Historical Factors Of Japanese Defense And The Proposed National Defense Program Outline

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HISTORICAL FACTORS OF JAPANESE DEFENSE AND THE PROPOSED NATIONAL DEFENSE PROGRAM OUTLINE

BY

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<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Abbreviation</th>
<th>Description</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ASDF</td>
<td>Air Self Defense Force</td>
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<tr>
<td>ASW</td>
<td>Anti-submarine Warfare</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GNP</td>
<td>Gross National Product</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GSDF</td>
<td>Ground Self Defense Force</td>
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<td>JDA</td>
<td>Japanese Defense Agency</td>
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<tr>
<td>LDP</td>
<td>Liberal Democratic Party</td>
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<tr>
<td>LIEO</td>
<td>Liberal International Economic Order</td>
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<td>MSDF</td>
<td>Maritime Self Defense Force</td>
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<td>MDPE</td>
<td>Mid-term Defense Program Estimate</td>
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<tr>
<td>NDPO</td>
<td>National Defense Program Outline</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PKO</td>
<td>Peace Keeping Operations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SDF</td>
<td>Self Defense Force (all branches)</td>
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<td>UN</td>
<td>United Nations</td>
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CHAPTER ONE

INTRODUCTION: A NEW OUTLINE FOR JAPAN'S DEFENSE

During the 1930s, Japan's foreign policy came under the influence of fanatical Army officers interested in expanding Japan's sphere of influence. In September 1931, a planned attack by elements of the Japanese Army at Mukden was the first step in the conquest of Manchuria and later Southeast Asia. The expansion of Japanese territorial influence also led them East into the Pacific and eventually to war with the United States.¹

In the aftermath of World War II, Japan lay in waste: cities crushed from repeated air raids (including the dropping of two atomic bombs); the people broken; and the economy lifeless. The American occupying forces blamed the Japanese military for the prosecution of the war, and systematically took apart any remaining military capability, allowing for a limited police force. To ensure Japan's continued low military level, General Douglas Mac Arthur drafted a constitution which totally disarmed Japan.² As part of this document, Article 9 of the Japanese Constitution states:

1) Aspiring to an international peace based on justice and order, the Japanese people forever renounce war as a sovereign right of the nation and the threat or use of force as means of settling international disputes.

2) In order to accomplish the aim of the preceding paragraph, land, sea, and air forces, as well as other war potential, will never be maintained. The right to belligerency of the state will not be recognized.
Signed into law November 3, 1946, the pacifist Constitution, even though heavily influenced by the United States, embodied the ideals of many Japanese. In general, the Japanese people were reacting to the militarism of the previous period and tired of war.

From the 1940s to the 1990s, Japan's military has undergone serious changes. Reinstitutionalized, defense has grown larger within an American alliance and as a member of the United States containment strategy. The United States guaranteed the security of Japan through its nuclear security umbrella and an American commitment of troops to the region. As the United States economy fell into relative decline, it placed pressure upon Japan to increase its defense commitments.

In 1991, the Cold War ended and a new regime took power in the Soviet Union. It was a time to celebrate -- large forces no longer opposed each other on opposite sides of the Iron Curtain. The superpowers began to change their defense policy to reflect the growing multipolarity of the world. Those nations in alliances with either the United States or the Soviet Union are in a period of reevaluation as to how they will approach the changes in the world strategic balance. Japan as an ally of the United States is faced with the same issues. The basis for the mutual security treaty, the threat of Soviet forces, no longer exists. The challenge becomes: Does Japan need the continued presence of U.S. troops and what should be Japan's future military standing?

By 1994, Japan was spending over ¥46 billion on defense. These expenditures reflected a change in domestic attitudes, structural difficulties, and
international opinion since 1946. The growth of Japan's defense has occurred because of a consistent set of factors. However, these elements can also push defense negatively with events such as the fall of the Soviet Union which has a downward effect. By understanding how these historical factors have affected Japanese defense, it may be possible to predict Japan's defense policies in the coming era.

To more fully understand how domestic and international factors have affected Japanese defense policy since World War II, I will briefly outline Japan's post-war history revealing the patchwork quilt of its defense policy. There are many factors which have influenced Japanese defense policy. Each factor is distinct, representing different influences and, at the same time, coalescing into a definite pattern and shape. An analytical framework aids in establishing a policy pattern which can develop from the pieces collected an understanding of the future of defense policy.

Japanese defense policy is evaluated through two different lenses -- historical and analytical. A chronological and historical approach presents basic themes, arguments, and examples of Japan's defense policy. To separate specific arguments from potential background noise, an analytical component is utilized to highlight specific items and how they interact. After evaluating the material, it is possible to judge its utility by placing it against Japan’s emerging defense policy, a new National Defense Program Outline. This approach will show that the new National Defense Program Outline to be an incremental change from the past, rather than a fundamental policy shift.
1947 to 1957: The Beginnings of Defense

In 1947, Japan signed and promulgated its new Constitution. As noted above, the provisions of Article 9 prohibited the ability of the Japanese to possess a military capability. Article 9 appeared to relieve the Japanese people from the future threat and oppression of militarism. The United States occupied Japan from the end of World War II until September 1951 when the San Francisco Treaty was signed, and plans were made for the withdrawal of American troops the following year.¹

The Korean peninsula flared up in 1950 when North Korea tried to forcefully conquer the South. The United States used Japan as a base of operations and requested the support of the Japanese. Although prevented from the use of force by its Constitution, Japan gave the United States permission to use bases on Japanese soil to support actions in Korea and deployed minesweepers to aid in the landing of United Nations Forces (the minesweepers were remnants of World War II and were kept in use to search for leftover war materiel). At the same time, MacArthur mandated the establishment of a lightly armed and trained Police Reserve Force, and, later, in 1952 the Maritime Reserve Force.² These troops were a security force MacArthur felt necessary to replace the troops away in Korea.
These early developments were not deemed a violation of the Constitution because Japan was not directly involved in military activities. Those in favor of the Police Reserve Force defended it as being exactly what was stated in its title, a police force. However, this force violated the spirit of the Constitution and set the precedent for later Constitutional. The events of the next few years would be an outright challenge to both the wording and the spirit of the Constitution, laying the base for the future of the military.3

Immediately after signing the San Francisco Treaty, Japan and the United States signed the Mutual Defense Agreement, which extended the U.S. troop presence and secured the protection of the nuclear security umbrella.4 Although the treaty did not necessarily call for the United States to come to the aid of Japan, it can be so interpreted because if Japan were attacked, the proximity of U.S. troops would require a United States response. The treaty itself did not require reciprocity from the Japanese. However, John Foster Dulles, the U.S. Secretary of State, warned Japan that if there were no increases in defense efforts, the U.S. Senate might fail to ratify the treaty. Dulles' warning was due to the passage of the Vandenberg Resolution which stated, "the United States could enter into collective security arrangements provided they were based upon the principles of "self-help and mutuality."5

Japan conceded to U.S. demands for defense increases and on June 2, 1954, placed defense into a legal framework with the Defense Establishment Law and the Self Defense Forces Law.6 The Police Reserve Force (of approximately 75,000) and the Maritime Police Reserve Force (of approximately
6,000) reorganized into the Ground Self-Defense Force (GSDF), the Maritime Self-Defense Force (MSDF), and established the Air Self-Defense Force (ASDF). The three groups together were known as the Japanese Self-Defense Force (JSDF or SDF), under control of a newly established Japanese Defense Agency (JDA). In setting targets for the force levels, Secretary Dulles suggested a level of 350,000 troops be established to ensure passage of the Mutual Defense Agreement in the Senate. However, Prime Minister Yoshida Shigeru argued that this level was not possible due to the necessity of economic reconstruction.

