires the knowledge by means of the corporeal senses; the mind gains from itself the knowledge of incorporeal substance."

Thomas says in the present state of life we can not understand separate immaterial substance in themselves, either by the passive or by the active intellect. Thus he disagrees with Augustine.

The mind can not know immaterial substances.

(a. 1, obj. 1, resp.)

Question 39

Of the knowledge of the separated soul

Whether local distance impedes knowledge in the separated soul?

Augustine says, "The souls of the dead are where they can
not know what is done here. The demon's rapidity of movement
enables them to tell things unknown to us."

Thomas says the souls of the dead can not tell what is done
here not because they are impeded by local distance but because
of some other reason. He speaks with the opinion that the demons
have naturally united to them bodies. Knowledge in the separated
soul is not hindered by local distance.

Hence knowledge in the separated soul is not hindered by
local distance.

( a. 7, obj. 1, obj. 2, resp. )

Question 90
Of the first production of man's soul
Whether the soul was made or was of God's substance?
Augustine says, "Certain opinions which he calls exceed-
ingly and evidently perverse among which the first is the opinion
that God made the soul not out of nothing but from Himself."

Thomas says that to say that the soul is of the divine sub-
stance involves a manifest improbability.

Thus he refutes the Manicheans, Pantheist and says that the
opinion is highly improbable and erroneous.

( a. 1, c., resp. )

Question 91
The production of the first man's body
Whether the human body was immediately produced by God?
Augustine says, "The corporeal things are disposed by God
through the angels."

Thomas says God does something in bodies beyond the power
of the angels and by this power He formed the body of the first
man from the slime of the earth. The first man's body was of necessity made immediately by God.

Thus the human body was immediately produced by God.

( a. 2, obj. 1, ad 2m. )

Whether the human soul was produced before the body?

Augustine says, "The soul was made before the body. Therefore having said: to His image He made them, He should not have added, male and female He created them."

Thomas says that the soul as a part of human nature, has its natural perfection only as united to the body. Therefore it would have been unfitting for the soul to have been created before the body.

Therefore it is clearly evident that the soul was not created before the body for the soul is the life of the body and the body without the soul is useless and the soul without a body is useless.

( a. 4, obj. 5, resp. )

Question 92

The production of woman

Whether the woman was made fittingly made from the rib of man?

Augustine says, "A body can not increase except by rarefication."

Thomas says this implies rarefication. It was right for woman to be made from the rib of man.

Thus fittingly and rightly it was for woman to be made from the rib of man.

( a. 3, obj. 1, ad 1m. )
Question 93

The end or term of the production of man

Whether the image of God is in man?

Augustine says, "Where an image exists, there forewith is likeness; but where there is likeness, there is not necessarily an image. Hence is it clear that likeness is essential to an image and that image adds something to likeness."

Thomas says I answer the same. Therefore there is in man a likeness to God; not, indeed, a perfect likeness, but imperfect. Scripture implies the same when it says that man was made to God's likeness.

Therefore there is the image of God in man.

(a. 1, c., resp.)

Whether the image of God is to be found in irrational creatures?

Augustine says, "Man's excellence consist in the fact that God made him to His own likeness and image by giving him an intellectual soul, which rises him above the animals of the field."

Thomas says it is clear that intellectual creatures alone, properly speaking are made to the image of God.

Hence it is clear only man is made to the image of God.

(a. 2, c., resp.)

Whether the angels are more to the image of God than man is?

Augustine says, "Granted to no other creature besides man God to be to His image."

Thomas says Augustine excludes creatures bereft of reason from the image of God; but not of angels.

Absolutely speaking the angels are more to the image of
God's likeness and image than man but that in some respects man is more like to God.

This is according to how we look at the question

( a. 3, obj. 1, ad lm. )

Whether the image of God is in man according to the Trinity of persons?

Augustine says, "One inessence is the Godhead of the Holy Trinity and one is the image to which every man is made. The Son alone is the image of the Father. There is good difference between the Trinity within ourselves and the divine trinity. We see rather than believe, the Trinity which is in ourselves, whereas we believe rather than see that God is Trinity."

