Crisis of Chineseness: Value Changes in the Face of Modernization in China

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Acronyms

CC    Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party
CCP   Chinese Communist Party
CSSA  Chinese Students and Scholars Association
FACSS Friendship Association of Chinese Students and Scholars
PRC   People's Republic of China
Chapter 1: Introduction to Contemporary China

Opening My Eyes to Chinese Politics

My association with China goes back more than a decade. I have been familiar with Chinese culture since my childhood. Its history, literature, philosophy, martial arts, kungfu movies, and food—all these cultural attributes have fascinated me for years. However, it was not until my sophomore year at Carroll College that I became captivated by the Reform and Opening Up and contemporary Chinese politics. That is when I learned of the Reform and Opening Up from a Japanese magazine specializing in international affairs.

It has been eighteen years since China changed its course of development. The policy called Reform and Opening Up was adopted in the Third Plenum of the Eleventh Central Committee in December, 1978. Since then, the People's Republic of China (PRC) has promoted market-oriented economic reforms, coupling these with an opening up to the outside. For the past two decades, its economic development and potential, vast market have attracted the attention of the world. I was fascinated by the dynamic process of reform and Chinese politics connected with these policies.

Richard Baum summarized the reform in the following precise manner:

In place of Mao's insistence on austerity, egalitarianism, self-sacrifice, self-reliance, and perpetual class struggle, they [new leaders in the post-Maoist era] advocated incentive driven production responsibility systems, decentralized state administration, expanded use of market mechanisms (euphemistically known as "economic methods"), and sharply increased international economic and technological involvement.

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1Baum, 1994, pp. 63-64.
2Baum, 1994, p. 4.
Increased interaction with the outside, especially the West, has brought foreign technology, business people, and tourists, as well as foreign ideas, into China. Some of the newly introduced ideas have the potential to challenge the legitimacy of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP). Alarmed by the encroachment of such ideas, leaders of the CCP name this phenomenon *peaceful evolution* and denounce it as "alleged Western attempts to undermine socialism and promote the growth of capitalism and bourgeois democracy in China through the extension of economic, cultural, political, and ideological influence and pressures from abroad."³

The term *peaceful evolution* first appeared in early history of the PRC when Mao Zedong said, "We have to ruin the hope for peaceful evolution in China which an imperialist prophet claims."⁴ This statement was an objection to what U.S. Secretary of State John Foster Dulles said in the context of containment, "I want to entrust our hope to the third and fourth generation of the People's Republic of China."⁵ Mao described peaceful evolution as attempts to convert socialism into capitalism in peaceful ways.⁶

As China's leaders see it, the manifestations of *peaceful evolution* include growing numbers of protests calling for democracy (in Marxist terms, *bourgeois* democracy), expansion of capitalist mentality, and moral degeneration, all characteristic of a decadent, Western, popular culture.

However, this notion of peaceful evolution is problematic. It is difficult to find

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³Ibid., p. 306.
⁵Ibid.
⁶Ibid.
evidence that Western foreign policy makers congregate in a back room and conspire to subvert Communist rule. More problematic is determining whether cultural changes (including political attitudes) in China are an intended result of subversive attempts by the West or an unintended result of modernization and internationalization. These puzzles provide the foci of this paper.

One of the goals of this paper is to investigate the logic of the peaceful evolution and the campaign against it. Another goal is to examine the validity of the claim of peaceful evolution. Moreover, this paper investigates the role of Chinese students in the United States as one of many media of infiltration of foreign ideas. More specifically, do these Chinese students play a substantial role in changes in Chinese culture, such as Chinese's increasing inclinations toward democracy, capitalism, and individualism? In order to understand the enormity of the changes occurring in China and the context within which the campaign against peaceful evolution developed, some back-ground on the changes in the Chinese economy will be necessary.

Reform and Opening Up

Economy in the Maoist Era

As indicated above, 1978 was a watershed year in the history of the PRC, that is, the termination of Maoist socialism. What characterized the economic policy before 1978, particularly of Mao? In Maoist China (1949-1976), the economy was command

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7Mao Zedong, the preeminent leader of the People's Republic of China since the establishment of PRC in 1949, died in September 9, 1976. After brief, but intensive, power struggles, Deng Xiaoping solidified the party, negated some of Maoist practice, and launched the Reform and Opening Up. For detail of this period, see Baum, 1994, pp. 27-65.
administrative and the means of production was publicly owned. Foreign trade was kept to a minimum to restrain the PRC's economic dependency on foreign countries and limit foreign influence resulting from such dependency. People were encouraged to work for non-material incentives. Although the standard of living was low, egalitarian principles were put into practice. For instance, lifetime employment (iron rice bowl) was guaranteed, along with other social welfare programs run by national enterprises, such as housing, child care, education, meals, and pension.8

