A Critique Of The Moral Doctrine Of Friedrich Wilhelm Nietzsche In The Light Of The Teachings Of The Christian Philosophers

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A CRITIQUE OF THE MORAL DOCTRINE OF
FRIEDRICH WILHELM NIETZSCHE IN THE
LIGHT OF THE TEACHINGS OF THE
CHRISTIAN PHILOSOPHERS

by
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Reverend Achilles Edelenyi, S.T.D.
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INTRODUCTION

The first half of the twentieth century has been a period of world tension and strife in nearly every realm of human activity. Men search for an answer to the problems confronting them at the present time. They ask themselves, "What is wrong with the world today?" "Here, at least, is one thing wrong: supermen, supercorporations, supergovernments, considering themselves "beyond good and evil", immune to criticism and independent of moral codes." Few men today realize that this state of affairs is but a culmination in the social order at present of the philosophy of a man who called himself, 'the first immoralist' Friedrich Wilhelm Nietzsche.

There have been many critics of Nietzsche, but there have been few who have really understood his philosophy. An understanding, however, is necessary, for only those who are aware of Nietzsche's true meaning are able to discern his widespread, yet subtle, influence in today's world. It is only in consideration of this influence that a real need for a well grounded criticism of the foundation of his moral doctrine is manifest.

Most people who read Nietzsche are at first inclined to dismiss him as a madman. Often they are acquainted with him

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only insofar as they remember his philosophy as the official philosophy of the Nazi-Fascist movement during the Second World War. The false notion that his significance was destroyed along with the Nazi movement is all too prevalent - and all too wrong. The Nazi doctrine, insofar as it depended on Nietzsche's philosophy, was only an interpretation - and an incorrect one at that - of what Nietzsche was trying to convey. Taken out of context, Nietzsche's words have been construed as the basis of Nazism, Fascism, and even anti-Semitism. Taken in relation to his total meaning, however, they signify none of these things, but rather they express something which is more harmful to the minds of men. Even those who have dismissed Nietzsche as a madman, when they are forced to face the reality of modern times and the condition of the world today, cannot refuse to admit that "...he was, and still remains after death, an amazingly influential madman."\(^1\)

To say that Nietzsche was wrong, and then to dismiss his whole philosophy as a falsehood is neither prudent nor is it correct. That Nietzsche was wrong is evident, but to say that no truth whatsoever resides in his doctrine is an insult to human intelligence. The fact that so many men have been convinced by his erroneous teachings, the fact that they have been so utterly deceived by his subtle analysis of culture and morality, all these testify that men must at least see some glimpse of the truth in what Nietzsche has to say. Their inability to distinguish truth from falsity, however, has brought about their

\(^1\)Gillis, op. cit., p. 86.
own deception. Through the course of history philosophy has been man's guide in the search for truth. Some have fallen into error by their own refusal to acknowledge the Truth which has confronted them in this search. Many others, as is often the case of those who follow Nietzsche, have glimpsed the truth of some particular philosophy only in a superficial way, and have been led, through a distortion of this truth, into error. This thesis then, is an attempt to discern truth from falsity in Nietzsche's Moral Doctrine, thereby to present the false in the light of the true in order that men might benefit from the latter, and not be deceived by the former.

In order to accomplish this purpose we must analyze and criticize the Moral Doctrine of Nietzsche by some standard which is true. It is for this reason that we choose the Christian philosophers as our standard, and even here we have chosen only those who have expressed a moral doctrine which is in accord with reality, and which can be proven to be true, and furthermore, only those who have definitely touched on those matters, in their moral teachings, which are pertinent to this particular critique.

It must be noted here too that Nietzsche attacked morality on two levels, the theological as well as the philosophical. In the background and explanation of the moral problem we must take the theological element into consideration in presenting Nietzsche's attack on Christianity and Christian culture. The Moral Doctrine itself, however, which is the basis for this critique will be evaluated and discussed only in terms of a strictly philosophy treatment.
It is important to point out here that, although the moral problem is precisely our object of criticism, Nietzsche's Revaluation of Morals is necessarily bound up with metaphysical and epistemological problems as well. It is evident then that in the analysis of the Moral Doctrine we must not disregard these underlying metaphysical and epistemological elements which are essential to the understanding of this problem. It is necessary therefore to analyze and criticize these elements insofar as they form the foundation of the Moral Doctrine, and to do so in the light of the corresponding phases of the teachings of the Christian philosophers. It is for this reason that we speak of Christian philosophers, and not, in a restricted sense, of Christian moral philosophers alone.

It is necessary too, to point out the distinction between Christian philosophers and Christian Philosophy. Although this matter will be treated in more detail later, it is important to keep the following facts in mind as we begin. We must realize that we are not criticizing Nietzsche in the light of Christianity, as the term 'Christian Philosophy' would seem to indicate. What we are doing, however, is evaluating Nietzsche's Doctrine in the light of the moral teaching of philosophers who are Christian, not primarily because of the fact that they are Christians, but more important in a strictly philosophical sense, because of the fact that their teachings are true.

The purpose of any critique should not be exclusively that of a destructive nature, but should be of such a type, especially in this instance, that it will not only point out the
falsehoods, but will retain the truth therein discovered, and will enable man to discern more easily one from the other. The practical, as well as the theoretical value of a critique on Nietzsche's Moral Doctrine is based on the fact that first of all - Nietzsche needs correction (which is evident) and secondly, "...so does the world which has inherited his strident criticism."¹ With this in mind, let us proceed to meet Friedrich Nietzsche and "...a mind that rejects miracles and at the same time welcomes myths; a mind which while denying the only true God, feels the need to create gods for itself."²


CHAPTER I

NIETZCHE: THE ATHEIST HUMANIST

HIS LIFE, AND HIS PURPOSE

There is no such thing as philosophy in a vacuum. In other words - the philosophical doctrine of any philosopher in the history of thought represents not only the author's intellectual activity, but also, by its very presentation, it reflects his temperament and personality, as well as the age and culture in which he lived. This is especially true of Nietzsche, for without an understanding of his life, the age in which he lived, and his reaction against the cultural atmosphere of his day, the Moral Doctrine which he proposed is almost completely unintelligible in its true sense.

It is easy to label him as an immoralsit, an atheist, a nihilist. In each of these labels there is an element of truth, but none of them would provide a valid clue to the man or his thought. It is only when they are taken in terms of his set purpose and in terms of his own life that they can be applied.\(^1\)

If any title is to be given to Nietzsche in respect to his approach to the philosophical problems which he treated, it is that of "Atheistic Humanist". In order to fully understand Nietzsche's position in this regard, for "Nietzsche

is the philosophical apex of this whole mode of thought.\(^1\), we must follow the trend of this thought in its historical sequence. Thus we will see Nietzsche in his role as the culmination of Atheistic Humanism personified in its full meaning.

With the beginning of the Renaissance in about the first decade of the sixteenth century, a new attitude grew up in the civilization and culture of Western Europe. This attitude, 'humanism', was the result of a revival of interest in the ancient classics of Greece and Rome. These works of the pre-Christian era emphasized and extolled the purely human qualities of man as man. A unique synthesis took place, therefore, when these ideas were projected into a Christian society in which the dignity of man depended on his relationship and his likeness (in a spiritual sense) to a Transcendent God. The humanistic attitude, which emphasized the purely human elements, rather than the divine elements, in man's nature, came into conflict with the Christian concept of man and his dignity. Many, it is true, were able to reconcile the two attitudes, but others - unwilling to admit any dependence of man on a Transcendent God, at first sought to avoid the problem by dismissing God as irrelevant. They soon realized, however, that they had neither avoided nor solved the problem.

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The problem posed was a human problem - it was the human problem - and the solution which is being given to it is one that claims to be positive. Man is getting rid of God in order to regain possession of the human greatness which, it seems to him, is being unwarrantably withheld by another. In God he is overthrowing an obstacle in order to gain his freedom.\(^1\)

Humanism, for many then, took on a new form - that of atheism. This new atheism "... is not so much atheism in the strict sense of the word, as antitheism, or, more precisely, antichristianism."\(^2\) We can see this force present and growing in the tendencies of modern philosophy. Even Kant, although not denying God's existence, at least denied that any knowledge of Him was possible on a purely theoretical level. This attitude soon found a more radical expression in the positivistic atheism of Compte, and finally, "We reach a climax when, at the beginning of this present century, we encounter Nietzsche, and hear his terrible, now famous cry: "God is dead."\(^3\) Here then is the story of the herald of the death of God!

The life of Nietzsche is so closely interwoven with the course which his philosophy took, that it serves as an indispensable aid in its comprehension. We do not, of course, by any means, attempt to explain Nietzsche's philosophy solely in terms of his life. His life is only an element, although a very important element, influencing his

\(^1\) de Lubac, op. cit., p. 6.
\(^2\) Ibid., p. v.
\(^3\) Lombardi, op. cit., p. 5.
philosophy in respect to its content, as well as its direction.

