Spring 1955

The Thomistic And Augustinian Doctrines Of Man's Final Causality

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THE THOMISTIC AND AUGUSTINIAN DOCTRINES OF MAN'S FINAL CAUSALITY

by

Elmer Albery

A dissertation submitted to the Department of Philosophy of Carroll College in partial fulfilment of the requirements of "Magna Cum Laude" recognition.

Helena, Montana
1955
This thesis for "Magna Cum Laude" recognition has been approved for the Department of Philosophy by

[Signature]

Date April 15, 1965
In this thesis I have sought to develop the concept of final causality from the writings of Saint Augustine. In the first chapter the Scholastic concept of causality, and more specifically the idea of the final cause has been treated. Chapter two develops the Augustinian concept for final causality from the major writings of Saint Augustine, i.e., The Confessions and The City of God. Chapter three is devoted to the comparison of the Thomistic with the Augustinian teaching and particular reference is given to the desire of man for his final end, as the Highest Good.

I have hoped by this dissertation to convey the importance of the final cause in men's lives and to bring about a better understanding of the early philosophy of the Church Fathers as regards man's final end.
### TABLE OF CONTENTS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Section</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Preface</td>
<td>iii</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chapter I The Thomistic Concept of Final Causality</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chapter II Final Causality in the Major Works of Saint Augustine</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chapter III Reconciliation of the Augustinian and Thomistic Concept of Final Causality</td>
<td>32</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bibliography</td>
<td>45</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
CHAPTER I

THE THOMISTIC CONCEPT OF FINAL CAUSALITY
Before we set out to study the concept of final human causality in the works of Augustine, it is necessary for the reader to grasp the main idea and definitions in general, involved in the concept of causality as such. This will aid in understanding the later chapters on the problem as treated specifically by Saint Augustine, and give an insight into the continuity between the later Scholastic philosophy of causality and the writings of the Bishop of Hippo.

This later Scholastic view of causality as analyzed in its natural breakdown is of course, the Aristotelian-Thomistic Theory. However, as an introduction to this philosophy of causality it would serve our purpose to present a very brief summary of the question of causality up till Aristotle's time.

__Pre-Aristotelian Causality__

The first note we must make in connection with this problem is the historical fact that we are indebted primarily to Aristotle himself for the presentation of the causal theories of his predecessors. Aristotle did not set out to be a philosophical historian but in expounding his own theory, he introduced incidently the casual thought of his predecessors and, at times, even with a rather unsympathic frankness.

The causal problem is traced through four major divisions of pre-Aristotelian Philosophy, namely, the Ionic, Eleatic,
Pythagorean, and Platonic. The main ideas of Causality in the pre-Platonic period are: (1) Causality, as such, was not as important as Cosomology in general, the treatment of numbers, the problem of being and becoming; (2) The ancient nature-philosophers concerned themselves more with the material cause and the cause of movement, with no clear distinctions; (3) No inquiry was made at all into the formal and final causes.¹

Causality for Plato was raised to the super-celestial region of the Idea and the Good. Plato's important contribution to the theory lies in; (a) his theory of ideas which function in three capacities; the efficient, formal and final causes, (b) matter, which for Plato would be in a certain manner our concept of the material cause, (c) the first clear expression of causality and its necessary character. "Now all things that come to be must need be brought into being by some cause, for it is impossible for anything without a cause to attain to birth."² This principle is a basis for the "Kinesiological Proof" of the existence of an unmoved mover.

The basic disagreement of Aristotle with Plato's casual theory is in the latter's conception of Forms and Ideas, which Aristotle opposed as groundless and gratuitous. Aristotle said that, as universals, they have no being, save in

² Plato, Timaeus 28 A.
the mind. In existential actualization in the physical order they lose their universality, becoming particularized in individual things, wherein they function as the form, act, entelechy of these individuals. Plato's causal theories are bound up in aphoristic reasoning and abstract concepts which become divorced from reality and are no longer vivified by it.

General Theory of Cause from Aristotle

It is recognized that Aristotle more than all the early philosophers valued a knowledge of causes, and saw the fundamental importance of the problem of causality. Moreover he "sought to purify and deepen, refine and define the meanings into an organic system both normative as well as constitutive of his scientific and philosophic conceptions." 3

Aristotle maintained causes are used in four senses; (1) the matter out of which a thing comes to be and which persists in change, (2) the form and model which is the determining factor in the essence, (3) that wherein lies the first beginning of change or of rest, (4) the end or that for the sake of which something is done. The Scholastics fixed the terminology as material, formal, efficient and final. Strangely enough Aristotle, after defining the four causes, does not give us the precise signification of the word "cause" itself. In his philosophical lexicon (Book IV of the Metaphysica) he does intimate that cause is a species of begin-

3 Meehan, op. cit., p. 29.
ning or principle which he defines as "that whence a thing first is, or becomes, or is known." In brief, however the cause for Aristotle can mean only that particular kind of principle which contributes some kind of being to another or on which as a consequence this other is dependent.

Aristotle used many varied illustrations of the functions of the four causes, most familiar is the one on the sculptor's art in which the effect is definitely dependent, in different ways, upon the four causes which contribute being in their own proper manner to the product.

The final cause which in Aristotle's system plays a tremendous role, takes precedence over others since it is the reason why the efficient cause initiates action, why the same cause acts on certain matter and not on other matter, and is the reason why a determined form is imposed on this matter, specifying it in its being. In the order of execution the final cause becomes the end, or that which finally is realized. Without it we see that no effect is produced, nor would an agent determine itself or be determined to act. It is required in the works of nature as well as those of art. Nature then is a cause operating for a purpose. He assimilated the final cause to the formal in natural generations and productions, the reason being that the final cause of any living being is simply to exist in the most perfect form possible. In a sense therefore the "what" and the "that for

4 Aristotle, Metaphysics, IV, 1, 1013a, 18.
the sake of which" are one. However, there is no doubt in Aristotle's mind that there is a distinction between the final cause and the formal. He answers the question, can the end or dinal cause be active in the actual production of the new being, by stating that the active power is a cause in the sense of that from which the process originates: but the end for the sake of which it takes place is not active.5

Aristotle and the Principle of Causality and Uniform Causation

It is no surprise to find Aristotle expressing the principle of causality in terms of motion, recalling that his concept of efficient cause as that of a being which acts by moving. Simply, the principle is stated: "Everything that is in motion must be moved by something."6 Motion was to Aristotle the actualization of that which is movable insofar as it is movable. The universality and necessity of this principle is found in the understanding of the terms "being in motion," and to reject it would be to deny the principle of contradiction.