Thomas says that Augustine means we must say that there is in man existing the image of God both as regards the divine nature and as regards the trinity of persons. For also in God Himself there is one nature in three persons.

Thus it is clear the image of God is found in every man according to the Trinity of persons.

( a. 5, obj. 1, obj. 4, resp. ad 3m. )

Whether the image of God is in man as regards the mind only?

Augustine says, "There is a threefold vision in us, corporeal, spiritual or imaginary and intellectual."

Thomas says we find in man a likeness to God by way of an image in His mind; but in no other parts of His being unless by way of trace.

Thus it is clear that the image of God is in all parts of the body.

( a. 6, obj. 1, resp. )
Whether the image of God is to be found in the acts of the soul?

Augustine says, "Man was made to God's image inasmuch as we exist and know that we exist, and love the existence and knowledge." He assigns the image of the Trinity in the soul to the memory, understanding and will, the mind ever remembers, understands and loves itself.

Thomas says since the principles of acts are the habits and powers, and everything exists virtually in its principles, therefore, secondarily and consequently, the image of the Trinity may be considered as existing in the powers, and still more in the habits, forasmuch as the acts virtually exist therein.

Thus with Thomas we can say that the image of God is to be found in the acts of the soul.

( a. 7, obj. 1, obj. 2, resp. )

Whether the image of the divine Trinity is in the soul only by comparison with God as its object?

Augustine says, "When we seek the Trinity in the soul, we seek it in the whole of the soul, without separating the process of reasoning in temporal matters from the consideration of things eternal. The image of God exists in the mind, not because it has remembrance of itself but because it can remember, understand and love God by Whom it was made."

Thomas says by the vision of glory temporal things will be seen, in God Himself; and such a vision of temporal things will belong to the image of God. This is what Augustine meant when he said that in that nature to which the mind will blissfully adhere whatever it sees in the unchangeable. We need to seek in the image of the Divine Trinity in the soul some kind of representation of
species of the divine persons, so far as this is possible to a creature.

This is clearly evident from the above that the image of the Trinity is not only seen by comparison with God as its object. ( a. 8, obj. 2, c., resp. )

Whether likeness is properly distinguished from the image?
Augustine says, "Some consider that these two were mentioned without reason, namely image and likeness, since, if they meant the same, one would have sufficed. Likeness is to an image as genus to a species; because where there is an image, forthwith there is a likeness, but not conversely."

Thomas says likeness is not distinct from image in the general notion of likeness, likeness is a kind of unity.
Thus likeness is not distinct from image in the general or common use of the words for they seem to imply each other. ( a. 9, obj. 1, c., ad lm. )

Question 94
Of the state and condition of the first man as regards his intellect
Whether the first man saw God through His essence?
Augustine says, "If man was gifted with the same tastes as now, how happy must he have been in paradise, that place of ineffable happiness. That the first man lacked nothing which his good-will might obtain. Adam saw without enigma, for enigma implies obscurity. If God speaks to first man as He speaks to angels then man knew God more clearly than we know Him now.

Thus first man and no man can see God through His essences. ( a. 1, obj. 1, Obj. 2, obj. 3, resp. )
Whether man in his first state could be deceived?

Augustine says, "In sleep the soul adheres to the images of things as if they were the things themselves. The woman could have believed the words of the serpent, had she not already acquiesced in the love of power, and in the presumption of self-conceit."

Thomas says it is clear that the rectitude of the primitive state was incompatible with the deception of the intellect.

Thus it is clear man in his first state could not have been deceived.

(a. 4, obj. 4, c., resp.)

Question 95

Of things pertaining to the first man's will - namely grace and righteousness

Whether the first man was created in grace?

Augustine says, "Adam did not possess the Holy Ghost. God, at the same time fashioned their nature and endowed them with grace. God so ordered the life of the angels and men, so to show first that they could do by free will, then what they can do by His grace, and by the discernment of righteousness. As soon as they disobeyed the divine command, and forfeited divine grace they were ashamed for their nakedness."

Thomas says Augustine means that they did not possess the Holy Ghost as the faithful possess Him now. The very rectitude of the primitive state wherewith man was endowed by God, seems to require that he was created in grace.

