A Critique Of Psychoanalysis In The Light Of Thomistic Philosophy

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A CRITIQUE OF PSYCHOANALYSIS IN
THE LIGHT OF THOMISTIC PHILOSOPHY

by

John Michael Courtney

A Dissertation
Submitted to
the Philosophy Department
of Carroll College in Partial Fulfillment
of the Requirements for Cum Laude Recognition

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Part 1. History of the Problem Among Philosophers. How does a material entity and a spiritual unity co-operate to act?

Ancient Greek Philosophy was concerned primarily with external nature, and it is for the most part naturalistic (the view that all facts have only natural causes and natural significance) and hylozastic (the opinion that all things are in some degree alive). The philosophers of this period had two problems: 1. that of substance; 2. that of change.

Philosophers of the Milesian school; Thasles, Anaximander, Anaximenes, and the Pythagorians deal almost exclusively with these problems. Heraclitus bases his psychology on his theory of the universe holding that the controlling element in man is the soul (fire), and man must subordinate himself to a "universal reason". Whatever passion desires to get it buys at the cost of the soul.

The Elastic school of Parmenides, being idealistic, and denying all change, calls the sense world illusion, stating that reason is the criterion of truth. Parmenides tells us that our reason shows the world as a unity, unchangeable and immovable, but sense perception reveals a world of plurality and change. How it is possible to perceive such a world he does not tell us.

Empedocles says man is composed of these elements. He ascribes psychic life to all things and maintains transmigration of the human soul.

Anaxargas ascribes souls to organic bodies in order to
explain their motion. He calls the mind, which initiated the motion, the nous, which has power over the matter, and as a result his position is one of vague dualism. He involves the mind only when a mechanical explanation fails.

Democritus and the Atomists agree with the Eleatics saying that absolute change is impossible. He claims that certain organs of the body are the seats of particular mental functions which results in the crude beginnings of physiological psychology on a materialistic basis. Sense perception is explained as a change produced in the soul by the action of images resembling the perceived object. Greek Atomists anticipated the distinction between primary and secondary qualities encountered in modern philosophy. This distinction was held by Kant (1724-1804). He claims that a primary quality is in the object exactly the same way as it appears in the mind. Primary qualities then are associated with quantity, extension, figure, position, number and motion. For Kant, a secondary quality is any physical property in the object using sensation that differs from the conditions of that property in the object itself. Secondary qualities are associated with color, odor, sound and taste.

The period of the Sophists and Socrates devotes its attention almost exclusively to the problems of man, to-human knowledge and conduct. Socrates and the Socratic school used a practical rather than a speculative approach.

Plato (437-347 B.C.) has the first complete system of philosophy. His theory of knowledge is of special interest to us.
He says that the senses give only appearances to us but not genuine knowledge. In sensation and opinion the soul is dependent on the body, but the soul in relation to the world of ideas is pure reason, and therefore the soul must free itself from the hindrance of the body. Ideas for him have real objective existence as sensation prevails in the apprehension of them but does not produce these ideas because the soul "remembers" them from some "preexistence". Plato gives a tri-partite division of the soul: 1. The rational faculty (corresponding closely to the term desire in modern psychology), this is a form of faculty psychology. Plato's separation of faculties is not so extreme as to preclude their interplay and co-operation. The soul may be pulled in opposing directions by these faculties as when reason restrains thirst when only poison is obtainable, or the spirited faculty rebels against morbid bodily appetites. The spirited faculty is often the ally of reason in the control of the appetite, and natural desires may be in conformity with reason as in moderate desire for food and drink.

Aristotle (384-322). Man, for Aristotle, is a microcosm distinguished from all other beings by the possession of reason. For him sense perception is a change produced in the soul by things perceived through the mediation of the sense organs. Aristotle's general distinction between form and matter in the mental world requires him to distinguish between the formal and the material phases of reason. Soul and body although distinct are one substance. The soul,
which is the principle of all vital phenomena is one, however, we distinguish several faculties in it. These faculties are not parts of the soul but are different phases of it, and these faculties (phases) of the soul are: 1. nutritive; 2. locomotive; 3. appetitive; 4. sensative; 5. rational.

Post Aristotelian philosophy deals mainly with the ethical aspect of man which is not of primary importance here. Aristotelian philosophy remained almost in tact up until the first century B.C. From the time of Christ up until the sixth century Pythagorean and Platonic philosophies caused a distortion of Aristotelian philosophy so that for the most part it can not be recognized as his.

The Stoics returned to the purely materialistic outlook on man. The soul is material and in no way free in that it is a part of the divine and determined by it. The Epicurians offer a more pronounced sensism than the Stoics, in that their standard of truth is one of pleasure and pain. They also held an atomistic theory of the soul and offer practically no psychology to us.

The Skeptics, Pyrrho being the chief exponent, offer little psychology and tend to universal disbelief or skepticism. In summery, we can say that these men, the Epicurians, Stoics, and Skeptics were more interested in using philosophy as a refuge from the problems of their times rather than a sound system of reasonable truths.

Greco-Jewish philosophy is an attempt to harmonize the sacred books of the Hebrews with Greek Philosophy. It made no important contributions to the field here discussed.
The Pre-scholastic phase of philosophy, is primarily theo-centric, that is concerned primarily with the relations between God and man. This phase of philosophy may be called theocentric also for the reason that many of the philosophers were engaged in protecting and demonstrating the truth with philosophical arguments.