It is dangerous to dismiss what a philosopher says in terms of his biography, but one cannot help looking into the life of this tempestuous poet for the source of some of the tempests, and the course these tempests took.¹

Friedrich Wilhelm Nietzsche was born in Rocken in Prussian Saxony on October 15, 1844, the first child of a Lutheran pastor. He was named in honor of the King of Prussia, Friedrich Wilhelm IV, who was the royal patron of Nietzsche's father. When Nietzsche was four years old, his father, a musician as well as a scholar, suffered a fall and died shortly afterwards. Nietzsche then moved to Naumburg with his mother and younger sister, Elizabeth, who was later to become responsible, through her editing of her brother's works, for a great deal of misconception concerning Nietzsche's thought at the present time. In Naumburg he lived with his grandmother, two maiden aunts, his mother, and his sister. His home life was characterized by strict discipline, and the religious atmosphere which prevailed - coupled with the fact that his grandfather and great grandfather, as well as his father, had all been clergymen, led him - even at this early age - to desire such a profession himself. As a child his solemn countenance and love of solitude earned him the name, 'the little pastor'. Little did those who observed him as a child realize that in less than a century, the 'little pastor' would be known throughout the world as one of the most bitter foes of Christianity and its foundations in the history

of Europe. Little did they know that even then the seeds of atheism were beginning to make themselves felt in Nietzsche's young mind. Although later on in life, Nietzsche asserted that he was an atheist by instinct, nevertheless,

He identified the instinct in question as the feeling of hubris or rebellious pride, which overcame him whenever he was told that one must accept God and must not call His existence into question. This very statement explained perhaps far more than Nietzsche realized - for it is possible that this instinct or rebellious pride was, in fact, a psychological reaction, originating in his home life as a boy, against the strict religious domination by his feminine relatives. This theory is also upheld by the fact that Nietzsche's first outward sign of atheism was his refusal to attend Easter communion services with his family in 1865, as though trying to show them at last he was free from their strict religious domination at last. In 1854 young Nietzsche entered the gymnasium at Naumburg, and in 1858 Frau Nietzsche was offered a scholarship for her son at the famous school of Pforta, which was only about five miles from Naumburg. Nietzsche spent six years here, during which time his ability in Greek, German, and Latin became evident, and thus the basis for his career in philology was being established; but, even more important, he became interested in the study of scripture and the ancient Greek classics, the knowledge of which is evident in his philosophical writings. It was at Pforta that he became a close

friend of Paul Deussen, who later became a professor at the University of Kiel and a famous Orientalist. In October of 1864, he went with Deussen to the University of Bonn, where he failed in an attempt to join in student activities, and his attempt to reform student societies ended only in his complete alienation from the student body. His inability in such instances to get along with people plagued him throughout his life. His own words echo the loneliness which he experienced as a result of this fault. "...: 'a profound man needs friends, unless indeed he has a God. And I have neither God nor friend.'

After his break with the other students, Nietzsche devoted himself to the study of philology under his favorite professor, Ritschl. When Ritschl went to the University of Leipzig in 1865 Nietzsche followed him there.

Here he came under the influence that was to shape his whole literary career. Chancing one day at a bookshop on a copy of The World as Will and Representation he heard, as it were, a daemon whispering in his ear: "Take the book home with you". This was his Tolle, lege; the message had found him.2

Thus his acquaintance with the great voluntaristic pessimist, Arthur Schopenhauer, had been made. Although later Nietzsche was to deny many of Schopenhauer's philosophical principles, nevertheless, Schopenhauer's influence on Nietzsche, the philosopher, is such that it cannot be overlooked, and will

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be taken up in greater detail later in this chapter. At Leipzig he also met Erwin Rhode, who later became famous for his study of the Greek notion of the psyche. Both Nietzsche and Rhode became deeply influenced by the pre-Christian Greek genius. By this time Nietzsche had become a pronounced atheist. It was here at Leipzig, too, that Nietzsche was to meet the man who, perhaps more than any other, was to be idol of Nietzsche's admiration, and later - the object of his sharpest criticism, Richard Wagner.

In 1867 Nietzsche was called into the Prussian Army, but suffered a severe fall, which, along with other ailments, was to cause him untold suffering throughout his life. He returned to Leipzig and continued his philology studies, writing some brilliant philological papers which he had published in the Rheinisches Museum. The authorities at the University of Bale in Switzerland were impressed by these essays, and they wrote to Ritschl in order to ascertain whether Nietzsche could be safely entrusted with the Chair of Philology. A short time later Nietzsche was accepted for this position on the recommendation of Ritschl. Nietzsche, therefore, only twenty-four years of age at that time, took over the Chair of Classical Philology at the University of Basel in 1869 and began teaching Greek. While at Basel, Nietzsche spent much of his time at the villa of Tribschen on the lake of the Four Cantons, where Richard and Cosima Wagner were living in seclusion. During this time a deep friendship grew up between the two men, a friendship such as Nietzsche had long sought in vain, until he
had met Wagener. The dissolution of their friendship which was to take place some years later must have been one of the most bitter disappointments in Nietzsche's life.

The desire for friendship, the need to love and to be loved, to be on 'intimate' terms of understanding, remained ever strong in Nietzsche, and the increasing loneliness of his later years was contributory to the final breakdown.¹

Nietzsche was to remain here at Basel for ten years, except for a brief time which he spent in the Franco-Prussian War. He had taken a leave of absence from Basel and served in the ambulance corps of the German Army. He contracted dysentery and diphtheria from the soldiers and was released from the service. He returned to Basel, but he was never able to fully recover his health. The frequent headaches and periods of extreme physical weakness, not only brought on his final madness more swiftly, but also influenced his philosophy of the Superman. He seemed to predicate of his Superman the bodily health and strength which he had longed for - and thereby had attained it at least in his philosophical ideal, if not in his physical nature. "Superman then will be the Highest example of yea-saying, of positive affirmation of life, in regard to both mind and body."²

Nietzsche's philosophical development can be divided into three definite phases, and it was here at Basel that he entered upon the first phase. This was the "...period

²Ibid., p. 84.
in which the geniuses, men like Wagner and Schopenhauer are held up to honor - the period of The Birth of Tragedy and Thoughts Out of Season."¹ During this time, up until 1878, Nietzsche is deeply influenced by the spell of Wagner's music and by the pessimism of Schopenhauer. His famous work, The Birth of Tragedy from the Spirit of Music, published in 1872, extols Wagner's opera as the reincarnation of Greek genius. In this work, written more from the viewpoint of a poet than from that of a philologist, "... he delineated his humanistic ideal as a synthesis of Dionysus and Apollo, turbulent energy and calm measure."² (Later, Nietzsche was to predicate the characteristics of both in terms of his Dionysian Superman.) Because of its poetic nature it was sharply criticized by Wilamowitz-Moellendorf, but Rhodes came to Nietzsche's defense and replied to the criticism with a pamphlet of his own. Nietzsche next produced Untimely Considerations (1873-1876) in which he treats, in one of the four main divisions, of "Schopenhauer as Educator," and here we see the influence of Schopenhauer taking hold of Nietzsche. Although much of what Nietzsche says of Schopenhauer here is actually the result of Nietzsche positing his own meaning into Schopenhauer's work - we see the element of pessimism enveloping Nietzsche, and here also, we see Nietzsche accepting Schopenhauer's position regarding the priority of the will to the intellect. Thus the foundation

²Collins, op. cit. p. 775.
of Nietzsche's "Will to Power" was laid. Here too, in the section regarding "Richard Wagner in Bayreuth", we see the beginnings of his break with Wagner, whom he felt "...was becoming a symbol of German chauvinism and racism, both of which Nietzsche had come to detest."¹

The second period of Nietzsche's philosophy began in 1878, and was to extend until about 1883. This is the period of questioning, of criticizing, an intellectual period of doubting in which Nietzsche's positivistic tendencies developed. During this period the logical value becomes supreme for Nietzsche. His changing attitude toward Wagner and his notion of, and contempt for Christian morality began to acquire a definite form in Human, All too Human, The Dawn of the Day, and The Gay Science (which appeared between 1878-1882).

In 1879, Nietzsche was forced to resign from the University of Basel because of ill health.

The next decade of his life was marked by an endless search for health at Swiss and Italian watering places, by a steady stream of literary production, by increasing loneliness and alienation from old friends, and by the final abyss of madness.²

His vain travels in search of a respite from the physical ills which beset him, took him to Naples, Engadine, Marienbad, Naumburg, Genoa, and Rome. Nevertheless, despite the discomforts of physical ills and the distractions of travel, Nietzsche's mind was slowly becoming conscious of its own thought. Thus,

²Collins, op. cit., p. 775.
in 1884, Nietzsche emerged on the third, and by far the most important phase of his philosophy, in which he stands as an independent philosopher interested primarily in ethical problems. It is during this period that Nietzsche definitely formulates the Moral Doctrine with which we are specifically concerned. His sister, Elizabeth, who had been closest to him up until 1884, had at that time, married and moved away, adding to the loneliness which Nietzsche was now experiencing more acutely. It is important too, in connection with this incident, to point out that Nietzsche himself had protested this marriage, not so much from the viewpoint of his own loss in terms of companionship - but more significant - because of the fact that Herr Forster, whom Elizabeth married, was anti-Semitic, an attitude which Nietzsche, despite the claims of the Nazis to the contrary, violently opposed.

Does he not say in the Genealogy of Morals, 'Maxim: To associate with no man who takes any part in the mendacious race swindle'? And Nietzsche was a constant opponent of anti-Semitism.¹

In June of 1884, Nietzsche met Baron Heinrich von Stein in Switzerland. In Stein, Nietzsche felt that he had at last found someone who would not only prove to be a friend, but also, one who would understand and appreciate the real significance of his philosophical ideals. Unfortunately for Nietzsche, Stein died an early death, and Nietzsche's hope of ever finding a true disciple of his cause died with him.

During the period from 1883 to 1885 Nietzsche had been

¹Copleston, op. cit., p. 107.
working at intervals on his greatest achievement, *Thus Spoke Zarathustra*. Finally completed in 1885, it embodied in a rather strange aphoristic style - at times resembling that of scripture (which Nietzsche had studied so ardently in his youth) - the main doctrines of his philosophy. Here we see the doctrine of the Superman, the cyclical recurrence, the Will to Power, and especially important to this study - the aristocratic moral concept, echoed by the prophet of the new order, Zarathustra, the herald of the 'Death of God'.

Was Nietzsche aware of what he had done - of what evil lay in the teaching which he had brought forth from the mouth of Zarathustra? From two of Nietzsche's own statements we see the answer, and we see a certain facet of his personality which is absent from most of his works, but which lay buried deep within his mind, haunting him to the point of insanity. In 1881, Nietzsche had written to his friend, Peter Gast,

> Whatever I may happen to say of Christianity, I cannot forget that I owe to it the best experience of my spiritual life; and I hope never to be ungrateful to it at the bottom of my heart.¹

But now we see an ungrateful Nietzsche, intent on destroying that to which he himself has admitted owing so much. In 1885, shortly after the completion of *Zarathustra*, he met the astronomer, Leberecht Tempel, in Florence. Concerning Tempel Nietzsche said, "I wish that this man had never known my books. He is too sensible, too good. I shall harm him."² Who is it that speaks thus? Is this the Nietzsche who so loudly pro-

¹Nietzsche, quoted by Copleston, op. cit. p. 6.
²Ibid. p. 21.
claimed the 'Death of God' in the triumphant tones of the Super-
erman - or is it rather a lonely man - frightened at the thought
of the depths, rather than the heights, to which this creature
of his own imagination would carry him?