It is clear that first man was in his state created with grace.
Whether passion existed in the soul of the first man?
Augustine says, "In our first parents there was undisturbed love of God, and other passion of the soul."

Thomas says in the state of innocence the inferior appetite was wholly subject to reason: so that in this state the passions of the soul existed only as consequent upon the judgement of reason.

Whether Adam had all the virtues?
Augustine says, "The prince of sin overcame Adam who was made from the slime of the earth to the image of God, adorned with modesty, restrained by temperance, refulgent with brightness."

Thomas says that in the state of innocence man in a certain sense possessed all the virtues due to reason being subjected to God.

Virtue is nothing but those perfections whereby the mind is directed to God and the inferior powers regulated by reason and as this was the state of the first man as he possessed all the virtues.

Question 96
Of the mastership belonging to man in the state of innocence
Whether in the state of innocence had mastership over animals?
Augustine says, "The animals were brought to Adam, under the direction of the angels, to receive their names from him."

\[ (a. 1, obj. 2, obj. 3, c., ad 2m, resp. ) \]

\[ (a. 2, c., resp. ) \]

\[ (a. 3, c., resp. ) \]
Thomas says the subjection of other animals to man is natural. Before he disobeyed nothing disobeyed him that was naturally subject to him which animals are.

Adam had mastership over all animals before he disobeyed God.

(a. 1, obj. 1, resp.)

Whether man had mastership over all other creatures?

Augustine says, "Corporeal matter would not have obeyed even the holy angels."

Thomas says man had no mastership over the angels in the primitive state. So when we read all creatures, we must understand the creatures which are not made to the likeness of God.

Man did not evidently and clearly have mastership over all others.

(a. 2, obj. 1, resp.)

Whether men were equal in the state of innocence?

Augustine says, "Order disposes things equal and unequal in the proper place."

Thomas says there must have been inequality in regards as the soul. There might have been also bodily disparity.

There were things that were unequal in the state of innocence.

(a. 3, c., resp.)

Whether in the state of innocence man would have been master over man?

Augustine says "God willed that man who was endowed with reason and made to his image should rule over none but cattle. But liberty is one of the chief blessings, and would not have been lacking in the state of innocence, where nothing was wanting that man's good will could desire."
Thomas says man could have been master of men in the sense of government.

Man could have been master over man.

(a. 4, obj. 1, obj. 3, resp.)

Question 97

Of the preservation of the individual in the primitive state Whether in the state of innocence man would have been immortal?

Augustine says, "God made man's soul of a powerful nature, that from its fulness of beatitude, there redounds to the body a fulness of health, with the vigor of incorruption."

Thomas says man was immortal before sin the soul was most properly endowed at the beginning with the power of preserving the body in a manner surpassing the capacity of corporeal nature.

(a. 1, c., resp.)

Whether in the state of innocence man had the need of food? Augustine says "How could man have an immortal body, which was sustained by food? Since immortality neither needs food nor drink."

Thomas says the immortality of the primitive state was based on a supernatural force in the soul and not on any intrinsic disposition of the body and to prevent the entire consumption of the humor man was obliged to take food.

The primitive man clearly needed food for in a sense the soul has vegetative functions though after resurrection we will not need food.

(a. 3, ad 3m.)

Whether in the state of innocence man would have acquired immortality by the tree of life?
Augustine says, "A taste of the tree of life warded off corruption of the body; and even after sin man would have remained immortal, had he been allowed to eat of the tree of life. Man had food to appease his hunger, drink to slake his thirst; and the tree of life warded off all bodily corruption.

Thomas says that the tree of life was in a certain degree the cause of immortality but not absolutely. It merely warded off all bodily corruption.

Thus it is clear that God is the cause of immortality and the tree of life and its fruit would not have given or imparted immortality to the eater.

(a. 4, c., resp.)

Question 98
Of the preservation of the species
Whether in the state of innocence there would have been generation or corruption?

Augustine says, "We must be far from supposing that offspring could not be begotten without concupiscence. All the bodily members would have been equally moved by the will, without ardent or wanton incentive, with the calmses of body and soul. Our first parents did not come together in the garden of paradise, because on account of to sin they were ejected from paradise shortly after the corruption of woman. In that state of innocence intercourse would have been without prejudice to virginal integrity, this would have remained intact, as it does in menses."

