Strategies For Greater Autonomy: U.S. - Japan Security Relations And The Development Of The Fourth Defense Buildup Plan

Takeshi Hirose

Carroll College, Helena, MT

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholars.carroll.edu/politicalsci_theses

Part of the International Relations Commons

Recommended Citation


https://scholars.carroll.edu/politicalsci_theses/50

This Thesis is brought to you for free and open access by the Political Science and International Relations at Carroll Scholars. It has been accepted for inclusion in Political Science and International Relations Undergraduate Theses by an authorized administrator of Carroll Scholars. For more information, please contact tkratz@carroll.edu.
STRATEGIES FOR GREATER AUTONOMY:
U.S.-JAPAN SECURITY RELATIONS AND
THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE FOURTH DEFENSE BUILDUP PLAN

A THESIS
SUBMITTED TO THE DEPARTMENT OF POLITICAL SCIENCE
OF CARROLL COLLEGE IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT
OF THE REQUIREMENTS FOR GRADUATION WITH HONORS

BY
TAKESHI KIROSE
DECEMBER 2, 1968
This thesis for honors recognition has been approved for the Department of Political Science.

Doctor Philip M. Wittman, Director

Professor Dennis E. Wiedmann, Reader

Doctor Robert P. Swartout, Reader
# TABLE OF CONTENTS

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS ........................................... i

LIST OF TABLES ............................................. ii

Chapter

1. Introduction: Theoretical Framework and
   the Development of Japan's Strategic Thinking ..... 1

2. Japanese Security Policy in Transformation:
   The Okinawa Problem, the 1970 issue, and
   the Nixon Doctrine ........................................ 7

3. The Fourth Defense Plan in Preparation:
   Interaction of Internal and External Forces ........ 20

4. Nakasone's Role in the Fourth Defense Plan:
   The Defense White Paper and the Initial
   Draft of the Fourth Defense Plan ........................ 38

5. Failure of the Fourth Defense Plan:
   The Impact of the Nixon "Shocks" ......................... 53

6. Conclusion: The Fourth Defense Plan and
   Japan's Evolution into an Active State ................ 68

SELECTED BIBLIOGRAPHY .................................. 71
First, I would like to express my gratitude to the members of my thesis board: Dr. Philip Wittman, for his valuable suggestions and tireless effort to improve the quality of this paper; Dr. Robert Swartout, for sharing his penetrating insight with me; and Mr. Wiedmann, whose patience and wit helped me realize the joy of learning. I am equally grateful to Rev. William Greytak and Mr. Stephen Maly for their helpful comments and advice which I treasured. My sincere appreciation also goes to Ms. Megan Hill who cheerfully went through the first drafts. Finally, I wish to thank my parents, Yasuo and Mitsuko Hirose, and Ms. Shinobu Nakayama, for their love and support, without which I would not have brought this thesis to completion.
LIST OF TABLES

I. Defense Expenditure as Share of
   GNP and Share of National Budget. . . . . . . . . 21

II. Japanese Attitudes toward the Mutual
    Security Treaty with the United States. . . . . . 26

III. Major JSDF Weaponry:
    Comparison of 1971 Nakasone Draft and
    October 1972 Japanese Cabinet Decision. . . . . 48

IV. Japanese Opinions on Establishing
    Formal Relations with the
    People's Republic of China. . . . . . . . . . . . . . 60
CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION: THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK AND
THE DEVELOPMENT OF JAPAN'S STRATEGIC THINKING

In many ways, international relations have entered a new phase. The superpowers seem to be moving toward arms control as witnessed in the INF treaty. The United Nations has restored its self-confidence through successful intermediary activities. As recent U.S.–Soviet summits indicate, the climate of détente is reemerging. Japan, however, seems to be going in the opposite direction. In 1988, Japan, regardless of its constitutional restraints, has become the third largest spender on defense only behind the superpowers. The self-imposed ceiling on the defense budget, i.e., one percent of its Gross National Product, was breached in 1986. The Japanese industrialists have been pushing their government for legalizing the sale of arms. Why then is Japan moving toward military expansion when its mentor, the United States, is reducing its defense budget?

History has been a dependable source for finding a clue to such puzzling questions as this one. The fundamental theme of this paper is to examine, using the formulation of the Fourth Defense Buildup Plan as a historical case study, how Japanese security policy was shaped in a time of transition
through changes in both internal and external contingencies. In order to fulfill this aim, a theory, concerning the way in which a dependent nation maximizes its interest through manipulative tactics and finally evolves into an independent nation, is utilized. While this theory's applicability to a country other than Japan remains unknown until a further study is completed, the theory provides an effective way of looking at the evolution of Japan into a more autonomous nation through changes which it made in handling of its security issues.

This theory divides the evolution of a dependent nation's policy making into four phases: 1) dependence; 2) semi-autonomy; 3) transition; and 4) autonomy. Each stage displays distinct strategies used by the dependent state in order to advance its interest:

1) Dependence: 1946-1952

The total dependence of a client state on a superpower characterizes this phase. The foreign policy of the dependent nation is shaped by the paternal nation in accordance with its priorities.

In the immediate postwar period, Japan's external policy was totally controlled by its senior partner, the United States. There was little or no room for domestic interests to interfere with foreign policy making. The policy goals of the two countries were totally identical. However, a change in American attitude occurred in 1952, in both official and practical terms. On an official level, Japan was restored to its independence in that year. On a more practical level, following the Communist revolution of 1949 in China and the
outbreak of an ideological war in Korea in 1950, Japan's strategic location suddenly became crucial for the United States and its effective conduct of a containment policy in Asia. Although the initiative came from outside, such was the beginning of Japan's rearmament.

2) Semi-autonomy (Reactive State) : 1952-1971

In the second phase, although the domestic interests of a dependent country begin to interfere with the policy making process, its external policy still reflects a mere reaction to paternal pressure. The dependent nation also begins to develop special strategies to maximize its own benefit.

Japan's strategic thinking underwent various changes in this period. First, public opinion became a decisive factor in determining Japan's external policy, as demonstrated in the 1960 crisis that aborted President Eisenhower's visit. Second, Japan took advantage of many of the irreconcilable U.S. positions on Asian security in order to amplify its own interests. As we will see in the subsequent chapters, the government of Japan manipulated the prospect of issues like the extension of the 1960 Security Treaty and the Fourth Defense Plan to secure the Okinawa reversion.

3) Transition (Quasi-Active State) : 1971-1988

The policy making of a dependent state is still reactive in nature during this phase, but conflicts between internal and external interests occur largely due to the strengthened power of the dependent nation. The policy goals of both countries, however, are still compatible enough to make the adjustment of major differences possible.

As will be shown in Chapter 5, the U.S. interest in this
stage manifested itself in the unilateral American actions that paralyzed the Japanese government. The lacuna of mutual interests further widened, but the United States was still powerful enough to impose its own will. But later in this phase, Japan became markedly more willing to take policy initiatives independent of the United States. For instance, the hawkish security policy under the Nakasone administration was not so much a passive response to the extensive American pressure, but rather, a response to a greater internal recognition for a stronger defense. The initiative came from the Japanese government itself and the increasingly rightist oriented Japanese public which faithfully supported it. Henceforth, Japan developed into something more advanced than a reactive state. But Japan continued to manipulate its alleged dependent status to keep itself from taking on major responsibilities that would impair Japan's economic interests. For instance, possessing sufficient capacity to assume its own defense, Japan deliberately took advantage of a well-known U.S. interest -- keeping democratic Asia from falling into the Communist block -- in order to keep Japan's defense spending at a minimum.

4) Autonomy (Active State): 1988–?

In this final phase, the relationship between the two nations develops into one of equity and mutual respect. The client state becomes as powerful as its former mentor in international relations. The dependent state actively engages in policy making process; its own interests, rather than its mentor's, prevail in crucial decisions. Further, the political and economic goals of the two nations do not
necessarily coincide, so that coordinating efforts between the two countries becomes very important.

This phase might have started in 1988, when the goals of Japan and the United States began to diverge. On the one hand, Japan has begun to pursue active economic diplomacy under the slogan, "a greater contribution to the world." Japan's active participation in international affairs contrasts with its reactive and restrained foreign policies of previous years. Japan is now the world's most generous donor of foreign aid and plays an important role in financial and economic arenas. The United States, on the other hand, has begun to disengage itself from the economic field. Yet it still maintains its superpower status with its military might. Thus the difference in the two nations' goals becomes increasingly evident: Japan pursues its role as an economic power; the United States as a restrained world leader.

An analysis of the tactical evolution of Japan into a quasi-active state during the formulation of the Fourth Defense Plan, which started as early as 1969 and continued to be affected until 1973 by a series of events, will be the central focus of this thesis. More specifically, internal and external situations of the period which helped formulate the Fourth Plan will be discussed in detail. The internal considerations involve: 1) interministerial disputes between the Japan Defense Agency (JDA) and the Japan Finance Ministry (JFM); 2) conservative business and political elites; 3) public opinion; and 4) personal ambitions of the then-JDA
director-general, Yasuhiro Nakasone. The external considerations have to do with changes in U.S. policies during the first tenure of President Nixon and concerns of regional powers like the Soviet Union, China, and South Korea.

The major issues in U.S.-Japan relations, which concern both internal and external contingencies, will also be treated in this thesis as important factors in affecting the making of the Fourth Plan. Such crucial issues include: 1) the reversion of Okinawa; 2) the expiration of the Mutual Security Treaty of 1960; 3) the textile disputes; and 4) the Nixon "Shocks." Furthermore, the changing meaning of the Fourth Defense Plan will be constantly examined so as to illustrate a transition in Japan's strategic thinking and the way in which Japan formulates its defense policy. Finally, an extensive comparison with the situation in 1988 will not be made in this thesis. However, since we believe that Japan is now in the fourth transitional stage of its development, it will be beneficial to examine how the third transitional phase took place so as to better understand Japan's current policy position.
Institutionalized around the primacy of economic growth, Japan's security policy, ever since its commencement in 1950, had been largely dilatory and reactive to external demands. The Japan Self-Defense Forces (JSDF), the nation's first modern military forces in the post-war era, were established in 1954 in large part due to pressure from the Eisenhower administration. In 1957, Japan adopted "the Basic Policies for National Defense" (see Chapter 4) in order to clarify its security objectives. However, even this seemingly positive action was designed basically to give the United States an incentive to update the U.S.-Japan Mutual Security Treaty of 1952.