The argument from Prime Minister Yoshida later became known as the Yoshida Doctrine. Kenneth Pyle defines the tenets of the Yoshida Doctrine:

1. Japan's economic rehabilitation must be the prime national goal. Political-economic cooperation with the United States was necessary for this purpose.
2. Japan should remain lightly armed and avoid involvement in international political-strategic issues.
3. To gain a long-term guarantee for its own security, Japan would provide bases for the U.S. army, navy, and air force.

Rearmament would be a low priority for Japan while the economy was still suffering from the destruction of the war.

Regionally, to quiet fears of Japanese militarization, the Ban on Overseas Dispatch was signed into law in 1954, which limited the SDF to the shores of Japan. This was necessary because the Constitution did not foresee the necessity of a military and, therefore, did not contain regulations on its use. No matter how tenuous the arguments in favor of establishing the SDF and Mutual
Security Arrangement, they were set in place and incorporated into the structure of Japanese government.\textsuperscript{10}

Japan's defense was further incorporated in 1956, when the National Defense Council (NDC) was established and charged with the direction of military policy. Following the establishment of the NDC, it was placed firmly under civilian control. The Prime Minister became the head of the organization, with the rest of the members being ministers of the controlling political party or coalition. With the passage of the Basic Policy for National Defense in 1957, the direction of the SDF was established. In this document the government created two principles upon which Japanese defense policy would be created. First, the SDF would be used for low-level conflict, and second, Japan would rely upon the United States military for broader security guarantees.\textsuperscript{11}

During the time of the SDF's establishment, Japan took control of its own defense armed with World War II vintage equipment.\textsuperscript{12} Satoshi Morimoto, for example, wrote, in an agreement signed by General Matsumae, Air Defense Commander of the JASDF, and General Burns, the Commander of the U.S. 5th Air Force, the JASDF relieved the USAF of its air defense of Japanese territory in 1959.\textsuperscript{13}

The other branches of the military took over self-defense responsibilities with similar agreements. Japan's immediate defense was no longer left to the United States, but they remained available if needed in the region. In October 1956, Japan and the Soviet Union normalized relations, but it cost Japan the islands of
Kunashiri, Etorofu, Habomai, and Shikotan taken by the Soviet Union at the end of World War II.\textsuperscript{14}

In this initial period, two challenges to the Constitution of Japan existed: the first was the reality and maintenance of "military" forces, and the second, the signing of the Mutual Defense Agreement. Both of these actions contradicted the constitutional principle of renouncing the right of the state to use force or the threat of force. In response, supporters of these two measures cited Article 51 of the United Nations Charter, in which it is recognized that all states possess the inherent and sovereign right of self-defense -- Japan, as a signatory to the UN Charter, acknowledged this as their sovereign right.\textsuperscript{15}

To justify the Japanese Self-Defense Force within the Constitutional framework, the military was charged with maintaining a defensive posture only, and disapproved the possession of weapons capable of force projection or attack. (However, the distinction between offensive and defensive weapons is difficult to make.) In addition, it was argued,

The Self-Defence forces have been justified as necessary in view of the fact that the aspiration for a world peace based on justice and order [paragraph one, Article 9 of the Constitution] has not been realized and because the United Nations has proved unable to preserve international peace.\textsuperscript{16}

The signing of the Mutual Defense Agreement created a difficult challenge for the Constitution. While the treaty did not call for Japan to defend the United States, U.S. bases within Japan placed the country firmly in the U.S. encirclement, later containment, framework surrounding the Soviet Union.\textsuperscript{17}
was believed that if the Cold War should heat up in Asia, Japan would be caught in the middle of the conflict. Soviet attacks on U.S. bases located on Japanese soil would thrust Japan directly into participating in such a conflict. This perception of the international situation transformed the agreement from an understanding on defense to a collective security agreement. The ratification of this treaty directly violated the Japanese Constitution which strictly forbade any collective security agreements.

The structure of Japanese defense also includes what would later become a familiar theme, United States pressure on Japan to increase expenditures for self-defense and rearmament. The United States influence was very strong due to the Korean War, the recent occupation by U.S. troops, and the perceived threat of an expansionary Soviet Union. Japan complied with American requests in hopes that the United States would make some concessions and sign a new defense treaty committing the United States to come to the aid of Japan. The instability in the region left over from the Korean War and the presence of Soviet troops to the North pressured Japan to quickly rearm and achieve a security guarantee. By 1960, Japanese forces numbered approximately 200,000, up from nearly 150,000 in 1954.

The theme of United States pressure is very important in understanding Japanese defense. While one cannot say that pressure from the United States is the sole factor pushing Japan for increased defense expenditures, this was a strong consideration in the formation of policy. Examples of U.S. influence include treaty negotiations and conditions, the occupation forces, and Japanese
dependency on the United States. The United States desired a strong power in Asia to counter communism -- part of the Cold War mentality.

The precedents of constitutional reinterpretation are also important developments. The Constitution mapped the government structure and abilities. However, once defense forces were established, whether justified by Article 51 of the United Nations Charter or not, it became extra-constitutional. The structure to govern defense was lacking in the Constitution. Laws to create a structural framework become debatable because the question can always be raised by the opposition whether these laws are constitutional. In this situation, defense hangs upon political consensus and until the opposition recognizes the need for the SDF's and JDA's existence it lacks solidity as an institution.

The rearmament of Japan also becomes tempered by the opinions of its regional neighbors. While it is understood that Japan is acting out of self-defense and within its relationship with the United States, there is lingering fear of what the Japanese military might become capable of. Japan needs to be very clear of its defense objectives and clearly communicate its intentions in hopes of allaying these fears.


In June 1957, Prime Minister Kishi Nobusuke and President Dwight D. Eisenhower met and agreed upon modifications to the Mutual Defense Agreement. There were two issues of concern to the Japanese about the original treaty. One, a provision in the treaty which allowed the United States the
right to intervene domestically. This was viewed as necessary at the time of the original draft due to the transition of power from the United States occupying force, to the fledgling Japanese government. The other issue of concern was to transform the treaty into a provisional agreement in which either country could terminate with one year’s notice. In order to assure the passage of a revised treaty in the United States, Kishi pushed for and secured passage of the First Defense Plan.

The plan established personnel and armament goals for the SDF: the GSDF at 180,000 personnel, 124,000 tons for the MSDF, and 1,300 aircraft for the ASDF. The Mutual Defense Treaty was ratified in a hastily called vote in 1960. Both the terms and the method of handling the treaty led to riots, strikes, and the need for police to be called to the Diet building to restore order. As a result of the internal turmoil, Prime Minister Kishi resigned to be followed by Prime Minister Ikeda Hayato who desired a “low posture” on defense, placing more emphasis upon the state of the economy.