For Aristotle, the principle of causality and the principle of the uniformity of nature were entirely distinct; the former was analyzed from the notion of effect, that is the nature of the thing as moved, and the latter is deduced from the nature of the cause and source of causal action. This law can be stated most briefly as: "It is a law of nature that the same cause, provided it remains in the same condi-

5 Meehan, op. cit., p. 35.
6 Aristotle, Physics, VII, I, 2416, 25.
tion, always produces the same effect." Nature for him is, "a source or cause of being moved, and of being at rest in that to which it belong primarily in virtue of itself and not in virtue of a concomitant attribute." Therefore this principle is a law of nature, as it is restricted to natural beings.

From this follows that the purposiveness seen in natural beings is a determined purposiveness. The determination reflected in the uniformity of natural processes comes from the first and most dominant of all causes, the final cause. Therefore all processes or becomings are attendant on being and a certain fullness of being, which substantially or accidently is the term of every process. It is from this that the classic principle of finality follows, i.e., everything exists for a final cause. In nature therefore the "good end and final cause" have a dominant role.

The Causal Theory from Aristotle to Aquinas

The most important fact in this period of some fifteen hundred years was the eclipse of Aristotelian philosophy and the rise of Neo-Platonism as the foundation for Christian philosophy because of the impetus the latter received from St. Augustine. Until the middle of the twelfth century the causal theories of Aristotle were unknown to Christianity.

It was left to the Arabian and the Jewish philosophers 7 Aristotle, *De Generatione et Corruptione*, II, 10, 336-a, 27-29. 8 Aristotle, *De Generatione Animalium*, V, 1, 778b, 1-6.
to introduce Aristotle into the Western schools some eight centuries after the age of St. Augustine, and for St. Thomas to Champion the rise of Aristotelianism. To this task Aquinas brought a love of truth and benevolence for Aristotle's thought unattained by any of his Arabian or Jewish predecessors. In the same vein, St. Thomas approached Aristotle's theory of causes with an understanding, perspicuity and mental acumen that led eventually to his own system of causes.

**General Theory of Cause from St. Thomas**

St. Thomas is not only in accord with the general causal theory of Aristotle but at times even in some details of the problem. They both realized the importance of causality. The knowledge of causes, Aquinas tells us, is an end which science sets for itself and endeavors to reach. This striving follows from a natural desire of men to know causes and what is more, the desire to know the highest and noblest of causes, God Himself. The cognition of causes appears to be in the highest degree intellectual, that is, the mind must pass beyond the phenomena or sensible appearances of things, which is a power of the intellect alone.

Thomas, unlike Aristotle, distinguishes principle, or beginning, and cause. The word principle, simply implies a certain order of one thing from another from which the latter proceeds in any manner whatsoever, while cause implies a certain "influx" into this being of the thing caused and connotes that on which things depend for their being or becoming.
St. Thomas accepted the four species of causes and applied them to extents never dreamed of by Aristotle. Thus, the material world around us, its Author, man and society, art and morality, are made comprehensive to the intellect. It is necessary to list the four causes again with their definitions to show where Aquinas differed from Aristotle in understanding, emphasis, and application. For St. Thomas, the material cause is that out of which something is made or becomes, and which persists actually within the effect; the formal cause is one of three forms, either the form by which a thing is formed (forma secundem quam) or the form after which a thing is made (forma ad quem) or the idea; the efficient cause is explained as the cause by which a thing is formed or from whose activity the formation of the effect proceeds; the final cause is that for the sake of which something is done, that on account of which the agent operates.

Aquinas has it that since an efficient cause doesn't operate unless there is a good to be attained, the end or final cause properly bespeaks a good, whether apparent real, and therefore an order of, and relation to an appetite. In agreement with Aristotle, Aquinas insists every agent acts for an end, and without final causes there would be no action whatsoever. Rational causes move themselves to their end because they have control over their actions by virtue of free choice, an intellectual faculty. Creatures lacking
rationality however do not so apprehend the end as such but tend to it in virtue of a natural inclination moved not by themselves but by another. Thus, only an intellectual nature freely ordains or chooses the end and the means for reaching it. The tendency toward an end on the part of all creation, rational creatures by rational appetite, and inanimate and brute beings by natural appetites, is called by St. Thomas the "intentio finis" and is manifested by all beings. Thus the concept of final cause involves: a good, apparent or real, that is attainable and to be attained; relation to an appetite, rational or irrational, and seeking the connatural goods.

Importance of the Concept of Final Causality

The concept lies in this, that the previously mentioned "influx" of the final cause consists in its being sought, and desired by an efficient cause. Its actual causality then lies in its moving the appetition faculty of the efficient cause. Aquinas agrees with Aristotle that the final cause moves the efficient cause, as understood in a metaphorical sense but he asserts that the causality of the final cause by that fact is no less real. It is so real that there would be no causality exercised by the other causes at all without it.

For both philosophers then the final cause is the "causa causarum." The inter-relation of the efficient cause to the final cause is brought out by the fact that we cannot conceive
of an efficient cause in operation, except "in ordine ad finem," since its action receives its necessary compliment only through its end; and likewise a final cause cannot be conceived of as operative apart from an efficient cause. This leads us to the last clarification of the two orders that is, the order of intention (final cause) and order of execution (efficient cause). St. Thomas holds that in each order there must be something that is prior, thus in the order of intention, that which is first is a principle that moves the appetite, viz., the final cause and in the order of execution the priority is in the principle on account of which the operation first begins viz. and efficient cause. If either were removed nothing would begin to operate. It is true that although final cause presupposes an efficient cause, the two orders are not totally independent. The order of actual efficiency or efficient causes in operation means that no potentially efficient cause could determine itself to act nor be determined unless by a final cause, directing it to an end. Whereas, in the order of causality in act, we see that the good which is the end of every action could never be called a final cause nor exercise final causality unless it were related to an appetite of a being that is capable of tending in its direction.

**Human Final Causality in the Scholastic System**

In concluding this chapter let us turn our attention to
the problem of human final causality in general. This will serve as an introduction to the concept in the writings of Augustine.

With St. Augustine, St. Thomas, and other Scholastics, we assert as true, the doctrine of Aristotle that creatures tend to their ends, and ultimately to a last end, by a true intrinsic finality, whether it is executed knowingly or unknowingly. The principle is "everything that acts, acts account of an end." Rational creatures act knowingly for their end, irrational creatures vice-versa. Thus in Scholastic it is proved that man in his deliberate and free acts, acts for an ultimate end which is the "Summum Bonum" or Supreme Good in the achievement of which he attains perfect happiness. The justification of this lies in the nature of the will of man and the concept of goodness.