Thomas says it is clear that generation by coition is natural to man by reason of his animal life which he possessed even before sin just as it is natural to other perfect animals, as the corporeal members make it clear.
It is clear that generation by coition is natural to man so that in the state of innocence there would have been generation by coition.

(a. 2, c., ad 4m, resp.)

Question 99
Of the condition of the offspring as to the body
Whether in the state of innocence children would have had perfect strength of body as to the use of its members immediately after birth?

Augustine says, "This weakness of body befits the weakness of mind. God made man right, which rightness consists in the perfect subjection of the body to the soul."

Thomas says we must conclude that children would not have had sufficient strength for the use of their limbs for the purpose of performing every kind of act.

It is clear that children would not have had the use of their members immediately after birth.

(a. l, obj. l, c., resp.)

Question 100
Of the condition of the offspring as regards righteousness
Whether in the state of innocence children would have been born confirmed in righteousness?

Augustine says, "Happy would have been the whole human race if neither they - that is our first parents - had committed any evil to be transmitted to their descendants, nor any of their race had committed any sin for which they would have been condemned."

Thomas says that it is clear that children would have been
not confirmed in righteousness.

It is clear that in the state of innocence children would not have been confirmed in righteousness.

(a. 2, c., resp.)

Question 162

Of man's abode, which is paradise

Whether paradise is a corporeal place?

Augustine says, "Three general opinions prevail about paradise. Some understand a place merely corporeal, others a place entirely spiritual; while others whose opinion I confess, please me, hold that paradise was both spiritual and corporeal. It is probable that man has no idea where paradise was. The plants were not actually produced on the third day, but in their seminal virtues, whereas after the works of the six days the plants were actually produced."

Thomas says we must hold to the Scriptures and says that it was fitting that God should place the earthly paradise in the east.

We can have our opinion about this but whatever the Scriptures hold we have to hold to. We can hold this as long as we hold it to be a spiritual place.

(a. 1, c., ad 2m, ad 5m, resp.)

Whether paradise was a place adapted to the abode of man?

Augustine says, "God rules corporeal creatures through spiritual creatures."

Thomas says it is clear that paradise was most fit to be the dwelling place for man, and in keeping with his original state of immortality.

We can hold this as long as it is a spiritual place and
this is in keeping with the original state of immortality.

( a. 2, ad 1m. )

Whether man was placed in paradise to dress it or keep it?

Augustine says, " These words of Genesis may be understood in two ways. First that God planted man in paradise that He Himself might work in man and keep him sanctifying him and by keeping man from all corruption and evil, secondly that man might dress and keep paradise."

Thomas says paradise was ordered to man's benefit, and not conversely thus man was made to enjoy paradise and he may again been placed there to dress and keep it.

This may be taken in two ways. He may and He may have not placed man there to dress and keep it.

( a. 3, c., resp. )

Question 103

Of the government of things in general

Whether all things are subject to the divine will?

Augustine says, " Not only heaven and earth, not only man and angel but even the lowest of the lowest animals hath God endowed with every fittin detail of their nature."

Thomas says wherefore as there can be nothing that is not ordered to the divine government as its end, it is impossible for anything to escape from the divine government.

All things are subject to the divine government and it is impossible fro anything to escape the controlling hand of the divine government.

( a. 5, c., resp. )

Whether all things are immediately governed by God?

Augustine says, " As the lower and grosser bodies are ruled
in a certain orderly way by the bodies of greater subtlety and power. So all bodies are ruled by the rational spirit of life; and the sinful and unfaithful spirit is ruled by the good and just spirit of life, and this spirit is God Himself."

Thomas says as to the design of government God rules all things immediately; whereas in its execution, He governs some things by means of others. God has the design of the government of all things even of the beast.

It is inevitable that all things are ruled by God immediately.

( a. 6, c., resp. )

Whether anything can happen outside the order of the divine government?

Augustine says, "To the order of the divine providence nothing in the world happens by chance."

Thomas says it is possible for an effect to result outside the order of some particular cause but not outside the order of universal causes.

Hence God is the first universal cause of all being and it is impossible for anything to occur outside the order of divine government.