Nietzsche's ethical position was explained in more detail
in Beyond Good and Evil in 1886, and in Toward a Geneology of
Morals in 1887, but already his mind, wearied by a futile, al-
though ardent attempt to reject the Truth, and his body, racked
by the tortures of long years of suffering, were beginning to
betray their possessor. In 1886 Nietzsche had visited his old
schoolmate and friend, Rhode, at Leipzig, but it proved to be
an unhappy meeting for both - and they parted with a contempt
for one another which nearly rivaled their early friendship in
intensity. Now, in 1887, Nietzsche after long years of trying
to 'save' mankind and human dignity, could only summarize the
years with this statement, "I have forty-three years behind
me...and am alone as if I were a child."¹

His last group of works clearly exemplify traits of the
madness which were slowly enveloping his mind; his Nietzsche
Contra Wagner, The Wagner Case, and The Twilight of the
Idols are all embodiments of his distorted animosity toward
the man whom he had once called his best friend. His fan-
atical mission against Christianity was exemplified in The
Anti-Christ, and even more vehemently in his auto-biography,
Ecce Homo. This last work is definitely the work of an ab-
normal mind, and in the beginning of January, 1889, he went

completely mad. Up until this time the general public had taken little notice of Nietzsche's works, but only a year before this, the well known critic, Brandes, had begun to offer lectures on Nietzsche in Copenhagen. As a result, less than a year later Nietzsche's fame had spread rapidly, but Nietzsche, who by this time had become completely insane, was never to know just how successful his life work had been. Brandes himself received an incoherent note, one of the few strange messages written by the mad Nietzsche after his breakdown, which read, "Friend George, - Since you have discovered me, it is not wonderful to find me; what is now difficult is to lose me."¹ This note, although written by a madman, has a message from Nietzsche to the world, for surely the world has had difficulty in losing Nietzsche and in escaping from the results of his madness.

From 1889 until his death less than a year later, Nietzsche remained insane, and was at first confined in an asylum, and later at the home of his sister, where he died on August 25, 1900. "The tragic and lonely spirit of Friedrich Nietzsche had gone forth to its Maker, whom it denied."² "Such is the Tragedy of Friedrich Nietzsche, in whom the world gained perhaps a great writer and a goad to its conscience, but in whom the world lost what it might otherwise have gained (had Nietzsche so willed) - a true guide and friend."³ The voice of that one who had proclaimed the death of Him Who had for all eternity.

¹Nietzsche, quoted by More, op. cit., p. 154
²Copleston, op. cit., p. 5.
³Ibid., p. 205.
ordained his own, was now still.

Before delving deeper in Nietzsche's true meaning, it is important to keep in mind the fact that the writings of Nietzsche, which were edited by his sister, Elizabeth Förster-Nietzsche, were in many instances altered by her in accordance with her own nationalistic and anti-Semitic views. His sister hindered, therefore, rather than aided the true concept of his writings in respect to these attitudes.

Another important factor which cannot be overlooked is the precise relationship to and influence upon Nietzsche by two men, who were, more than any others, responsible for certain important trends in his philosophy. They are; Arthur Schopenhauer, the voluntaristic pessimist, and Charles Darwin, the evolutionist.

As we pointed out previously, Nietzsche's first contact with Schopenhauer's *World as Will and Representation*. Strangely enough, the immediate note which stood out in Nietzsche's mind after reading the book, was not the doctrine of the Will, which was later to be one of the main preoccupations of Nietzsche's work, but it was rather - the 'Atheism' of Schopenhauer. In this light, the voluntarism and pesimism which motivated Schopenhauer's philosophy took on a new and delightful meaning to the young Nietzsche. This was the beginning of Nietzsche's philosophical career.

Rebel as he might in later years against Schopenhauer's pessimistic doctrine of blind meaningless will; try as he might to construct a positive doctrine out of that
blank negation, he never got the poison out of his blood. In regard to some basic philosophical points, Nietzsche and Schopenhauer were in complete agreement.

Nietzsche agreed with Schopenhauer and other German idealists in rejecting the notion of a material substratum, or things-in-themselves underlying phenomena, and with Schopenhauer in relegating intellect and reason to a position subordinate to that of the will. In respect to the latter point, however, the agreement ends here.

He agrees with Schopenhauer that the will constitutes the essential nature of the real, although the will is no longer a noumenal backdrop for Nietzsche, but is only the dynamic aspect of the "appearances." While Schopenhauer interprets the cosmic dynamism as essentially 'the will to live', Nietzsche maintains that Schopenhauer's will, of its very nature, turns against itself in an act of ascetic denial or renunciation - which Nietzsche refers to in disdain as 'anti-vitalistic'. Nietzsche requires something more of his conception of will; he demands that it posses a nature which is 'yea-saying' to life, a cosmic will which is always affirming itself. Under the influence of Schopenhauer, too, Nietzsche

...found the clue to the "birth of tragedy" among the ancient Greeks in the distinction between the "Dionysian and the "Apollonian" - two conceptions which reflect the notion of the world as will and idea respectively.

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1 More, op. cit., p. 149.
3 Collins, op. cit., p. 779.
Nietzsche thus explained that his Will to Power was a form of 'overcoming one's self', and he "...expressed this in the synthesis between Dionysian power and Apollonian measure or constraint of intelligence." Nietzsche thus identified this synthesis as a concrete exemplification of the term "Dionysian" alone, which he applied to the Superman. Although Nietzsche differs with Schopenhauer on many points, it cannot be denied that Schopenhauer's influence is apparent in many instances in the doctrines of Nietzsche.

That there is a gulf between Schopenhauer and Nietzsche is undeniable, for the one preaches resignation, the other defiance, the one conformity, denial, asceticism, the other rebellion, affirmation, strength, and action; but the same vision is common to both, the vision of the 'irrationality of things.'

In speaking of the Will to Power, we pointed out that Nietzsche had, in this concept, given Darwin's notion of the evolutionary struggle for existence a new significance. Just how greatly and in what manner Darwin influenced Nietzsche in this regard is important.

Charles Darwin had published his famous work, *The Origin of the Species by Means of Natural Selection* in 1859, when Nietzsche was yet a young boy. Because of the widespread popularity of this epoch making work the minds of many were greatly influenced, but the influence of this work on Nietzsche curiously took on both a negative and a positive aspect.

In a negative sense, Nietzsche did not find any great

1Collins, *op. cit.*, p. 800.
2Copleston, *op. cit.*, p. 158.
hope of progress in Darwin's theory of evolution as such. He felt that Darwin's theory, which tended to erase any essential distinction between man and the animal would also eventually undermine the very basis of man's dignity, the very thing which Nietzsche was trying to prevent. Nietzsche himself, "...spoke of his own view as 'anti-Darwin', and he meant by that that he substituted the struggle for Power in place of the struggle for Existence."¹ Despite this conscious rejection of Darwinism, Nietzsche was influenced in a positive way by Darwin insofar as...

...in the unconscious he was fascinated and obsessed by Darwin's notions of the "struggle for existence" and the "survival of the fittest". His "Blond Beast" is only the logical culmination of those discredited features of the Darwinian hypothesis.²

Although it has been stated that "...there is nothing in Darwinism itself, apart from all preconceived philosophical interpretations, which compels a Nietzschean ethics."³, nevertheless, it remains a fact that, not Darwinism considered in itself, but rather - the effect which it produced on the scientifically minded age, tended to shake the belief of many in the supernatural aspect of man's existence, and even in its faith in divine revelation and the revealing God. In this light Nietzsche was influenced in a very real way. In view of this denial of the existence of God in the minds of men, Nietzsche sees a corresponding nihilism on the part of men, a nihilism

¹Copleston, op. cit. p. 80.
²Gillis, op. cit., p. 85.
from which Nietzsche sought to save them. Nietzsche expresses his fear when he says,

...the destiny of Europe lies even in this - that in losing the fear of man, we have also lost the hope in man, yea, the will to be man. The sight of man now fatigues. - What is present day Nihilism if it is not that? We are tired of man.¹

Nietzsche therefore believed that he must construct a whole new system of values, a naturalistic morality without supernatural sanction, in order to preserve the spread of an attitude of complete nihilism, which would otherwise logically follow. This, in turn, involves a more detailed analysis of Nietzsche's purpose.

In regard to Nietzsche's most famous work, Thus Spoke Zarathustra, we can readily point out that, "Its purpose is to destroy morality."² But - what morality? It is precisely the morality of the Christian culture in which he lived that Nietzsche sought so vehemently to overthrow. Nietzsche maintained that Christian ethics, representing slave morality, embodied a life-denying principle that was destroying man's dignity.

The present European standards are those of the slaves, and Nietzsche even affirms that they have become such largely through a deliberate plot of the Jews, at the beginning of the Christian era, to revenge themselves upon their Aryan conquerors by foisting upon them an ignoble standard of worth."³

In regard to the concept of a Transcendent God, Nietzsche felt that not God, but only the idea of God existed. In other

¹Copleston, op. cit., p. 44.
²Gillis, op. cit., p. 87.
³Dolson, loc. cit., p. 343.
words God had not created man, but rather man, in his own mind, had created God. When Nietzsche, through Zarathustra, cries out that "God is dead" he is referring here to the idea of God, for he denied the reality. Thus Nietzsche felt that since this belief in God had become dead in the minds of men, then Christian morality no longer had any meaning.

"...but do not be so stupid as to imagine that Christian morality can stand without the basis of the Christian religion, or that natural morality is independent of a Transcendental Foundation".¹

"The real significance of loss of faith in God is cultural nihilism and the downfall of all values."² Since there is no longer any objective moral standard, for the only absolute standard is based on the idea of the Christian God, which has no meaning now that the idea of God no longer exists for men, then men are urged to strive themselves to establish a completely immanent voluntaristic system of goals and values. The true man, the superman, must transcend the 'morality of the herd' and go 'beyond good and evil'.