Augustine does not define clearly the distinctions between Theology and Philosophy. For him the soul is simple, spiritual and immaterial, and man is a rational animal, the soul and body of man together forming one substance. The soul gives being and species to the body, it acts on the body. The body, however, has no independent power of acting of the soul; whatever power the body has is conferred on it by the soul itself. Augustine shows the powers of the soul thus: (1)

- **Faculties of Sense**
  - Sense Appetite
  - Irascible
  - External Senses
    - See
    - Touch
    - Hear
    - Smell
    - Taste
  - Sense Knowledge

- **The Soul**
  - Internal Senses
    - Sensus Communis
    - Imagination
    - Sensuos Memory
  - Will (Intellectual Appetite)
    - Estimative
    - Intuitive

- **Faculties of The Soul as Spirit**
  - Intellectual Knowledge
    - Intelligence
    - Discursive
  - Intellectual Memory

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St. Augustine stresses the importance of the will, because the will, as he expresses it, is the faculty that moves the intellect to act.

The psychology of St. Thomas will be the principle source of argumentation against our opponents, for he is the primary and principal exponent of Scholastic Philosophy. We shall, however, include here a brief review of his psychology to demonstrate his influence on latter thought.

Man is both pure spirit and matter, the soul is an immaterial subsistent form of the body, it is organic, sensitive and intelligent. The soul possesses three different capacities or functions: the moving function, the sensitive function, and the intellectual function. Intelligence and free will constitute the essence of the human soul and differentiate it from other souls. While united intimately with an organic body, its intellectual function is hyperorganic. That is, the intellect is intrinsically independent of the body and only extrinsically dependent on it. In other words, the human being is a union of mind and body, intimately connected but not so bound together as to exclude any interaction. The intelligent soul can, therefore, exercise its functions without a body. The individual soul in all of its "parts" remains after death.

Scholastic philosophy began to decline during the latter half of the fourteenth century due to the lack of serious study and the rise of opposing systems. Later the Renaissance gave rise to many philosophical theories attempting to discredit scholastic philosophy. The Reformation, or better the
the Protestant Revolt, in the sixteenth century attacked the philosophy of the Schoolmen, for it was an ally to the very Catholic dogmas which the so-called reformers were trying to overthrow.

The Renaissance, accompanied by a renewed interest in the classics, particularly Greek, gave rise to a reemphasis on man, and to humanism and to homocentric philosophy. Many systems arose which professed skepticism, evolution, Machiavellian politics and natural religion. Thomism was generally disregarded outside the Catholic Church, however, when Protestantism felt a need to rationalize her faith she turned somewhat to Scholasticism.

Francis Bacon (1561-1626) holds that:

Human philosophy studies body and soul in their relations. Among its topics are the miseries of the perquisites of excellence of the human race, physiognomy, and the interpretation of natural dreams, the effect of the body states on the mind, e.g., in madness or insanity, the influence of mind on body, the proper seat and habitation of each faculty of the mind in the body and its organs, and also medicine, atheletic and voluptuary. Bacon includes in human science all knowledge of man as a psycho-physical individual; his is a comprehensive philosophical anthropology. (2)

Bacon's scientific humanism, although far removed from the classical humanism of Renaissance philosophers, was destined to reappear in the theories of such men as John Dewey.

Thomas Hobbes (1588-1679) gives a materialistic interpretation of the mind. Mind is a motion in the brain and

(2) Frank Thilly, op. cit., p. 290.
images or ideas are motions in the brain or heart; i.e., motions of a material substance. His materialism, however, is modified when he says that states of consciousness are no longer motions but effects of motions, this is called in modern term, epiphenomenalism (the opinion that an attendant phenomenon appearing with something else and referred to that as its cause). Man also has a motive power by which the mind gives animal motions to its body. He uses the pleasure - pain theory of good and evil and states that there is no such thing as absolute goodness because goodness is always relative to the individual man. A man is free to act but not always free to will, a man cannot say I can will if I will.

Rene Descartes (1596-1650) although educated in Scholastic philosophy, emphasized the practical character of philosophy. For him mind is diametrically opposed to the body, the body attribute is extension, it is passive while the mind attribute is thinking and it is active and free. The two substances are absolutely distance because no body can think and the mind is absolutely without extension. Imagination and perception are distinct from myself as modes of things. Descartes' extreme dualism follows from the fact that he left nature free for the mechanical explanations of natural science. The human body, he holds, is a machine, the moving principle of the body is heat in the heart; the organs of sensation are the nerves. It is not necessary that man have a sensitive soul or any vital principle of motion other than
blood and "animal spirits". Since mind and body exclude each other there can be no interaction between them: mind cannot cause change in the body nor can the body cause change in the mind. Descartes, however, recognizing some facts which point to an intimate union of mind and body in man, is not consistent with his premises. Descartes does not make clear just how this intimate union is to be explained.

He seems to adopt the position that the relation between mind and body is not such that a physical state becomes, produces, or causes a mental state, or visa versa, but rather that the mind is simply troubled by organic processes. (3)

His obscurity and confusion on this point are due to his desire to explain the body functions on a purely mechanical basis but still leave place for the action of a spiritual principle.

From Descartes' fundamental misconception of the relation of mind and body followed the misunderstanding which prevails in modern psychology, that is, between those who believe in the spirituality of the soul and those who insist on the value of experimental methods in the study of psychic phenomena. Thus a great problem of modern psychology arises - the correlation between psychic phenomena and physiological processes.

Toward the end of the seventeenth century almost all French writers of note tended toward Cartesianism. Bossuet (1627-1704) and Fenelon (1651-1715) while presenting the traditional philosophy of St. Augustine and St. Thomas included

in it unmistakable marks of the influence of the techniques of Descartes. Pascal (1626-1662) while including Cartesianism in his condemnation of all purely rational philosophy, shows in his own doctrines a development of the ideas contained germinally in the philosophy of Descartes. Malebranche (1638-1715) gave Descartes philosophy a more complete and definite form, he brought into view the elements of occasionalism and ontologism hidden in it.