( a. 7, ad 2m. )

Question 104
The special effects of the divine government
Whether creatures need to be kept in being by God?
Augustine says, "If the ruling power of God were withdrawn from His creatures, the nature would at once cease and all nature would collapse. Man is enlightened by the presence of God, and in His absence returns at once to darkness."
Thomas says both faith and reason bind us to say that creature in being by God. The being of every creature depends on God, so that not for a moment could it subsist, but would fall into nothingness were it not kept in being by the operation of the divine power.

Hence all being are kept in existence by God.

(a. 1, c., resp.)

Whether God can annihilate anything?

Augustine says, "God is not the cause of anything tending to non-existence. Because God is good we exist."

Thomas says after things have been made, He is free not to continue their existence; and thus they would cease to exist; and that would be to annihilate them.

God only can annihilate things.

(a. 3, obj. 1, obj. 2, resp.)

Question 105

Of the change of creatures by God

Whether God can do anything outside the established order of nature?

Augustine says, "God the maker and creator of each nature, does nothing against nature. God sometimes does things which are contrary to the ordinary course of nature."

Thomas says since the order of nature is given to things by God; if He does anything outside this order it is not against nature. God can do something outside the order created by Him.

God can do anything outside the established order of things and of the nature of things.

(a. 6, obj. 1, c., resp.)
Whether whatever God does outside the natural order of things is miraculous?

Augustine says, "Where God does anything against the order of nature which we know and are accustomed to observe, we call it a miracle."

Thomas says those things which God does outside those cause we know are called miracles.

Miracles fall into two classes and thus anything that happens outside the ordinary order of things are called miracles.

( a. 7, c., resp. )

Whether one miracle is greater than another?

Augustine says, "In the miraculous deeds, the whole measure of the deed is the power of the doer?

Thomas says a thing is called a miracle a miracle by the comparasion with the power of nature which it surpasses, so by the power of nature that is surpassed, the greater is the miracle.

Thus it is clear that one miracle can be greater or the other passed.

( a. 8, obj. 1, resp. )

Question 106

How one creature moves another

Whether one angel enlightens another?

Augustine says, "The rational mind is informed by God alone, without created intervention."

Thomas says the rational mind is informed by God alone. For the created mind is always considers informed, except it adheres to the first truth; while other kinds of enlightenment that proceeds from man or angels, are, as it were, dispositions
to the ultimate form. One angel enlightens another.

It is clear that the angels can enlighten each other.

(a. 1, obj. 3, ad 3m.)

Question 106

Of the angelic degrees of hierarchies and orders

Whether all the angels are of one hierarchy?

Augustine says, "There are two cities, that is, two socities, one of the good angels and men, and the other of the wicked."

Thomas says, those that can not be governed in the same way by a prince belong to different principalities. There must be a distinction between the human and angelic hierarchy.

The angels are not all of the same hierarchy. Thomas mentions three angelic hierarchies in addition.

(a. 1, c., resp.)

Whether the grades of the orders are properly assigned?

Augustine says, "Bodies are ruled in a certain order; the inferiors by the superiors; and all of them by the spiritual creatures, and the bad spirits by the good spirits."

Thomas says and gives the different opinions. He says this order is reasonable.

The grades of orders are fittingly assigned.

(a. 6, c., resp.)

Whether men are taken up into the angelic orders?

Augustine says, "There will not be two socities of men and angels but only one; because the beatitude of all is clear to God alone."

Thomas says that as regards the grade of nature men can be assumed into the angelic order.

It is safe to assume that men will be assumed into the an-
gelic order.

(a. 8, c., resp.)

Question 109

The ordering of the bad angels

Whether there are orders among the demons?

Augustine says, "For order belongs to the good and dis-order belongs to evil."

Thomas says the contrary and that there is order among the demons. God can exist without evil; whereas evil can not exist without good.

There must be order among the demons for they need a leader.

(a. 9, obj. 1, ad Im.)

Whether the good angels have precedence over the bad angels?

Augustine says, "The treacherous and sinful spirit of life is ruled by the rational, pious and just spirit of life."

Thomas says those creatures which are the more perfect and nearer to God, have the power to act on others, therefore the good angels have precedence over the bad, and these are ruled by them.