"It is true that Nietzsche did not aim at robbing the herd of their religion, but in trying to 'set free' potential disciples from the 'shackles' of religion and morality he shows himself as a man who had said, "Evil, be thou my Good".³

In order to make it possible for the Ubermensch (superman) to achieve his goal - Nietzsche had to bring about a complete revaluation of morals, which is the subject of the next chapter.

¹Collins, op. cit., p. 789.
²Copleston, op. cit., p. 88.
³Ibid., p. viii.
NIETZSCHE'S REVALUATION OF MORALS

If we are to understand Nietzsche's approach to the revaluation of the morality of Christian Culture, it is necessary to know in just what sense Nietzsche may be termed a moral philosopher.

If a moral philosopher be taken to mean a man who presupposes or enunciates an absolute system of ethics, then, of course, Nietzsche is not a moral philosopher in the sense—he summons us 'Beyond Good and Evil'—but if a moral philosopher be taken to include a man who has a doctrine about morality and moral values, then he certainly is a moral philosopher.1

Although there are those who would deny that Nietzsche actually constructed a philosophical system, but rather would maintain that he was not a system thinker, but a problem thinker, nevertheless—the fact remains that, at least in respect to his moral doctrine, we can discern a certain system or logical procedure. Let us then consider the basic philosophical elements which constitute the foundation for this revaluation of morals.

In the philosophy of Immanuel Kant, less than a century before the time of Nietzsche, the emphasis was placed on the phenomena or appearances, rather than on the noumena or things-in-themselves, which Kant considered unknowable, at least in

1Copleston, op. cit., p. 29.
the order of pure reason on the purely speculative level. In
Nietzsche's philosophy we see that the world of phenomena has
become a focal point, whereas the world of noumena has been
completely excluded and denied. Men, according to Nietzsche,
have tried to set up some absolute standard to which the world
of appearances can be compared in order to discern the 'real'
and the 'unreal'.

And in this way the world has become to be divided into
a real world and a seeming world, and the world of
change, becoming, plurality, and opposition, was dis­
credited and calumniated. The real world was called
a world of semblance, a mere appearance, a false
world; and the fictitious supersensible world of per­
manence, the false world, was enthroned as the true
world.¹

Nietzsche therefore denies not only the knowledge, but also
the very existence, of any noumena or substance behind the
appearances of things. In his own words, "...there is no
such substratum, there is no 'being' behind doing, working,
becoming; 'the doer' is a mere appendage to the action. The
action is everything."² Nietzsche's philosophy of fieristic
monism thus makes the aspect of 'becoming', the only real thing.
Nietzsche, although he offers arguments for his thesis of 'be­
coming', never succeeds in proving it.

His metaphysical monism of becoming holds a logi­
cal priority over the psychological and moral ar­
guments advanced in its favor. The latter man con­
tain many brilliant and sensitive observations, but
they are philosophically decisive only on condition

¹Thilly-Wood, op. cit., p. 506
Horace B. Samuel, Vol. 13 of The Complete Works of Friedrich
Nietzsche, ed. Dr. Oscar Levy, (Edinburgh and London: T.N.
Poulis, 13 and 15 Frederick Street, 1913) P. 46.
that one already accepts Nietzsche's metaphysical
description of the real world.¹

Nietzsche's description of the world of becoming, with the
view that"...the Real is a complex of energies, activities,
and tensions"² necessarily excludes the need for positing
a transcendental metaphysics in order to explain its cause or
its existence. For Nietzsche - the metaphysical explanation
of the world is immanent in the world itself. "The ultimacy
of becoming, as a character or descriptive fact of the world,
was converted into an ontological ultimacy, belonging to an
autonomous dynamic principle."³ By this very description,
the existence of, as well as the need for, a Transcendent God
is emphatically denied. Nietzsche is left only with the idea
of God, created by the minds of men out of fear. God, then,
becomes for Nietzsche - not a theological problem, but a
purely philosophical and psychological concept. Nietzsche
then deals with this idea of God by proclaiming the death of
this idea in the minds of men, but, "The God whose death
Nietzsche proclaimed and desired is not only the God of meta-
physics, but very definitely, the Christian God."⁴ If Nietzsche
is to overthrow morality, then the reality, and even the idea
of a Transcendent God who is its author must first be destroyed.
Nietzsche realized that Christian morality could no longer
exist once its foundation in a transcendent God was eliminated.

¹Collins, op. cit., p. 786.
²Fuller - McMurrin, op. cit., p. 453.
³Collins, op. cit., p. 785.
⁴de Lubac, op. cit., p. 63.
Now that Nietzsche, at least in his own mind, has eliminated Truth, what has he to offer in its place? Universal truth as the object of man's intellect does not exist for Nietzsche. "Besides, Nietzsche goes on to tell us, there is no such thing as universal truth. The propositions which have been offered to us as such are errors." The reason for Nietzsche's attitude is explained in part by the following fact; In his philosophy, the will has priority over the intellect, and therefore the question for Nietzsche is not that of the Truth, but of the 'good'. Yet, even in this case, with the denial of a Transcendent God - 'Good' in the sense of the morality of Christian culture no longer has any meaning for Nietzsche. He therefore attempts to posit his own object of the will in accordance with the concept of his voluntaristic dynamism. In fact "...the whole of Nietzsche's philosophy often seems an attempt to answer the question as to the nature of the chief good." For Nietzsche then, this good must be the goal, the purpose, and the motivating force, which will cause the superman to transcend his environment and to attain the extramoral realm. Therefore Nietzsche maintains that, "Power and power alone is the good."  

An absolute moral law therefore has no meaning in Nietzsche's moral doctrine. For him it is only a fantasy in the

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3. Ibid.
minds of those who cannot face life, but tend to flee from it and to find refuge in their cowardness behind the mask of religious myth.

There is supposed to be a transcendent realm of absolute truth, eternal value, and perfect being, which provides a standard for our knowledge and conduct. But this leads to a flight from the real world of becoming. Hence a philosophy of pure becoming must eliminate the absolute truth, along with the idea of God.1

Here again we see the influence of Schopenhauer. Nietzsche, instead of trying to discover the truth of absolute morality and the Transcendent God on which it depends, is content, if not over eager, to accept Schopenhauer's interpretation, or rather distortion, of it. "Philosophy was no game for Nietzsche, but an earnest and passionate struggle, motivated by the firm resolve to shut his eyes to the truth."2 In the case of his eagerness to accept Schopenhauer's idea of God and the idea of an absolute moral doctrine as 'life denying principles', Nietzsche betrays his own blindness to anything but those things which will further his own preconceived notions.

Nietzsche will admit particular truths, but only in a pragmatic and relative sense. In his Genealogy of Morals he emphatically states, "To talk of intrinsic right and intrinsic wrong is absolutely nonsensical;..."3 But if there is no standard of absolute truth, what then of morality and ethical

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1 Collins, op. cit., p. 787.
2 Copleston, op. cit. p. 209.
conduct? If there is a transvaluaton - what new standard of value is to replace the absolute? For Nietzsche, "Value and power are the same; conduct, personality, and moral codes are valuable only insofar as they promote power."¹

If Nietzsche hopes to destroy truth as an absolute, and hopes to deny the meaning of intrinsic right and wrong, then he also necessarily, in the process, destroys the very meaning of conscience in man.

For Nietzsche, the entire apparatus of conscience must be rejected. Fixed rules violate the principle of flux, and commands divorced from the power-formula imply a source acceptable only to a transcendental metaphysics.²

Since Nietzsche absolutely denies any such thing as a transcendental metaphysics - the significance of this statement is clear. Nietzsche has now, in his own mind at least, destroyed all restraints, both external (God and Absolute Truth) and internal (Conscience), which in any way contain life denying elements. The superman is now free to say "Yes" to life by means of the Will to Power.

By removing the meaning of God and morality from life Nietzsche hopes to create a vacuum which will seem capable of being filled only by the significance which the Will to Power can supply. "The cosmos as such is a chaos of becoming, but man can will to make it intelligible, to construct concepts,

²Ibid.
and thus to endow experience with meaning and value.\textsuperscript{1} With this introductory explanation of the fundamental concepts underlying Nietzsche's approach to the question of morality, let us now proceed to the study of the Revaluation which he proposes.

Now that the idea of God has been destroyed, all that remains for the 'first immoralist' is to complete his relatively easy task of destroying the structure which it supported, for the entire morality of Christian culture is dependent on God as its author and its foundation. With the supernatural destroyed, Nietzsche must now look to the natural human level and examine historically what he posits as the purely natural origins of all morality.

Nietzsche's revaluation is intended to renaturalize the moral problem, and render it concrete by showing that moralities are many, and that moral concepts are evolutionary products of our egoistic drives.\textsuperscript{2}

Nietzsche believed that moral systems had evolved from man's attempt to establish some norm or some standard which would embrace and stabilize this constant flux in a world of becoming, at least for them, in order that this world might have a meaning for man, and man, in turn, might judge his own meaning in relation to it.

Moral ideals, like all other concepts are born from human efforts to stabilize the stream of becoming, which is intrinsically homogeneous and undifferentiated. Man tries to introduce moral distinctions

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{1}Collins, \textit{op. cit.}, p. 789
\item \textsuperscript{2}Ibid., p. 791.
\end{itemize}
into the chaotic flow of emotions and desires, which comprise the practical analogue to the matter of sensation.¹

In attempting this historical analysis of morals, Nietzsche proposes to treat those events and circumstances which have in fact and in time contributed to the moral system which oppressed Europe during his own lifetime. However, just as his metaphysics of becoming is attested to by arguments which have validity only if that which he is attempting to prove has already been assumed, so also in respect to his analysis here. Although he refers to it as historical, it is actually a psychological evaluation, and not any historical study in the true sense of the word. What Nietzsche actually does is to begin with a definite preconceived notion regarding the values and origins of all moral concepts, and then he attempts to construe historical circumstances and events in such a way that he can thereby evaluate these circumstances in terms of the preconceived attitude which he holds in regard to them. Instead of attempting to derive the truth through an objective analysis of the historical facts, Nietzsche is rather attempting to analyze history in an effort to discover incidents which can, with the proper 'misrepresentation', be utilized in 'proving' his own thesis. He had, in his own metaphysics, destroyed the foundation of morality, and now since he cannot find a suitable explanation from the objective facts of history he must posit his own meaning and interpretation into historical facts, denying their very meaning in the objective order.