God as the Supreme Good can only will His own Goodness, yet; "So as He understands things apart from Himself by understanding His own essence, so He wills things apart from Himself by willing His own goodness." By this we see He wills other things and imparts to them their goodness. "It pertains to the nature of the will to communicate as far as possible the good possessed; and especially does this pertain to the Divine will from which all perfection is derived in some kind of likeness."10

The necessary good of every will is the necessary object,

10 Saint Thomas Aquinas, op. cit., I, q, 19a, 2.
that is, the object to which the will necessarily tends or adheres. The necessary good for every rational being then is the good without which the complete well-being of the one willing could not be had. The human will tends to this necessary good as the final end, in the possession of which the complete good of the individual will be found. From this it follows that as in God His own infinite perfection eternally possessed is His final end, so we see His Divine will is Free in regard to all good that is not Himself, because of the fact of existence of finite good.

The problem that arises in Scholastic philosophy as a result of this is the nature of the freedom of the will in man. It needs only to be recalled that man in exercising freedom of the will must always will a good, apparent or real, and that there is no immutability associated with freedom of the will in man. In God, immutability consists in one simple act of willing His own Goodness and freedom as regards its exercise on all other creatures. Man also by nature is subject to his ultimate good which is his objective final end, and to this his will tends necessarily. However true freedom of the will for man is the ability to adhere always to a good as such.

In Thomistic thought, the human will is free because, being determined to Universal Good, it is indetermined to particular goods, which then becomes means to the absolutely
final end, i.e., Universal Good. Man by free will moves himself to act. But it is not of the essence of liberty that a free being be the first cause of its movement just as, to cause something else, one need not be the first cause. The notion of first or primary cause in Scholasticism refers exclusively to God; all other causes are called secondary causes. Consequently, when something moves itself, it is not thereby prevented from being moved by that from which it has the power of moving itself; thus it is not repugnant to liberty that God is the cause of free choice. He operates in the will as He does in nature. God as first cause moves each being in accordance with its nature. He moves necessary beings in a necessary manner; He moves free beings in a free manner; He Himself, being the cause of the freedom and of the necessity.

The ultimate solution of the problem of finality, that is, the intrinsic determination which is found in the things of nature, or in other words, the natural appetite drawing a being to its end, can only be explained ultimately by God, Ipsum Esse, the Author of Nature, the Giver of Finality, the end of all things.

Finally, we take from St. Thomas his theory of the ultimate end of man in particular "in specie," viz., the vision of God's essence. He reminds us that if a created intellect could never see God, it would never attain to beatitude (the Meehan, Efficient Causality in Aristotle and St. Thomas, p. 305).
ultimate final end) or that beatitude would consist in something other than God, which is against reason. Beatitude then for St. Thomas is the perfect good of an intellectual nature, for man whose intellect is made for truth, the beatitude is the understanding or the vision of the essence of God:

Finally the ultimate perfection of the rational creature is to be found in that which is the source of its being; since a thing is perfect insofar as it attains to its source.... For there resides in every rational animal the desire to know the cause of every effect which he sees. Thence arises wonder in men. But if the intellect of the rational creature could not attain to the first cause of things, the natural desire would remain vain. Hence it must be granted that absolutely the blessed see the essence of God.\textsuperscript{12}

CHAPTER II

FINAL CAUSALITY IN THE MAJOR WORKS OF SAINT AUGUSTINE
In this chapter we turn to the two great major works of Saint Augustine, the *Confessions*, his autobiography, and the *City of God*, a biography of the Church. In the former, Saint Augustine writes as a philosophical minded theologian and in the latter as a theological minded historian. Both however constitute the "Opus Majus" of his life and have been tremendously influential upon later ages.

**Difficulties with Causal Concept in Augustine**

The reader should be reminded of our approach to Saint Augustine. We do not find here the Aristotelian terminology expressing final causality. In the writings of Saint Augustine with the exception of the *Encriдон* and the *Beata Vita*, we do not find philosophy separated from the theology, Revelation from reason. Because of this it is at times difficult to see the concept of human final causality in Saint Augustine but it is there, and if we keep in mind what final human causality answers: what is the end of man, what is his purpose, why is he here, to what good does he tend, we will see that the concept is implicitly present.

One of our difficulties with Augustine will be his Platonic terminology. Certain words hold a very different meaning for Augustine than for Aristotle or Aquinas. Also, he uses terms familiar to his disciples which have other
connotations to us. For example the word, "necessitas" denotes the natural development of things and human actions according to the law of causality. Other Scholastics would here speak of "fate." Later in the City of God, Augustine derives the word, "fatum," i.e., "fate," etymologically from "fari," i.e., "to speak." Thus when Augustine speaks of fate, he is signifying God's word, i.e., divine providence or regarded from the human point of view, the law of causality. Needless to say, this has nothing to do with the pagan concept of fate. Such difficulties however are overcome as we read his works and gain an insight into his method of philosophizing.

Confessions and Final Causality

As de Raeymaeker says, we find in the Confessions a clear expression of man's final cause:

Man, a creature of God, naturally tends towards his Creator as his end. Love is the source of his action. But this love is a participation in Subsistent Goodness and no creature that is merely a reflection of divine perfection can ever satisfy it. Voluntary movement, the natural and conscious urge of the soul, can find its end only in God: 'For thou has made us for Thyself, and our heart is restless, until it rests in Thee.' (Augustine, confession, Liber I, i, I). The final end of man resides in the union of the soul with God, in the loving intuition of Subsistent Truth. Far from abolishing personal consciousness, this union, which can
only be realized in the supernatural order, exalts personality to a supreme degree.13

This is the topic paragraph of the whole of Book One of the Confessions, wherein Saint Augustine takes up his infancy and praises of the Lord, who is both "supreme Essence and Life." Contrasting this statement of final human causality with that of Aquinas the difference in their expression of the same thought is easily perceived:

And since Thy years fail not, (because of the nature and immutability of God), Thy years are one today. How many of ours and our father's years have flowed away through Thy 'today', and from it received the measure and mould of such being as they had; and still others flow away, and so receive the mould of their degree of being.14

He ends Book One in the same manner that he began, that is, with a statement of the human end:

But all are gifts of my God; it was not I who gave them to me; and good these are, and these together are myself. Good, then, is He that made me, and He is my good; and before Him will I exult for every good which as a boy I had. For it was my sin, that not in Him, but in His creatures—myself and others—I sought for pleasures, sublimities, truth, and so fell head long into sorrows, confusions, errors. Thanks be to Thee, my joy and my glory, and my confidence, my God, thanks be to Thee for Thy gifts, but do thou preserve them to me. For so wilt Thou preserve me and those things shall be enlarged and perfected which Thou has given me, and I myself shall be with Thee, since even to be Thou hast given me.15

This theme remains the same throughout the Confessions.