The "Basic Policy" was accompanied by a series of periodical defense buildup plans. The First Defense Buildup Plan (1958-1960) was intended to consolidate the basic framework suggested in the "Basic Policy" with a particular emphasis on ground defense. The major aim of the Second Defense Buildup Plan (1962-1966) was to achieve sufficient defense capacity to cope solely with localized aggression. The Third Defense Buildup Plan (1967-1971) was aimed at the
overall improvement in the Ground, Maritime, and Air Self-Defense Forces through the modernization of equipment.

The Fourth Defense Buildup Plan (1972-1976) was initially intended as an extension of its predecessor, stressing the modernization and greater home production of weapons. However, the three major issues of 1969 concerning U.S.-Japan relations -- 1) the Okinawa question, 2) the expiration of the 1960 Mutual Security Treaty, and 3) the enunciation of the Nixon Doctrine -- fundamentally altered the incremental nature of the fourth plan. This was because the Japanese government headed by Premier Eisaku Sato (1964-1972) recognized the potential bargaining power of the Fourth Defense Plan. All three events seemed to demand substantial improvements in Japan's defense ability. The Sato administration tried to satisfy this demand by giving the United States an illusory impression that Japan, with the upcoming plan, would have a greater defense capability. In Sato's calculation, this would greatly increase the chance of achieving the Okinawa reversion and the renewal of the Mutual Security Treaty. The rest of the chapter deals with the significance of the three issues mentioned above and how they influenced Japanese strategic thinking.

The Origin of the Okinawa Problem

The Okinawa problem -- the question of whether U.S. administrative rights over Okinawa should revert to Japan -- had been a continual source of controversy between the United States and Japan ever since the restoration of Japan's independence in 1952. For the Japanese, the issue of
reversion not only invited public debate about the security alliance with the United States, but also raised sensitive questions of national sovereignty. For the Americans, the reversion of Okinawa necessitated a strategic reassessment which was sure to generate severe resistance from the military authority.¹

The Eisenhower administration vehemently displayed its determination to keep the island "so long as conditions of threat and tension exist in the Far East."² The first indication of American interest in the reversion came from President John F. Kennedy, who then set up a special commission in 1961 to investigate the matter.³ President Lyndon B. Johnson, although less interested than his predecessor, demonstrated much more flexibility in the handling of the Okinawa problem. The return of the less strategic Bonin Islands and the setting up of a tentative date for the Okinawa reversion were such cases in point. But Japan still had to wait for the advent of the Nixon administration to witness a significant breakthrough in the Okinawa question.

Why, then, had the United States clung to its position for almost two decades, undermining pro-American sentiment in Japan? The Okinawa problem involved not only a territorial dispute but also a security issue of great magnitude.⁴ The U.S. steadfastly adhered to its posture because Okinawa had become one of its most important military bases in Asia. The Korean War first proved Okinawa's importance in U.S. counter-communist strategy. It was, however, the Vietnam War that fully demonstrated the utility of American bases on
The Okinawan bases were particularly useful as a fueling station for Guam-based B-52 strategic bombers. U.S. forces on Okinawa were considered invaluable for a comprehensive U.S. strategy toward the Pacific. Thus, the reversion of Okinawa to Tokyo's jurisdiction was thought to seriously threaten the operability of U.S. forces and, consequently, larger U.S. interests in Asia.

American skepticism toward the reversion was further bolstered by the so-called "prior consultation" pledge added to the U.S.-Japan Mutual Security Treaty in 1960. According to the pledge, the United States has no power to act "in a manner contrary to the wishes of the Japanese government with respect to" six major changes in the use of American bases in Japan. In other words, if Okinawa were returned to Japan, U.S. bases on the island would be subject to the same restrictions as those on Japan proper, not to mention the exclusion of nuclear weapons. The "prior consultation" pledge was so interpreted as to preclude effective military operations by Okinawa-based U.S. forces in the Pacific. The concession over this pledge became a major stumbling block in the series of Okinawan talks.

The Expiration of the 1960 Security Treaty

President Richard M. Nixon, elected in the autumn of 1968, placed the solution of the Okinawa problem at the top of his priority list. Nixon's interest in Okinawa might be explained in part by his keen foresight that U.S.-Japan relations would be of supreme importance both politically and economically in the years ahead. But Nixon had a more
practical reason to be aware of the Okinawa issue than any other U.S. president: 1970, the year that the U.S.-Japan Security Treaty would expire, was approaching.

Upon the expiration, either side could take one of four actions: abrogation, revision, renewal, or continuation. Since the Mutual Security Treaty, when revised in 1960, caused widespread anti-American protests in Japan, both countries believed that they had to act with extreme caution not to jeopardize their future alliance. If the Okinawa reversion were not renegotiated before 1970, it was widely feared that Japanese resentment would lead to major demonstrations against maintaining the treaty. President Nixon thought that, in the long run, an overthrow of Sato's pro-American Liberal Democratic Party (LDP), due to political unrest in Japan, would pose more serious problems than an inefficiency of the Okinawan bases. The president, therefore, realized the need to show a sympathetic response, or perhaps to solve the Okinawa problem before the 1970 issue would spur anti-American sentiment in Japan.

Having learned from the 1960 riots that aborted President Eisenhower's planned visit to Japan, such astute American observers as Edwin O. Reischauer recognized the importance of resolving the Okinawa problem before the expiration of the 1960 treaty. He wrote in 1960 that Japanese discontent with the treaty:

cannot be disregarded, for it is made up, not just of the formally organized Socialist opposition, centering around the trade-union movement, but also the bulk of Japan's intellectuals and college students -- that is, the would-be ideological pathfinders and the generation to which the future of Japan belongs.
In fact, the dominance of the LDP in both Houses, which had constructed a favorable relationship with the United States, was increasingly threatened by leftist opposition parties in the 1960s. Reischauer, acutely perceiving the threat, suggested to the U.S. government as early as 1964 that the return of Okinawa was necessary to sustain friendly U.S.-Japanese relations. In his opinion, the political value of the U.S. alliance with Japan would outweigh the mere convenience of its military bases in Okinawa.  

Based on some practical realizations, Reischauer's thesis had finally come to be accepted by the uniformed officers, the most fervent opponents of the reversion. The financial burden created by the Vietnam War made the financing of the Okinawan bases extremely difficult. Appropriations from Congress for civil aid to Okinawa were cut back further and local discontent with American rule multiplied.  

Japan's offer to finance Okinawa suddenly became more attractive. Moreover, the official study conducted by a Washington research group concluded that very little would be lost if Okinawa reverted to the Japanese administration. The widely entertained idea that reversion would make the Okinawan bases virtually useless began to dissipate.  

Instead, the reversion began to surface as a realistic option.

The recurrence of isolationist sentiment among the American public in the late 1960s also played a decisive role in causing Washington to change its position on Okinawa. By the time Nixon was elected, the bi-polar system of the postwar era under the leadership of both the United States
and the Soviet Union had undergone basic structural changes. American preponderance came into question, as its protégés had become economically competent and politically assertive. America's inability to end the war in Vietnam further displayed its decline and promoted the multipolarization of the global system. Shattered completely by this loss of American confidence was "the bi-partisan and internationalist domestic consensus on which postwar American policy had been built." As a result, it became essential for the United States to reevaluate its extensive international commitments. Nixon's response to this isolationist sentiment was bound to be realized in his new policy toward Asia. And the new policy, the Nixon Doctrine, would provide more visible grounds for the Okinawa reversion.

The Nixon Doctrine as a Rationale behind the Okinawa Reversion

Criticism of U.S. over-involvement mounted as the situation in Vietnam turned against the United States. The Nixon administration was desperately searching for a way to bring about peace without weakening the position of the U.S. in the post-Vietnam period. In the meantime, U.S. allies in Asia, having recognized the U.S. withdrawal from Indochina as irreversible, felt increasingly vulnerable to communist aggression. Drastic changes in the foreign policies of these countries would be plausible unless the United States reassured its commitment in the region. A newly defined commitment, however, would be equally undesirable if a domestic consensus were not secured. President Nixon,
therefore, needed an innovative design that would satisfy these two basic criteria.

On July 25, 1969, six months after his inauguration, President Nixon announced a new policy toward Asia. The essence of this new policy was that the United States would continue to supply military and economic assistance to U.S. allies in Asia, but not manpower. The rationale behind this announcement was the sober realization of the world's structural change and the serious attempt to redefine the U.S. commitment abroad. This statement was later elevated into the Nixon Doctrine as an official policy of the United States toward Asia. President Nixon elaborated on main points and tried to describe them in more precise terms in an address to the nation on November 3, 1969. He stated, first of all, that:

the United States will keep all of its treaty commitments. . . . Second, we shall provide a shield if a nuclear power threatens the freedom of a nation allied with us or a nation whose survival we consider vital to our security. . . . Third, in cases involving other types of aggression we shall furnish military and economic assistance when requested in accordance with our treaty commitments. But we shall look to the nation directly threatened to assume the primary responsibility of providing the manpower for its defense.