It is clear that the angels have precedence over the bad in any order.

(a. 4, c., resp.)

Question 110

How the angels act on bodies

Whether the corporeal creature is governed by the angels?

Augustine says, "All bodies are ruled by the rational spirit of life."
Thomas says it is generally found both in human affairs and natural things that particular power is governed by the universal power.

All corporeal things are ruled by the angels. Whether corporeal matter obeys the mere will of the angels? Augustine says, "It is not to be thought, that the visible matter obeys these rebel angels; for it obeys God alone."

Thomas says every informing of matter is either immediately from God or from some corporeal agent; but not immediately from an angel.

Corporeal matter obeys God alone
(a. 2, c., resp.)

Whether bodies obey the angels as regards local motion? Augustine says, "Angels use corporeal seed to produce certain effects.

Thomas says corporeal nature has a natural aptitude to be moved immediately by the spiritual nature as regards place.

The angels can move bodies as regards local motion.
(a. 3, c., resp.)

Whether angels can work miracles?
Augustine says, "The magicians work miracles by private contracts, good Christians by signs of public justice. That it is not absurd to believe that all things we see happen may be brought about by the lower powers that dwell in our atmosphere."

Thomas says God alone can work miracles.
(a. 4, obj. 2, obj. 3, resp.)

Question III
The action of angels on man
Whether an angel can change man's imagination?

Augustine says, "One spirit by intermingling with another can communicate his knowledge to the other spirit by these images, so that the latter either understands it himself, or accepts it as understood by the other."

Thomas says that angels and men can move the will by way of persuasion. The angels being able to rouse the passions, can move the will, not by necessity, for the will ever remains free to consult it, or to resist passion.

Thus the angels can change the will of man by moving it.

( a. 3, obj. 3, resp.)

Question 113

Of the guardianship of the good angels

Whether angels are appointed to the guardianship of all men?

Augustine says, "Infidels though at times perform good works, do not perform the will, for they do not have the right intention."

Thomas says an angel is assigned to each man in this life. When he arrives at the end of life he has no longer a guardian angel; but in the kingdom of heaven he will have an angel to reign with him, in hell a demon to punish him.

It is evident that an angel is appointed to the guardianship of all.

( a. 4, obj. 3, resp.)

Question 114

Of the assaults of the demons

Whether demons can lead men astray by means of real mir-
Augustine says, "I can not believe that the human body can receive the limb of a beast by means of a demons' acts or powers. Often by means of the magic art miracles are wrought like those which are wrought by the servants of God. The work of Anti-Christ may be called lying wonders, either because he will deceive men's senses by means of phantoms, so that he will not really do what he seems to do; or because, if he works real prodigies, they will lead these into falsehood who believe in him."

Thomas says as Augustine says when the demons do what these holy men seem to do, they do it for their own glory and latter for the glory of God.

The demons can not work miracles for God alone can work a miracle they merely perform deception.

( a. 4, obj. 2, c., ad 1m, ad 3, resp. )

Question 115
Of the action of the corporeal creature
Whether a body can be active

Augustine says, "There are things that are acted upon, but do not act; such are bodies; there is one whom acts but is not acted upon; this is God. There are things both that act and are acted upon; these are spiritual substances. An accident does not extend beyond its subject."

Thomas says a body acts forasmuch as it is in act, on a body forasmuch as it in actuality.

It is clear that bodies not only act but are also active.

( a. 1, obj. 1, obj. 5, resp. )

Whether there are any seminal virtues in corporeal matter?
Augustine says, "Demons produce certain results by employing with hidden movement certain seeds which they know to exist in matter. There are said to be certain casual virtues which seem to suffice for the production of things. Of all the things which are generated in a corporeal and visible fashion, certain seeds lie hidden in the corporeal things of this world."

Thomas says there are seminal virtues in corporeal matter.

Thus it is clear that there are seminal virtues in corporeal matter.

( a. 2, obj. 2, obj. 4, resp. )

Whether the heavenly bodies are the cause of what is produced in the bodies here below?

Augustine says, "Nothing is more corporeal than sex. Bodies of a grosser and inferior nature are ruled in a certain order by those of a more subtle and powerful nature."