Moreover, the frustration of the adherence to the ultimate


final end is the cause of unhappiness, whereas the desire and search after that end will bring about the greatest happiness which is union of love with God Himself. The preponderant expressions of the praise of God as the end of man's search dominating this major work are given expression in beautiful and penetrating psychology.

When the problem of evil is taken up, he mentions the place of all causes in relation to the final ultimate cause:

And I looked back on other things and I saw that they owed their being to Thee; and were bounded in Thee; but in a different way; not as being in graces but because Thou containest all things in Thine hand in Thy Truth, things did harmonise, not with their places only but with their seasons.16

Saint Augustine leaves no doubt in our mind that each being possesses good insofar as it conforms to the final cause "from the angel to the worm, from the first notion to the last, Thou settest each in its place, and realisest each in their season, everything good after its kind."17 Moreover by the Pontitianus incident (Pontitianus and a friend were converted to the service of God by reading a life of St. Anthony and pondering on their final end) the reassurance is given that the purpose of human life should only be to live as a friend of God.

Saint Augustine asks himself, "But what do I love, when I love Thee?", that is, what is the nature of the love for the final ultimate end that man has? Philosophically, an object

16 Ibid., Book VII, p. 120.
17 Ibid., Book VIII, p. 139.
of love is always a good, moreover, a good that is sought as an end. Saint Augustine then answers his own question:

...not beauty of bodies, nor fair harmony of time, nor the brightness of the light, so gladsome to our eyes, nor sweet melodies of varied songs, nor the fragrant smell of flowers, and ointments, and spices, not manna and honey, not limbs acceptable to embraces of the flesh (notice all are proximate ends). None of these I love when I love my God; and yet I love a kind of light, and melody, and fragrance, and meat, embrace of my inner man, where there shineth unto my soul what space cannot contain, what time beareth not away, and there smelleth what breathing disperseth not, and there clingeth what satiety divorceth not. This is it which I love when I love my God.

From here he goes on to narrate his search for his ultimate end, first in the sea and the deep, in the living creatures, in the air, in himself, and always the reply is either, "We are not God, but He made us," and so the Saint replies to these things, "Ye have told me of my God, that ye are not He, you tell me something of Him." Therefore all causes are relative to the final cause.

O my soul, thou are my better part, for thou quickenest the mass of my body, giving it life, which nobody can give to a body: but thy God is even unto thee the Life of thy life.

Augustine from this point departs into the psychology of memory which is indeed an important factor in man's search for his ultimate end:

How then do I seek Thee, O Lord? For when I seek Thee, my God, I seek a happy life. I

18 Ibid., Book X, p. 178.
19 Ibid., Book X, p. 179.
will seek Thee, that my soul may live. For my body liveth by my soul, and my soul by Thee. How then do I seek a happy life, seeing I have it not, until I can say, where I ought to say it, it is enough?  

"Could it be," Augustine asks himself, "that I experienced this happy life somewhere before and remember it?" He expresses his doubt and also his doubt as to whether all men wish to be happy, that is, obtain their true final end, i.e., joy in God; or is it because the flesh lusteth against the Spirit they are not able to will strongly enough to obtain it? The answer is stated: "This is the happy life which all desire; this life which alone is happy, all desire; to joy in the truth all desire."  

But then they could not know the truth and not desire a happy life unless they are strongly taken up with other things (proximate ends) which have more power to make them miserable, than that which they so faintly remember to make them happy. Therefore when the truth is found, God is found, but in the most famous of all lamentations Augustine complains:

Too late loved I thee, O Thou Beauty of ancient days, yet ever new!; too late I loved thee! And behold Thou wert within (internal finality), and I abroad (external finality) and there I searched for Thee; deformed I, plunging amid those fair forms which Thou hadst made. Thou went with me, but I was not with Thee, Things held me far from Thee, which unless they were in Thee, were not at all (efficient causality of God)... When I shall with my whole self cleave to Thee, I shall have sorrow or labour and my life shall wholly be lived, as wholly full of Thee."  

20 Ibid., Book X, p. 190.  
21 Ibid., Book X, p. 194.  
22 Ibid., Book X, p. 196.
After this St. Augustine returns to question of what are the proximate causes which occupy men's hearts. He calls them, "innumerable toys, made by divers arts," which men add to tempt their own eyes, while inwardly they forsake the final end and outwardly follow their own proximate ends, and thereby destroying in their hearts the love of God on account of which they themselves have been made by. Then he speaks of the lusts, the concupiscences, the curiosity, the pride and praise of men as destructive of the quest for the true final end. He points out that they please themselves, and displease God, by taking pleasure in things not good, as if they were good (apparent goods) or in Things of God as if their own. The final end therefore should be the abiding and discerning light to judge all things, and that nowhere can man find completeness except in his final end: "Now in all these which I run over consulting Thee can I find any safe place for my soul, but in Thee; whither my scattered members may be gathered, and nothing of me departs from Thee."23 Finally the chapter closes with the realization that though the sins of men drag man away from his final end, a persevering search will lead him back.

Treating of the beginning of the world, St. Augustine brings out the fact that final causality is first in the intention: "For the will of God is not a creature but before the creature; seeing nothing could be created, unless the will

23 Ibid., Book X, p. 211.
of the Creator had preceded... But thou precedest all things past, by the sublimity of an ever present eternity."24 Because of this than the Final Cause is an abiding cause outside of time. All other causes, that is proximate, are in time, for by the word "cause" the connotation of motion is given, and motion must exist in time:

...to follow The One, forgetting what is behind, and not distended but extended, not to things which shall be and shall pass away, but to those things which are before, not distractedly but intently,...until I flow together into Thee.25

Dealing more fully with the natural desire of man for his final end, he says:

I fell off into that (his own error), and became darkened; but even thence I love Thee, I went astray, but remember Thee. I heard Thy voice behind me, calling me to return, and scarcely heard it, through the tumultuousness of the enemies of peace. And now, behold, I return in distress and panting after Thy fountain. Let no man forbid me of this I will drink, and so live. Let me not be mine own life; from myself I lived ill, death was I to myself, and I revive in Thee... Thou hast told me also with a strong voice (the natural desire), in my inner ear, that neither is that creature so eternal unto Thyself, whose happiness Thou only art, and which with a most persevering purity, drawing its nourishment from Thee...26

And this natural desire is good because of the goodness imparted to it by the Supreme Good. The possession of the final end therefore is "to cleave fast to God, which surpass-es all extension, and all revolving periods of time."27

Here he takes up what might be in a sense considered a

26 Ibid., Book XII, pp. 246, 249, 248.
27 Ibid., Book XII, p. 256.
discussion of the causes when he states that God, (efficient cause), created from nothing (a quasi-material cause) a form (formal cause) which "bleaveth to the unchangeable Form" (final cause). The question Augustine affirms here is, "Did God create the formless matter of the corporeal creature?"