The Nixon Doctrine, in effect, called for the exclusion of automatic American involvement in an indigenous conflict, reflecting a domestic disillusionment with an ambitious but ambiguous foreign policy. At the same time, this doctrine gave considerable reassurance to U.S. allies in Asia, indicating a limit to the extent of the U.S. withdrawal and an essential continuity in its commitment to the region. While supporters hailed the Nixon Doctrine as "new,
remarkable, and a genuine alternative to the bitter contentions of the first postwar years, critics like Earl Ravenal were very suspicious of the Doctrine's duality that would allow broad interpretations. He thought that the ambiguity in the Doctrine's definition would give the United States an excuse for another intervention if something unexpected happened. The Nixon Doctrine might not have been a drastic departure from previous policies, but it no doubt represented the first serious effort to reorder American foreign policy priorities since the advent of the Cold War.

**Implications of the Nixon Doctrine in Japan's Security Context**

The Nixon Doctrine was seen by the Sato administration as a request from the United States to extend Japan's military role in Asia. The underlying rationale was that if replaced successfully by Japan, the U.S. could safely withdraw from the region, keeping a military balance with communist powers intact. This idea of substituting Japan for the United States stimulated nationalistic sentiment among political and business communities, and encouraged the Sato government to adopt a more autonomous defense posture. The Nixon Doctrine also suggested that U.S. help promised in the Mutual Security treaty would not be available in time of crisis unless Japan were confronted with an eminent nuclear threat. This sense of uncertainty gave the Japanese government another reason to assume a more independent defense posture.

Elsewhere in Asia, too, the Nixon Doctrine caused great
concern. What made Asian countries uneasy, other than the increasing communist threat, was a devolution of U.S. power to Japan and the resulting revival of Japanese nationalism. Many Asian countries, with bitter memories of Japan's Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere, even saw the possibility of recurring Japanese militarism in the Pacific. Japan's quest for resources and markets in Southeast Asia, abetted by its elevated international status, caused further concerns among Japan's neighbors. Many Japanese, having sensed relaxing tensions between two ideological camps and understanding the wariness in Asia, also voiced concerns about Japan's assuming significant military responsibility in the area.

On a more theoretical level, the Nixon Doctrine posed a major challenge to three assumptions on which Japanese defense policy hitherto had been based:

1. that the United States would remain deeply engaged militarily in the region, both on nuclear and conventional levels;
2. that there was would continue to be a basic identity of Japanese and American security interests; and
3. that the economic and political dimensions of policy could be effectively separated from security matters.

For these reasons, Japan, until the enunciation of the Nixon Doctrine, needed no tangible defense strategy beyond the alliance with the United States. Japan's approach to its security issues thus far had been passive and subdued, being built around U.S. security guarantees envisaged in the Mutual Security Treaty. The dramatic shift in the premises of the U.S. policy, therefore, forced the Sato administration to clarify and redefine Japan's obscure defense policy.

Overall, the Japanese response to the Nixon Doctrine was more active than passive. Although the initiative came from
Washington, Premier Sato, a pragmatist, found in the doctrine a perfect excuse for strengthening Japan's defense capacity which would please the business community, the hawks in the government, and most important, the United States. By improving the Japanese defense or providing an illusion that Japan would build a strong defense, the Sato government wished to assure the United States of security in Asia without a significant U.S. presence, and, consequently, to achieve the reversion of Okinawa and the extension of the 1960 Security Treaty. The upcoming Fourth Defense Plan was bound to be utilized by the Japanese government to show its determination. Hence, it was the Nixon Doctrine that had the first and foremost impact on the inchoate stage of the Fourth Defense Buildup Plan. And it still has a considerable influence on the present Japanese defense policy. In fact, the origins of U.S. pressure on Japan to engage in massive military buildup can be traced to the Nixon Doctrine.²⁵


3. Destler, p. 25.


7. Destler, p. 32.


15. Donald C. Heilmann. "Japanese Security and Postwar Japanese Foreign Policy," in Robert A. Scalapino, ed., The Foreign Policy of Modern Japan (Berkeley: University of


CHAPTER 3

THE FOURTH DEFENSE PLAN IN PREPARATION:
INTERACTION OF INTERNAL AND EXTERNAL FORCES

The first two decades of the postwar Japanese defense policy had been built around two assumptions: "a lack of clear, long-term goals involving more independent actions by the nation and an emphasis on domestic over external considerations." As shown in Table I, the ratio of defense-related expenditures to Japan's GNP steadily decreased until 1970. Further, the growth rate of Japan's defense budget had been somewhat lower than that of others including education and social welfare. These figures were indicative of the fact that Japan's security considerations had been secondary to the country's economic growth since excessive defense spending was thought to impair the economic progress. However, changes in domestic and external environments, which occurred in 1969, demanded basic reevaluations in the reactive and incremental nature of Japanese security.

Among the internal forces were business and political elites. They exhibited extreme nationalistic sentiment and asked for greater autonomy in the Japanese defense posture.
Changes in external conditions such as the unfolding of the Nixon Doctrine also demanded Japan's assumption of greater military responsibility. Thus, the mutual interest of both internal and external forces, although each having a distinct cause, left the Sato administration with few choices.

The Fourth Defense Buildup Plan for fiscal year 1972 through 1976, having been under consideration since the spring of 1969, presented the Japanese government with an ideal opportunity to reconstruct its security policy in accord with these converging demands. Factors including the Okinawa reversion talks, the Nixon Doctrine, intergovernmental disputes in both Japan and the United
States, and demands from the business community interacted with one another and constituted the determining force in the embryonic stage of the Fourth Defense Plan.

Political Elites' Reaction to the 1970 and Nuclear Storage Issues

The Japanese Foreign Ministry worked more consistently than any other group in Japan to maintain and strengthen Japan's security and economic cooperation with the United States. When Premier Sato rather prematurely brought up the subject of the Okinawa reversion in 1965, Japan, in the Foreign Ministry's opinion, was far from prepared to assume this administrative or military responsibility. The Foreign Ministry officials actually wanted the United States to keep nuclear weapons on Okinawa. They believed that keeping nuclear weapons was necessary for Japan's well-being and that it was better to have them on Okinawa than on mainland Japan.²

The Okinawa reversion became a major public issue in the spring of 1967 when a speech made by a Japanese ambassador spurred enormous media coverage. The ambassador suggested in his speech that Japan would have to allow continued nuclear storage on Okinawa in order to make the reversion possible. The Okinawa issue henceforth gained momentum and inspired an ardent security debate among an otherwise apathetic public.

Early on, Sato avoided taking a stand on the Okinawa bases and nuclear storage, knowing that his own LDP was deeply divided over this issue. Some of his colleagues, although a minority, insisted that nuclear weapons in Okinawa
were vital to Japan's security and that Japan itself should seriously consider the option of becoming a nuclear power. Other conservative leaders argued in favor of a nonnuclear status for the bases in Okinawa under the same restrictions that applied to those in Japan proper, the so-called "mainland formula."³

Sato's Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) was also divided over the question of whether the security treaty should be automatically extended for an indefinite period or revised and extended for a fixed term. The advocates of the latter view argued that a definitely extended treaty would be a firmer arrangement and would not be subject to sudden abrogation if an opposition party took power in Japan.⁴

This automatic extension was perceived as a more practical option by the Foreign Ministry, which was fully conscious of the 1960 treaty's beneficial elements, as well as of its possible unconstitutionality. The Foreign Ministry was also aware that, if revised, the U.S. Congress would demand a more bilateral treaty based on Japan's economic strength and that it would be difficult to have a more equal treaty because of Japan's constitutional restrictions.⁵ The automatic extension argument finally prevailed and was adopted as the policy of the LDP and the Sato government by June 1968.⁶ However, the factional and inter ministerial dispute over the manner in which the reversion should be made remained controversial.

Meanwhile, the Japanese public was being united on the Okinawa issue more than ever before. Psychologically, the Okinawa question represented the last remnant of the war that
had haunted them for over two decades. The Japanese wanted to resolve the problem altogether to do away with the bitter memories of the past. Premier Sato staked his political career on the reversion in order to "put an end to the prewar era," as he symbolically put it. Thus the prime minister, leading the reluctant Foreign Ministry and the divided LDP, initiated a major campaign to achieve domestic and international consensus through constructive talks with the United States.

Consequently, Okinawa became "the first foreign policy question in postwar Japan over which there had emerged a national consensus, at least on the issue of reversion itself." But the manner of the reversion -- whether the "mainland formula" should be adopted or not -- was still much debated. The timing of the reversion was finally agreed to in the Johnson-Sato joint communiqué of 1967 which stated that Okinawa would be returned "within a few years." "A few years" was translated into two or three years in Japanese, allowing Sato to use this vague promise to hold off the opposition and the press. Meanwhile, the prime minister, although still undecided on which stance to take, worked hard to achieve consensus on the way in which Okinawa would return.

The Okinawa Talks and Changes in Sato's Defense Rhetoric

After the issuance of the Johnson-Sato communiqué, the Japanese government launched a year-long debate on "defense-mindedness." Premier Sato, for instance, declared in a speech before both Houses of the Diet on December 5, 1967, that:

if the [Japanese] people become determined to
defend their own country in unity and to take realistic steps toward that end, not only the international stature of [Japan] will rise and we shall be better able to contribute to the stability of Asia, but, I am convinced, it will bring about the reversion of Okinawa in the near future.10

Since Sato, prior to the conference, had been noted for his prudence in his handling of the defense issue, this change in his defense rhetoric caused enormous media publicity. The change was intended, as a part of the reversion campaign, to show Japan's willingness to expand its security interest. It was considered mandatory by the Japanese policy-planners to express their willingness to assume Asian defense after U.S. retrenchment from the region in order to secure the reversion.