Benedict Spinoza (1632-1677), under the spell of Cartesianism, builds his philosophy on its principles. However, he departs from Cartesianism dualism in that he holds that there is but one substance or principle, upon which depends all processes physical and mental. The mind exists as a complex mode consisting of thought, feelings and volitions, and these states of the mind are not effects of the body or bodily processes; mind and body in no way influence one another, there is no interaction between them. The functions of the mind and body while originating from a single principle are parallels, they are but processes of the same thing expressed in different ways.

John Locke (1632-1704) is styled as the successor of Bacon and Hobbes but Descartes influenced him even more both directly and indirectly. For him, mind and body are real and interact. His general position is that mental processes cannot be the bare action of matter, that there can be no sensation without an immaterial source, and that there is in man a spiritual being of some sort. He is not clear, however, as to
whether this being is really spiritual or material. His theory then, in fact, is dualistic in the sense that there are two substances, mind and body, but he tends definitely to a material explanation whenever and wherever possible.

The idealistic movement, represented by Leibniz, and Berkeley, was an attempt to remove the antithesis between mind and body, by reducing matter to mind. Leibniz attempted to harmonize all the systems of his predecessors, this attempt obviously could result in nothing but a confused idealism. Berkeley solved his problem by saying that if all is spirit then there can be no matter and therefore, no interaction between them.

Immanuel Kant (1724-1804). Kant's philosophy is one of criticism and voluntarism. He refused to accept any theory (no matter how strongly supported) without criticism, and he maintains that the will is superior to the intellect (appealing to moral consciousness to prove the truths which reason can not demonstrate).

Kant was a reaction to the strict empiricism of Hume, he sought to again give place to Religious and moral doctrines which were disregarded by Empiricism.

To explain how we obtain and increase our knowledge, Kant postulates his categories based on the different kinds of relations which exist between subject and predicate. There are twelve such categories. These categories or a-priori forms are neither subjective dispositions nor are they ideas; they are the empty forms of intellectual knowledge.
The function of these categories is to synthesize the manifold impressions of experience. Kant then postulates the schema or time as media between the a-priori form and the manifold of experience. We have the manifold representations of sense-impression; then the application of the forms of space and time resulting in sense-intuition; next, the schema and last of all the a-priori form, above all there is the unity of consciousness.

The value of the categories is that they render synthetic a-priori judgments possible and thus make intellectual knowledge possible, although the categories are a priori (independent of sensation), they do not extend our knowledge beyond phenomena, they do not lead us to a numenal knowledge of that which is given in sensation.

Basing his psychology on his theory of knowledge, Kant rejects the rational psychology which attributes identity, substantially, immateriality and immortality to the soul. Kant does not deny the unity, substantiality, etc. of the soul, but he says their proof rests on man's moral consciousness. Kant's doctrine of moral law is outstanding in his philosophy; for him, it is not based on pleasure, it is autonomous and imperative. Kant bases several conclusions on the existence of the moral law eg. the freedom of the will, the existence of God, the immortality of the soul. He proposes that natural religion is sufficient for man.

From this examination of the theory of knowledge and the psychology of Kant, it can be said that he affirmed at least
implicitly the interaction of mind and body, although it is not clear if he gives real existence to the body.

George Wilhelm Hegel (1770-1831) offers idealism in the strict sense of the term. Mind as he puts it, is the most complete development of the Absolute. His position in relation to interaction of mind and body may be summed up in his statement "The rational alone is real".

Johann Friedrich Herbart (1776-1841) in his realistic conception of Philosophy conceives the soul as a simple real essence, one of the "Realm". There are not, therefore, several faculties of the soul but one faculty, that of self-preservation. The soul is related to the body, which is an aggregate of reals, and the seat of the soul is in the brain. All souls are essentially alike; the differences in souls and in their development are due to external conditions, such as the organization of the body etc. Herbart attempted to reduce psychic life to a mechanism governed by the same laws as physics.

Herbert Spencer (1820-1903) states that psychology investigates only internal phenomena as such, he leaves external phenomena to physics and the connection and relation between them to physiology. His stand on interaction then implies a materialistic concept of the mind. From Spencer and the other materialists both before and after him, we can see why modern psychology tends to a purely materialistic outlook on man.

Henri Bergson (1859-1941) holds that the findings of
psychology fortify the findings of biology and that the me­chanistic theories of mind have failed to prove that the psychic is conditioned by the physical. Neither the matter constituting the world nor the consciousness which utilizes this matter can be explained by itself; there is a common source of both this matter and this consciousness.

Modern psychology since it disclaims the mind as a sub­stance also disclaims the soul as a substance. This fallacy followed from Decartes' claim that mind and matter are not conjoined in a substantial union. The results of Decartes' proposition were two: Those who treated the mind isolated from matter called Extreme Idealists and those who treated the matter isolated from the mind called Extreme Materialists. Since human nature is drawn more easily to the tangibilities of matter than to the intangibilities of mind, modern psychology resulted in the Extreme Materialistic vein. The great leaders of this materialism in psychology, Hume and Taine, maintained mind is nothing more than a series of con­scious acts. Associational psychology came into being de­fended by James Mill, Spencer, and James. Functionalism in the theory of Dewey is simply a disguised and associationistic doctrine or better a disguised phenomenalism. Watson, at first followed Dewey, but later founded behavioristic psychology, substituting behavior for consciousness.

We have attempted to show in this brief survey the different outlooks on the problem of interaction between mind and matter. This is important because our opponents
attempt to leave out interaction between mind and matter by denying the spirituality of the soul (the principal of the minds operations) and basing their psychologies on a purely materialistic basis. We hold that this explanation cannot be a true one and we shall attempt to prove that only from a psychology based on a true concept of man (a material and spiritual unity) can a true psychology result.