Under the name 'matter' with regard to "spiritual creatures," St. Augustine designates whatever, although incorporeal, still is not God, but the workmanship of God; "The creature itself, such as it would be if not penetrated by an light eternal, and cleaving to God by that pure and undefectible love, whereby its natural liability to change is restrained." 28

Treating of the natural ending of beings, Augustine says the end of a being is its goodness, its primary goodness; and an inquiry into the reason why causes are outside of God, which Augustine again resolves to his principle that because God is good, all things are:

In Thy good pleasure is our peace. The body by its own weight strives towards its own place. Fire tends upward, a stone downward. Weight makes not downward only, but to his own place. They are urged by their own weight, they seek their own places. Oil poured below water, is raised above the water; water poured upon oil, sinks below the water. They are urged by their own weights to seek their own places. When out of their order they are restless; restored to order, they are at rest. My weight, is my love; thereby I am borne, whithersoever I am borne. We are inflamed, by Thy Gift we are kindled; and are carried upwards; we glow inwardly, and go forwards. We ascend Thy ways that be in our heart, and sing a song of degrees; we glow

28 Ibid., Book XII, p. 256.
inwardly with Thy fire, with Thy good fire, and we go; because we go upwards to the peace of Jerusalem: for gladdened was I in those who said unto me, We will go to the house of the Lord. There hath Thy good pleasure placed us, that we may desire nothing else, but to abide there for ever.29

In conclusion he explains the operation of the final end, i.e., final cause:

We therefore see these things which Thou madest, because they are; but they are because Thou seest them. And we see without, that they are, and within, that they are good, but Thou sawest them there, when made, where Thou sawest, yet to be made. And we were at a later time moved to do well, after our hearts had conceived of Thy Spirit; but in the former time we were moved to do evil, forsaking Thee; but Thou, the One, the Good God, didst never cease doing good. And we also have some good works, of Thy gift, but not eternal; after them we trust to rest in Thy great hallowing. But Thou, being the Good which needeth no good, art ever at rest, because Thy rest is Thyself.30

We get a further grasp of St. Augustine concept of final causality as applied to man in the City of God. Herein he recalls the wisdom of Socrates who disputed about the chief good as the possession of that which can make a man blessed. But Augustine also shows where Socrates' followers took from his disputation whatever pleased them best and each placed his own final end or good in whatever it pleased himself to consist, whereas Augustine says with Plato the final end is "that at which, when one has arrived, he is blessed."31 From

29 Ibid., Book XIII, p. 274.
30 Ibid., Book XIII, p. 301.
which:

Man has been so created to attain, through that which is most excellent in him, to that which excels all things that is, to the true and absolutely good God, without whom no nature exists, no doctrine instructs, no exercise profits—let Him be sought in whom all things are secure to us, let Him be discovered in whom all truth becomes certain to us, let Him be loved in whom all becomes right to us. 32

Augustine emphasizes the pre-eminent position of Plato and the Platonic school of philosophy over others. He tells us that Plato determined the final end to be to live according to virtue, and affirmed that only he alone can attain virtue who knows and loves God, and that only knowledge and imitation of Him are the true cause of blessedness. Therefore, the final end is the true and highest good, and as Plato would have it, the true philosopher is, he who loves God," for philosophy is directed to the obtaining of the blessed life" and he who loves God is blessed in the enjoyment of God. 33 For Augustine then, the philosophy which is related to the final end holds highest authority.

Whatever philosophers, therefore thought concerning the supreme Good, that he is both maker of all created things, the light by which things are known, and the good in reference to which things are to be done (final end), that we have in Him the first principle of nature, the truth of doctrine, and the happiness of life, whether these philosophers maybe more suitably called Platonists, or whether they may give some other name to their sect.... We prefer these to all other

32 Ibid., p. 248.
33 Ibid., p. 252.
philosophers and confess that they approach nearest to us.\textsuperscript{34}

St. Augustine explains the superiority of the Christian philosophers, those who know their final end by knowing God, to other philosophers:

...ignorant that it is from the true and supremely good God that we have that nature in which we are made in the image of God, and that doctrine by which we know Him and ourselves, and that grace through which, by cleaving to Him, we are blessed. This, therefore is the cause why we prefer these to all the others, because, whilst other philosophers have worn out their minds and power in seeking the cause of things, and endeavouring to discover the right mode of learning and living, these (Christian philosophers) by knowing God, have found where resides the cause by which the universe has been constituted, and the light by which truth is to be discovered, and the fountain at which felicity is to be drunk.\textsuperscript{35}

He talks here of those who live as if their final end did not exist; this he says is to live "according to a lie" because those live not as they are made to live, which is a lie, and furthermore they still in truth desire to be blessed even by not living so that they may be blessed.\textsuperscript{36} It is then a lie to do all things in order that it may be well with us, but which finally makes us more miserable then we were, since "the source of man's happiness lies only in God," whom he abandons when he sins, and not in himself, by living according to whom he sins.

Now then, even though the righteous are blessed, still they do not live always as they wish because what they seek

\textsuperscript{34} Ibid., p. 254.
\textsuperscript{35} Ibid., p. 255.
\textsuperscript{36} Ibid., p. 445.
to attain, i.e., the final end, they cannot because they still live, thus they are compelled to wish to die in order that after death they may live better. But such a one is still blessed since he is "patiently wretched" following Terence's maxim, "Since you cannot do what you will, will what you can."

For a blessed life is possessed only by the man who loves it. If it is loved and possessed, it must necessarily be more ardently loved than all besides; for whatever else is loved must be loved for the sake of the blessed life. And if it is loved as it deserves to be-and the man is not blessed who does not love the blessed life as it deserves-then he who so loves it cannot but wish it to be eternal. Therefore it shall then only be blessed when it is eternal.37

When Augustine comes to the treatment of the "two cities" he divides the human race into two parts, the one consisting of those who live according to man, the other of those who live according to God, the end for the first being, eternal damnation, and for the other, reigning with God. The earthly city of God desires earthly goods only in so far as they are ordained to be used by its citizens for obtaining their final end. Eternal victory and never-ending peace are therefore sought by the citizens of the city of God, and in this we understand these terms peace and victory as our final end. The proper hierarchy of nature in the heavenly city requires that the soul be under God, the flesh under the soul, and both together under God; hence eternal life is the perfection of

37 Ibid., p. 474.
good, and eternal death the consummation of evil. The aim of the life of the citizens of God's city must therefore be to avoid the death and attain the true Highest Good.