By the early spring of 1969, when the date of the Nixon-Sato conference was fixed, Sato was leaning toward the "mainland formula" option and his security rhetoric appeared more hawkish than ever before. In early March, the Sato government ordered the Japan Defense Agency (JDA) to outline the post-reversion Japanese strategic policy.11 The U.S. Senate and the State Department had been expressing their discontent with the current Japanese effort to accommodate a flexible interpretation of the "prior consultation" pledge in order to earn non-nuclear status for the bases in Okinawa. These strong counter forces in the United States might have proved an obstacle to achieve the reversion. In order to placate these oppositions, the Sato administration felt the urgent need for a tangible post-reversion defense plan that would match overall U.S. objectives in Asia.(A year later, these objectives were embodied in the Nixon Doctrine.)
Table II
Japanese Attitudes toward the Mutual Security Treaty with the U.S.
(by percentage of responses)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Pro</th>
<th>Con</th>
<th>Other</th>
<th>Don't know</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1960 spring</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>46</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>29</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1960 autumn</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>28</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1962 spring</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>38</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1967 spring</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1969 autumn</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1970 spring</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>29</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1971 spring</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>29</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

SOURCE: Scalapino, Robert A, ed. The Foreign Policy of Modern Japan, p. 137.

In the meantime, the JDA started the preparation for the Fourth Defense Plan based on its study of the military balance in post-reversion Asia. The preparation was speeded up by the prospect of Foreign Minister Aichi's visit to the United States in June. Consequently, the agreement between the Defense Agency and the Foreign Ministry on the basic lines of the Fourth Plan — more than one percent of Japan's GNP should be spent on defense, and maritime defensive capability should be improved — was reached before the minister's visit.\(^\text{12}\) This brought Minister Aichi a stronger bargaining position in the ensuing talks with his counterpart.

The Business Community and the Security Debate

As the Okinawa talks and the 1970 issue proceeded, an ardent debate on having an "autonomous defense" posture emerged primarily from business circles. Japanese business leaders and organizations had been active in making and implementing the Japanese security policy throughout the
postwar period. However, as Frank Langdon stated:

Japan's emergence as the world's third largest economy, the stirring of nationalistic pride, the fear of China's nuclear weapons, ... the need in 1970 to reconsider the U.S.-Japan security treaty (and profit potential in military industry) have brought to the fore of the business community new voices demanding an acceleration of defense spending.13

Debates on an autonomous defense posture and the liberation of arms export thrived especially among the two biggest business organizations in Japan: Nikkeiren (the Japan Federation of Employees Organization) and Keidanren (the Federation of Economic Organization.) They were becoming excessively militant at that time. The Nikkeiren report of August 1969, for example, concluded that: 1) the Mutual Security Treaty should be revised by 1975 to accommodate a more equal role for Japan; 2) study of nuclear arms should be encouraged and production of nuclear arms should be considered; and 3) defense expenditure should be raised to 1.5% of Japan's GNP.14

The five arguments most commonly used by the advocates of increased defense spending were: 1) Japan, enjoying such an economic boom, must spend more on defense; 2) Japan should become more self-reliant in its defense production; 3) Japan should assume greater responsibility for the defense of immediate areas such as the Straits of Malacca; 4) application of a new technology generated by expanded production of advanced weaponry to civilian industry could be expected; and 5) an enlarged defense budget would increase employment.15

The role that the business community played in the
embryonic stage of the Fourth Defense plan was rather significant. First, business leaders urged domestic production of conventional arms like Phantom jets. Second, the business community argued in favor of naval forces with a long-distance strike and convoy capability to protect Japan's oil routes. These two recommendations eventually led to the expansion of air and maritime forces. Finally, business leaders urged JDA Director-General Arita to issue a defense white paper to clarify officially Japan's post-reversion security objectives.

Well aware of this kind of rightist sentiment among the business community, JDA Chief Arita repeatedly called for the rectification of the one-sided military relations in which the United States had been "the chief" and Japan "the subdued." He also vaguely defined the "autonomous defense" posture as the alteration of this asymmetric relationship. Subsequently, the director-general ordered the JDA to draft the original Fourth Defense Plan with a particular emphasis on the "autonomy" of Japan's defense posture as embodied in strengthened maritime and air defense and the increased use of domestically made weapons.

The Reordering of Japanese Security Policy

The Sato government at first hesitated to draft the defense white paper as demanded by the business community for fear of stirring up criticism. But JDA Director-General Arita was quick to respond, and completed the 452-page paper in September 1969, two months after the announcement of the Nixon Doctrine. This paper was significant in many ways.
First of all, the Arita paper defined the most likely contingencies for which Japan should prepare in the post-reversion period in a concrete manner: "a Cold-War type of covert operation, indirect aggression, and an armed attack by an external force."  

Second, Arita identified two pillars of Japanese security strategy developed up to point. Japan's own self-defense for internal aggression and reliance on the United States for external threat. He went on to reinterpret the first pillar by widening the realm of self-defense. This newly defined self-defense would require capabilities to:

1) prevent any aggressor from achieving a military fait accompli such as occupation of a local area in Japan with an amphibious or paratroop landing, especially during an initial period when U.S. military help may not have yet arrived; 2) secure the minimum safety of sea transportation, a factor vital to national survival; 3) maintain air supremacy for a considerable period.

Arita's emphasis on Japan's own defense efforts and frequent references to time-frames obviously reflected an uncertainty toward U.S. troop arrivals as implied in the Nixon Doctrine.

The Arita paper was never published, however. First, as the Japanese government was preoccupied with the reversion of Okinawa and the Nixon-Sato conference, the prevailing political climate was ill-suited. Second, Arita's criticism of a "nonalliance-neutrality policy" backed by the opposition parties could have undermined a non-partisan consensus on the Okinawa reversion. Third, it was possible that the paper's emphasis on Japan's independent defense efforts might have encouraged those opposing the extension of the 1960 Security Treaty. This also could have aroused suspicion among the
regional powers over the extent of Japan's defense. Finally, Arita was replaced by Yasuhiro Nakasone in January 1970, without expanding his version of the post-reversion Japanese defense.23

The Reversion of Okinawa and Japan's Expanded military role

Meanwhile, some changes in the U.S. position were also under way. Although still reluctant to repeal its right to store nuclear weapons on the island, the Nixon administration was coming to accept Reischauer's thesis that the reversion of Okinawa to Japan was politically imperative. The maintenance of a friendly alliance with Tokyo gradually outweighed "the military cost of having somewhat less flexibility in operating the Okinawa bases under Japanese sovereignty."24 The United States did not want to intensify Japan's political unrest surrounding the security treaty because that could have proved politically costly. In fact, increasing agitation against the U.S. presence in Okinawa was not only posing a physical danger to the use of American bases but also undermining the popularity of Sato and his party. The overthrow of the pro-American LDP by the opposition parties could lead to political chaos and the losing of American bases altogether. The Okinawa reversion was considered the only remedy for potential riots against the United States. Thus the United States decided to fully manipulate the prospect of the Okinawa reversion to soothe the 1970 problem, just as Japan attempted to exploit the Fourth Defense Plan to achieve the return of Okinawa.25
According to Henry Kissinger, by April 1969, U.S. policy-planners achieved a consensus on the basic principles of the post-reversion U.S. policy toward Japan:

There was an agreement that Japan was the cornerstone of our Asian policy and that it must be our basic objective to strengthen the relationship. We would seek to continue the Security Treaty without amendment after 1970, assuming Japan was not torn by domestic schism over it. We would encourage Japan to play a larger political role in Asia and to make moderate increases in her defense capability, though we would not exert pressure on her to develop substantially larger forces.26

After a consensus among the American policy-makers was reached, the Okinawa talks showed significant improvements: Foreign Minister Aichi made a trip to Washington in June and attained concessions over the prior consultation pledge; President Nixon announced the new doctrine in July; and in August, Secretary of State William Rogers made a return visit to Tokyo and reached basic agreement on the reversion. The "prior consultation" issue, a major obstacle in the Okinawa talks, was settled with Japan indicating a willingness to respond favorably to the American request in an emergency and to express interest in the security of the Far East. The Japanese negotiators believed these to be reasonable concessions in return for the "mainland formula" for the Okinawa bases.27 But, the most controversial issue of all -- the nuclear storage in Okinawa -- was left for the two leaders to decide.

The joint communiqué issued after the Nixon-Sato conference on November 22, 1969, virtually satisfied all of the Japanese demands, including the issue of nuclear storage. The communiqué stated that "upon return of the administrative
rights, the Treaty of Mutual Co-operation and Security and its related arrangements would apply to Okinawa without modification thereof. Therefore, the president and the prime minister agreed to repeal the American rights to store nuclear weapons on Okinawa. But the U.S. did not renounce the right to reintroduce them in an emergency. The nuclear problem "would be carried out in a manner consistent with the policy of the Japanese government as described by the Prime Minister." The ambiguity of this statement was certain to allow various interpretations. This would enable the U.S. to reintroduce nuclear weapons to Okinawa in time of crisis; the Japanese would interpret this as proscribing the storage of nuclear weapons on Okinawa.

The joint communiqué was also significant in identifying Japan's own security interest with that of its Asian neighbors for the first time. The communiqué realized that "the security of Japan could not be adequately maintained without international peace and security in the Far East and, therefore, the security of countries in the Far East was a matter of serious concern for Japan." Although no common position on Vietnam was taken, the Nixon-Sato communiqué named Japan's two anti-communist neighbors with which Japan's security interest would be most intimately associated: Korea and Taiwan. Official Japanese recognition of expanding its military interest, although overstated for American consumption, was a revolutionary departure from its previous policies characterized by reluctance and reactive incrementalism.

Inevitably, however, Japan's pledge to support American
efforts to maintain the status-quo in the Korean peninsula and Taiwan aroused enormous opposition from within and without. People's Republic of China and North Korea were swift to accuse Japan of reviving militarism with its old dream of a Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere. Southeast Asia, Australia, and even the U.S. Congress joined them by expressing caution against the resurgence of Japanese militarism. While the opposition from Asian countries was understandable, the reaction of the U.S. Congress greatly puzzled the Japanese policy-makers.32

U.S. administrative rights over Okinawa officially returned to Japan on May 15, 1972, as agreed in the joint communiqué. Although Japan appeared to obtain everything it had asked for, in reality, both sides gained something from the reversion. Japan resolved the long overdue Okinawa problem at last. The United States succeeded in devolving its power to Japan in accord with the Nixon Doctrine in the Pacific Basin. The United States also acquired a promise from the Japanese government to restrict its textile exports. And they both successfully preserved the amiable U.S.-Japanese relationship, thereby alleviating tension in Japan surrounding the security treaty. Moreover, the Okinawa reversion laid the foundation for a new relationship between the U.S. and Japan, based on a more equal partnership.