(3) Frank Thilly, op. cit., P. 311.

Part 2. Definition of Terms.

A. The Soul and its Faculties

We shall begin with dictionary definitions.

The soul, 1. in general, the ultimate intrinsic principle of life; the vital principle of a living substance; the substantial form of a living body; the first act of a physical (organic) body having life potentially. 2. specifically, the human soul. The intrinsic ultimate principle of human conscious life or of man's knowing and willing. (1)

There are two ways of looking at the soul of man:

Entitatively as the form of the body; and operationally, as the root of his powers. As the form of his body, man's soul is part of his essence. As the root of his powers, man's soul is the ultimate principle by which he lives, senses and thinks.

Human powers are divided into two classes: those belonging to the body and soul together, called psychosomatic and those belonging to the soul alone called psychic. Psychic powers are identical with mind, and minds, by extension, are identical with the soul. Man is thus a hylomorphic creature made up of matter and form. Each is necessary to his essence. As parts of his essence each is incomplete without the other, and neither is a complete substance. The soul of man then is the substantial form of matter and thus demands a material substrate as a co-efficient of its very being. This informed matter is the substance we call man.

Further, the soul of man is the immediate subject of his rational powers. Thinking demands both a power that thinks and a substance in which that power to think is rooted. Thinking

(1) Bernard Wueillner, op. cit., P. 116-7
is thus an act proper to the soul alone, since the soul alone is the ultimate principle of such operations. As a basis of rational processes, the soul of man must be a substance. What is said of the soul of man must be true of his mind since his mind is operationally indentified with the essence of his intellectual soul.

Aquinas' proof of the incorporeality and subsistent character of man's soul rests mainly on an analysis of its cognitive operations. The highest power of the mind (soul) is its power to understand the determinate nature of all corporeal substances. It, therefore, cannot be a corporeal (material) substance itself. The mind of man does not and in fact cannot function by a body organ because the fixed and determinate nature of the organ would prevent it from knowing all bodies. It is correct to say, then, that the mind shows an objective dependence on sense (since the data of sense furnish the objects of intellection) but in the subjective order (in the acts of abstracting and understanding) the intellect of man is completely devoid of matter and the appendages of matter. Thus the mind is immaterial in its intellectual operations and, therefore, immaterial in its intellectual nature, (as a thing acts so it is).

Further proof for the immaterial nature of man's soul is the fact that being as such is the adequate object of the mind. The proper object of human understanding belongs to man as such, but its adequate object is common to all intellectual agents. Every thought of mind can, therefore, be
reduced to the concept of being. The mind is able to apprehend all the various kinds of being in one single notion of being, precisely because it can abstract from the concreteness of this or that particular being. It is, therefore, evident that the principle of man's intellection, which is the soul, is an immaterial substance.

From the fact of the soul's incorporeal nature, we can infer its simplicity. The soul is simple because it is made up of no parts, as a corporeal substance is made up of matter and form. Secondly, it is not made up of quantative parts in the manner that matter is made up of continuous units (parts outside of parts). The first conclusion is evident from the fact that the soul of man is a form, the form of matter in conjunction with which it forms the composite substance of man. The second conclusion is evident from the incorporeal nature of the soul, evident from empirical analysis. Introspection shows that a thought has no extended parts dwelling materially in space. Concluding, we say that the soul does not and cannot have matter, for it does not have matter and form but it is the form of the matter. Ideas are indivisible and have no material parts so the mind which produces them must itself be simple.

Now since the soul is immaterial it cannot be conjoined to matter in a material way and, therefore, the soul cannot be the mind when considered only as the material brain. The soul is present in the body definitively, being limited by matter only in the exercise of its faculties. For, while it
has no parts outside of parts it does have powers outside of powers which are exercised within definite areas. Since the soul is the form of the body it is present everywhere throughout the organism. The whole of the soul is present in every part of the body. The soul of man does not, however, exercise its powers everywhere since certain of these powers are dependent on material structures and operate only in and through such structures (e.g. the power of sight operating through the eye, a material structure).

From the above facts, we must conclude further that the soul, since it is immaterial by nature, cannot come from a material source as the body does. The soul cannot be a part of some other spiritual substance for spiritual beings have no parts. We, therefore, must conclude that the human soul exists by a special act of creation.

The position of Aquinas on the immortality of the human soul is this: being opposed to any form of materialism and to the doctrine of impersonal survival, he holds that the soul of man by nature is incapable of destruction. Further he holds that its survival is not conditioned by its activities on earth; that since it is an individual form, it must continue to exist as such. Aquinas offers two proofs for his position: 1. Metaphysical; based on the intrinsic nature and the extrinsic cause of the human form with respect to its intrinsic nature; first of all the soul of man cannot be a body as we have already shown, it can, therefore, have no parts to wear out or fall apart. Secondly the soul is not
dependent on a body, demonstrated from the fact that his intellectual acts, though objectively in need of the products of the senses, are nevertheless subjectively free of matter and its contingencies. It follows, therefore, that if the mind does not need a body to think (absolutely), it does not need a body to exist. With regard to its extrinsic cause the human soul is by nature incorruptable (providing, of course, the creator's supporting power). God, by his absolute power could annihilate the soul in view of His supreme dominion over all creatures, but He would have to change the nature of the soul to do so.

2. The psychological proof for the survival of the human soul rests on the principle that we judge the nature of a thing according to the end for which it acts. These ends are two in man, first the natural desire of the intellect to know universal truth, and second; the natural desire of his will to be united to the universal good.