St. Augustine first reviewed the opinions of the philosophers regarding the final supreme good and their efforts to make for themselves a happiness in this life. From this review St. Augustine arrived at two definitions, one of the final end of the Highest Good as "that for the sake of which other things are to be desired, while it is to be desired for its own sake" and the end of evil as, "that on account of which other things are to shunned, while it is avoided on its own account." 38

Thus by the end of good, we at present mean not that by which good is destroyed so that it no longer exists, but that by which it is finished, so that it becomes complete, and by the end of evil we mean, not that which abolishes it, but that which completes its development. These two ends, therefore are the supreme good and the supreme evil, and as I have said, those who have in this vain life pursued the study of wisdom have been at great pains to discover these ends, and to obtain the supreme good and avoid the supreme evil in this life. 39

St. Augustine herein brings to mind the idea of virtue as contributing to the possession of the final end and he points out that there are some three hundred philosophers who hold diverse opinions as to the nature of the final end. Those who place this end or security where peace is complete and unassailable, shall there enjoy the gifts of nature fully,

38 Ibid., p. 669.
39 Ibid., p. 670.
that is, in God. Thus the Creator of all natures has bestowed upon us gifts not only good but eternal, not only of the spirit, healed now by wisdom, but also of the body renewed by the resurrection. In Him, virtues will no longer struggle against evil, but shall enjoy the reward of victory, the eternal peace which no adversary shall disturb. "This is the true blessedness, this the ultimate consummation, the unending end."40

Even the peace that can be enjoyed in this present life by the good, will seem as mere misery compared to the final felicity. True virtue therefore is that virtue which refers all the advantages it makes good use of, and all that it does in making good use of good and evil things, and itself also, "...to that end in which we shall enjoy the best and greatest peace possible."41

The epitome of Augustines' theory of final causality is found in his discussion of the happiness of the eternal peace, which constitutes the end or true perfection of the saints:

But as the word of peace is employed in connection with things in this world in which certainly life eternal has no place, we have preferred to call the end or supreme good of this city life eternal rather than peace. ... But, on the other hand, as those who are not familiar with Scripture may suppose that the life of the wicked is eternal life, either because of the immortality of the soul, which some of the philosophers even have recognized, or because of the endless punishment of the wicked, which forms a part of our faith, and

40 Ibid., p. 685.
41 Ibid., p. 680.
which seems impossible unless the wicked live forever, it may therefore be advisable, in order that every one may readily understand what we mean, to say that the end or supreme good of this city is either peace in eternal life, or eternal life in peace. For peace is good, a good so great, that even in this earthly an mortal life there is no such word we hear with such pleasure, nothing we desire with such zest, or find to be more thoroughly gratifying. So that if we dwell for a little longer on this subject, we shall not, in my opinion, be wearisome to our readers, who will attend both for the sake of understanding what is the end of this city of which we speak, and for the sake of the sweetness of peace which is dear to all.42

The Augustinian notion of peace is for us the concept of the final end. We see that the actual possession of certain happiness in this life, without the hope of the final peace, is in reality a false happiness. Only in so far as we have hope can the true blessings of the soul now enjoyed, "... since true wisdom directs men to that end in which God shall be all and all in a secure eternity and perfect peace."43 Even so, the peace of those who serve God cannot in this mortal life be apprehended in its perfection, since only in the final peace, to which all our righteousness and blessedness has reference, is our supreme good found. It follows from this that all men must first pass through a last judgement to obtain the ends, the good to the supreme good, and the evil to the supreme evil.

In concluding this chapter, we see that the causality of the final end regarding the citizens of the City of God

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42 Ibid., p. 686.
43 Ibid., p. 699.
is to live so as to possess the peace of the Eternal City. The final end is the motivating force in their lives, directing, ruling, referring all things to itself, that is, the supreme good. It is then a true final cause of the good, namely to cleave to Him who supremely is, and in turn; the citizens of the earthly city resist their true final end by inordinately loving the good found in natures and even though obtaining it become evil in the good, and wretched because deprived of the greater final end.
CHAPTER III

RECONCILIATION OF THE AUGUSTINIAN AND THOMISTIC CONCEPT OF FINAL CAUSALITY
In this chapter we will compare the Augustinian and Thomistic doctrines of man's final causality. As it was mentioned before, the writings of St. Augustine do not contain purely philosophical expression of final causality. St. Augustine, a Father of the Church, did not approach this question from a purely philosophical view, i.e., divorced from Revelation. The majority of his writings were intent on preserving and transmitting intact the deposit of Faith. We cannot discover from him the natural appetite of the soul tending toward the "finem bonum," apart from its setting in fallen or redeemed man as clearly as we can in Aquinas:

We can...rightly call vision the end and rest of the will...all these and such like acts of will have their own particular ends, which are referred to the end of that act of will which is not referred to anything else, but of itself suffices him who loves it. The will therefore, to see has for its end vision, and the will, to see a particular thing has for its end the vision of that thing.... For it is the same thing to speak of the repose of the will which we call its end, if this is still referred to something further, as it is to say that a foot at rest in walking, when it is placed at a spot whence another foot may be planted in the direction of the man's steps. But if something so satisfies that the will reposes in it with certain pleasure, it is nevertheless not to that which the man ultimately tends; for this too refers to something further, so that it may be considered not as a citizens' nature land, but as a place of refreshment (reflection) or even sojourning, for the traveler. 44

Augustine knew with as much certainly as Aristotle however, that man's will tends by a necessity of its nature toward

happiness, "the notion of which is imprinted on our minds." Thus he knew as well as Aquinas that true human happiness or beatitude is found only in God. Since God is the soul's beatitude or the final end and the will is directed by its nature toward happiness, he saw that the soul must be directed by its nature toward God:

For as God is man's supreme good...it clearly follows, since to seek to the supreme good is to live well, that to live well is nothing else but to love God with all the heart, with all the soul, with all the mind..."

This identification between the soul's final end and God, reveals three of his most characteristic teachings. In the first place his doctrine of divine illumination shows that for Augustine, God is actually in the soul as the truth that illumines the mind of every man coming into the world, especially as regards man's supreme good.

The striving after God is therefore the desire of beatitude, the attainment of God is beatitude itself. We seek to attain God by loving Him; we attain to Him, not by becoming entirely what He is, but in nearness to Him, and in a wonderful and sensible contact with Him, and in being inwardly illuminated and occupied by His truth and holiness. He is light itself, it is given to us to be illuminated by that light.

Beatitude therefore brings in the possession of the truth. "Dost thou hold wisdom to be anything other than truth, wherein we behold and embrace the supreme good?" So that the soul is really tending towards God when it is tending towards God.