The First Defense Plan was active from 1958 to 1960. While it established definite goals for the level of force, it lacked the fiscal resources to complete these goals. In 1962, the Second Defense Plan was instituted and pushed for the completion of the first plan, lasting until 1966. To implement the plan, the military requested an increase in defense spending to 2% of GNP. The Ministry of Finance, however, following the directive of Prime Minister Ikeda, forced this figure down, fearing that increased military budgets would come at the cost of economic development. In the end, the defense budget provision
was whittled down to 1.37% of GNP. While the sum was significant considering Japan's growing economy at the time, it did not enable the JDA to attain the procurement levels to fulfill national policy.\textsuperscript{24}

These half-hearted efforts by the Japanese to provide for their own defense were a source of consternation for the United States. The primary concern of the two nations greatly differed, with Japan seeking economic development and the United States seeking countervailing strength to the Soviet Union. For Japan, defense policy was presented with two interpretations to specific audiences. When policy was presented to the Japanese people, emphasis was placed upon the state's moderate and strictly defensive efforts. To the United States, however, Japanese diplomats stressed how they were working toward goals and trying to overcome popular opposition to the military.

International events were turbulent for Asia during the 1960s. One of those events, the United States's involvement in the Vietnam War, affected relationships established between the U.S. and nations in the region. American bases in Japan were used heavily during the bombing campaign on North Vietnam, straining Japanese-U.S. relations. The Chinese detonation of a nuclear device in 1964 gave rise to fears of China becoming the regional power. However, for Japan, one of the most marked events was normalization of Japanese-South Korean relations. The significance of this change was the realization that Japan's self defense depended, in part, upon the defense of South Korea. Japan's defense was no longer seen in purely national security terms, but as an integral partner in the security of Northeast Asia.\textsuperscript{25}
As the Japanese economy boomed during this period, opposition parties and "doves" within the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) called for control of the defense budget. To continue the relationship of defense spending as a percentage of GNP would result in greatly increased budgets as the economy was expected to grow dramatically. These concerns were further compounded by the proposal of the Third Defense Plan, 1967 to 1971, containing a proposed increase of 2% of GNP and a change from quantitative numbers for equipment to a combination of quantitative and qualitative levels for equipment. Part of this proposal was to purchase the U.S.-made F-4 Phantom Fighter-Bomber and Nike-Hercules Missiles (which could be armed with nuclear warheads). Part of the dramatic increase in expenditures was the withdrawal of American military assistance under the strain of the Vietnam War. At one time this aid amounted to $5.7 billion and accounted for a significant amount of Japan's military equipment.

To secure support of the Third Defense Plan in the Diet, the military, with the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP), had to make concessions, placing restrictions on defense growth. In April 1967, to limit the influence of a possible military-industrial complex, the Diet passed the Ban on Arms Exports. In December of 1967, the Three Non-Nuclear Principles were adopted which stated that Japan would rely on America's security guarantee and would not possess, produce, or permit entry of nuclear weapons into Japan. In essence, the principles passed concerned the United States bringing, off-loading, or dumping...
nuclear material and the fear that Japan may be perceived as not only under the U.S. nuclear umbrella, but a part of the U.S. nuclear security strategy.

Other concessions were made on the capabilities of the military and its weapons. In 1968, it was announced that bombsights would be removed from aircraft followed by the removal of mid-air refueling capability in 1973. In 1969, the Diet passed a resolution holding that space be used exclusively for “peaceful purposes.” This series of checks, to counter the growth of the Japanese military, were similar to the Ban on Overseas Deployment, which supplemented unanticipated capabilities not covered by the Basic Law on Defense or the Constitution.

The United States and regional neighbors had a profound influence upon Japan’s defense policy. Consistent with previous patterns, the United States pushed for greater Japanese spending on the military for both personnel and equipment. The U.S. became frustrated because Japan appeared to be paying lip service to and did not implement official policies. For example, by 1967, Japan possessed 231,000 troops, but was 20,000 troops short of the number authorized by the government and still below the number the Secretary Dulles requested in 1954. At the same time, the Mutual Security Agreement indicated a willingness of the United States to recognize the dependency of Japan on its military strength.

Regional issues included China’s possession of nuclear weapons and its pursuit of delivery systems, the normalization of relations between Japan and South Korea, and the Vietnam War. From the American perspective, a rising
tide of communism threatened democracy in Asia and to combat this threat the
United States needed a strong coalition. The lingering effects of the Korean War
and China's increasing amount of offensive military power helped push Japan,
Korea, and the United States together, enabling U.S. requests to receive some
following.

1969 to 1979: Changing to Fiscal Restraints

In July 1969, President Richard Nixon alarmed Asia with his "Guam
Declaration." J.E. Dornan stated:

...although U.S. treaty commitments remained in force and the U.S.
nuclear umbrella would continue to be extended to shield our allies and
non-communist nations generally from strategic nuclear threats, in the
future each ally would have to bear primary responsibility for defending
itself against internal insurgencies and perhaps even against mounted
conventional attacks.31

The items in the Guam Declaration, later couched in terms of the "Nixon
Doctrine," aimed at increased burden sharing with a special significance for the
Vietnam War. This had a side-effect of heightening fears in Asia of a U.S.
withdrawal. In Japan, there was concern that the SDF would need to be
increased if the United States withdrew.32 Maswood described the 1970s as

... ushering in a series of economic crises. . . The two oil crises, the dollar
shock, the collapse of the Bretton-Woods monetary system, the rising drift
towards protectionism, all meant that economic growth instead of being
almost taken for granted, became an issue that preoccupied Japanese
decision makers.33

In this atmosphere, Nakasone Yasuhiro, a powerful figure in Japanese politics,
was appointed the Director General of the Japanese Defense Agency in 1971.
His direction and ambition enabled the JDA to weather the buffeting of the 1970s crises.

Nakasone's agenda was to clear the post-war accounts. He saw the Constitution's vision of Japan as a unique, pacifist nation "tantamount to carrying the guilt of the Pacific War into the indefinite future."34 The goal of Nakasone became normalization of Japan's relations. Ozawa Ichiro, a Diet Member and a former member of the LDP with similar ideas as Nakasone to what constitutes a nation, defines a normal nation as possessing two things: first, the willingness to take on international responsibilities; and, second, cooperation with other nations to create stability and prosperity for their citizens.35 To do this several steps were necessary.

Nakasone perceived a threat to Japan due to a United States drawdown of troops from Korea in 1971 and Japan needed to increase its defense capability. The U.S. felt justified in further troop reductions in the Pacific because of détente with the People's Republic of China.36 In 1971, Nakasone pushed for a higher budget for the Fourth Security Plan to ensure that the military force levels would be met. Through political wrangling Nakasone was able to get the budget he had asked for, which included enough to cover the purchase of more equipment. However, several "shocks" in the 1970s, increased inflation and prevented a completion of equipment procurement.37

The Fourth Defense Plan also established a set of guidelines for the future Japanese defense posture:

1. Japan should be ready to deal with limited aggression by maintaining air and sea control.
2. If the above should fail, Japan should be ready to resist and prevent the imposition of a fait accompli.
3. Together with denial and resistance, Japan should be able to terminate any contingency with the support of the United States.
4. Japan should rely on the U.S. nuclear umbrella against nuclear threats.38

These guidelines were used to establish the level of Japan's military force in the face of immediate threats and directed the weapon procurement programs that the JDA should pursue.

It was during the economic difficulties of the 1970s that it was decided to uncouple the budget and long-term defense planning. Instead of placing procurement within the time-frame of four- or five-year budgets, a National Defense Plan Outline (NDPO) was adopted in 1976, which designated the long-term goals of Japanese force with an unstated completion date. The NDPO was a reflection of the relaxed East-West tensions and China-United States rapprochement. In the relaxed international environment, the plan set the minimum necessary defense potential to ward off small-scale attacks.39 With the NDPO, an absolute ceiling was placed on defense expenditures; connected to GNP, the total amount of spending could not be in excess of 1% GNP. The new limit on defense contrasted sharply with spending in the 1950s and 1960s which consistently exceeded one percent of Gross National Product.