The change in the quality of U.S.-Japanese relations was certain to influence the future of Japanese defense policy. Japan, for the first time in postwar history, acknowledged its military responsibility in Asia. This may be interpreted as a sign of Japan's transformation into a quasi-active
state. For instance, the Japan Self-Defense Forces would be stationed outside of Japan proper, and the nuclear option would appear more real. Japan's new military role would indubitably demand that Japanese policy-makers engage, in Z. Brzezinski's phrase, in "novel and broader thinking."\textsuperscript{33} This would also spur more lively security debate in and outside of Japan. Thus the role of the upcoming Fourth Defense Plan became even more significant as a showcase for Japan's new commitment.


5. In the current security arrangement, it is the responsibility of the United States to help repel an aggression against Japan. However, the opposite is not the case due to Article IX of the Japanese Constitution that defies Japan's "right of belligerency." Therefore, it is virtually impossible to have a bilateral security setup based on equality unless the Constitution itself is amended.


9. Weinstein, p. 76.


12. As much as 90% of Japan's crude oil supplies pass through the Straits of Malacca.


14. Otake, p. 32.


17. Brzezinski, p. 113. When detailed procurement needs for the aircraft began to be outlined by the JDA in October 1968, the Defense Production Committee of FEO was called in to help consider, for example, what new factories would be needed, how soon, and what level of future production to expect.

18. Ibid., p. 98.

19. Langdon, p. 114

20. Otake, p. 15.


22. Ibid., p. 356.

23. Ibid., pp. 356-357.


27. Destler, p. 33.


29. Ibid.


32. Otake, p. 33.

33. Brzezinski, p. 97.
With the Okinawa question solved, the Fourth Defense Buildup Plan lost its initial meaning as an ambiguous but effective bargaining tool. But the emergence of several conflicting factors — the détente-like atmosphere and the increasing wariness against Japan, on the one hand, and the advent of Yasuhiro Nakasone as JDA Director-General, on the other — gave the fourth plan a whole new outlook.

First of all, the Fourth Defense Plan found its significance as an embodiment of "exclusively defensive posture," a reconciliatory measure prepared by Nakasone. This new policy was defined in Japan's first Defense White Paper: "in the case of an aggression against our country, Japan will stick to a strategically defensive position by invoking the right of self-defense, an inherent right of the country, and will protect its independence and peace."¹ Second, the new plan, although largely due to Nakasone's personal ambition, displayed Japan's desire for greater autonomy. The rest of the chapter explores Nakasone's role in the making of the Fourth Defense Plan and how his position was modified by changes in both internal and external conditions.
Nakasone's Attempt to revise "Japan's Basic Policy for National Defense"

In a January 1970 cabinet reshuffle, Yasuhiro Nakasone was appointed the new JDA Director-General. There were some concerns in the Sato government about nominating Nakasone, mainly due to his reputedly hawkish stance. But Sato decided to include Nakasone in his cabinet in order to strengthen the foundation of his premiership by encouraging Nakasone's faction to side with him. Upon assuming the director-generalship, Nakasone did work hard to provide a more practical concept for the Fourth Defense Plan and to complete an unfinished Defense White Paper by the fall of 1970. The director-general also tried to deter the opposition by suggesting that in the mid-1970s the security setup with the United States might be replaced by a looser one. In his proposed arrangement, Japan would be more independent of the United States and more responsible for its own defense. The purpose of these actions was to develop a long-range strategic plan relevant to the changing international atmosphere.

One example of Nakasone's efforts was his attempt to revise "Japan's Basic Policy for National Defense," which had served as basic guidelines for Japanese security policy since 1957. According to the "Basic Policy," the aim of Japanese defense was:

- to prevent direct and indirect aggression, and once invaded, to repel it in order to preserve the independence and peace of Japan for the cause of democracy. To achieve this purpose, the Government of Japan adopted the following principles:
  1) To support the activities of the United Nations and its promotion of international cooperation,
thereby contributing to the cause of world peace.
2) To promote the national welfare and enhance the spirit of patriotism, thereby laying a sound basis for national security.
3) To gradually develop an effective defensive power within the bounds of national capabilities to the extent necessary for self-defense.
4) To cope with aggression by recourse to the security arrangements with the United States of America, pending effective functioning of the United Nations in preventing and repelling aggression. 3

On March 19, Nakasone stressed at the National Security Research Committee of the LDP the need for developing its own defense strategy based on a truly bilateral U.S.-Japanese security alliance. Nakasone argued that "with its own defense strategy, Japan could get rid of its vague expectations [about what the United States could do for Japan] and its unilateral reliance... on the U.S." 4 so that Japan could equally share security missions with the United States.

Nakasone, based on his estimates that the Self-Defense Forces were already capable of repelling limited and localized aggressions, advocated the revision of Article 4 of the "Basic Policy for National Defense"—reliance on the United States for repelling external aggression—to attain Japan's more equal security relationship with its former mentor. Much to his surprise, however, Nakasone's recommendation, which appeared compatible with the prevailing nationalist sentiment, spurred immediate criticism from in and outside of the government. 5

The opposition argued that Japan was heading toward full-scale rearmament, and that this would arouse suspicion among Japan's Asian neighbors. The Japanese press interpreted Nakasone's thesis as an indication of resurgent militarism, although it was mainly a conscious response to American
criticism of Japan's "free ride." Different from the time of the Okinawa negotiations, the détente-like atmosphere defying Japan's adoption of a stronger defense was gaining ground both in Japan and the United States. The doves within the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) were appalled by how easily Japan's allies misread its intentions. They insisted on indicating a ceiling on Japanese defense capacity to mollify the criticism that Japan was drifting away from détente. Henceforth, Nakasone, his hawkish stance notwithstanding, was forced to make dovish remarks in and outside of Japan.

Nakasone, however, did not completely abandon his effort to attain a more self-reliant defense capability. He tried to actualize some of his theses in the upcoming Fourth Defense Plan. For example, the JDA director-general maintained his position that under the Fourth Defense Plan an attempt would be made to secure command of the sea and air in the vicinity of Japan through patrols of fighter planes and bombers against ships bent on attack or invasion of Japan. He went on to argue that although it was not proper to possess offensive aircraft carriers, aircraft carriers for anti-submarine operations could be legally maintained. In his opinion, Japanese defense forces should be small, but highly mechanized, and armed with the most modern weapons and equipment. Security missions would be carried out as far as possible with their own forces so as to reduce reliance on the United States.

At the same time, to soothe the campaign against the U.S.-Japan Security Treaty and charges of reviving Japanese militarism in 1970, Premier Sato made a great effort to
demonstrate limitations on Japan's defense policies and their peaceful nature. The Premier, for instance, emphasized the civilian control of defense and the three nonnuclear principles (not to make, not to store, and not to let others introduce nuclear weapons). While reaffirming the cooperation with the United States, Sato adopted a new policy of merely supplementing Japan's own efforts with American assistance. The new policy made a sharp contrast with the earlier Japanese policy of relying on American assistance and merely supplementing it with Japanese forces. The new approach had the merit of appealing to nationalist sentiment which desired greater autonomy from the United States. It was also designed to assuage both foreign and domestic critics by implying that the Japanese forces would never be truly self-reliant in their capacity.  


Following Nakasone's trip to Washington, the first Defense White Paper was published in October 1970, after a full year of preparation. The finished product, its initial ambition notwithstanding, was one of compromise and de-mystified little about the current Japanese defense policy. The paper basically reiterated a non-interventionist self-defense policy aimed at peace, spelling out in detail the type of forces that Japan had gained. It also stressed Japan's limited aim of repelling direct aggression within its immediate peripheral areas against Japan through local control of the seas and air. As for external aggression
beyond its immediate areas, the White Paper stated that the United States would bear the obligation of defending Japan, quoting a statement by Secretary of Defense Melvin Laird. His statement confirmed that the United States would abide by the security arrangement with Japan and use all types of weapons for the defense of Japan.  

The term "exclusively defensive posture" (senshu boej) was designed in the White Paper to show Japan's determination to develop a more independent defense capability and to confine its military efforts to strictly defensive actions. This equivocal term was utterly compatible with Sato's new policy that the Mutual Security Treaty would remain at the core of Japanese defense and that within the framework of the security setup Japan would develop a more independent defense ability. The Defense White Paper attempted to justify implied compatibility of an autonomous defense and a collective security in this fashion:

What is aimed at by a collective security system is joint defense, built on autonomously-oriented spirit of each nation concerned; such a system is not incompatible with autonomous defense. In this contemporary world, autonomous defense does not necessarily mean single-handed defense. If each nation enters into mutual cooperation with other nations while retaining each autonomy in order to protect its national interest, a collective security system thus formed is also one form of autonomous defense.

The White Paper found a further justification in the renunciation of possessing nuclear arms. The paper first stated the unconstitutionality of possessing any weapon of an offensive nature. And then the paper went on to discuss the constitutionality of developing tactical nuclear weapons only to rule out a possibility of Japan becoming a nuclear power:
Even though it would be possible to say that in legal and theoretical sense possession of smaller nuclear weapon, falling within the minimum requirement for capacity necessary for self-defense and not posing a threat of aggression to other countries, would be permissible, the government, as its policy, adopts the principle of not attempting at nuclear armament which might be possible under the Constitution.  