B. The Body and its Faculties

"The body, Philosophy of nature. An individual material thing; a real material unit. Specifically, the human body." (2)

The body of man is, as we have mentioned, an incomplete substance. The body is the material substrate which is informed by the soul. The term body used in conjunction with the term soul always refers to first matter. The human soul confers on first matter all the perfections we see in this

(2) Bernard Wuellner, op. cit., p. 15.
highly organized and most complex matter called the human body. The soul united directly and immediately to first matter is its co-principle in the constitution of man. The body or corporeal substance is, strictly speaking, something that has already been perfected by union with its substantial form. Therefore, it should be said that the constitutive principles of man's essence are matter and rational soul. The union of body and soul is a design of nature and thus man's intellect is to be conditioned by the operations of his senses. The body of man places him in contact with the universe of physical dimensions, with matter and its tangible properties. The body is, therefore, a necessary instrument of knowledge. Accordingly, nature has ordained that the human soul should receive its rational perfection from the body to which it is conjoined. Otherwise of what use would the body be to man? Man's senses have their roots in matter as well as in spirit, they function in a material medium and upon material objects but their principle of operation ultimately is the soul.

The following diagram (3) gives us a total picture of man's powers, based on the Thomistic principles of classification. We must keep in mind that its basic ordering of powers is based on the principle that a power is more perfect in proportion as its acts are less restricted by the contingencies of matter. Secondly, the object placed opposite the power in the diagram is the proper object of the power, the object to which that power is primarily ordained.
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(2) Bernard Wuellner, op. cit.

Part 3. Opponents

Brief biographical outline showing the influence on our opponents; Freud, Jung and Adler.

A. Sigmund Freud was born in Maravia in Czechoslovakia on May 6, 1856. When Freud was four years old the family moved to Vienna which Freud was later to make the capital of psychoanalysis. A book on nature by Goethe (a philosopher and poet) inspired Freud to study medicine, but after his studies, he gave up the medical practice to do clinical research in neurology. Freud studied with Joseph Breuer, who introduced Freud to the use of hypnotism as a technique for probing the unconscious in hysteria cases. The hypnotic suggestion was also utilized to relieve the patient of repression. Freud, at 26, was in Paris studying hysteria and hypnosis under Jean-Marie Charcot, one of the greatest neurologists of the century. He also studied with Bernheim, the founder of a new school of neurology at Nancy.

Perhaps the greatest influence on Freud was Breuer. From Breuer's techniques in dealing with hysteria, Freud evolved his therapy of "free association" which was to become so important in his whole system. By free association, the mental patient is urged to disclose all his thoughts and images as they come to mind so that the analyst can piece together a picture of forgotten experiences which are causing the mental disorder.

Freud and Breuer parted due to their disagreement upon the role which sexuality plays in the formation of neurosis. Freud, however, always retained great admiration for his old teacher and gives him full credit for the help he gave to him.
In 1890, Freud published the results of his first experiments with his new method now known as Psychoanalysis. In this same year, he gave up entirely the practice of hypnotism in favor of free association as a method of recall. The fanciful and mystical character of hypnotism also repelled him as it did Jung. By 1895, the Psychoanalytic system of treatment and investigation was well developed and widely used, and within the next decade a whole school of Psychoanalysis had grown up with its center at Vienna.

In 1908, the first of a series of meetings on Psychoanalysis was held. Here the various members of the school discussed cases, methods, etc. Here also the school began to split up into various factions. Freud lectured throughout Europe and in America. His death came in 1939. Important works of Freud are: Introductory Lectures on Psychoanalysis, The Interpretations of Dreams, and Three Contributions to the Theory of Sex.

Freud proposed Psychoanalysis not only as a method of discovery, prevention and cure of mental disorder, but he later developed it into a philosophy of life. (1)

Among the principal philosophical influences on Freud, as we mentioned above, is Rene Decartes. Decartes is mainly responsible for starting the body-mind problem in modern psychology.

(1) Smith, V. E., op. cit. P. 162-3
Freud answered the problem by rejecting Cartesian dualism, and settled on extreme materialism. Freud also drew from Herbart many of his terms such as "mechanism of repression".

So we see, Freud did not consciously draw on any one philosopher or system of Philosophy, but was influenced by the general philosophy of his day and age. The philosophy of Rationalism of the 18th century, "Age of Reason", and the so called "Enlightenment" and its results in the 19th century influenced him to a great extent. This fact is obvious from his treatment of such things as: free will, the existence and spirituality of the soul, God, and many other concepts.

B. Carl G. Jung was born on July 26, 1875 in Kesswil, Switzerland. He graduated at Basel and in 1900, began his career as psychiatrist as an assistant in the mental hospital and psychiatric clinic of the University of Zurich, where he became senior staff physician in 1909. Meanwhile, in 1902, he studied under Pierre Janet at the Salpetriere in Paris, gaining knowledge of theoretical psychopathology, and later worked under the direction of E. Bleuler; as a result of these researches, he published a series of papers, among which was one concerning the new test method, the association experiment, which made him widely known.

Jung sought a starting point, and from his earlier studies in philosophy, it occurred to him that Schopenhauer's conception of the will might give him this starting point. In Schopenhauer, Jung was a definite conception of uncon-
scious elements in human personality, of drives and desires exerting forces "beyond the control of rationality". Jung felt that Schopenhauer held the clue to the problem or at least the means to solve the problem. Jung could not, however, accept his conception, that the will was purely not-rational, or completely without meaning.

The next principle influence on Jung was Edward van Hartmann, whose work Philosophy of the Unconscious was popular at the time. Jung believed that Hartmann's idea of the will was more accurate than Schopenhauer's, and incorporated it into his system. He was also influenced by J. J. Bachofen for his approach and method in treating symbolical material in relation to dreams.