¹Collins, op. cit., p. 791.
Nietzsche's ardent desire to overthrow the existing morality through this method was such that it even caused him to present the moral history of the premoral period. Since the premoral period is actually, for Nietzsche, the whole era of human prehistory, then the very terms 'history' and 'moral', when predicated of this era, are actually contradictions.

By a curious logical inversion Nietzsche, having begun with the idea of the superman and the will to power distinguishes three periods of history: the premoral period, during which action was valued from consequences; the moral period, during which action is valued by intention; the ultramoral period, during which action will be valued by something surmounting moral intention . . . . The fact that the last is an ideal state to be achieved does not worry Nietzsche. But perhaps it is unfair to criticize Nietzsche from the point of view of logical correctness, since logic, and the truth which it serves, are values of the herd with which he cannot be bothered.¹

Nietzsche thus distinguishes three periods of moral evolution in history, the premoral and the moral pertaining to that morality which he is attempting to overthrow, and the extramoral, the realm of the superman, the realm beyond good and evil, which he is trying to achieve.

The first period, the premoral period, is, as we have pointed out, the prehistorical period. Undaunted by this most important fact, Nietzsche begins to explain it from an historic viewpoint in respect to the origins of our moral laws. Nietzsche here applies the evolutionary ideas of Darwin to the moral order and conceives of the ultimate origin of morals in customs or mores which are only particular

¹Denecke, op. cit., p. 135.
utilitarian standards set up in accordance with local customs on account of the necessity for survival. Here Nietzsche is not only influenced by Darwin, but he also anticipates the later pragmatists, such as William James, who identify the 'true' with the 'useful'. At this time then, he maintains that, "Actions are evaluated solely in terms of their useful or harmful consequences, rather than in terms of their origin or motive."\(^1\) The element of survival, so prominent in Darwin's theories, is a predominant factor for Nietzsche in the establishment of premoral rules of conduct, which are founded in accordance with those actions which are necessary for survival. As generation upon generation handed down these habits of conformity, there gradually developed a fixed set of these customs or mores which through time acquired a venerable character which seemed to require of itself a bond of obligatory observance on the part of men. Thus, says Nietzsche, the idea of moral obligation resulted.

The binding force of moral commands comes not from the content of the mores, but from their venerable character, from the sacredness which they acquire after ages of successful guidance of community life.\(^2\)

Nietzsche now moves into the moral realm, where he begins his attack on the Judaeo-Christian concept of morality, but first he distinguishes between two types of morality to which all morality is reducible in this early period, slave morality and master morality.

\(^1\)Collins, \textit{op. cit.}, p. 793.
\(^2\)Ibid.
In speaking of slave morality Nietzsche refers to the moral code of those slaves in the Roman Empire who had adopted Christianity. The basis for this morality lies, says Nietzsche, in the principle of resentment, which characterizes the Jewish race.

The revolt of the slaves in morals begins in the very principle of resentment becoming creative and giving birth to values -- a resentment experienced by creatures who, deprived as they are of the proper outlet of action, are forced to find their compensation in an imaginary revenge.\(^1\)

Nietzsche's hatred of Christianity and of Christian morals is centered about this idea of resentment which he associates with them.

Such ethics is founded on the resentment the weak feel at any exhibition of powers they themselves do not possess. It is designed to keep the strong and the superior under their thumb and at their level. In fact it was invented by the down trodden Jews, who had in some way to compensate for their inability to withstand their enemies, and could imagine none better than that of calling them bad names and pretending to themselves that the superior qualities of their conquerors were sinful.\(^2\)

Nietzsche maintains that the weak and cowardly Jews were unable to defend themselves against their more powerful enemies by physical force. As a result -- in order to compensate for this inability on their part to withstand these enemies -- they sought, by means of a moral doctrine under a religious guise, to bring about a new standard of worth, according to which they, and not their Aryan superiors, would hold the

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dominant position. They therefore disguised their own weaknesses by means of the term 'virtue', and therefore these virtues are nothing more than 'external masks' behind which the hatred of those who dare not be anything else but weak, hides in envy. They predicated the term 'virtue' of weakness - and it became 'meekness'; since they were powerless of themselves to exact revenge on their conquerors, they called this impotency 'forgiveness'; they were unable to rid themselves of the burdens inflicted upon them by their Aryan conquerors - and so, unable to act, they called this passiveness 'patience'; "Instead of perfecting oneself, which would involve hardness against oneself, one 'flees' to one's neighbor 'and would fain make a virtue of that!'"1 and thus they speak of Charity and 'love', and yet they dream of a hell and of a Vengeful God, "Vengeance is mine; I will repay, saith the Lord" (Romans 12:19).

Christian morality, therefore, according to Nietzsche, was only a continuation and development of this morality which was conceived by the Jews in order to deceive the world. These same moral standards were adopted by the slaves of the Roman Empire as Christianity began to spread in the early centuries. Nietzsche therefore refers to 'slaves morality' in this sense, or in a somewhat more general sense, to the 'morality of the masses', both terms meaning about the same and both being in contrast to 'master morality' or what he sometimes refers to as 'aristocratic or noble morality'.

1Thilly - Wood, op. cit., p. 505.
What sets off the moral from the premoral age is its emphasis upon conscious motivations (and not merely upon practical consequences), as the source of the worth of actions. But the motives are viewed differently, according to one's position in society.¹

Slave morality, according to Nietzsche, is essentially a reaction, and the master morality and its standards are the object of this reaction. Although slave morality distinguishes between good and evil, Nietzsche maintains that the primary emphasis for them is upon the aspect of evil (Bose), for their primary purpose is not so much to make themselves morally better, but rather—to make these aristocrats appear worse. This, says Nietzsche, is in accordance with the underlying motivating force of the slave morality—resentment. Christianity therefore serves as a perfect instrument of expression for the morality of the masses and its decadent and envious life denying principles.

The contrary is the case when we come to the aristocrats' system of values: it acts and grows spontaneously; it merely seeks its antithesis in order to pronounce a more grateful and exultant 'yes' to its own self;—its negative conception, 'low', 'vulgar', 'bad', is merely a pale late born foil in comparison with its positive and fundamental conception (saturated as it is with life and passion), of 'we aristocrats, we good ones, we beautiful ones, we happy ones'.²

In Nietzsche's own words then, we are made aware of the striking dichotomy which existed, according to him, between slave morality and master morality. The aristocrats create their own morality. They need no moral standard against which they

¹Collins, op. cit., p. 793.
must first react. Their first impulse is a spontaneous 'Yea saying' to life. They equate good with those traits - nobility, power, beauty, which characterize themselves. In contrast to the idea of good, the aristocrats speak, not of evil, but of 'worthless' (schlect), and they predicate this term of the plebeian masses. "Whatever serves to maintain the masters in power is denominated good, whereas anything that threatens their interests is bad."¹ The emphasis, however, for the aristocrats is not upon the negative aspect, as it is for the slaves, but upon the good or affirmative aspect in accordance with their characteristic 'Yea saying' toward life and the will to power.

The 'master morality' then, for Nietzsche, represents the evolutionary trend upward toward the extramoral realm which Nietzsche is ultimately seeking, while slave morality represents the downward life denying tendency which Nietzsche feels can result only in complete nihilism. The morality which Nietzsche is trying to overthrow is precisely the morality of the herd. We note therefore that Nietzsche's definition of morality; "Morality is the idiosyncracy of decedants, actuated by a desire to avenge themselves with success upon life."² applies not to master morality, but rather to this herd or slave morality. "In Nietzsche's eyes morality expresses the will to power of the herd; it is quite distinct from the master - morality, the expression of the will to power of the

¹Collins, op. cit., p. 794.
²Nietzsche, quoted by Copleston, op. cit., p. 100.
higher man, the noble type." The trend of the culture of Europe at the time of Nietzsche, however, he felt, was such that the herd morality was becoming dominant to the extent that the resulting mediocrity which necessarily accompanied it was destroying the vitality of Europe. It was no longer possible for the superman to emerge. The effects of this slave morality — through the agency of Christianity and its twofold secularized offspring, socialism and humanitarian democracy, were such that even the 'noble ones' were constrained by the chains, forged by the weak and decadent, from bursting forth into the extramoral realm — there to establish their own morality and ethical values. "The masters have been done away with; the morality of the vulgar man has triumphed." For Nietzsche, this state of affairs can never remain static, but — because of the life denying tendencies inherent in the morality of the herd, there can only be a perpetual retrogression into nihilism and the complete downfall of human dignity. But this human dignity is precisely that which Nietzsche is trying to preserve, and thus he must rescue man from this fate, and therefore he, "...demands a return to the master-morality. This is the meaning of his summons to man to go forth 'beyond good and evil'." But — and this is very important — he does not demand the abolition


3Copleston, op. cit., p. 93.
of herd morality. He demands the return of master morality, not as the only moral value, but rather as the predominant and triumphant morality, and it can do so only if the morality of the herd remains in an inferior position in order that those who are bound by this herd law might be used as instruments of the supermen who are thereby striving to achieve their goal beyond good and evil. Nietzsche therefore calls for the return, not only of the master morality, but he demands a return to the double standard, one for the herd - the other for the superman.

The goal is not 'uniformity of morals' for all men but a 'graduation of rank among types of morality'. The masses cannot partake in the strength and independence of the few, but this only means that the standards of the flock should not be imposed upon the geniuses among us.¹

Obviously Nietzsche's own ethics are diametrically opposed to the morality of the herd, but on the other hand, it also differs, although not nearly as much, from the master morality. In the first place - this master morality is only an upward trend toward what Nietzsche is hoping to achieve, namely the 'break through' into the extramoral realm. Secondly, "It differs from 'master morality' by vehemently condemning any such disregard for less favored human beings as one finds, for example, in the treatment of the outcasts in the Law of Manu."²

In this instance Nietzsche maintains a unique position. On the one hand - he criticizes Christianity and the moral virtue of

¹Collins, op. cit., p. 796.