Thomas says the movement of the bodies here below, which are various and multiform, must be referred to the movement of the heavenly bodies as their causes.

Thus it has been clearly shown that the movement of the heavenly bodies are the cause of the movements of the bodies here below.

( a. 3, c., resp. )

Whether heavenly bodies can act on the demons?

Augustine says, "The agent is superior to the patient; namely that on earth man fabricates certain powers useful in producing certain effects on the stars. The demons are enticed through various kinds of stones not as an animal is enticed by food, but as a spirit by signs; that is to say, forasmuch as these things are offered to them in token of the honor due
to God, of which they are covetous."

Thomas says it is clear that they are subject to the action of heavenly bodies neither essentially nor accidentally, neither directly or indirectly.

It is clearly evident that the heavenly bodies can act on the demons. Heavenly bodies are superior to the bodies of the lower regions and thus the demons are subject to heavenly bodies.

(a. 5, c., resp.)

Question 116
On fate

Whether there be such a thing as fate?

Augustine says, "Whatever happens by fate is not foreseen due to the word fate is understood to be derived from the word fari which means to speak; as though things were said to happen by fate, which are fore-spoken by one who decrees them to happen. We can admit the existence of fate."

Thomas says the ordering of human action, the principle of which is the will, must be ascribed to God alone thus we can admit the existence of fate.

Fate exists and this can not be doubted or ascribed to chance.

(a. 1, obj. 2, c., resp.)

Whether fate is in created things

Augustine says, "The divine will or power is called fate."

Thomas says fate is in the created causes themselves, as ordered by God to the production of their causes and effects.

Thus it is seen there is fate in created things.
Whether all things are subject to fate
Augustine says, "Fate is something real, as referred to
the divine intellect and power. The divine will is the cause
of all things that happen."

Thomas says fate is to be referred to the divine will
and power as to its first principle. Whatever is subject to
moral causes is subject to fate. Those that do not proceed
from unchangeable created causes are not subject to fate.

All things are subject to moral causes which are subject
to fate while those that proceed from changeable created
causes are not.

(a. 2, obj. 2, ad 2m.)

Question 117
Of things pertaining to the actions of man
Whether man can teach the angels?

Augustine says, "This mystery was hidden from men, but
not from the Church in heaven, which is contained in the prin-
cipalities and powers who know it from all ages, but not be-
fore all ages; because the church was at one time was at first
there, where after the resurrection the church composed of men
will be gathered."

Thomas says men can never enlighten the angels concerning
divine things but they can make known to them the thoughts of
their hearts, by means of their speech.

Men can never teach the angels anything.
(a. 2, ad 1m.)

Whether man can by the power of his soul change corpor-
real matter?
Augustine says, "Corporeal matter obeys God alone."

Thomas says that corporeal matter is not changed to form save either by some agent composed of matter or by God Himself in Whom both mind and matter pre-exist virtually as in the primordial cause of both.

Man by the power of his soul can not change corporeal matter.

(a. 3, c., resp.)

Whether the separate human soul can move bodies at least locally?

Augustine says, "The demons often pretend to be the souls of the dead, in order to confirm the error of heathen superstition."

Thomas says the separate soul can not by its natural power move a body. Therefore within the limits of its natural power can not command the obedience of a body.

The separate human soul cannot move bodies locally.

(a. 4, ad 2m.)

Question 119

Of the propagation of man as to the body

Whether some part of food is changed into true human nature?

Augustine says, "The bodily food when corrupted, that is, having lost its form, is changed into the texture of the members."

Thomas says that belongs to the true nature of anything which enters into the texture of the members.

It is true that some of the food is changed into the true human nature.
Whether the semen is produced from the surplus food?
Augustine says, "We were in Adam not only by seminal virtue, but also in the very substance of the body."

Thomas differs with Augustine and says those words of Augustine are not to be understood as though the immediate seminal from which the individual was born were actually in Adam as a principle. For even the corporeal matter which is supplied by the mother and which he calls the corporeal substance, is originally derived from Adam; and likewise the active seminal power of the father, which is the immediate seminal virtue in man.

Semen is the result of food being digested in the body.
(a. 1, c., resp.)