Jung met Freud in 1907, and from then on, became occupied more intensively with the ideas of Psychoanalysis. However, Jung did not agree completely with Freud and criticized Freud's theories in his book The Psychology of the Unconscious, published in 1912. This was the beginning of the eventual departure of Jung from Freudian circles.

After his break with Freud's psychoanalytic school, Jung called his own theories Analytical Psychology and later, Complex Psychology. We will see the points of difference between Freud and Jung later. Richard Wilhelm worked with Jung when he began his research on the philosophic and religious symbolism of the Far East. In later years, from his co-operation with Heinrich Zimmer, and with Karl Kerényi, he produced and edited works in this field.
One of the most important influences on Jung's thought was Friedrich Nietzsche, who in fact, influenced the whole origin and growth of Psychoanalysis. Nietzsche's insanity reminded Jung of the first case he had handled as a psychiatrist, and started him on his research into the causes, cures, etc. of insanity.

Jung like Freud lectured extensively in both Europe and America. In 1948, he founded the Jung Institute for the teaching and perpetuating of his system of "Complex Psychology". Important works of Jung are: Psychological Types, The Psychology of the Unconscious, and Contributions to Analytical Psychology.

C. Alfred Adler, born in 1870, at Vienna, studied medicine and practiced for a time as an eye specialist and later as a psychiatrist. He joined the Freudian school but withdrew about 1912 to found his own school. He felt that Freud over stressed the sexual motives of human thought and behavior and underestimated man's striving for superiority and power.

It is not sure that Adler drew all his ideas from Freudian Psychoanalysis. His association with the Freudian school was only temporary, and after he left it, he retained very few of its theories intact.

Adler, in his "Individual Psychology" as it came to be known, drew his theories on society from F. Tonnies, a popular sociologist of the 18th century.
It seems that Adler was also influenced by Darwin (in Origin of Species), for he talks of the various forms of the tendency to self-preservation to some extent. The term "will to power" which Adler uses comes from Nietzsche so there would also seem to be some influence on his part.

For the most part, Adlerians use terms of popular psychology which at the time have degrees of different meaning in the system of Individual Psychology. Thus, when Adler speaks of a "feeling", he usually means a rational act of some sort, although he does not necessarily mean a free act.

Important and representative works of Adler include: The Practice of Individual Psychology, The Science of Living, and Pattern of Life.

In conclusion, we see that the Psychoanalytic school of psychology developed just as a method or technique for treating mental disorders, and only later became a philosophy. This school as a whole was influenced by the popular philosophy of the time, the development of which we indicated in Part 1. We saw there how the problem of interaction of soul and body was treated from the very beginning of philosophy. We saw also how these various treatments of the subject on the philosophy affected modern psychology and philosophy as well. (2)

Further, we can see that contemporary psychology is the source of much confusion and disorder in our time, which confusion carries over into education, morals, religion and even into economics and politics. This modern view of man,

(2) Vander Veldt and Odenwald, op. cit. P. 142
brought about by the divorce of psychology from philosophy and its marriage to science, brings man to the state of mere animal. Man has been equated to the limited devices of the laboratory and clinic. (3)

It is true, we must not condemn all of psychology because of the errors of a few, but when these errors become the basis for a whole philosophy of life, then condemnation is necessary.

Modern psychology, and in particular Psychoanalysis, has done much good in the line of therapeutics, treatment and investigation, but they have done much harm by overstepping their clinical bounds to become a total philosophy. (4)

As we have seen in Part 1, the cause for the materialistic tone of modern psychology has its roots in the philosophy from Descartes time. This fact will become more evident as we proceed. What we here propose is to show that the philosophy of Psychoanalysis is not a whole outlook on man nor is it the best philosophy just because it is the newest. Thomistic philosophy and in particular, Thomistic psychology still is the best and most complete outlook on man as we have shown in Part 2.

We do not intend to throw out modern advances nor to condemn modern methods in the field of experimental and abnormal psychology. We do hold, however, that research

could be more intelligently carried out if guided by true principles, and its conclusions would be more intelligible if they were interpreted by an adequate, universal outlook on man.

"The philosopher makes his contribution by defining the essence of man, distinguishing his powers, analyzing the nature underlying his habits and acts; the scientist makes his contributions by investigating the phenomenal co-relations among human operations and discovering these by the material and accidental determinants of his habits and powers". (5)

(5) Adler, K. J., op. cit. P. XI.


Evaluation of Psychoanalysis

Among the general public of today there is a tendency to associate psychiatry entirely with Freudian Psychoanalysis. This tendency is obviously erroneous. Freudian Psychoanalysis and Psychoanalysis in general, is but a mere phase, important though it may be, of psychiatry. Included in this tendency is the fact that much of the dislike for Psychoanalysis is carried over to psychiatry as a whole.

Psychiatry is that branch of medicine that is concerned with the discovery and treatment of mental disturbances. People who are mentally disturbed are just as surely sick as those who suffer from cancer, heart diseases or the common cold. Mental disorders range from a full psychosis, which generally demands that the patient be confined to an institution of some sort, to partial disturbances of the mind, usually called psychoneurosis, which can be, and most usually are, treated by the private practitioner. The purpose of psychiatry is an attempt on the part of the physician to heal an upset or distracted mind, or to help a person over a trying emotional experience which could or already has caused certain psychic and/or physical disorders. There is nothing mysterious or magical about psychiatry, it is every bit as scientific as the healing of body disorders. Psychiatry is as old as the human race and "is perhaps most simply exemplified by the picture of a loving father holding
and comforting his sobbing child". (1)