The pressure was on Japan to increase its defense from the Nixon administration which was considering the removal of troops. In prior discussions, the United States had not been willing to reduce its presence because of the perceived communist threat in the region. But as tensions cooled, the United States felt others could pay for their own defense. The
National Defense Program Outline was a statement of Japan’s position in the relaxed international situation. It can also be viewed as an attempt by Japan to avoid coercion by the United States, clearly stating Japan’s unwillingness to significantly arm itself.

Prime Minister Takeo Miki, in a visit to the United States in 1975, agreed to a formal study on military cooperation and established the U.S.-Japan Defense Consultation Committee -- a forum formed, in July 1976, to openly discuss issues of strategy, information, and back-up support. In 1978, this group agreed upon a Guideline for U.S.-Japan Defense Cooperation. The Guideline created a division of labor between the U.S. and Japan and prepared for joint exercises, the first occurring in 1978. With the Guideline in place, Japan changed to an activist role within the U.S.-Japan Security Treaty. The Guideline partially fulfilled America’s demands for increased burden-sharing.

Toward the end of the 1970s, tension increased in Asia. Jimmy Carter, while running as a presidential candidate, stated he believed in a complete withdrawal of U.S. troops from the Korean peninsula. According to Kun Chong-whi, the presence of U.S. troops had insured a precarious balance, and a withdrawal, if it were to occur, would eliminate the assurance of U.S. support in the region and require Japan to re-evaluate its defense posture in view of an unstable Korea. The fear of a U.S. withdrawal was only one element of increased tension. Two actions by the Soviet Union in the late 1970s renewed Japanese fears over security. The first was the redeployment of troops on the disputed Northern islands after an absence of eighteen years. The second was
the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, in 1979, which renewed the view of the
Soviet Union as an expansionary power. 43

Like a see-saw, the events of 1969-1979 were a series of actions and
reactions. In the initial years, tensions increased in Asia, due to a perceived
withdrawal following Nixon's Guam Declaration. This led to increased spending
on defense in 1971, with the Fourth Defense Plan and the first defense plan
adequately funded to complete its goals. But inflation resulting from OPEC
actions and erratic exchange rates from the loss of the Bretton-Woods System
prevented the Fourth Defense Plan's completion. In the mid-1970s, emphasis
on defense waned. This brief interlude was a result of détente between the
Soviet Union and the United States.

While the events of the 1970s give one the impression of sudden changes
in policy, three consistent factors were interacting to determine Japanese
defense policy. Since Japan's emergence from World War II, United States
pressure and containment policy pressured Japan to increase defense. As
tensions cooled between the superpowers, hope for peace rose during the
1970s. Domestic influence in favor of economics presented less of a reason to
maintain a large defense. As American troops withdrew, a smaller force was left
to deal with possible aggression. As overall troop levels decreased, the U.S.
pressured Japan to insure its own security. However, this pressure had little
affect on Japan in the new environment. It was with the invasion of Afghanistan
that Japan again came under the influence of the United States. The Cold War,
which for a brief period seemed to be ending, suddenly became hot and policies reminiscent of the 1950s and 1960s were put into practice.

1979 to the Present: Overcoming Defense Restraints

In reaction to the invasion of Afghanistan, the United States moved the bulk of its Pacific Fleet into the Indian Ocean. To make up for the loss of forces in the Pacific, the U.S. began putting pressure on Japan to increase its defense posture and take over some sea-lane defense responsibilities. However, it was not until the Japanese leadership realized that the Soviet Fleet, after the treaty of Cam Ran Bay, spanned the South China oil route and witnessed an increased deployment of Soviet naval power that Japan committed itself to a sea-lane defense effort. In a statement made by Prime Minister Suzuki Zenko during a visit to Washington in May 1981, he indicated that Japan would consider undertaking the defense of sea-lanes within 1,000 nautical miles of Japan.44 American estimates of the minimum required force for an effective defense would be “350 F-15s (as opposed to the projected 187 . . .), 70 destroyers, 25 submarines, 125 P-3Cs [an Anti-Submarine Warfare (ASW) plane used to locate ‘enemy’ submarines]” (Maswood, 1990, p. 66).46 The United States estimates and a Japanese investigative group, the Comprehensive National Security Study Group established by Prime Minister Ohira, deemed a 1,000 mile defense policy to be impossible to accomplish under the one percent GNP limit.46

In 1981, the former Director General of the Japanese Defense Agency, Nakasone Yasuhiro, came to the prime ministership, significantly increasing the
possibility of major change in Japanese defense policy. Nakasone pushed for state normalization in which Japan would be seen as politically powerful, commensurate with its economic strength. What is unusual about Nakasone’s term is that he served an additional year beyond LDP custom, normally only four years. In his last year, Nakasone made a concentrated effort to change defense policy. Nakasone asked those in the military to draft a five-year plan on defense so it might be passed before he left office. The document being discussed was the Mid-Term Defense Program Estimate. This had been an internal JDA document for use in long-term planning in support of NDPO goals.

The achievement of the NDPO goals within a five-year time frame would also require defense spending in excess of one percent GNP. According to Maswood, Nakasone’s wanted an abrogation of the one percent defense spending limit and the institution of higher defense budgets.47 Within the LDP, there was considerable opposition to the breach of the one percent GNP defense spending cap. To solve this problem, Nakasone appointed members to his cabinet who opposed his increases on defense, while appointing a friendly minded official to the Foreign Ministry post to ensure his budget push for the JDA. This political maneuvering compromised outspoken opponents of defense increases while Nakasone received their tacit consent in exchange for their positions.48

On September 18, 1985, the Diet accepted the budget and MDPE in its entirety. However, this only raised the defense budget by a few thousandths of a percent above one percent GNP.49 Symbolically, the defense limit was
breached, but not significantly so. Prime Minister Nakasone left office in 1986, somewhat successful in enlarging the status and budget of the Japanese Defense Agency.

The next issue of significance was the deployment of the MSDF to the Persian Gulf to aid in minesweeping operations. This was the first foreign deployment of Japanese troops since minesweepers aided during the Korean War. Joseph Keddell believed that the decision to deploy minesweepers was due to Japan's fear of criticism by the international community. Many of Japan's actions were considered parallel to those of Germany, a nation which also had regional pressure against military activism related to pre-World War II militarism. Both of these nations participated in limited actions in the Gulf.

In 1991, Japan signed a treaty announcing the intention to help implement the peace in Cambodia. To do this the Diet needed to pass a bill revising the 1954 Ban on Overseas Dispatch. A Special Investigative Committee on Japan's Role in International Society, headed by Ozawa Ichiro, was formed to deal with the issue of international action and constitutional constraints.

Japanese participation in the United Nations peace-keeping activities unmistakably differs in form and substance from the sovereign acts that are forbidden under Article 9. Japanese participation does not involve the use of force overseas based on decisions by the Japanese government and under government commands.