The White Paper thereby provided the rationale and incentive for having an "exclusively defensive posture" and sustaining the security treaty with the United States at the same time. Insofar as Japan does:  

not have nuclear weapons and other offensive armament, and as long as there are no major changes in the international situation, the Japan--United States security arrangements will be necessary for [Japan's] protection.  

To sum up, as a response to the criticism of militarism, Japan's first Defense White Paper insured the essential continuity of Japan's inoffensive security policy. Its major emphasis, however, was on Nakasone's "exclusively defensive posture," based on the principle of self-reliance suggested in the Nixon Doctrine. With this concept, the White Paper also suggested the direction of the original Fourth Defense Plan which was to follow shortly after the paper's publication. But Nakasone's White Paper did not get into the question former JDA Chief Arita raised — that is, the credibility of the U.S.-Japan security pact.  

The Outline of the Fourth Defense Plan

When presented by JDA Chief Nakasone in October 21, the Fourth Defense Plan set off a number of controversies, although it basically had the the same features as Arita's. The total budget projected for the five-year period was ¥5.8
trillion or approximately $16.1 billion. This sum was 2.2 times greater than the total amount spent on the Third Build-up Plan. This was considered far too expensive to carry out, although, as Nakasone pointed out, direct military spending would remain below the symbolically important level of one percent of Japan's GNP. The Fourth Defense Plan would also have made Japan the seventh largest spender on defense in the world, up from the current twelfth position. These projections inevitably aroused enormous criticism as a sign of resurging militarism. Critics also pointed out the inconsistency between the rhetoric of the Sato government and the size of the projected defense budget.

According to the Defense White Paper, the main purpose of the Fourth Defense Plan would include:

- the improvement of the treatment of Self-Defense Forces personnel,
- the promotion of the integration of functions,
- the improvement of the Ground Self-Defense Forces,
- the increase and strengthening of the Maritime and Air Self-Defense Forces,
- the strengthening of information gathering,
- and the autonomous development of equipments.

If the initial draft of the Fourth Defense Plan had been carried out, the SDF would have contained, in addition to the 180,000 Ground Self-Defense Forces (GSDF), 5,000 more Maritime Self-Defense Forces (MSDF) and 3,000 more Air Self-Defense Forces (ASDF). For the GSDF, helicopters, armored personnel carriers, various types of guns, and 240 additional tanks (making a total of 990 tanks) were to be provided. The MSDF, in preparing for the security responsibility of Okinawa after 1972, would have received a total of 80 additional ships, including destroyers, submarines, and torpedo boats. The total tonnage of naval
vessels was planned at 247,000 with 200 ships. By the time of
the plan's completion, the ASDF would have gained a total of
920 aircraft, including 180 F104J Starfighters and over 158
F-4EJ Phantom intercepters. Nike-AJAX surface-to air missiles
were also planned to be installed in Okinawa and its
surrounding area. 21 No matter how formidable it sounded,
defense experts seemed to agree that this force would add
only slightly to Japan's defense capacity. 22

Another emphasis was placed upon Research and
Development (R&D), in part due to the industrialists' massive
lobbying efforts. Japan was far behind other industrialized
nations in the amount spent for R&D. Japanese industrialists
well understood the spill-over effect of R&D to the civilian
sector, especially since it applied mainly to high-tech
fields. Thus an allocation of 3.3 percent for R&D was planned
in the initial Fourth Defense Plan, compared to 2.1 in its
predecessor.

The Draft of the Fourth Defense Plan

For about six months after the publication of the Fourth
Defense Plan's outline, the Japan Defense Agency probed into
the plan and made further modifications. During this time,
the new plan went through numerous changes due to the
unexpectedly swift withdrawal of American troops in Japan
(USFJ), inflation, higher personnel costs, and more expensive
hardware. The uniformed officers of the Air Self-Defense
Forces, in particular, were made wary by the early withdrawal
of USFJ and insisted on further improvement in air defense.
The Japan Finance Ministry (JFM), on the other hand, insisted
on keeping the whole cost of the plan well below the projected amount. But the Japan Defense Agency (JDA), without consulting the JFM, issued in April 1971 its own version of the new plan's initial draft.

It goes without saying that the Finance Ministry, which had been expressing its discontent with the outline of the fourth plan, opposed the initial draft that projected an annual increase in defense expenditure of 18.8 percent. Since the economic growth rate for the next five years was expected as 14.8 percent, this kind of growth in defense spending was clearly unacceptable for the JFM. As we will see in the following chapter, the Finance Ministry played an important role in shaping the final version of the Fourth Defense Plan.

The first thing to note about the draft is that, compared to the outline published six months earlier, it placed a primary emphasis on Japan's cooperation with the United States under the bilateral security arrangement. This new policy was a compromise stemming from interministerial debates and was intended to deter the charge, that Japan was reviving militarism, by stressing the continuity of an inoffensive Japanese security policy. (see Table III) The new policy also reflected the fact that Nakasone's "exclusively defensive posture" was rejected within the LDP shortly after the issuance of Nakasone's original Fourth Plan. Prime Minister Sato used the prospect of Japan having a more autonomous defense as part of strategy to bring about the reversion of Okinawa. But after the reversion was assured, Sato, in order to mollify campaigns against the security
pact's renewal and charges of resurgent militarism, promptly changed his position and counteracted Nakasone. The director-general, as a consequence, was increasingly isolated from his fellow Liberal Democrats and withdrew some of his proposals, including the "exclusively defensive posture."

The defense concept portion of the initial draft also represented an interministerial compromise. But, as a Japanese defense expert noted, this new approach, "with its comprehensive consideration of how Japan itself might resolve a conflict, demonstrated an unprecedented realism and rationality in Japan's defense thinking."26

First, Japan's defense capabilities should be able to deal with limited, direct aggression (by implication, without immediate U.S. involvement) by maintaining sea and air control in Japan's peripheries for the limitation of damage and an early limitation of the aggressor. Second, should Japan fail in the latter mission, it should be able to deny and resist any attempts by the aggressor to achieve a military fait accompli or to occupy a local area. Third, together with the necessary denial and resistance, Japan should be able to terminate the contingencies either with U.S. support under the security treaty or with a peace (truce) effort through the U.N. Finally, Japan must continue to depend on the U.S. for deterrence against nuclear threat.27

Even with this limited approach, however, the procurement plan itself was virtually unaffected. The new plan would still require ¥5.8 trillion, an amount that the Finance Ministry could not accept.28 Further, before he had fully elaborated on the plan, Nakasone was replaced by Keikichi Masuhara a month after the publication of the initial plan. A year-long debate on the revision of the "Basic Policy" also ended with Nakasone's replacement.

Evaluations of Nakasone as a statesman have been done numerous times before and after his assumption of premiership
### Table III

**Major JSDF weaponry**

Comparison of 1971 Nakasone Draft and October 1972 Japanese Cabinet Decision

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Total</td>
<td>Prospect</td>
<td>Total</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>GSDF</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tanks</td>
<td>660</td>
<td>type61 180</td>
<td>990</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Armored track vehicles</td>
<td>570</td>
<td>type60 34</td>
<td>750</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Combat helicopters</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>V-107</td>
<td>total</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>total</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HU-1H</td>
<td>of 275</td>
<td>81</td>
<td>of 400</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>MSDF</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total vessels</td>
<td>210</td>
<td></td>
<td>200</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total tonnage</td>
<td>133,000</td>
<td></td>
<td>214,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Escort ships</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>58</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Submarines</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Anti-submarine aircraft</td>
<td>255</td>
<td>P-2J 45</td>
<td>total</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>HSS 2 41</td>
<td>of 350</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>ASDF</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Phantoms F-4EJ</td>
<td>330</td>
<td>76</td>
<td>46</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Trainers T-2</td>
<td></td>
<td>80</td>
<td>59</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FST2(remodeled)</td>
<td></td>
<td>126</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Recon RF-4E</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>total</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Transport C-1</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>of 920</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NIKE-AJAX missiles carriers</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


...in 1982. Supporters of Nakasone have hailed him as the first Director-General to formulate the Japanese security policy in the post-Cold War terms. He clearly understood the current status of Japan and the message of the Nixon Doctrine. He also knew the limitation of Japan's capacity as a military nation due to both psychological and economic reasons. Thus, Nakasone's "exclusively defensive posture" was a realistic attempt to fulfill the triple responsibilities of Japan: one, as a sovereign independent nation; two, as a nation with pacifist conviction; and three, as a semi-autonomous partner...
of the United States. However, Nakasone was seen by his critics as "embodying a combination of several characteristics, none of which endeared him to Tokyo's political elite: opportunism, egoism, hawkishness, and flamboyance, as well as an unfortunate tendency to take U.S.-Japan security cooperation nearly seriously as did the Americans. These traits had earned Nakasone the nickname of seikai no kazamidori ('weathervane of the political world')." Critics also charged that Nakasone, with his nationalist sentiment and ambition, abused the JDA director-generalship to make Japan militarily competent. He disregarded the sentiment of the Japanese people and misread the climate of détente prevalent at that time.

Whichever interpretation might turn out correct, the reality is that Nakasone's ambitious plan was prevented from becoming a reality. But his role in the Fourth Defense Plan's formulation and his impact on Japanese strategic thinking should not be overlooked. It may be true that his personal ambition played an important part in his support of rather dramatic security measures. However, it may also be said that he was sincerely concerned about Japan's future as a sovereign nation. Nakasone, therefore, tried to rectify Japan's semi-autonomous status through an active commitment to its national and regional defenses. Although Nakasone eventually failed in his attempt at achieving a greater autonomy, time did catch up with him. During his tenure as a premier (1982-1987), he initiated a series of active foreign policies and paved the way for a new phase in Japan's tactical development.