46 Saint Augustine, De Moribus Ecclesiae, I, xxv, 46.
47 Ibid., I, xi, 18, p. 39.
the truth that beatifies. This indeed, is the dominant theme of his De Beata Vita, a theme that constantly recurs in the rest of his works. We saw in the Confessions that the search for beatitude is the search for God. For clarification of the part divine illumination plays in man's life let us state this again simply. All men naturally seek to be happy. This is their end in all their activities and in their final end they seek their greatest happiness. However, not all agree as to what this happiness is, except to the extent that all are seeking the truth and wish to rejoice in their final end.

Now in Augustine's system the truth that shines in every mind is identified with God, it is clear thus that all men seeking their final end in the pursuit of truth are seeking God. Wherever truth is known, God is there. No matter where the heart strays, God is within it.⁴⁹ Though the soul may not know it as such, it is still seeking its own happiness in the truth, i.e. final end, that all men naturally desire.

When God is sought without, He is still within, illuminating the soul to put away its blindness and deafness and seek Himself where He is as the final end.

God, and the Good-in-self, the notion of which is impressed on our minds as a standard of judging the good in the world, are interchangeable terms for St. Augustine. The good that the soul is always seeking and cleaving to by love is nothing other than this final end.

From this, the second teaching is shown, i.e., that the natural image of God in the soul also furnishes a foundation for a natural tendency towards Him whose image is there. The mind always remembers, knows, and loves itself, and this threefold power is for the Saint a natural image of the Trinity. Before the mind becomes a partaker of God it bears His image, so that through it the soul is capable of God and able to partake of his final end. The image of God may be defaced, worn out, or obscured but it is always there. It lies beneath the holiness and justice in which man was created and which are lost by sin. St. Augustine brings out the distinction between man's knowing and considering his final end. The soul always knows itself and God through His image but it doesn't always consider what it knows. The knowledge the soul has of itself in the image of God is stored up in memory while we are thinking of something else. This is why the soul is always capable of obtaining its end whether it is actually aware of this or not. Even in sin, the soul bears this natural likeness to the final supreme good, and sinners strive after nothing else but some kind of likeness to God.

A third characteristic Augustinian teaching is his doctrine of the natural weight of the will which again implies a natural desire for God as the final supreme good. The will holds primacy among man's powers, evident of course from the fact that preceding every act of knowledge is an act of the will, an appetite or desire to know. Aristotle maintained in
his *Physica* that every body is borne by its natural weight towards a determined place in the universe, where it finds its repose. This is called its natural place. Thus in seeking its natural place fire is borne upwards and a stone downwards. In somewhat similar fashion Augustine conceives man and his will. In every soul, as in a body, a weight pulls and inclines it constantly towards its final end or natural place, where it too will find repose. This weight of the soul is natural love, and it is this that moves the will instinctively. The specific gravity of bodies might be said to be their love, whether they are carried downwards by their weight, or upwards by their levity. Saint Augustine says: "My weight is my love; by it I am borne withersoever I am borne." God, however is charity, and charity is love, and love is the internal weight that belongs to the nature of the will. This doctrine puts God at the very center of the soul as it were and gives meaning to the teaching of the *Soliloquies*, that every being capable of loving is loving God whether he is aware of it or not.

In the light of these principles we see that Augustine understood the soul's natural hunger for its final end; a hunger for happiness that is fulfilled when the soul possesses God. An abiding presence of God in the soul makes men long for the eternal happiness and gives man in some measure a happy life. When God leaves, men lack this blessed life. God,

50 O'Connor, op. cit., p. 64.
51 Saint Augustine, *Confessions*, I, 1, 1.
the Saint tells us, is the common good and final end for angels as well as for men since He is the beatific good. It belongs to man's nature to cleave to God, so that every vice is an injury to nature. The natural desire for God as our final end gives meaning to his statement: "It is the especial wretchedness of man not to be able to be with Him, without whom he cannot be."\(^{52}\)

How much of this teaching is natural reason and how much is Christian contemplative wisdom is hard to determine with accuracy. What is apparent is that in the Judaeo-Christian philosophical system of St. Augustine there is placed, or rather discovered, in the soul of every man, prior to grace and prior to all conscious reflection, a natural desire for God as our final end and beatitude. The doctrine of divine illumination is not as basic as the identification of God and the final end but as long as the divine illumination of truth was in the Augustinian tradition, a natural desire in man for the final end follows necessarily. For example St. Bonaventure, a pure Augustinian, for whom the soul had an innate knowledge of God as its supreme good and final end since it is made in His image and likeness, states, "The soul naturally tends toward the one in whose image it has been made, in order that in Him it may be beatified."\(^{53}\) It is true that in later Augustinianism the doctrine of divine illumination was dropped but the radical inclination of the will towards the final end as man's

\(^{52}\) Ibid., p. 24.

\(^{53}\) Saint Bonaventure, *De Mysterio Trinitatis*, quoted by O'Connor, op. cit., p. 25.
beatitude remains the heart of Augustine's philosophical system.

Let us here compare the teaching of St. Augustine and St. Thomas. For both of them it is true that God is the final end or beatitude. They both agree, because it is a revealed truth, that the vision of God is the ultimate end of man. But for Augustine the human by its very nature has an innate, necessary tendency toward God as the final end. Also the intellect tends by its nature as intellect, prior to all actual knowledge, towards this vision as the only object that can finally put an end to its unlimited appetite for truth, in other words, every intellectual creature has a natural desire for the beatific vision as the final end.

Saint Thomas explains this somewhat differently because of his guiding principle that the intellect acts over will. Therefore the primacy of the intellect is even over the innate, natural tendency of the will towards its final end according to St. Thomas. For him the notion of happiness and good must first be present in the intellect before there can be any natural tendency of the will in the direction of the final end. He agrees that man's will is necessarily striving for happiness, but it is not tending of necessity toward any particular object as identified with this happiness.\(^{54}\)

St. Thomas then differs from St. Augustine in his teaching on the natural desire for God as the final end. Whether divine illumination is a form of knowledge or not, St. Augustine
\(^{54}\) O'Connor, op. cit., p. 28.
taught that even in this life man's mind sees or makes identification of God with man's beatitude, so that the will cannot help being drawn towards Him by natural necessity. For Saint Thomas we don't see in this life, at least, the perfect identification of God with the good-in-general or with happiness. There is no natural necessity towards God as the final object that constitutes our beatitude. Since in this life the knowledge of God is indirect, this knowledge does not present God to us as He is in Himself, i.e. "face to face." This will occur only in the next life so that there will be a natural necessity for our will tending towards the Infinite Good. In Thomas' system we can, by a necessary chain of reasoning, arrive at the knowledge that the craving of the human will demands a final happiness and in the cravings of the created intellect for truth there is a demand for Perfect Truth. Reasoning, however conclusive, does not make God appear as He really is in Himself. To assent to a true proposition is one thing; to tend of necessity towards and object seen as fulfilling all the requirements of the good is another. Men necessarily desire the happiness of the final end, but they do not necessarily desire God as their happiness, St. Thomas would say, although he fully agrees with St. Augustine that only happiness, or the final good in general, exercises a necessary compulsion upon the will in the present life.55