In June 1992, the Peace Keeping Operations (PKO) Bill passed the Diet. Ozawa stressed the significance of this bill and how the passage of it was a significant step towards state normalization.
Policy changes during the 1980s reflected changes in the international environment. The first half of the 1980s witnessed the end of détente and the Soviet Union was looked upon as an expansionary power by the United States, a potential threat to her neighbors. These tensions and pressure from the United States led to an increase in Japan's defense expenditures. The last half of the 1980s brought about the end of the Cold War and the need for a revised defense structure. The first crisis of this new era, the Persian Gulf War, led Japan to participate within the confines of its Constitution. The second event, the participation of Japanese forces within Cambodia, demonstrates Japan’s role as a greater global activist.
The last chapter focused on the evaluation of Japanese in which long-term influences were tracked in a historical format. In stepping away from this approach, this section will identify these factors more clearly and broaden the discussion. In understanding these factors, it may be possible to predict the future of Japanese defense not by looking into a crystal ball but using past experiences to provide insight into the future.

There exists a dichotomy of internal and external elements affecting Japan's defense. Internal factors influencing defense are: public opinion, economics, the budget, lack of defense ministry strength, the Constitution, and personal influence. External factors are: pressure from the United States, regional threats, and perceptions of regional neighbors. These elements come together to define and create Japan's military policy in an equation without numbers.

The following sections evaluate how the factors affecting policy are defined and how they interact. The analysis is based, like most social science, on observation and not upon laboratory or experimental evidence. The suppositions put forward here can only be tested in the face of historical data or by comparison with future policy decisions.
Internal Factors

Public Opinion

The growth of the military met with consistent resistance from the public and is recognized by many as the primary barrier limiting Japanese defense. Much of the public's negativism is a rejection of World War II militarism and its trappings. Whether likely or not, the military's actions, before and during the war, delegitimized it in the eyes of the citizenry. This relationship could only be overcome with time and consistent apolitical action on the part of the military.

The initial public limitation on defense must be contrasted with the current situation in which Japan maintains a strong military with over 180,000 troops. The development of forces and their acceptance by the public can be described as a cycle where larger forces or defense commitments are proposed; a period of initial resistance; and acceptance over time. This cycle can also be called a "ratcheting effect," where the public becomes accustomed to increasingly higher levels of defense.

The public's acceptance of higher defense spending is not isolated and is affected by international pressures and the economic performance. Internationally, pressure from allies and from potential enemies can shape public opinion. In the immediate post-war period, public opinion was in favor of strengthening defense in light of the Korean War. Harrison Holland points out,

The public's recognition of the importance of the United States-Japan relationship and its support of only a minimal defense buildup effort have created conditions in which military issues are treated as an extension of United States-Japan political relations.
Additionally, the United States pressured Japan to increase defense expenditures after the signing of the Mutual Security Agreement in 1951, which the public accepted as necessary to maintain its relationship. Public resistance was weak in this early period because of the immediate Cold War threat made by the presence of Soviet troops on the Kurile Islands and the Korean War.

Economic arguments surrounding defense focuses on the “guns versus butter” issue. In contrast to former Prime Minister Yoshida’s arguments, the strong Japanese economy, during the 1960s, did not provide a reason to clamp down on defense expenditures. The 1970s changed this perception and in the environment of economic crises and international political détente; future economic stability became linked with the affordability of defense. The dynamics of this relationship will be evaluated in more detail later.

A counterpoint may be a study by Scott Flanagan which may temper arguments about the strength of public opinion on defense issues. Flanagan found a disjuncture between public voting behavior and a party’s stand on defense issues. If true, decisions by the party in power on defense will not affect them at the polls and heightens the effect of other factors on defense. More study needs to be done on the ways the public influences defense decisions to try and resolve this question.

In summary, three assumptions can be made about public opinion: first, the public consensus is for a moderate defense effort; two, policy is more likely to meet with public approval if the economy is doing well; and, three, a
moderate effort also assumes that the external threats to Japan remain unchanged. Without significant changes in the external environment, public opinion will most likely remain unchanged.

Economic Growth

After the devastation of World War II, the Japanese people focused upon economic recovery. The principles of the Yoshida doctrine established a link between economic growth and defense spending as a burden during reconstruction. Large defense expenditures were viewed as an unacceptable social cost.14 When the Japanese economy grew during the 1950s and 1960s, the percentage of defense expenditures when compared to Gross National Product dropped. However, the growth of the economy provided significant increases in defense expenditures.15

Increases in overall defense expenditures continued until the 1970s. Defense budgets were made for four to five year increments with long range planning relying upon estimates of economic growth and potential tax revenues. As already mentioned, the optimism of the 1960s led to higher defense budgets, but by the 1970s, economic optimism declined. Further, defense budget planning changed to yearly allotments linking the performance of the economy with military commitments and in hopes of better controlling creeping defense expenditures.16 Defense spending above one percent of GNP became an unacceptable opportunity cost. John Emmerson and Harrison Holland point out, Japan’s defense policy is based on the premise that Japan is not threatened by anyone and therefore need not increase her military
strength at a pace that would impinge on economic development or the "comfortable life" increasingly enjoyed by the Japanese people.17

With the end of the Cold War, Japanese defense may become increasingly linked to the economy. The justification for the possession of a high level of military force based upon U.S. pressure for a containment strategy no longer exists. As economic growth declines, policy-makers may search for a peace dividend, which would also apply to expenditures on qualitative improvements in equipment and whether there is a need for "cutting edge" systems. These decisions will not be made in isolation and economic sacrifices could be outweighed by security threats.

The Budget and the Japanese Defense Agency’s Relative Strength

There exists an interdependent relationship between the budget and the defense agency’s negotiating strength. In Japan, additional spending for defense can be looked upon as discretionary and, therefore, competing with other ministries for funds requiring the JDA to effectively sell itself.18 The JDA can be aided in its sales pitch by the economic health of the nation, personal interests, public opinion, and international pressures and developments. Changes in these areas can increase or decrease the ministry’s relative strength. Resources will also depend upon the fiscal health of the country and its increasing deficit.

In this competition for funds, other ministries have strong influence over the JDA due to a unique form of bureaucracy.19 Officials serving the JDA
typically do not rise from internal ranks but come instead from other ministries. After a term of service they rotate back into their original civil service branch. This system compromises the abilities of the JDA when pursuing budget changes. Their own officials may not truly believe in the agency's proposals and new budget allotments may be weighed against the cost to their former ministry.20

The negotiating strength of the JDA is further damaged when its budget is reviewed by the Ministry of Finance. It is here that the budget for all ministries is determined. Typically, Ministry of Finance officials do not favor defense items. However, during the 1980s ministry and budgetary pressures were overridden by a consensus from the public, international pressure, and strong leadership.21

With the end of the Cold War and the reduction of United States pressure it is likely that economic and other national considerations will come before defense in the budget, especially considering the increasing budget deficits.

The Constitution and Other Structural Barriers

The reconfiguring of the Japanese state after World War II marginalized defense as an institution. Strong language in the Constitution disallowed the "maintenance" of "war potential" and the use of threat as a means to achieve policy objectives. The reinterpretation of the Constitution allowing for the JDA and the formation of the SDF in 1951 were not done by amendment. Therefore, steps to strengthen defense institutions must compete with constitutional
interpretation. One begins to question, how large can military forces be before they violate constitutional principle? What types of equipment can be acquired?

In the initial phase of growth, these fundamental questions haunted the JDA. In the late 1960s, a consensus formed around defense setting limits, defining the types of weaponry and the abilities of the SDF were put forth in laws. These included the Ban on Arms Exports, the Three Non-Nuclear Principles, the Ban On Overseas Dispatch, and the removal or prevention from acquisition of "offensive" weapon systems. In the 1970s, the One Percent GNP Cap was also placed on defense by general consensus, but never enacted into law. Ideally, these actions were to rectify the apparent contradictions between the Constitution and policy and to define defense within a set of prescribed limits.