²Thilly - Wood, op. cit., p. 505.
pity for those who are less favored - and he calls this 'weakness'. On the other hand, he condemns the Law of Manu in its harsh treatment of those who are poor outcasts of society.

How then can Nietzsche reconcile these two viewpoints in his own philosophy? He does this by predicking the 'hard virtues' of the superman. These are the 'warrior virtues', which differ greatly from the virtues of the moral teachings of Christianity. They are the 'hard qualities' of endurance, strength, harshness, self discipline, and suspicion, which are necessary for the true superman in order that he might rise above the herd. The superman then, with this overabundance of vitalistic power stemming from the possession of these virtues, naturally - in this abundance - aids others who are less fortunate, not out of pity or love (as the Christians call it), but rather as an almost necessary consequence of this joyful yea saying attitude toward life.

The ultimate goal of Nietzsche's revaluation of morals is the Superman for whom he has created this extra moral realm beyond good and evil.

\[\text{Man is a rope stretched between the animal and the Superman - a rope over an abyss...Lo, I teach you the Superman! The Superman is the meaning of the earth. Let your will say: The Superman shall be the meaning of the earth.}^1\]

The Superman is one who wills to accept the doctrine of the Cyclical Recurrence of all things. Nietzsche conceived of

the universe as infinite in time, but containing a finite number of dynamic atoms or 'power quanta'. These 'power quanta', containing a finite of energy and acting in a limited space, can result in only a limited or finite number of different combinations; therefore, the particular configurations in this system must occur over and over again in an endless process. Thus there is an endless repetition, an eternal recurrence, of the same series of events. The Superman is one who joyfully accepts this state of affairs and who finds the whole meaning of life and the significance of his Will to Power in it.

It is this will to make an eternal recurrence one's chosen significance for the cosmos, which makes the doctrine the crucible for testing the authentic will-to-power and the coming of the Superman.¹

Now that Nietzsche has created the extramoral realm for the Superman, where he will be free from all the moral restraints of the herd and where he can create his own moral values beyond good and evil, he finds that he is left with this idea of the eternal recurrence as the only 'joyful wisdom' in a godless world. Nietzsche has destroyed the idea of God and has left the world only a cosmological myth of the eternal recurrence to replace Him.

Personal unhappiness and frustration, and impatience with a world he despised, led Nietzsche to evolve his Superman, 'beyond good and evil', beyond you and me, beyond himself.²

¹Collins, op. cit., p. 803.
In seeking to preserve man's dignity, he has destroyed the very foundations on which it depends. His "...doctrine of the superman is philosophy gone mad."\(^1\) Nietzsche has failed in his purpose, and therefore we must return to the true morality - a morality founded on a God as the Author of Eternal Truth.

The philosophy of a morality without God has been proved to rest on nothing: baseless appeals, empty exhortations, ...monotonous flatness. Let God, therefore, return!\(^2\)

Let us now turn to the teachings of the Christian philosophers wherein we can discover God and the true morality, and whereby we can evaluate and criticize Nietzsche's moral doctrine in respect to it.

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CHAPTER III

THE CHRISTIAN PHILOSOPHERS CONTRA NIETZSCHE

The standard by which we are to evaluate and criticize Nietzsche's Moral Doctrine must of necessity be founded on a true basis and must arrive at true conclusions concerning human morality through the use of pure reason. For this reason we have chosen the teachings of the Christian philosophers as our standard. Before proceeding to the analysis itself we must make a distinction which is essential to this entire criticism, namely - the distinction between the Christian philosophers and the term 'Christian Philosophy'. Considered per se, that is, in its essence, philosophy to the extent that its nature is fully realized must be the same for all men at all times and all places. In this strict sense there cannot be a Christian philosophy any more than there can be a Christian mathematics or a Christian grammar, for philosophy as such, in its pure nature, is the work of reason alone.1

In regard to the Christian philosophers, however, we must note the following important fact,

Philosophy is in fact formulated by living men who are part of an age and environment which they cannot help but reflect - if only in their choice of problems - in their philosophizing.2

2Ibid.
For this Critique we have chosen four of the Christian philosophers as representatives of the true moral doctrine: St. Augustine, who represents the pre-scholastic school, St. Thomas Aquinas, who is the greatest representative of scholastic philosophy; and Jacques Maritain and Etienne Gilson, who represent the moral teaching of today. We do not choose these particular philosophers because they each represent a different moral teaching among themselves, for morality is a universal and eternal norm which is founded ultimately on the Essence of God and is therefore immutable. There are, however, two reasons for our choice of these particular Christian philosophers. First - Their philosophical teachings regarding the material pertinent to our critique represent, not only the purely philosophical basis of Christianity, but - because of this - they are precisely the philosophical foundations which Nietzsche attempted to destroy through his Revaluation. It is therefore important to be able to refute Nietzsche on this level, and not only refute, but be able to criticize his attack by means of that very Truth which he sought to deny and destroy. Secondly - Those philosophers were chosen, not only in view of the fact that in these particular matters their philosophical views are in accordance with, and - as in the case of St. Thomas - to a large extent, express the philosophical basis of Christian moral teaching - but also - and even more important here, their teachings on these particular points are in accordance with reality and truth - which is the essential element of philosophy; for it remains a fact,
That no matter what its conditions of formation or exercise within the individual philosopher, the worth of any philosophy depends when all is said and done upon its truth, the firmness with which it is based on rational evidence, and the rigor with which it demonstrates its conclusions...¹

If the work of any philosopher, Christian or otherwise, does not measure up to that standard which the essence of philosophy itself requires, then - to that extent - it is a decadent philosophy.

Our space does not permit, nor does our purpose require that we explain individually the complete moral teaching of each of the Christian philosophers. Our main purpose, however, is to criticize and evaluate Nietzsche's moral doctrine, and therefore we must limit the explanation of the teachings of these philosophers to that material which is specifically pertinent to those corresponding (or rather contradictory) elements in Nietzsche's philosophy of morals. Furthermore - although the moral teachings of each of these Christian philosophers are in complete agreement with one another in respect to the essential elements which comprise the true moral doctrine, nevertheless, each of these men, because of the various influences upon them in regard to the time and circumstances in which they wrote, and because of the particular phase of the moral doctrine under attack in that era, naturally will emphasize different points in the moral teaching according to their purpose. St. Augustine, as we know, was primarily interested in establishing the proof that the ultimate foundation of the moral law is in the Essence

¹Sullivan, op. cit., p. 263.
of God, and in showing that we - as rational creatures - have a moral obligation toward the Eternal Law established by our Creator. St. Thomas, while also treating this matter in a more elaborate and systematic fashion proper to the scholastics, makes an extensive study of the moral virtues and, in the application of the metaphysical doctrine of Aristotle concerning the four causes, to the moral order, explains that God is both the Efficient and Final Cause of the moral law which binds all men. These two philosophers thereby establish a firm basis for the true moral concept, while the contemporary Christian philosophers, such as Maritain and Gilson are faced with the task of defending the basic foundations of morality against such recent attacks as that of Nietzsche by means of the principles expressed by these early philosophers, and of clarifying the moral position of the Christian philosophers today in opposition to these false theories.

We begin then by considering the ultimate foundation of the moral law - God Himself. Nietzsche not only denied God 'by instinct (hubris)', but he even offered three 'proofs' for the validity of this denial. First; Historically - he maintains that the idea of God originated in fear and not in any rational conclusions concerning His actual existence, therefore this idea of God is non-rational. Second; He argues that, since the world is a self sufficient world of becoming in itself, then it needs no cause outside itself to explain its existence or its 'perpetual motion of becoming'. Third; He uses a type of dysteleological argument in which he maintains that the world about us is
full of evil and suffering and therefore we cannot say that there
is an all-good God who created such a world. In investigating
these arguments we become aware that, rather than proving Niet-
zsche's moral position in respect to the denial of any found-
ation in an existing God, they are actually themselves founded
on Nietzsche's hypothesis of a self-sufficient world of becoming,
an assumption which Nietzsche never actually proves. Here then
is the argument of the Christian philosophers against Nietzsche's
threefold denial of God's existence.

First, in respect to Nietzsche's contention that belief in
God has only a non-rational basis and is therefore, in itself,
non-rational, St. Augustine argues;

Such is the power of the true Godhead that it cannot
be altogether and utterly hidden from the rational
creature once he makes use of his reason. For with
the exception of a few in whom nature is excessively
depraved, - the whole human race confesses God to be
the author of the world.\(^1\)

In the writings of St. Thomas we also find arguments and proofs
for God's existence which definitely establish the fact that
man's belief in God's existence is not based on emotional non-
rational myth, but that it can be demonstrated and proven
through reason. "Yet from every effect the existence of a cause
can be clearly demonstrated, and so we can demonstrate the ex-
istence of God from His effects."\(^2\) St. Thomas later offers

\(^1\)St. Augustine, *De Doctrina Christiana*, 1,7,7, quoted by
Frederick Copleston, S.J.; *A History of Philosophy*, Vol. 11,

\(^2\)St. Thomas Aquina, *Summa Theologica*, 1, q.2 a.2 con-
tained in *An Introduction to St. Thomas*, ed. Anton C. Pegis,
five main proofs, based on objective evidence and following the basic rules of reasoning, whereby we can establish the fact that God does exist. The first proof for God's existence - the proof from motion - is especially appropriate for arguing against the second phase of Nietzsche's denial, wherein Nietzsche posits a self-sufficient world of becoming, which needs no cause outside of itself to explain it. St. Thomas begins by considering the fact that it is obvious to us that there is motion and change in the world. (Nietzsche himself would not only admit this - but he even overemphasizes it in his own philosophy). St. Thomas however then proceeds from this common ground to argue directly against Nietzsche's position. St. Thomas' proof is based on his doctrine of Act and Potency, and here - in its application to motion - he defines motion as the reduction of a thing from potentiality to actuality. He points out, however, that nothing can be reduced from potency to act except by a being already in act. His argument from motion in its constituent elements is,

...whatever is moved must be moved by another. If that by which it is moved be itself moved, then this also must needs be moved by another and that by another again. But this cannot go on to infinity, because then there would be no first mover, and, consequently, no other mover seeing that subsequent movers move only inasmuch as they are moved by the first mover; ...Therefore it is necessary to arrive at a first mover, moved by no other; and this everyone understands to be God.¹

The final argument of Nietzsche involves one of the most

¹St. Thomas, Summa Theologica, 1, q.2, a.3, contained in An Introduction to St. Thomas, p. 25.
perplexing problems in philosophy - the problem of evil. Nietzsche maintains that an all-good God could not be the cause of the evil in this world - and in this point Nietzsche is correct insofar as God can in no way be the direct cause of evil. He errs, however, when he falsely concludes that God therefore could not be the cause of the world in which this evil is found. An explanation of the nature of evil and its types will clarify the problem and will point out Nietzsche's error.