5. Otake, pp. 35-36.


7. Otake, p. 36.

8. Ibid., p. 40.


10. Ibid., pp. 143-144.


15. Ibid., p. 32.


17. Momoi, p. 347.


21. Osgood, pp. 53-54.


23. Otake, p. 77.


25. Otake, p. 74.


27. Ibid., p. 358.

28. Otake, p. 75.

When published in April 1971, the JDA version of the Fourth Defense Plan caused a chain of controversies. The media and opposition parties were swift to castigate its projected scale. Regional powers expressed their wariness with acrimonious statements. Disarray among the LDP hawks became increasingly evident. Some hawkish Liberal Democrats not only voiced their reservations against the JDA's militant posture but also sided with the doves in favor of a tighter defense budget. As a consequence, the JDA became isolated within the Sato government at this crucial moment when a firm consensus was necessary. Probably, the only major player who supported the JDA and its pretentious plan was the military industry.

The JDA Director, Nakasone, left his post in part due to this controversy. While the loss of this ambitious leader alone caused tremendous confusion in the JDA, a set of far more damaging events was under way in the summer of 1971. The serial incidents started in early July, with U.S. Defense Secretary Melvin Laird's visit.
Laird's Visit to Tokyo

Laird was seen by the Sato government as advocating Japan's acquisition of nuclear arms. He was also the one who was responsible for introducing the concept of "Realistic Deterrence." Laird in his 1972 Defense Posture Statement explained the new concept in this manner:

With regard to U.S. force capabilities in Asia, we do not plan for the long term to maintain separate large U.S. ground combat forces specifically oriented just to this theater, but we do intend to maintain strong air, naval and support capabilities. . . .In the future, we expect the emphasis in Asia more and more to be placed on U.S. support to our allies who themselves will provide the required manpower.

Laird took the Nixon Doctrine one step further by suggesting that U.S. commitment in Asia would be limited to air and naval capacities, and to support of allies who were capable of providing their own manpower.

During his week-long stay in Japan, Secretary Laird met with several members of the Sato administration and clarified the new U.S. policy. The secretary also inspected the Japanese Self-Defense Forces (JSDF) and emphasized the need for updating JSDF equipment with American-made weapons. While Laird's new concept itself was a welcome move for the JDA officials who wanted a more autonomous defense, his request for Japanese financial contributions greatly annoyed them. This was because Laird's proposal would require a major change in the JDA version of the Fourth Plan. The purchase of U.S. made arms would also contradict one of the initial theses of the Fourth Defense Plan, that is, domestication of weaponry production. Nevertheless, Laird's proposal indubitably pleased the Finance Ministry that saw greater practicality in buying less expensive U.S. weapons. With such
purchases, Japan could reduce both its trade surplus with the United States and its defense spending.

Laird's demand, however, was rather trivial compared to the two ensuing incidents. The impact of these events on Japan's foreign policy was so immense that they were collectively known as the Nixon "Shocks" in Japan. And they without a doubt had the biggest influence on the formulation of the Fourth Defense Plan in its latter stage.

The First "Nixon Shock": Détente

The first psychological shock came from Nixon's announcement on July 15, 1971 to visit Beijing. The announcement was historical in the sense that it paved the way for American rapprochement with China and eventually with the Soviet Union. And the rapprochement was directly responsible for bringing about the relaxation of international tension between the two ideological camps. What was shocking to Japan, one of the staunchest apostles of U.S. pro-Taipei policy, was that this fundamental shift in the U.S. position was made without any prior consultation with its allies.

Actually, there had been a few symptoms of the ideological relaxation before Nixon's visit to Beijing. Short-lived relaxations had occurred after the Geneva Agreement of 1954 and after the Cuban Missile Crisis of 1962. Accordingly, the Japan Foreign Ministry was reported to have discussed the possibility of a Sino-American rapprochement prior to 1970. However, few had ever taken such an argument seriously. Thus the U.S. decision to unilaterally court
Beijing nearly paralyzed Japan. Although the Japanese government was infuriated, Japan was neither independent nor active enough to pursue its own course. Prime Minister Sato, his pro-Taiwan sentiment notwithstanding, followed the American lead so as not to risk the fragile agreement on the Okinawa reversion.

Nixon's new policy toward China was appalling also because it aggravated the reviving fear in Japan of being internationally isolated. The Sino-American rapprochement in many ways symbolized the beginning of a new era. Voices demanding a reexamination of the Fourth Defense Plan rapidly increased among the pro-Beijing LDP factions and the opposition parties because the Fourth Plan's militant prospect was thought to counter the spirit of détente. This was believed to isolate Japan from the rest of the world. Hence, the JDA was left with little choice but to modify the Fourth Defense Plan.

The Second Nixon "Shock": the Economic Crisis

Nixon's plan to visit China was followed exactly a month later by the second shock of emergency economic programs. The American action was taken once again without notifying its allies. Before going into detail, however, a discussion of the international trade condition at that time is in order.

By 1970, the United States seemed to have lost its competitive edge in the global economy. Western Europe and Japan, so dependent on American aid until the 1960s, had grown into rather potent challengers to the U.S. dominance in international trade. Foreign products, reasonably priced and in many cases better, literally flooded into the U.S. market.
However, American products in the foreign markets were not as competitive as they could have been. This was partly due to the fact that both the Common Market and Japan established external trade barriers which the United States felt were quite excessive and discriminatory. As a result, in 1971, the United States for the first time since the Great Depression suffered a trade deficit. Criticism of European cooperation and Japan's trade surplus began to soar in the United States.

The decline in the dollar's standing abroad further demonstrated America's downfall in the global economic order. The dollar was devalued in part as a consequence of unsound fiscal policies used to finance both the Vietnam War and social programs like the Great Society. They stimulated the U.S. economy unevenly and worsened existing inflationary pressures. Other causes of the dollar's depreciation involved costly foreign aid programs, private investments, and purchases of higher-priced oil.

Knowing that the dollar fixed to gold was valued more than it should have been, foreign dollar holders took advantage of this situation and rushed to exchange dollars for gold. Had dwindling of the America's gold stock continued, the United States would have been confronted by a major crisis in its balance-of-payments. Thus, the Nixon administration had to find a solution to effectively depreciate the value of the dollar to that of gold. Otherwise, the gold stock of the United States would soon be depleted.

It was against this background that the Nixon administration resorted to harsh unilateral economic measures
that produced another psychological shock to Japanese leaders. On August 15, 1971, after the dollar had fallen to its lowest point against the Deutsch mark since World War II, President Nixon disclosed the emergency measures that would defend the dollar abroad and correct the balance-of-payment deficit. On the domestic level, the president announced various tactics to reduce both unemployment and inflation. On the international level, he suspended of the dollar's convertibility into gold, imposed a 10 percent surcharge on all imports into the United States, and reduced foreign aid by 10 percent.11

Although the problem was primarily American in origin, the new policy was principally targeted against Japan.12 By 1970, the United States was increasingly frustrated by Japan's inability to revalue the yen and discard its trade barriers. However, it was the impasse of U.S.-Japanese talks on textiles (1970-1971) that had the foremost effect on the U.S. decision.

Actually, textile products were a declining industry in Japan and thus of minor importance, compared to the magnitude of the Okinawa issue that paralleled the textile dispute. However, President Nixon's need for valuable political support from the textile industry and Premier Sato's inability to singlehandedly deliver any drastic change, due to the special Japanese policy-making process, needlessly complicated the problem.

The prime minister found himself caught in a dilemma between his craving for support from the domestic textile industry and his determination to assure the Okinawa
reversion. Therefore, he repeatedly made vague promises in order to make both alternatives viable. Nevertheless, Sato's repeated failures to deliver his promises agitated Nixon. The president's decision to proceed with the new economic policy without informing Japan was at least partially motivated by his skepticism about Sato's ability to resolve the textile dispute.

As Robert Scalapino once stated, the Sato government "badly misjudged the American mood and, admittedly under strenuous domestic pressures to hold the line, unwisely postponed in taking actions that would have provided greater equity in bilateral economic relations." The textile conflict remained unsettled until October 15, 1971, when Japan finally agreed with the United States to restrict its textile exports due to the threat of an Executive Order under the 1917 Trading with the Enemy Act. Prime Minister Sato could not risk Japan's alliance with the United States, or, more specifically, the Okinawa reversion over a minor issue of textile exports, albeit this meant humiliation and the loss of popular support.

Implications of the Nixon "Shocks"

The impact of the Nixon "Shocks" on the making of the Fourth Defense Plan was immense. First, the fundamental theme of détente reinforced the pacifist determination of the Japanese people, thereby eroding public support for an autonomous defense posture. The original Fourth Plan was thus regarded as an antithesis of détente. The plan also faced stiff resistance from pro-Beijing LDP factions as well as
Table IV
Japanese Opinions on Establishing Formal Relations with the People's Republic of China
(by percentage of responses)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>immediately</th>
<th>as soon as possible</th>
<th>no need to make haste</th>
<th>Not necessary</th>
<th>Don't know/no answer</th>
<th>TOTAL</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Apr.1971</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>44</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Jul.1971</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Oct.1971</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nov.1971</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>44</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Jul.1972</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Oct.1972</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sep.1972</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


vigorous attacks from opposition parties and the mass media.
The Sato government began to realize that Japan's economic and political interests would be undermined if its neighboring countries felt that Japan was drifting away from détente and developing a formidable military capacity. To show its good will, Japan decided to scale down the Fourth Plan.

Second, the "Shocks" inevitably generated anti-American sentiment among the Japanese and further antagonized U.S.-Japan relations. As a high-ranking Japanese official noted, the Nixon "Shocks" might have "set back Japanese-American relations by ten years." Kiichi Saeki, a Japanese foreign policy scholar, interpreted the "Shocks" as indicating America's willingness to "sacrifice some of the partnership relations with her allies in order to negotiate with enemies." While the sudden changes in U.S. policy might have been targeted against Premier Sato himself, who had repeatedly failed to deliver his promises, to the Japanese, "it was not their lameduck premier, but Japan that
was ignored. The Nixon 'Shocks' (were) regarded as a national humiliation." By the same token, the Nixon "Shocks" provided the stimulus necessary for improving Sino-Japanese and Soviet-Japanese relations. At a time when the ties between America and Japan are at their weakest point in the post-war period, both China and the Soviet Union were competing for the security which an alliance with Japan could provide.