Freudian Psychoanalysis began with Freud's attempts to discover the causes of mental disorders. He, as we have stated, began at first to use hypnotism as a method of discovering their causes, then as he saw the limitations of this method, developed what is called Psychoanalysis, or depth psychology. As far as his method goes it has done much good and has given his contemporaries and later psychiatrists grounds for further development in the discovery, treatment, and cure of mental sickness. Freud's failure lies in his attempt to form a whole philosophy of life based on materialistic premises. (2)

Freud's system of psychology is based on sensistic principles, which, of themselves, include a denial of an incorporeal and subsistent soul or mind. He interprets the higher intellectual processes as emergences from the id, (the source instinctive striving). A theory of this sort brings the highest levels of human achievement down to the dimensions of the material. Freud may be classified as a biological determinist. That is, he proposes the absolute rule of animal impulses in all human conduct. But we hold, on the principles laid down in Part 2, that animal instincts do not represent the whole or even essential picture of man's operations; and the laws that govern his lower powers,

(1) Vander Veldt and Odenwald, op. cit. P. 141 ff.

dependent on matter, are not the same as those which govern his higher powers, not dependent upon matter.

As a materialist, Freud is forced to deny the freedom of the will, since matter and reason or particulars and universals are mutually exclusive. There is no human liberty because there is no intellectual apprehension of good on which to base it.

Jung is forced to the same conclusion on the freedom of the will. Although Jung adopts a different stand on the concept of the libido, he still makes will no more than instinct or a blind drive, he objects, however, to the supremacy of the libido.

Adler's position on the freedom of the will is similar to Freud's and Jung's, but the reasons are somewhat different. For Adler, the basic driving force of human nature is not the libido, but the will to power. This "will" to power is not will in the Thomistic sense of a rational appetite but again a blind drive on instinct, Adler also stresses the fact that the libido or will to power is not supreme.

Now, the position of Aquinas is midway between the extremes of indeterminism and determinism. The will is a rational appetite, that is, it is moved by the knowledge of the intellect. Man has some notion of good in general, such a notion is abstract and universal, it cannot be restricted to here and now, or determined to any one thing. Thus, man is always able to compare the particular good,
which is presented, with his universal concept of goodness.
The judgement of the intellect then, must be indifferent in
regard to such goods. Thus, Psychoanalysis ignores the
freedom of the will and in doing so fails to have a com-
plete picture of man.

Habit, for the Freudian, is part of the instinct
only larger in concept; and like instinct, is determinate
and compulsory in character.

Jung’s position on habit is not clear, however,
we can see a difference between his position and Freud’s.
While Freud’s philosophy is mechanistic, Jung’s is finalis-
tic; thus habit for Jung would be more than blind instinct,
and would include some knowledge of the purpose it serves.

For Aquinas, habit is essentially a product of
reason. Habit is found in man alone, for man alone needs
habit, since nature has provided, from the beginning, the
determinate paths along which the powers of the animal and
plant should operate. Because man’s soul is immaterial,
his intellect and will cannot be determined by particular
objects in the way that the powers of plants and animals
are. The function of the habit is to compensate for this
lack of determination. Thus, due to the basic miscon-
ception of the powers of man, they fail to see the true role
that habit plays in the everyday life of man.

The basis of Psychoanalysis is the existence of
the unconscious. The problem of the unconscious is not
whether there exists a body of unconscious dispositions in
the mind, but whether these unconscious elements can be active in such a way as to influence conscious behavior. For Freud, these unconscious elements are the sole rule of behavior.

Freud, in postulating the unconscious as the sole rule of behavior is guilty of reduction. That is, while an unconscious state does effect our conscious behavior sometimes and to some extent, they are not the sole causes of conscious behavior sometimes and to some extent, they are not the sole causes of conscious behavior. Man is a rational being, as we have shown, and reasons to decide his behavior at least some of the time. There are many other factors also influencing our behavior besides the unconscious animal instinct as Freud would propose. Not least among these are: education, simple choice (free will), obedience and so on. (3)

Jung and Adler would agree, to a certain extent, with the Thomistic concept of the unconscious but only in so far that they say that it is not the sole rule of behavior. They depart from the Thomistic concept of the unconscious to some extent also in that they hold that is is a material or biological thing and not a part of the mind, a spiritual faculty.

Also, basic to Psychoanalysis is the principle that there is constant conflict among various sets of forces, which Freud calls "repression", "resistance", and "trans-

(3) Allers, R., op. cit. PP. 52-79.
ference. The repression is that which has been forced into the unconscious, resistance is the force preventing the repressed from becoming conscious, transference is the breaking down of the resistance so the unconscious can be known.

This constant conflict that Freud speaks of is not an essential part of mental life. As we have seen, the powers of the soul, intellect and will, work in harmony. True, there are times when we do have a conflict within ourselves, but this happens only when we act contrary to our reason or when we do something which we later realize was wrong. This conflict is most often solved and is not as constant and unavoidable as Freud would hold.

The third principle of Psychoanalysis is the dominating influence of sexuality in infants. Freud considered this influence to be most important and taught that it had an extensive effect on later life. He believed also, that it had far-reaching influence in literature, art and religion.

Further, according to Freud, there is a fundamental urge or striving for a goal, this goal being saturated with sex. This sex saturated urge he originally called libido, and later called the id. This sex urge includes, for Freud, a host of feelings not ordinarily connected with sex, but affiliated with the pleasure principle.