Jacques Maritain (1882 - ) in his lecture, St. Thomas and the Problem of Evil points out a basic fact concerning the nature of evil,

With regard to the metaphysics of evil, St. Thomas appropriates and develops the great themes made classical by St. Augustine: evil is neither an essence nor a nature nor a form nor an act of being - evil is an absence of being; it is not a mere negation, but a privation: the privation of a good that should be in a thing.\(^1\)

The teachings of the Christian philosophers concerning evil in respect to God’s causality, based on the works of St. Augustine and St. Thomas may be summarized as follows;

Evil is a privation in a being and not a positive reality. We cannot therefore explain evil by a positive cause as we can explain being, for being is a positive effect whereas evil is not. Since evil, by its very nature, is a privation of a good, we must therefore find the answer in these finite beings themselves.

All creatures, because they are finite and contain potentiality, are capable of failing to actualize their full measure of proper good. From this failure arises evil.¹

God cannot be the direct cause of physical evil (suffering, sickness, etc.) because he creates being and all being is good insofar as it is being. He is however the indirect cause insofar as he creates finite beings which themselves are capable of falling short of their full goodness or perfection, since they are finite. God, however, can in no way whatsoever be the cause of moral evil. God can only permit moral evil. If He were to permit no moral evil he would thereby have to deny free will in man, for moral evil exists only in the free will of a rational finite being who has gone contrary to the moral law. God does, however, produce good from both physical evil and moral evil.

"Because of the good that He brings from it God permits the evil to occur."² Nietzsche thus errs when he argues that an all good God could not have created our world. The instance of evil in the world does not contradict God's divine plan of order in the universe, for all things are ultimately ordained to result in the good which God wills in some form, despite physical and even moral evil.

Now that we have 'reestablished' proof of God's existence in opposition to Nietzsche's contention, we proceed logically to the next important point in morality - Eternal Truth and an


²Ibid., p. 612.
 Immutable Moral Law. Nietzsche maintains that there is no such thing as Absolute Truth. He argues that men posit absolute truth in another realm opposite the ever changing sensible world of the here and now; thus the emphasis is placed on this 'other world standard', and the real world, the sensible world, loses all its value. Nietzsche will admit only particular truths and even in regard to them he takes only a relative or pragmatic view.

In opposition to Nietzsche's view here, we might begin by pointing out that, although Nietzsche protested violently against the idea of an absolute in any form whatsoever, including absolute truth or an absolute moral law, nevertheless, he himself actually posited an absolute realm of becoming when he expressed his 'Law of Cyclical Recurrence.'

In willing that the meaning of the cosmos be nothing other than the great ring of becoming itself, one thereby 'absolutizes time'. 'Eternity' is given in the joyful moment when one wills the eternal recurrence, since an absolutized time is the same as eternity. And this belief also satisfies the search after stable being.\(^1\)

Thus Nietzsche, although denying absolute truth, has, in this instance at least, violated his own position by positing an absolute law of eternal cyclical becoming. St. Augustine, in treating the proofs concerning the existence of God, uses one proof which is also pertinent in our study of Eternal Immutable Truth. He begins by arguing from introspection that the mind does apprehend some truths which it must acknowledge as necessary and changeless, for there are truths which the mind can

\(^1\) Collins, op. cit., p. 803.
neither constitute nor amend. If these truths were inferior to
the mind, the mind could amend or change them; on the other
hand, if they were equal to the mind and of the same character
as the mind, they themselves would be changeable, as is the
mind. "Hence if truth is neither inferior nor equal to our
minds, nothing remains but that it should be superior and more
excellent." Augustine then goes on to explain that this eter­
nal truth is but a reflection of the Essence of God, who is the
foundation of all truth. We can readily perceive that it fol­
lows therefore that truth, founded in the immutable Essence of
God, is also immutable and absolute. There is therefore such
a thing as absolute truth. Furthermore, we argue against
Nietzsche's contention that this idea of absolute truth sets up
an 'other world standard' which robs this world of its signifi­
cance. St. Thomas points out that truth is transcendental,
both the truth of things and the truth of thought, each in its
own particular manner.

The truth of things is convertible with being by pre­
diction and in respect to substance; ...The truth of
thought, or of an intellect, on the other hand, is
convertible with being, not in respect to the substance
of the intellect, but in respect to its agreement with
a thing.2

Both the truth of things and the truth of thought therefore,
since they are convertible (but not synonymous) with being,
are transcendental. By this very fact then, this truth, rather
than robbing this world of its significance, is - in fact -

1St. Augustine, De gratia et libero arbitrio ad Valentinum,
quoted by Copleston, A History of Philosophy, Vol. 11, p. 68.
2Benignus, op. cit., p. 374.
that by which this world has a significance for us, for truth is precisely the conformity of our mind with being. It is Nietzsche himself, who by denying transcendental truth and by denying any 'being' behind appearances, has robbed this world of its significance, for he has destroyed the very relationship which constitutes our true knowledge of the world.

Contrary to the Nietzsche's position, the Christian philosophers maintain that there is an ultimate eternal truth and an eternal law based on the essence of God, in which the moral law is founded. St. Thomas says, "Accordingly, the eternal law is nothing else than the exemplar of divine wisdom, as directing all actions and movements."¹

Just as Nietzsche, having once dismissed God and Eternal Truth as non existent, thereby 'destroying' the foundation of the morality of Christian culture, was able to replace this morality with his own doctrine, so also, we, after having proven that Nietzsche's denial is false and unfounded, and after having offered conclusive arguments, based on reason and expressed by the Christian philosophers, that God does exist and that there is an Absolute Truth and an eternal moral law, can now proceed from this foundation to criticize and destroy Nietzsche's doctrine and to 'restore' the true morality which he denied.

The first phase of the Moral Doctrine itself is what Nietzsche refers to as the 'premoral era'. He maintains that

¹St. Thomas, Summa Theologica, I-II, q.xciii, a.1, contained in An Introduction to St. Thomas, p. 629.
prehistoric period man evaluated their actions solely in terms of their useful or harmful consequences, rather than in terms of any inner motive based on a reasonable recognition of the moral law of right and wrong. He maintains that a norm of morality is consequent rather than antecedent to men's actions, and that moral codes are only the result of utility and products of man's struggle for survival.

Our first reply to Nietzsche would be to point out that he seems to have a great deal of historical knowledge concerning prehistoric times, a contradiction in itself. He cannot even base his hypothesis on the unchangeable essential nature of all men in all ages, for he denies any stability anywhere in the world, and his own doctrine of constant change leaves him without any basis in respect to this argument.

In order to provide an answer to this phase of Nietzsche's doctrine we turn to Jacques Maritain once more. Concerning Maritain's relative contribution in respect to moral philosophy it is stated that,

What work he has done has been more in the nature of clarification than of addition; but it is just this clarification on a number of points often misunderstood that makes it worth while to study him.1

Here especially this statement is true. Maritain, in accordance with the teachings of St. Augustine and St. Thomas, does maintain that man's nature (or his essence) is immutable and that the moral standard has been and will always be essentially

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the same for all men.

Against the ethical relativists who would confuse moral principles with customs and mores, Maritain maintains with uncompromising firmness that 'there are objective norms of morality, there are duties and rules, because the measure of reason is the formal constitutive element of human morality,' and this measure of reason is the same for all men.¹

The natural moral law, therefore, which is founded on the Eternal Law, can be known by all men at all times by the light of reason. Gilson explains that,

While manifold in its specific determinations, the law of nature is one with the oneness of the primary precept, which we have said contains all others, and it is one also from the fact that it is the same for all. This is why natural rights are the same for all people... The principles of the natural law are the same in all countries and among all peoples...²

Nietzsche, in accordance with his pragmatic view toward particular truths, applies this view to moral values and endows them with this same pragmatic character. Nietzsche's doctrine of the supremacy of the will to the intellect leads him to this pragmatic error, for in a theory of truth such as pragmatism teaches, the will becomes more related to thought and to truth than the intellect itself. For the pragmatist, truth is not an absolute objective norm, but rather something in the order of action, for truth, according to the pragmatists, can be recognized as such only when it is tested as a principle of action. Nietzsche has thus confused the proper object of the intellect.

¹Fecher, op. cit., p. 191.

with that of the will, for as a pragmatist, he places truth more
in the realm of willing rather than in its proper realm, that of
knowing.

The Christian philosophers, having based their arguments on
the fact that there is a natural moral law by which all men at
all times can know the general command, "Do good and avoid evil",
through natural reason, have thus disproved Nietzsche's conten­
tion regarding the origin of morals. Nietzsche's argument, on
the other hand is not only unfounded historically, but it is it­
self undermined, as we have pointed out, by his doctrine of con­
stant change. Because of his position in regard to constant
flux or change in the world, Nietzsche deprives himself of the
opportunity of arguing from the essential oneness and unchange­
ableness of human nature, which at least could have given him
some insight into the actions of men in this prehistoric per­
iod on which he could base his hypothesis concerning the origin
of morals.

We arrive now at the consideration of Nietzsche's moral
realm. Since he denies one moral law which governs all men,
and since he refuses to acknowledge that all men are essentially
equal, he naturally posits a hierarchy of morality, one for the
masses and one for the select few.