These issues had been redefined by the mid-1980s because many of the laws established earlier had been violated. For example, the Ban on Arms Exports was compromised by shipments of component parts exported to the United States with their end use being placement within high-tech weapons systems. The GNP cap, while not a law, faced a new willingness of the Diet to commit more resources, over one percent GNP, and allow greater leeway in weapon types. The Ban on Overseas Dispatch was violated in principle following the Gulf War when minesweepers were deployed to the Persian Gulf. These laws or limits were not replaced with new structural barriers.

However, despite this seeming lack of legislation, there is a new consensus limiting further developments on defense. This consensus is implicit and hinted at in the Peace Keeping Operations (PKO) Bill and other recent
documents indicating that defense will be kept to a moderate effort with international action limited to United Nation’s peace keeping operations.\textsuperscript{22} A moderate defense effort could be defined as expenditures near one percent of GNP allowing for enough forces to repel an attack, assuming the aid of the United States in short order, a blue water navy capable of routine patrols of principle trade routes, and ground forces capable of being deployed on PKOs. These measures are based on the assumptions of a continued Japan-U.S. alliance, stability on the Korean peninsula, and the continued non-belligerence of Russia and China. If any of these assumptions change, Japan’s stance on defense would need to be redefined.\textsuperscript{23}

Personal Influence and Individual Leadership

An element that can either aid or hinder defense is personal leadership. For example, two significant players in defense have been Prime Minister Yoshida and Prime Minister Nakasone, and smaller roles have been played by Prime Minister Kishi and Ozawa Ichiro, a diet member. Leadership can be decisive in helping to form a consensus or determining goals. Prime Ministers are particularly important because of their ability to set goals and agendas for their cabinet.

Prime Minister Yoshida had a serious impact due to his doctrine which established the initial consensus for defense limits and linked it with the success of Japan’s economy. The ability of Yoshida to direct his cabinet and the nation toward the singular goal of economic growth negatively affected defense in the
short-run. His argument was and is used to justify Japan's limited defense when facing the United States. This kind of goal setting can be overwhelmed in time as new popular consensus forms or leader's position erodes with time.

Prime Minister Kishi desired a renegotiation of the security treaty with the United States. His goals were the elimination of the America's ability to intervene in Japanese domestic politics and the guarantee of U.S. assistance in the event Japan was attacked. His leadership on this issue did form a consensus and, although weak, it produced the 1962 Mutual Security Agreement. His dedication to a specific policy goal was crucial in the renegotiation of this document.

Two more recent leaders, Prime Minister Nakasone and Ozawa Ichiro, have argued for stronger defense and a "normalization" of defense policy. Nakasone has a long-term relationship with the JDA, serving as its head in the early seventies and in the mid-1980s as prime minister. His goal of achieving the NDPO required a breaching of the One Percent GNP Cap which exceeded popular sentiment and bureaucratic inertia. The manner in which he arranged his cabinet and the popularity he possessed among the people enabled him to overcome concerns and achieve his goal.

Ozawa Ichiro, as a Diet member, provided impetus to policy changes. A member of the LDP, he headed a committee to determine whether or not the Constitution needed to be rewritten to conform with defense policy and also was much in favor of the PKO Bill. In addition, Ozawa desired an increase in Japan's international stature in terms of defense which continues to exceed
popular opinion in Japan. While his leadership was useful in discussions of the PKO Bill, his influence on broader military policy is weak.

Personal leadership and influence is limited to specific policies and the political strength they possess to influence policy making. The effects or strength of their leadership also wanes over time, leaving room for the formation of a new consensus. Singular leadership can compel changes on certain issues and formulate a group of supporters. However, concessions made and changing events will eventually force this group apart. The issue initially forming the group may change and the bargains made to insure political support may lose their hold. To properly evaluate this issue it would take an examination of each Diet and Prime Minister since World War II, which is beyond the scope of this study.

External Factors

External factors affecting Japan's defense creates the environment in which decisions interact with regional neighbors and the global power structure. As noted earlier, the international environment affects defense policies and public opinion. The greater the forces regionally or possible aggression would give impetus to greater military expenditures. The international environment also provides some limitations on Japan's defense.

Constraints on defense consist of the perception by neighbors of an increasing Japanese military which is rooted in memories of World War II. One could argue that Japan must be exceedingly transparent in its actions so as not
to send mixed signals to regional neighbors. The existing commitment of the United States affects Japanese defense expenditures in two opposing manners. First, pressure for larger defense efforts comes from the United States in the form of requests for “burden sharing” and potential regional threats. Second, the presence of U.S. troops reduces the number that Japan would have to supply to provide for its own defense. In other words, U.S. troops take the place of Japanese troops because of an overlap of functions.

Northeast Asia, in the words of Vladimir Ivanov,

is an area of residual military and strategic standoff. After Europe it has the highest concentration of large, well-trained, extremely well-equipped forces in the world.28

Regional actors include: Russia, North and South Korea, Japan, China, Taiwan, and the United States. These nations act in two opposite manners on Japan’s defense. First, many of these nations and peoples suffered at the hands of the Japanese during World War II who allowed excesses in the treatment of foreign peoples. This legacy still engenders fear from regional neighbors and many have expressed concern over the growth of the Japanese military.29

Second, regional neighbors make-up the nature of possible military threats that the SDF needs to be capable of countering. Considerations are the size, capacity, threat, and potential areas of conflict of other regional actors. The JDA makes recommendations based upon conclusions about this environment. The public and politicians draw their own conclusions about the potential threat and weigh it against the costs of the military. Since Japanese
politics has disallowed the use of coercion in foreign policy, the ability of the Japanese military to repel attacks becomes its primary concern.

Russia

In terms of equipment and trained personnel, Russia represents the largest threat to Japan. A conflict between these nations could have focused upon the Southern Kurile Islands, which are claimed by both countries but are occupied by Russia. During World War II, the Soviet Union took these islands under its administration and after the war, during negotiations, the Soviets refused to return them to Japan. During the Cold War, other potential areas of conflict were the Soviet Union’s access to the Pacific Ocean through choke points near Japan. In the event of a crisis, the control of these areas would become critical to Russia’s access to the sea for its Pacific Fleet. These issues have never been settled, which resulted in the United States and Japan being prepared for a worst case scenario.

After the Conventional Forces in Europe Treaty, the former Soviet Union began withdrawing significant amounts of materiel and personnel from the European Theater. Not all of these forces were retired, but were deployed to the Soviet Far East. These increases in troops and quantity and quality of equipment constituted a significant increase in forces opposing Japan. Additionally, Sakhalin Island was cut off from graveside visits made by Japanese and the Soviet military facility there was enhanced, which occurred after a long absence of any significant military presence on the island. The future
implications of these moves is yet to be determined but will be a consideration in future defense planning.

The Koreas

The separation of North and South Korea is another source of contention in the region. The peninsula is the focus of a large amount of military forces including a contingent of U.S. Army troops. The break down and complete failure of negotiations encouraged the establishment of a U.S. garrison. The role of the United States is important in Korea as a moderating element. In addition, provocative actions by North Korea forced the United States to maintain this stance for over forty years. It is the tension between these parties and the unresolved conflict that affects Japan's security. It is in Japan's interest that security on the peninsula be maintained.