The Maoist economy was a command economy, characterized by the collectivization of agriculture and nationalization of industries. The CCP started the collectivization of farms in 1953. By the end of the year, 30% of the farms were collectivized.9 However, the process was so slow that Mao described it "as slow as foot-bound women walk[ing]."10 In August, 1958, the campaign merging farmers into people's communes began and by the end of the year, 98% of the farmers were incorporated into the communes.11 People's communes were an amalgamation of political and production units. The communes practiced egalitarian distribution of wealth within a unit based on in kind wages and the rejection of material incentives.12

Another important aspect of the Maoist era was nationalization of industries.

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8Goldstein, 1992, pp. 13-16. The connotation of iron rice bowl is slightly different from lifetime employment in the capitalist economy. Iron rice bowl literally means eating with a rice bowl which never breaks even if it falls down, and therefore, means the lifetime employment at national enterprises which never go bankrupt despite financial difficulties (Himeta, et al., 1993, p. 266).


10quoted in NHK China Project, 1995a, p. 38.


Nationalization started as a part of the First Five-Year Plan in 1952. By 1957, state enterprises shared 68.2% in total industrial output (56.0% in 1952), capitalistically-managed state enterprises shared 31.7% (26.9% in 1952), and private enterprises became non-existent (17.1% in 1952). Besides nationalization of industries, nationalization of land was implemented. Since 1953, land has been owned by state and laborers' groups, meaning that once enterprises and other state institutions obtain land, they can use it perpetually with no cost but cannot sell or buy it.

All these methods were aimed at the establishment of a command economy. The State Planning Commission (SPC), the State Economic Commission (SEC), and ministries for each industry were established. Distribution of materials for production, finance, distribution of products, price, and trade were under the central control of the government. Market mechanisms and price mechanisms were abandoned. "Therefore, plants and firms were not what we [Japanese] imagine as 'enterprises' but merely manufacturing sectors, or tools, which carried out what was already determined (although this was often not carried out)."

All development achieved in early Maoist China was offset by the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution (the Cultural Revolution) from 1966 into the early 1970s. Although there are debates over the origin of the Cultural Revolution, it is apparent that the Cultural Revolution brought economic and social deterioration, and educational disruption. In the

\[\text{13Himeta, et al., 1993, pp. 197-199.}\]
\[\text{14NHK China Project, 1995a, p. 178. However, in April, 1988, the constitution redefined property rights so that "use right" of land can be transferred ("ownership" still belongs to the state) (Ibid., p. 184).}\]
\[\text{15Himeta, et al., 1993, p. 198.}\]
\[\text{16NHK China Project, 1995a, P. 97.}\]
economic realm, annual rates of agricultural and industrial production dropped by 9.6% in 1967 and 4.2% in 1968. The Cultural Revolution devastated the educational system, too. From 1966 to 1970, higher education was suspended because it was perceived as the manifestation of the bourgeois academic authority. From 1967, the youth in cities were sent to rural villages. They were unable to develop their intellectual capacities for years. The intellectuals were forced to follow the same course as the youth; categorized as one of Nine Old Stinkies and persecuted harshly, intellectuals became inactive.17

Economy in the Post-Maoist Era

The Cultural Revolution had greatly subsided by the time of Mao's death in 1976.18 Following Mao's death and the success of Deng’s faction in securing leadership in 1978, the Cultural Revolution was recognized as the biggest mistake in the history of the PRC.19 This realization and the need to repair an economy devastated by the Cultural Revolution necessitated a reexamination of the previous economic policies and, hence, departure from the Maoist economy. The economy in the new era is characterized by the policy of Reform and Opening Up, which is aimed at stimulating economic growth by market mechanisms and opening the country to the outside.20 It is characterized by agricultural, industrial and trade reforms. Additionally, the Reform and Opening Up has aimed at serving a broader national goal called the Four Modernizations (in agriculture, industry, science and technology, and

17Himeta, et al., 1993, pp. 240-247.
18In a narrower sense, the end of the Cultural Revolution occurred at the CCP Ninth National Congress in 1969 (Himeta, et al., 1993, p. 235).
20Himeta, et al., 1993, pp. 260-261.
the military). In other words, the Reform and Opening Up was supposed to boost national strength as a whole.\textsuperscript{21}