In his eagerness to justify his doctrine of the
superman as self-legislator of moral values, he
erects surmises of what 'might' have occurred, in
the development of moral conscience, into a dia­
lectical pattern of what 'did' occur. Opposing
views of morality are disposed of, simply by being
ranked in a rigid hierarchy of vital values,
and by being saddled with all the objectional features found in present-day society.¹

Nietzsche made morality dependent upon one's position in society and not upon the natural law found in the nature of every man. St. Thomas, however, who holds — contrary to Nietzsche — that men are essentially equal and that there is an objective moral norm which does not differ according to the social order (as Nietzsche asserts), maintains the following view,

"The proximate rule for the acts of the will is the human reason; the supreme rule is the eternal law and the will of God that it gives expression to. The moral act derives its quality from its agreement or non-agreement with some norm. This norm and rule is derived ultimately from God and is expressed in the 'lex aeterna.'²"

In regard to this twofold division of morals, let us begin by considering Nietzsche's hypothesis concerning herd morality. Nietzsche claimed that the basis for slave morality lay in the resentment of the Jews which was expressed in the subtle form of a new morality which predicated virtue of weakness, and which was transmitted to the world by the Christian culture which absorbed it. Again Nietzsche has taken an historic circumstance out of context and has interpreted it in such a way that it furthers his own theory, without ever considering the objectivity of that fact itself. Nietzsche maintains that, historically, the Jews were conquered by their Aryan 'superiors', and thus, this attitude of resentment and its consequence — herd

¹Collins, op. cit., p. 797.

morality - sprang up. If Nietzsche were to examine the facts more closely, he would find that the concept of morality was antecedent to, rather than consequent of, the Aryan conquest. Nietzsche's argument is therefore not only historically unfounded, but it is chronologically incorrect. Furthermore, in connection with this idea of the development of herd morality we argue against Nietzsche's attack on the concept of morality and virtue expressed by the Christian culture. Nietzsche's attack on the 'Christian ascetic ideal' is not an attack on Christianity itself, as Nietzsche would have us believe, but it is rather, an attack on the concept of this ideal as expressed by Schopenhauer, which, if Nietzsche had taken time out to investigate - he would have found it to correspond in no way to the true Christian teaching. Nietzsche does not go to the writings of the Christian philosophers themselves, such as St. Thomas and St. Augustine, in order to discover exactly what they teach concerning morality and virtue, but he is content (and even over anxious) to accept the distorted views of secondary sources regarding these facts, ...and yet Nietzsche dares to affirm that this is an 'historical argument'. In regard to the idea of virtue Nietzsche also errs, for he regards his own subjective description of the virtues as a fact rather than examining the objective facts themselves. St. Thomas maintains that a virtue is a morally good habit that makes both the person and his works good, and which perfects the faculties of man's soul - intellect and will. The virtues proper to the moral order of Christianity were not, as Nietzsche would lead us to believe, originated
and developed as means whereby the resentful Jews and early Christians sought to disguise their weakness and their hatred for their Aryan conquerors in their plot to overthrow their masters. The definition which St. Thomas accepts and defends concerning virtue can in no way be in accordance with Nietzsche's view that the virtue proper to the moral doctrine of Christianity is for an evil purpose, namely the overthrow of the master morality and the destruction of their Aryan conquerors, on account of hatred and resentment. St. Thomas' view concerning virtue is that by its very nature its direction toward good is so essential that there is no possibility of its abuse. This definition, "Virtue is a good quality of the mind by which we live righteously, of which no one can make bad use, which God works in us without us," of which Thomas says, "This definition comprises perfectly the whole essential nature of virtue." necessarily denies Nietzsche's whole argument. The fact that 'virtue is a perfection' argues against Nietzsche's assertion that all of Christian or herd morality is opposed to perfection, and is essentially a life-denying morality.

Hence Nietzsche's proof of the egoistic source of all morality and the antagonism of Christianity to the dignity of man is theoretically oversimplified and historically unfounded.

On the other hand it is Nietzsche himself who is antago-

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2St. Thomas, Summa Theologica, 1-11, q. 55, a. 4, contained in Pegis, An Introduction to St. Thomas Aquinas, p. 563.

3Collins, op. cit., p. 798.
-nistic to the dignity of man, for in his doctrine of master morality the dignity of the many is to be suppressed in order that the dignity of the few might be enhanced. The Christian philosophers, however, assert that human dignity stems from man's very nature, and therefore all men possess this dignity equally. Human dignity is not restricted to a few privileged individuals as Nietzsche would have us believe. Nietzsche would suppress the dignity of the herd for the advantage of the aristocrats, thus he defects his own purpose, for he destroys the very dignity in man which he sought to preserve.

We come at last to the extra-moral realm, the realm which Nietzsche posited for the activity of the superman, the realm beyond good and evil. The purpose of Nietzsche's whole revaluation of morals was to achieve this realm beyond morality - a realm where the Superman would be free to determine his own standards in accordance with his 'will to power'. St. Thomas however would oppose Nietzsche here, not only in respect to the concept of the Eternal Moral Law and the natural moral law, which no created finite being can change or transcend, but specifically in respect to the idea of a "willed act" being beyond good and evil, for he says,

And every individual act must needs have some circumstance that makes it good or evil, at least in respect of the intention of the end... Consequently, every human act that proceeds from deliberate reason, if it be considered in the individual, must be good or evil.1

There is no realm, therefore, beyond good and evil. Men's acts

1St. Thomas, Summa Theologica, 1-11, q.18, a.9, contained in Pegis, An Introduction to St. Thomas Aquinas, p. 536.
are judged as either good or evil according to their conformity or non-conformity with the moral law. No man can determine for himself the morality of his own acts, for this moral law is precisely that to which he is obliged to conform his acts, and that by which they are considered good or evil.

The influence of such moral doctrines as that of Nietzsche concerning the right of the individual to determine his own standard of morality has effected even our present day, so much so that Pope Pius XII has condemned this concept of the moral life which he describes in this way,

The distinctive mark of this morality is that it is in fact not based on universal moral laws, as, for instance, on the Ten Commandments, but on the real and concrete conditions or circumstances in which one must act, and according to which one must act, and according to which the individual conscience has to judge and choose. This state of things is unique and is valid but once for each human action. This is why the champions of this ethics affirm that the decision of one's conscience cannot be commanded by ideas, principles and universal laws.¹

Since Nietzsche has denied any moral law or any moral obligation in this extramoral realm, he therefore contradicts himself when he affirms that the Superman has certain rights which the herd does not possess, and that he possesses the 'hard virtues' proper to a Superman, for the very basis of any right or any virtue presupposes a moral law. The Superman, then, who Nietzsche claimed was the 'meaning of the earth, now has no meaning - even for Nietzsche, for Nietzsche

Nietzsche's doctrine of the Superman is therefore deprived of its significance, for the philosophy on which it depends has been proven, through this analysis, to be based on false assumptions and to have been developed, not according to reason and logic, but in accordance with the purpose of 'the first immoralist' who sought to revaluate morals by ultimately denying morality itself, and who sought to replace an Eternal God with the fantasy of a cosmological myth. In the final analysis, then, we see that Nietzsche's philosophy was thus 'Nietzsche contra Nietzsche'.

"...; but it must never be forgotten that Nietzsche merely stated his philosophy, he never proved it. Indeed on his premises it could never be proved, for once atheism is granted - the world has no meaning: it can be given a meaning, it is true, but then what right has one man to claim that the meaning he wishes to give to life shall be accepted by others."

The Christian philosophers have proved Nietzsche false and have affirmed the existence of the true moral doctrine and of the God on which it depends. The Eternal God is again recognized as the true meaning of the earth and as the ultimate significance in the life of man. The Superman is no more...... "Zarathustra is dead".

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1Adler, loc. cit., p. 27.

2Copleston, Friedrich Nietzsche - Philosopher of Culture, p. 170.
CONCLUSION

The problem treated in this thesis in not that of a purely theoretical nature, remote from our lives and important only as an intellectual exercise. It is rather a subject which concerns every man in search of a philosophy of life which will provide him with the true answer in regard to the purpose of his existence and the standard according to which he can choose the proper means to this end.

Friedrich Nietzsche was also in search of truth, although he himself seemed to deny it. He thought he had found this truth - the meaning of the world - in the Superman, but he was mistaken. From the very beginning of his search he was doomed to failure, for he denied the very faculty by which truth is attained and subordinated it to his own egoistical doctrine of the 'will to power'. Furthermore, and more important, he denied the very Author of Truth, God Himself. Any moral standard which Nietzsche would have tried to establish without this foundation in a Transcendent God could not have been anything but false. Nietzsche never did establish a system of morality, for having 'destroyed' the true foundation of morality, at least in his own mind, he was left with no
alternative but to deny the morality which depended on it. His doctrine of morality, therefore, was of a destructive, rather than a constructive nature. He sought to destroy the true morality by explaining it in terms of a purely natural (and unsavory) origin, and then he sought to establish a realm unhampered by these restraints of the 'herd', where man - the superman - might enjoy the freedom of his 'will to power' beyond good and evil. Nietzsche's failure was inevitable, for the way of Nietzsche is the way of madness. His own complete mental breakdown at the end of his life in large part attests to the fact that the human intellect does seek Truth, and that a refusal to acknowledge this Truth is contrary to reason, and can lead only to madness.

The fact that Nietzsche failed is important, but even more important are the basic reasons for his failure. It has been the purpose of this thesis to point out these reasons, inherent in Nietzsche's moral doctrine, and to show the true meaning of life and morality as expressed in the teachings of the Christian philosophers. Nietzsche's philosophy contains one important good quality, however, for it exposed the shallowness of those who are not truly moral. It is this writer's hope that in exposing, in turn, the shallowness of Nietzsche's moral doctrine by means of the teachings of the Christian philosophers, that this critique may aid its readers, not only by making them aware of the errors in the moral doctrine of Nietzsche, but also - by providing them with a deeper insight and a greater appreciation of the moral law and its ultimate foundation in God Himself. If this be so, then this thesis has achieved its purpose.
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