In the late 1970s, when the United States discussed withdrawing troops from Korea, Japan and South Korea felt they were being abandoned. The guarantees of the US-Japan Mutual Security Agreement sounded hollow. While the US decided not to withdraw from Korea, the discussion generated within Japan raised the importance of Korea in relation to Japan's defense and Japan has remained sensitive to possible destabilizing elements threatening the peninsula's security.
J. E. Dornan summarizes the relationship between Japan and the United States as:

The history of the Japanese-American relationship since the signing of the security treaty has been punctuated by a series of crises, large and small, and by a whole series of stresses and strains. While U.S. policy-makers have never abandoned the view that it is undesirable for Japan to become a major military power, since the Korean War more than one American defense official and Congressional leader has voiced dissatisfaction with the level of Japan's contribution to security arrangements in North East Asia.\textsuperscript{34}

This passage understates the "stresses and strains" in the Japanese-American relationship over the last fifty years.

The United States has been a consistent element pushing the growth of Japan's defense which has resulted from Cold War tensions. Pressure increased and slackened with the tension in U.S. and Soviet relations. The relationship created in the Mutual Defense Treaty has been beneficial for both nations, providing Japan with a nuclear defense and a strong ally; and the United States with bases, technology for weapon systems, and a member in its containment strategy. Japan's response to American requests revolves around its desire to be secure in the face of potential Soviet threats during the Cold War.\textsuperscript{35}

In the historical chapter, specific instances were discussed where the United States requested Japan to possess a certain numerical level of personnel and later the ability to take on certain defense responsibilities. To generalize, the United States felt it was taking on the defense of Japan in the face of the
Soviet Union with little contribution from Japan. At times this has led to resentment by the United States and "Japan-bashing" in the late 1980s. However, the United States did not withdraw its commitment, suggesting that the benefits received from Japan outweighed the costs. Japan also seemed somewhat pleased with the relationship, stating in the White Paper of 1990 that it desired a strong relationship with the United States.36

During periods of détente, the United States was less able to effectively pressure Japan to increase its defense commitment. The best example would be the mid-1970s when Japan was placing significant limits upon its defense in the absence of large U.S. pressure. Later, relaxation of tensions was overturned by the invasion of Afghanistan and new requests from the United States for Japan to pay for its own sea lane defense as U.S. forces were called to the Indian Ocean.

The loss of U.S. pressure leads to a deeper question. If Japan was increasing defense to satisfy American requests, then without this pressure will Japan's defense efforts become lower? Arguments in favor of a new National Defense Program outline state, "...it is appropriate that Japan's capability be restricted, both in scale and functions, by streamlining, making it more efficient and compact, as well as enhancing necessary functions and making qualitative improvements..."37 This indicates that Japan's long-term defense commitment will be reduced provided there is not a rise of a large global confrontation or regional threat.
CHAPTER FOUR

INTO THE FUTURE

In 1991, the global security environment was transformed with the fall of the Soviet Union -- the end of the Cold War. For Japan and the United States, this means a recalculation of each other's needs in the region. Are the costs too much for the United States to maintain forces in Japan? Does Japan still need a nuclear deterrent and the added security of U.S. forces? Are the United States and Japan natural adversaries, as some have claimed, and will become enemies in a new kind of Cold War? These decisions have been delayed for some time now. However, there are indications of a new policy forming in Japan, specifically, a new National Defense Program Outline redefining the roles the JDA and SDF will play in the future.

Preliminary language of the NDPO states that the SDF will provide forces to be deployed within a United Nations' peace keeping operation; decrease overall troop levels; and continue to focus on high levels of technology -- a capital intensive defense. This policy would take place with a continued relationship with the United States where Japan would continue to benefit from the presence of U.S. forces. This proposal does not represent a radical shift in ideas, but a continuation of past influences and limitations.

Japan would rely upon the United States for a broader security commitment and be limited to a moderate defense effort which would not bear
too heavily on the economy -- consistent with earlier findings. It also reflects the lack of a regional threat to Japan where no particular enemy has been identified. One could question where the United States stands in this new equation. While no policy has been issued, neither have requests been made for Japan to increase its defense. It can be inferred that the situation is very similar to that of the mid-1970s when defense requests were difficult to justify in a relaxed environment.

The relaxed environment also poses some difficult issues. Ozawa Ichiro, and to some degree Prime Minister Nakasone, have pressed for Japan to increase its defense as a means of gaining international political power. They have called for the strengthening of the military without consideration of immediate threat. For Japan to adopt such a policy seems extreme and would give rise to regional fears of another nationalist, militarist regime in Japan. It also is contrary to the incremental historical development of Japan's defense forces.

In an era of post-Cold War international relations, Japan will continue to formulate policies consistent with the indications made during the mid-1970s and with the interplay of the economy, public opinion, regional neighbors, budget considerations, and United States pressure. In the long-term these factors indicate that Japan will decrease its defense commitment to the immediate defense of Japan and to U.N. actions. International issues which could change this course would be the Korean peninsula, a flare-up between Taiwan and China, a new large strategic conflict, or a withdrawal of U.S. forces. A public
consensus for a moderate effort appears firm, but may decline with a less tense international environment.

A side-by-side comparison of the proposal with the existing NDPO reveals very little change in minimum force requirements while expanding the roles the

<table>
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<tr>
<th>Table 4.1 Comparison of 1976 NDPO and 1996 NDPO Proposal</th>
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<td><strong>1976 NDPO</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td>1. Objectives</td>
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<tr>
<td>Military should:</td>
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<tr>
<td>- maintain surveillance and possess capacity to repel small-scale invasions</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- rely upon the U.S. to defend against aggression</td>
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<tr>
<td>2. International Situation</td>
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<tr>
<td>- increasing interdependence</td>
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<tr>
<td>- East-West dialogue</td>
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<tr>
<td>- little prospect for regional conflict</td>
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<tr>
<td>- security of region due in part to Japan-U.S. security arrangements</td>
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<tr>
<td>3. Basic Defense Concept</td>
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<tr>
<td>- restricted defense to prevention of armed invasion</td>
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<tr>
<td>- reliance upon the U.S. for broader security guarantee</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- counteracting of aggression</td>
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<tr>
<td>4. Posture of National Defense</td>
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<tr>
<td>Establish:</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- warning and surveillance</td>
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<tr>
<td>- counter indirect aggression with use of military power</td>
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<tr>
<td>- counter direct military aggression</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- command communications, transportation, and rear support services</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- education and training of personnel</td>
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<tr>
<td>- disaster-relief operations</td>
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<tr>
<td>5. Posture of the Ground, Maritime, and Air Self Defense Forces</td>
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<tr>
<td>The GSDF shall possess:</td>
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<tr>
<td>- one unit of each type of force for mobile operations</td>
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<tr>
<td>- ground-to-air missiles for vital areas</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The MSDF shall possess:</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- one fleet escort force able to maintain at</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Proposed NDPO (1996)</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td>1. Purpose</td>
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<tr>
<td>Military should:</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- provide assistance in the case of large-scale disasters</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- participate in PKOs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- defend Japan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. International Situation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- end of Cold War</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- increasing interdependence</td>
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<tr>
<td>- major countries are reducing of military capabilities</td>
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<td>- little prospect for regional conflict</td>
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<td>- security in region due in part to Japan-U.S. security arrangements</td>
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<tr>
<td>- restricted defense to prevention of armed invasion</td>
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<tr>
<td>- reliance upon the U.S. for broader security guarantee</td>
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<tr>
<td>- respond to large-scale disasters</td>
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<td>- contribute to PKOs</td>
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<tr>
<td>4. Contents of Japan's Defense Capability (cont.)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Defense postures:</td>
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<tr>
<td>- counter aggression</td>
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<tr>
<td>- disaster relief-operations</td>
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<td>- international peace cooperation activities</td>
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<tr>
<td>- warning, intelligence, and command and communication</td>
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<tr>
<td>- logistic support</td>
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<tr>
<td>- personnel affairs, education, and training</td>
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<tr>
<td>- flexibility</td>
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<tr>
<td>The GSDF shall possess:</td>
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<tr>
<td>- one unit of each type of force for mobile operations</td>
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<tr>
<td>- ground-to-air missiles for vital areas</td>
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<tr>
<td>- high level of proficiency</td>
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<tr>
<td>The MSDF shall possess:</td>
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least one escort flotilla on alert at all times
- one escort ship per specified sea district for coastal surveillance and defense
- fixed wing and anti-submarine aircraft provide surveillance and ship protection.