In the agricultural sector, the \textit{household-responsibility system} was introduced in 1980. Under this system, the production unit was a family and land was allocated to each household. Families were allowed to sell anything beyond the quota assigned by the government in the newly introduced market. This material incentive motivated farmers to increase production. For instance, from 1980 to 1986, the agricultural production increased 3\% annually, whereas from 1949 to 1980 it increased by 2\% on average annually.\textsuperscript{22} Also during this period, the new constitution adopted by the Fifth Plenum of the Fifth People's National Congress (November, 1982) officially abolished the political role of the people's commune, and, subsequently, 96\% of the farmers were decollectivized by the end of 1984.\textsuperscript{23}

Industrial reform started in 1984, and is characterized as the decentralization of decision making to individual enterprises. State enterprises have gained autonomy in personnel and financial affairs, wages, and production. In the industrial sector as well, material incentives were introduced to increase industrial production.\textsuperscript{24} Also in 1984, a three-tier price system was introduced. Under this system, some prices are determined by the state, some by the market within boundaries determined by state, and others completely by the market. Subsequently, in 1988, the state sector in industry grew by 13\%, the collective sector by 29\%, and the private sector by 46\%.\textsuperscript{25} In 1994, the non-state sector shared roughly 10\%.

\textsuperscript{21}Anonymous, 1997.
\textsuperscript{22}Goldstein, 1992, pp. 18-19; Himeta, et al., 1993, p. 261.
\textsuperscript{23}Himeta, et al., 1993, p. 261.
\textsuperscript{24}NHK China Project, 1995a, p. 97.
\textsuperscript{25}Goldstein, 1992, p. 21; p. 25.
of industrial production.\textsuperscript{26}

In terms of trade reform, a remarkable step was taken in 1979. China established four special economic zones (SEZs--Shenzhen, Zhuhai, Shantou, and Xiamen), which welcomed direct foreign investment and technology, assembled a good portion of exports, experimented with new economic systems, and provided models for the modernization of other regions.\textsuperscript{27}

In 1984, fourteen other coastal cities (including Shanghai) opened to the outside. Foreign trade in 1990 was five and half times as large as that in 1978.\textsuperscript{28} The PRC also made an effort to join leading, international, economic organizations. In the early 1980s, the PRC gained membership in the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund.\textsuperscript{29}

\textit{Side Effects of the Reform and Opening Up}

In contrast to the above, Dengist economy departed from that of Mao in two major respects: the introduction of market mechanisms and the opening up of the country to the outside world. The introduction of market mechanisms means two changes: from state initiatives to individual initiatives, and from non-material incentives to material incentives. The opening up also means the influx of foreign ideas, besides outflow of Chinese ideas. The Reform and Opening Up has been accompanied by the perception of negative outcomes, two of which are notable for this study. They are moral degeneration and increasing inclination toward Western, non-traditional Chinese ideas. The Research Institute of Public Opinion at

\textsuperscript{26}NHK China Project, 1995a, p. 140. However, even in 1990, the non-state sector produced 45\% of manufactured goods in the PRC (Goldstein, 1992, p. 37).

\textsuperscript{27}Goldstein, 1992, p. 21; Himeta, et al., pp. 262-264.

\textsuperscript{28}Himeta, et al., 1993, pp. 262-263.

\textsuperscript{29}Feeney, 1994, p. 229.
People's University conducted a survey concerning the degree of citizens' satisfaction in 1992. In terms of social morale, 52.1% of the respondents were either "dissatisfied" or "not satisfied very much." In terms of human relations, 34.9% answered either "dissatisfied" or "not satisfied very much," and 72.8% acknowledged, "People today have become self-centered." A crisis of faith among youth also has been observed. Youth are increasingly cynical, materialistic, and hedonistic.

Another manifestation of moral degradation is the increase in crime. Since the 1980s, crimes committed by youngsters (under twenty-five years old) increased tenfold. Besides juvenile crimes, pornography and kidnapping have become concerns. Corruption, speculation, and profiteering of officials are increasingly rampant.