55 In Thomistic philosophy, God is involved in the natural
desire of men for their final end as happiness, since He is in fact their beatitude. Man naturally desires his final end but what is naturally desired must be naturally known by him. Only in a confused way therefore does this natural knowledge of happiness which precedes its natural desire imply a knowledge of the existence of God, or the fact that He is our final end. Nevertheless Saint Thomas has a doctrine of a genuine natural desire for God; only it is not to be conceived in terms of the will tending of necessity toward God as our beatitude, or even in terms of the intellect tending by its nature toward the vision of God as its final end. Every natural power has its tendency to an end which is its natural desire. It is important however to see that to desire to know an object is not the same as desiring an object already known.

St. Thomas realizes that the analogy of being makes it impossible that a created intellect tend by its very nature towards a direct and immediate vision of God as its natural final end but this does not exclude a natural knowledge of God from the natural end of the created intellect. St. Thomas teaches that the ultimate end of an intellectual nature is to know God in some way or other, and that whatever little we know of God, the Highest Being, will serve as the ultimate end of the intellect far better than a perfect knowledge of inferior things. The fact that the vision of God will put an end to the cravings of the intellect for truth doesn't make this vision the naturally known end of man. This teaching of
St. Thomas broke a long tradition of thought on the natural
desire of man for God, but almost immediately the tradition
closed in again from the work of John Duns Scotus, whose treat­
ment of this problem has lasted to the present day.

Recall that in the first chapter we gave the concept of
causality in general and final causality in particular both
from Aristotle and Aquinas; the next chapter presented the
Augustinian doctrine on man's final causality, that is, the
Supreme Good as the final cause of all human acts. This last
chapter so far has contrasted the Thomistic and Augustinian
teaching of man's desire for his final end.

Concluding Augustinian doctrine on man's final end, we
see that the human will offers the solution as to how man knows
and strives after the final end and in what that final end
consists.

When therefore the will as the immediate
good cleaves to the immutable good...man
finds therein the blessed life. And this
blessed life, that is to say, the affection
of the mind cleaving to the immutable good,
is man's personal good.... For by truth and
wisdom, which are common to all, all are
made wise and blessed by adhering to the good. 56

It is equally true for Augustine as for Thomas that we
cannot realize fully the final end unless we first know some­
thing about it. "Since no one can love at all a thing of
which he is wholly ignorant." 57 But indeed we cannot know
fully the operation of the final cause even though we be

philosophers seeking knowledge of ultimate causes, "Thus also
56 Saint Augustine, De Libero Arbitrio Libri, i, II, xix, 52.
57 Saint Augustine, De Trinitate, X, i, 1, 2.
many learn the justifications of God, and yet learn them not. For they know then in a certain way; and again from a kind of ignorance do not know them, since they perform them not.\(^5\) The principle of final causality regarding the finality of God in creating man is even more clearly asserted:

He knew beforehand, without any beginning, all things to come by time, and among then also what we should ask of Him and when, and to whom He would listen or not listen, and on what subjects. And with respect to all His creatures both spiritual and corporeal, it is not because they are that He knows them, but they are because He knows them. For He was not ignorant of what He was to create; hence He created because He knew, He didn't know because he created. Nor did He know them when created in any other way than He knew them when still to be created; for nothing occurred to His wisdom from them, but that wisdom remained as it was, while they came into being, as it was fitting and when it was fitting.\(^5\)

Is the final end of God in creating man for Himself frustrated when souls choose other goods then their final supreme good? St. Augustine answers:

Let man choose for himself what he will; the works of the Lord as so constituted that the creature, constituted with a free will, should not transcend the will of the Creator, even though he acts contrary to His will. For God willeth not that thou should sin; since He forbiddeth it. Yet if thou has sinned, think not that a man has done what he willed, and that happened to God which He did not will. For as He would that man should not sin, so would He spare the sinner, that he may return and live. So too it is His will finally to punish one who persisteth in his sin, that the rebellious may not escape the power of justice. Thus whatever choice thou has made, the Al-


\(^5\) Saint Augustine, *De Trinitate*, XV, xiii, 22.
mighty will not be at a loss to fulfill His will concerning thee. 60

What happens when man rejects his final end knowingly? We have seen enough from St. Augustine to know the ultimate result, that is, lasting unhappiness apart from the final good, conflict and discord in this life, and lack of peace even in the earthly city.

Isn't this exactly what we see around us in the world today? Are not the signs evident that men have as a rule neglected their final end? Take the wars of the past fifty years, the degradation of home life, the rise of crime and immorality, surely these point to a fact brought out by Augustine, "When God punishes sinners, He doesn't inflict His evil on them but leaves them to their own evil." 61 All the strife and unrest in the world, Augustine would say, is the result of man's vain attempt to neglect or avoid his finality. This is so forcefully declared in his classic statement: "... for Thous madest us for Thyself, and our heart is restless, until it repose in Thee." 62 Man, created for a final end consisting in the Supreme Good, as is evident from Thomas, Aristotle and last but not least, Augustine, in setting up for himself another end, whether it be money, power, fame, lust, passion or simply self-gratification, brings upon himself not happiness but only intensifies the natural void in his heart for Good.


61 Ibid., p. 125.

It is for our day to return to Augustine's concept of final causality since he, of all Saints, speaks with vast introspective psychology, complete experience, and genuine wisdom. The search for the final cause is never-ending from generation to generation but few nowadays read Augustine, an authority on its possession. To those who do he bids, "take up and read" not only his works, but scripture and philosophy; and to all others who still seek, his message is:

You have striven perchance to see the Good of all good, the Good from which all good things come, the Good without which nothing is good, and the Good which is good without other things. You have striven to see it, and perhaps in straining the sight of your minds, you have found yourself wanting. This I gather from myself, for such are my feelings. But if there be anyone, as may be, and well may be, stronger in this mental sight than I, who fixes his gaze of his heart for long on that which is, let him praise as he can, let him praise as we cannot.  

63 Saint Augustine, In Enarrationes Psalmos, CXXXIV, 6, 7, Przywara, op. cit., p. 84.