The ASDF shall possess:
- control and warning units for Japanese airspace
- fighters and ground-to-air units
- capacity to interdict invasions

6. Basic Policy and Matters to be taken into Consideration in Building up Defense Capabilities
- recruiting standards
- maintenance and improvement of defense facilities
- implementation of equipment acquisition programs
- research and development to improve maintenance and qualitative levels

5. Points of Note in Upgrading, Maintaining and Operating the Defense Capability
- defense policies will be in harmony with "economic, fiscal and other situations"
- promote effective maintenance, improvement, and reduction of defense facilities
- cost effective implementation of equipment acquisition programs
- research and development to improve maintenance and qualitative levels


SDF needs to play (i.e. emergency relief and PKO roles). However, in section five of the proposal, provisions are made to promote the "smooth consolidation and reduction of defense facilities," which indicates that forces will be reduced.

Shikata Toshiyuki, a retired lieutenant general of the SDF, suggests decreasing

... the current number of Ground Self-Defense Forces (180,000), with its existing unfilled vacancies, to about 150,000 or 160,000, and (step) up mobility and firepower by reorganizing into 9 smaller divisions and several brigades.

These changes are aimed towards a leaner and meaner SDF.
Conclusion

The patchwork quilt quality of Japanese defense began with the U.S. request to increase Japan's self-defense while preoccupied with the Korean War. The humble beginnings of the Police Reserve Force seem significantly different from the modern military Japan currently possesses. The influences which led to the reinstitutionalization of the military forces consistently affected their size and strength (i.e. pressure from the United States). The effects of the Cold War have pressured these figures upward but with its end, Japan will revert to policies more reflective of its national interests.

The proposed NDPO is Japan's response to the effects of factors identified here as determining defense policy. While historically these elements have pushed the relative strength of defense upward, the end of the Cold War will reduce defense commitments in the long-term. In briefly evaluating the new NDPO as a test of the hypothesis presented, one realizes that even before this document was produced it was possible to see the form changes were likely to take.

Arguments that Japan should rearm, regardless of threat, are contrary to Constitutional constraints on the use of force and popular desires. Politically, Japan has refused to use power politics in achieving its ends: first, it is too weak to do so; and, second, it would cost too much to achieve that strength.

Fictional accounts of Japan asserting its strength like, George Friedman and Meredith Lebard's *The Coming War with Japan* and Tom Clancy's *Debt of Honor*, only raise unjustified fears. The historical development and factors
described refute such fanciful tales and contradict their arguments. Some may point to the rise of nationalist leaders who promote the military as a national symbol. However, these leaders would still be limited by the Constitution, national laws, bureaucratic interests, and public opinion which could override or compromise narrow interests.

The incremental growth of Japan’s defense argues against sudden shifts in defense policy. Since defense policy is checked at many different levels, changes are made through consensus, which requires broad support and reflects traditional influences. In this manner, Japan’s defense can be analyzed far in advance and enables one to outline future policy developments.
ENDNOTES

Notes to Chapter One:


Notes to Chapter Two:


4 Maswood, (1990), 29.


8 Maswood, (1990), 29.


14 Weinstein, (1971), 76.

16 Maswood, (1990), 3.


18 Ibid., 64-65.

19 Ibid., 111.


21 Ibid., 39.

22 Ibid., 39. See also Weinstein, (1971), 120.


25 Sugita, (1979), 140.

26 Keddell, (1993), 41.

27 The Japan Institute of International Affairs, (1991), 72.

28 Maswood, (1990), 28.

29 The Japan Institute of International Affairs, (1991), 72.

30 Weinstein, (1971), 111.


32 Maswood, (1990), 35.

33 Ibid., 5.

34 Ibid., 9.


36 Dornan, (1979), 8.

37 Maswood, (1990), 31. The oil shocks and the collapse of the Bretton-Woods system mad it difficult for Japan to purchase the military equipment it needed from outside to complete the plan. At home, the costs of personnel and their maintenance became increasingly expensive in light of these events.

38 Ibid., 31, 32.

39 Ibid., 32, 33.

40 Ibid., 39.

41 Ibid., 40.


43 Maswood, (1990), 35-37.

44 Ibid., (1980), 41.

Ibid., 138. See also Maswood, (1990), 38.

47 Maswood, (1990), 54, 55.

48 Ibid., 58.


52 Ibid., 109-116.

Notes to Chapter Three:

1 These factors are a compilation of ideas from several sources. See Emmerson, J. K., & Holland, H. M.; Maswood, S. J.; Holland, H. M.; Morimoto, S.; Ozawa, I.

2 Ibid.

3 For an example see Morimoto, (1994), 173.

4 A general description of public negativity can be found in Morimoto, Ibid.


6 The ratcheting effect also takes into account qualitative changes. In the early period, weapon systems could only be defensive in nature, however, this is
difficult to define since many systems are dual use -- offensive and defensive. Examples would include the possession of blue water naval ships, and aircraft with refueling capabilities -- both of which enable the SDF to strike offensively while increasing the ability of the SDF to counter external threats. Opposition to these systems waned over time and by the 1990s had become accepted parts of the SDF arsenal. See Morimoto, S., (1994), 173.

7 Holland, (1988), 34.

8 Maswood, S., J., (1990), 29, 30.


10 Ibid., 61-63.


16 Maswood, (1990), 32.


18 Holland, (1988), 42-44.
19 Ibid., 14.

20 Ibid., 29-47.


26 Maswood, (1990), 53, 54.


29 Maswood, (1990), 50.


31 Ibid., 172, 173.

32 Dornan, summarized a comment made by Hasai Hiyuki of the Kanai Economic Association who stated in 1978, “. . . it would be desirable for the government immediately to increase defense expenditures to 1.5 percent of the gross national product; the U.S.-Japan Mutual Defense Treaty, he asserted was no longer adequate to protect Japan against all of the threats to its security.” This statement reflects how Japan was having to rethink its military stance in the face of a possible U.S. withdrawal and considered providing for its own security.

Dornan, (1979), 17.

A wider perspective would include Japan’s desire to maintain open access to the United States’ market for Japanese products.

The Japan Institute of International Affairs, (1991), 23.


**Notes to Chapter Four:**

1 Ibid.

2 The 1976 NDPO force objectives and capacity were in two sections, four and five. In the proposal these are placed together in section four.

3 Ibid.

BIBLIOGRAPHY