Equally alarming to Party leaders is people's, especially intellectuals', preference and call for Western, bourgeois democracy, instead of socialist democracy. For example, in Peng's study on Chinese political discourses, he found that all discourses in his survey show their desire for democracy. In 1979, a democratization movement called Beijing Spring arose. The government stifled it, concluding that this movement from the grassroots would undermine social order and political stability under communist rule. In 1986, student

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30Kojima, 1994, p. 143.
31Ibid.
33This may be the result of introduction of commercial agriculture. According to Ember and Ember (1993, p. 461), it brings about class polarization, which results in migration to urban areas. Crapo (1993, p. 342) suggests that rapid population growth in the urban sector results in crime, among other social problems.
34Baum, 1994, p. 379.
36Himeta, et al., pp. 270-272.
protests calling for democratization spread nationwide. Conservatives within the party perceived it as a manifestation of *spiritual pollution* caused by *bourgeois liberalization* and held General Secretary Hu Yaobang responsible for the protest, forcing him to resign.\(^{37}\) In 1989, well-publicized student demonstrations at the Tiananmen Square were decisively suppressed. Although there were disputes within the Party over an appropriate government reaction to the demonstration, party leaders including Deng Xiaoping did not consider milder alternatives; they concluded, as they had in 1979, that democratization by such a grassroots mass movement would result in social and political disruptions and chaos reminiscent of the Cultural Revolution.\(^{38}\)

Concerned with this social decadence and possible socio-political disruption, the CCP launched a series of rectification campaigns, such as the anti-spiritual pollution campaign and the anti-liberal democratization campaign. After the Tiananmen incident (or the June Fourth Incident, as it is called in the PRC) of 1989, Chinese leaders characterized the threat of social decadence as *peaceful evolution* and launched the *anti-peaceful evolution campaign*. It is this campaign that deserves further focus in this study. In the following chapter, I will investigate the anti-peaceful evolution campaign—its logic and the politics behind it.

\(^{37}\)Ibid., pp. 273-274.

\(^{38}\)Ibid., pp. 275-277.
Chapter 2: Peaceful Evolution

Thirty years have passed since the term *peaceful evolution* was first used. In 1989, the term reappeared as a concern of Party leaders. Conscious of increasing moral degradation and an inclination toward Western ideas among their people, Chinese leaders insist upon struggling against "subversive foreign ideas that filtered in as a result of the economic open-door policy, cultural exchanges, study abroad, etc."\(^1\)

This notion of peaceful evolution is sometimes utilized as a tool for foreign policy.\(^2\) This paper, however, focuses on the role of peaceful evolution as a tool for domestic rectification. The *anti-peaceful evolution campaign* is a rectification campaign following ones against ideological erosion, such as *spiritual pollution* and *bourgeois liberalization*. Before describing the notion of peaceful evolution and a campaign against it, it would be helpful to understand the dual sides of this notion which I found. The notion of peaceful evolution connotes the West's effort to undermine socialism. However, whenever Chinese leaders discuss it, the discussion accompanies concerns about the West's attack on Chineseness. In other words, the notion of peaceful evolution connotes two different kinds of ideas: non-socialist, presumably capitalist ideas, and non-Chinese, Western ideas.

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\(^1\)Goldstein, 1992, p. 73.

\(^2\)According to Amako (1992, p. 90), Chinese leaders see the "act" of peaceful evolution as interference in China's domestic affairs by the West. In other words, they utilize the notion of peaceful evolution as a tool to reject any kind of demand regarding Chinese domestic politics from the West (e.g., a series of Western demands on human rights protection).
The Anti-Peaceful Evolution Campaign

These are a series of campaigns aimed at opposing cultural "degradation" and reindoctrinating socialist ideology. The *anti-spiritual pollution campaign* (1983-1984) targeted Western bourgeois culture. Books, videotapes, and films representing Western, decadent, capitalist culture were confiscated. It soon spun out of control and threatened Chinese reformers, foreign investors, and the process of the reform itself.³

The *anti-bourgeois liberalization campaign* (1985-1989) attacked demands for Western democracy and humanism among party reformers and intellectuals, both of which conservatives called decadent capitalist ideology.⁴ It was accompanied by heavy censorship of the press, a ban of liberal magazines, and excommunication of certain intellectuals, such as Fang Lizhi, from the Party.⁵ The campaign, which seems to have contained elements of factional politics more than the previous campaign, reached its height when conservatives managed to force Hu Yaobang, the general secretary at the time, to resign. Outside the party, the campaign not only failed to evoke enthusiasm but also provoked opposition among intellectuals.⁶

The anti-peaceful evolution campaign (1989-1992) targeted Western ideas. It began in the aftermath of the June Fourth Incident. Infused by the image of the Goddess of Democracy standing in Tiananmen Square as a manifestation of peaceful evolution, anything

⁵Fang Lizhi was an astrophysist and vice-president of the Chinese University of Science and Technology before he was excommunicated. He was one of the most active critics during this period of time. For his advocacy and activity in this period, see Baum, 1994, pp. 200-201.
Western was treated as subversive. For example, personnel of the Peace Corps and Fulbright scholars were perceived as foreign agents who collaborated with domestic counter-revolutionaries to subvert the regime.\(^7\)