Third, Japan finally realized the inseparability of economic and security issues. Japan had prioritized its economic growth by carefully avoiding extensive military spending. And to a great degree it had succeeded. But the Nixon "Shocks," along with the Arab oil embargo in 1973, reminded Japan that it should "discard its traditional policy of avoiding international political problems and start playing a role commensurate with its ability." This change in Japan's attitude was reflected in the Fourth Plan's formulation in terms of increasing demand for a greater purchase of American arms. Nakasone's version of the Fourth Defense Plan partially aimed at boosting the home production of arms. However, with the introduction of the new American economic policy, internal and external pressures to import U.S. weapons became intolerable for the Japanese government.

The external pressure came from the United States with the purpose of defending further depreciation of the dollar by rectifying the trade imbalance with Japan. Within the Japanese government, the pressure came from the Finance Ministry, which had protested the trend of unrestricted defense spending all the way. The second "Shock" helped
revalue the yen, thereby widening the price gap between indigenously produced arms and American imports. Thus, the Finance Ministry found a more practical reason for the purchase of U.S. arms: Japan could rectify the trade imbalance and reduce defense expenditure at the same time. Consequently, the Finance Ministry gained a stronger position to pursue the Sato administration on the defense budget. The JDA, despite a massive lobbying campaign by the military industry, eventually succumbed to the pressure and renounced the idea of producing PXL and AEW domestically.  

The Aftermath of the Nixon "Shocks"

The year 1972 experienced a series of after-shocks. Within the Japanese government, for instance, the new JDA Director-General was forced to single out his position from two options: 1) procrastination of the Fourth Defense Plan to make further changes that were compatible with recent conditions; and 2) assurance of the plan's start in 1972 as scheduled, yet with significant reduction in both its quality and quantity. By early October, the JDA chief, citing the recession in Japan's economy and the Nixon "Shocks," said he had decided: 1) that the Fourth Defense Plan would be carried out as scheduled; 2) that necessary reductions in the plan would be made in accordance with the current economic and political situations; and 3) that certain segments of the plan -- improvements in the treatment of SDF personnel, emphasis on education and training, cooperation in public works, the strengthening of defense intelligence, Research and Development (R&D) -- would be restored. In this revised
plan, the JDA director reduced the original plan by ten percent (¥500 billion) through fewer purchases of first-line combat weapons, but deferred the purchase of a number of aircraft and other items. The JDA proceeded with the revised plan, albeit reluctantly, and requested the Finance Ministry to include in the Fifth Defense Plan those items of equipment that were cut out of the present plan.

During 1971 and much of 1972, the Sato administration sought a consensus and formal Diet approval of the Fourth Defense Plan. In February 7, 1972, the government proposed and the National Defense Council approved a budget for fiscal year 1972 to 1973, increasing military spending by 19.7 percent. This increase in the defense budget was caused primarily by an unexpected economic boom and an over-issuance of government bonds. Naturally, the new budget that included $90 million for the production of 20 T-2 supersonic jet trainers and the procurement of F-4EJ Phantom aircraft provoked such vigorous opposition that the Japanese Diet was paralyzed for a record twenty days before a compromise was finally reached. The revised budget submitted in the same month removed for the time being an appropriation for some new aircraft and froze $294 billion earmarked for disbursement after the coming fiscal year. Consequently, the new version more closely resembled the Third Defense Plan in its outlook than the Nakasone plan which it had replaced.

Furthermore, each major international event in 1972 -- President Nixon's visit to Beijing, the SALT agreements, the Okinawa reversion, the Seoul-Pyongyang talks, and the normalization of Sino-Japanese relations -- helped reduce
regional tensions and even the hawks acknowledged their willingness to scale down the program. In the meantime, U.S. policy-makers also mellowed some concerning their position on Japanese defense. Henry Kissinger, for instance, reportedly said during his visit to Tokyo in June 1972, that:

1) The United States does not expect Japan to play a military role in areas beyond the Japanese homeland nor to assume military burdens in East Asia under the Nixon Doctrine; and 2) [The U.S.] did not accept the view that Japan will become a military big power, nor was it U.S. policy to have Japan arm itself with nuclear weapons.

The change in Kissinger's rhetoric is rather significant, given the fact that Japan's assumption of military responsibility in Korea and Taiwan was considered a prerequisite for the return of Okinawa. (See Chapter 3) The most proximate cause for strengthening Japanese defense had been U.S. disengagement from Asia. However, with the emergence of détente, proponents of strengthened Japanese defense lost this convincing argument.

On July 7, 1972, a month after the formation of the Tanaka cabinet, the Fourth Defense Plan underwent a further curtailment. (The extent of the cutback is shown in Table III.) The Tanaka administration finally approved the plan on October 9, following the premier's return from Beijing where Deng Xioping allegedly recognized the JSDF's legitimate existence. While still emphasizing the security cooperation with the United States, the approved version obviously took détente into account in its situation judgment:

The recent international situation has overcome the period of severe East-West confrontation in the past, and as a general direction, it is moving in the direction of multi-polarization, and under this situation, there is even seen a tendency toward the
easing of tension. The examples of this are seen in the development of U.S.-China and U.S.-Soviet relations, and the progress of East-West negotiations in Europe.24

This represented Japan's effort to move away from the anachronism of Cold War thinking and to redefine the Fourth Defense Plan in the context of détente. Consequently, the Fourth Plan merely reinforced the incremental nature of Japanese security policy. Thus, the new plan totally lost its meaning as a vehicle for achieving an autonomous defense posture supported by strong naval and maritime forces with gradual domestication of weaponry production.

The ordeal for the ill-fated Fourth Defense Plan was not over yet; the oil embargo by the allied Arab nations necessitated a further downscaling. As a result, the JDA voluntarily jettisoned oil-consuming weapons such as tanks, jets, and large ships from the procurement plan. Skyrocketing costs due to higher oil prices further threatened the procurement programs.25 Thus, the Fourth Defense Buildup Plan as an instrument for Japan's achieving greater autonomy ultimately ended in failure.


4. Otake, p. 78.


10. Ibid., p. 594.


21. Otake, p. 79.

22. Ibid., p. 85.

23. Burleson, p. 20

24. Ibid., p. 87.

CONCLUSION: THE FOURTH DEFENSE BUILDUP PLAN
AND JAPAN'S EVOLUTION INTO AN ACTIVE STATE

In the period from 1969 to 1972, Japan evolved from a semi-autonomous nation constantly avoiding international responsibility to a more active and independent state. Indeed, Japan underwent many critical changes during this period. One such change was its approach to strategic thinking. The formulation of the Fourth Defense Buildup Plan (1972-1976), which paralleled this critical time, reflected those changes in Japan's security policy.

The Fourth Defense Plan was initially intended as a mere extention of its predecessor, whose emphasis was on the modernization of obsolete weapons. This was indicative of the fact that Japan lacked a comprehensive defense policy due to its lopsided security arrangement with its mentor, the United States. Similarly, the basic premise of a semi-autonomous Japanese policy had been to keep Japan's international involvement at a minimum so as not to subvert its economic growth. However, as the Okinawa reversion became a critical issue in 1969, Japan felt the urgent need for modifying its traditional reactive policy to resolve the issue. It was against this background that the Japanese government used the
prospect of the Fourth Plan to show its willingness to take active steps in regional security. The Fourth Defense Plan thus was given a new meaning as the embodiment of Japan's determination to achieve the reversion. The unfolding of the Nixon Doctrine in July, 1969, inevitably reinforced this characteristic. The Nixon-Sato joint communiqué of November, 1969, which included a clause implying that Japan might replace the United States in the defense of Taiwan and South Korea, made the nation even more active in its approach to the regional defense.

The emergence of Nakasone as the JDA Director-General gave the Fourth Plan a far more ambitious outlook. Nakasone used his office to achieve Japan's greater autonomy and international status through active security commitments independent of the United States. Nakasone's intent was shared by a certain segment of the Japanese society, including the industrialists and right-wing elements within the LDP. With the introduction of an "exclusively defensive posture," Nakasone enjoyed considerable popular support. However, the advent of many restraining factors, namely, changes in U.S. foreign policy (détente, adoption of emergency economic measures etc.), regional concerns, Japanese pacifism, and fear of autonomy on the part of the Japanese government, eventually restrained Nakasone's ambition and aborted an attempt to bring about a truly independent security status for Japan. As a consequence, the final version of the Fourth Plan returned to the incremental approach common to the previous five-year buildup plans.

Fluctuations and ambivalence in Japan's handling of
foreign policy marked the Fourth Plan's formulation process, reflecting Japan's mixed feeling toward becoming an autonomous state. Although Nakasone's ambitious attempt had failed, Japan learned two important lessons: 1) that Japan could not continue to rely upon U.S. puissance by avoiding the essential responsibilities of an independent sovereign state; and 2) that, as witnessed in the Nixon "Shocks," the policy goals of Japan and the United States were no longer identical so that sooner or later, Japan would have to pursue actively its own course. Through these experiences, Japan has grown from a junior partner of the United States into a more independent state, and had done so without sacrificing its military and economic arrangements with its senior partner. Furthermore, compared to the Japanese defense policy of the 1950s and much of 1960s, which Washington had initiated, that of the late 1960s and early 1970s, as in the Fourth Defense Plan, was a product of a healthy mixture of Japan's domestic concerns and the demands of the international political environment.
SELECTED BIBLIOGRAPHY

Primary Sources


Secondary Sources in English


Secondary Sources in Japanese


Otake, Hideo. Nihon no Boei to Kokusai Seiji: Detanto kara


Articles in English