This third principle of Freud's is a complete reduction of the manifold factors of the mental life. Freud disregards all the other determinents which go into the
making of man's various actions. Again there is some element of truth in what he says, but his error is the fact that he makes infantile sexuality the sole factor of later mental conflicts. (4)

Since Freud saw that changes in the libido must be produced by something he adopted, some new terms to explain these changes to the force that seemed to impede the entry of the unconscious contents into the conscious, Freud at first gave the name "censor". He later divided the psyche into three departments, the "id", the "ego", and the "superego", each of which influences the others. The "id" is the sum of innate, instinctive strivings, mostly libidinal in nature; it is the primary reserve of energy, motivating the individual to "do what he wants, when he wants". The "ego" is the conscious part of the psyche, the source of conscious thoughts, feelings, and voluntary movements. The "superego" is the new name for what Freud originally called "censor". The "superego" is the watchman of morality, the subjective moral norm. (5)

The diversity of the Psychoanalytic schools can be seen best by the various stands taken on different dominating influences. It was because of these that Jung and Adler broke off from Freud, but the substitutes made for the

sex drive were not much better than the original concept. Jung's "complexes" of inferiority and superiority replaced the sex libido but still were only material urges or instincts. Adler postulated the will to power to replace the sex instinct but again it was but an instinct.

Freud postulated religion as nothing but an escape from conflict or in other words, a projection of the "Father Image". Religious people opposed the Freudian concept of religion and many, turned to Jung and Adler because they are more favorable to religion. Freud had always emphasized, almost to exclusion of everything else, the need for analysis into the past as the basic means of psychiatric treatment. Jung tends to give more weight to present difficulties and the need for a synthesis on the part of the individual. He recognized religion as one means of providing such unity and meaning to a person's life. Religion, therefore, played a more important part in the therapeutic system of Jung than it did in Freud's, still it was regarded as only an instrumental cause. Adler also must be given credit for helping to reconcile psychiatry and religion. His emphasis on individual aims and goals as a means to understand the individual at least leaves room for religious motivations. Rudolf Allers, baptized and interpreted Adler's system in his work *The Psychology of Character*, making it acceptable and beneficial to the religious person.

The brief outline of Freud's explanation of mental disorder, given above, gives a general idea of Freud's position in relation to Thomistic Psychology. We see that Freud attempts to explain all human activity on a purely materialistic basis. From this, we can see several important facts:

1. Although Freud claimed Psychoanalysis was only a method of investigating the unconscious, he presupposed fundamental psychological and philosophical concepts we cannot accept. Among these are his:
   a. Biological determinism.
   b. Gross materialism.
   c. Fallacy of reduction or over-simplification.
2. If Freud's psychological and philosophical postulates are acceptable, then we must accept the conclusions he draws logically from them. We obviously cannot accept Freud's philosophical and psychological assumptions and remain in harmony with the principles laid down in Part 2.

In this brief criticism of Psychoanalysis, we have attempted to show some principal points of difference with Thomistic Psychology. These are by no means all the points of divergence nor have we attempted to go into the merit of the system as a therapeutic method. This would involve a work of much greater size and the material is already well covered in such works as Aller's *New Psychologies*, and *The Successful Error*, Moore's *Dynamic Psychology*, Dalbiez's *Psychoanalytical Method and The Doctrine of Freud*, and
Nuttin's *Psychoanalysis and Personality*.

In conclusion, we can see that Freudian Psychoanalysis actually involves three things, (a) Psychoanalysis is a method of diagnosis and treatment of mental disease, (b) Psychoanalysis is a form of theoretical scientific psychology, sometimes called "depth psychology", or one of the types of "dynamic psychology", and in this aspect, belongs in the realm of experimental psychology, (c) Psychoanalysis as a philosophy of life when it denies the right of other philosophies to postulate theories and to form conclusions about man. It sets itself up as giving the ultimate and final explanation of man in all of his activities.

It is in this third sense that we attack Psychoanalysis for it opposes our principles as laid down in Part 2. Psychoanalytic Philosophy strongly opposes sensationism and associationism as well as all forms of radical immaterialism, to which we must adhere in order to remain in harmony with the principles we have mentioned.

In the psychoanalytic concept, sensory appetency, impulse or desire, is more basic than sensation or any other form of knowledge. We can see how this concept of appetency differs within the Psychoanalytic school itself.

Appetency, the driving force of Freudian Psychology is modified by sensation memory and reason. This reason, for Freud, is the "censor" or "super-ego" as we have mentioned.

Reasoning for Freud is what the Thomist calls "Rationalization" or the practice of attributing to ones
actions reasonable motives, when in fact they flow from desire
and biological drives the libido, etc.

We see then Psychoanalysis as a philosophy has
failed on several important points. First of all and most
basic is its denial of the intellect's power to have objective
knowledge and from this other errors follow. Secondly, it
postulates a subjective norm for moral standards. Thirdly,
it has destroyed man's unity through the apparatus of the
"censor", "id", "super-ego", etc.


(5) VanderVeldt and Odenwald, op. cit.

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(6) *America*, Vol. XCVI, No. 7 (Nov. 17, 1956)
Part 5. Summary and Conclusion

We have attempted to show in this work that modern psychology and psychiatry in particular has been influenced by our opponents to such an extent that the two, modern psychology as a part of philosophy and Psychoanalysis, tend to be identified with one another. We have attempted also to show that this identification is in wrong on the basis of over-simplification.

By tracing the problem of interaction of mind and body from the beginnings of Philosophy, we have attempted to show how the problem came to be in modern psychology with its various ramifications. We saw that the problem is as old as philosophy itself, and will continue to be unless a proper outlook on man's mental life is taken. In Part 2 of our work, we have attempted to show what this proper outlook, this proper psychology should be. The definitions and explanations given have been proven by many great thinkers from Aristotle to Thomas and by the test of time and refuted attack.

Further, we attempted to show the sources of our opponents errors. In this section, we tried also to give a brief insight into our opponents stands and some aspects of the problem of interaction of mind and body. Finally, we attempted to show our opponents chief points of departure from what we held to be a true outlook on the problem. The work is admittedly brief and somewhat sketchy, but we hope it will be of some use to the foreground for further discussion and evaluation.
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