Tomoyuki Kojima suggested that the background of the anti-peaceful evolution campaign was a division within the party over the best policy in retaining communist rule in China. Alarmed by the collapse of communism in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union, conservatives insisted on solidifying the ideology in order to sustain the regime. Deng and pro-growth reformers advocated ensuring popular support for the regime by modernization, meaning further reform and wider opening up.\(^8\)

The campaign was stimulated by the formulation of a new strategic agenda, neoconservatism. Leaders in this camp, mostly those of the princeling group,\(^9\) perceived the collapse of communism in East Europe and the Soviet Union as a result of peaceful evolution and, in order to prevent such an event in China, insisted on maintaining political stability and unity by gradualism in the reform, the Party's control over the economy, and cultural nationalism.\(^10\)

A Chinese visiting scholar, speaking on condition of anonymity, suggested an alternative viewpoint that the campaign started due to the Party's preference of the conservative policy. According to this informant, who offered a view of a monolithic Party staunchly in support of this campaign, peaceful evolution has been a concern among the

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\(^7\)Dittmer, 1994, p. 188.

\(^8\)Kojima, 1994, p. 52.

\(^9\)The princeling group is a group of children of Party elders. One well-known member is Chen Yuan, a son of Chen Yun. He is a Vice President of the People's Bank of China (Swaine, 1995, p. 119).

Party leaders throughout the 1980s and 1990s. Before the June Fourth Incident, liberals thought that it was a manageable problem, whereas conservatives perceived it as a serious matter. After 1989, the Party leadership built a clear consensus: "It is no good ideologically and practically."\textsuperscript{11} Such a consensus, this Chinese visiting scholar suggested, started the campaign.\textsuperscript{12} He also noted that the anti-peaceful evolution campaign differed from the previous campaigns in terms of different levels of perceived threats. In the previous campaigns, the peaceful evolution was a potential threat. In this campaign, it was a clear and present danger since the leadership concluded that the demonstration at the Tiananmen Square in 1989 was the direct result of Western influence under the Reform and Opening Up. This clear perception of its threats, according to this informant, made the Party leaders take counteractions wide in scope.

Driven by the perceived threat of peaceful evolution, the rectification focused on ideological constriction. On September 29, 1989, General Secretary Jiang Zemin emphasized the importance of political education to prevent ideology from degenerating into capitalist ideology and called for observance of the \textit{Four Cardinal Principles} (socialism, people's democratic dictatorship, leadership by the communist party, and Marxist-Leninist-Maoist Thought). According to the Chinese visiting scholar mentioned above, this campaign was more sweeping than the previous campaigns. Mass media, the government, and many work units were involved. Political education took place on many occasions.\textsuperscript{13} At school, children

\textsuperscript{11}Anonymous, 1997.
\textsuperscript{12}Ibid.
\textsuperscript{13}Anonymous, 1997. Nonetheless, there is a voice denying that the campaign was wide in scope. A Chinese student I interviewed, who was in China until 1994, said, "I saw the term peaceful evolution in newspapers very often. But I don't think it was a special policy... No. I don't think it was an actual policy" (Zhang, 1996).
studied the Century of Humiliation (1839-1949) as a part of political and ideological education. Military training at universities was revived. Freshmen were required to take it at school for a month, while those at Beijing University and Fudan University, the most active universities in the course of the June-Fourth Incident, were required to do a year at military academies. Within the military, half of the training was devoted to political study. The campaign to *emulate Lei Feng*, a model for soldiers of the People's Liberation Army (PLA) was revived. Additionally, regulations on student exchanges were tightened.

Between 1989 and 1991, Jiang Zemin and Premier Li Peng followed the conservatives' policy to achieve "administrative rectification and readjustment" in the economic arena and "oppose[ ] peaceful evolution" in the political arena. By the middle of 1991, Jiang literally became a spokesperson for Deng Liqun and other conservative ideologues. In July, Jiang gave a speech in which he outlined the main task of the Party to be that of opposing peaceful evolution and encouraged Party members to engage in intensive study in order to carry out such a task. This statement encountered opposition not only from local governments opposing re-centralization of the economy, but also from Deng Xiaoping opposing the conservative faction.

In the autumn of 1991, Chen Yun denounced Vice-Premier Zhu Ronji without

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14Wang, 1992, p. 221.

15A Chinese visiting scholar, 1997; NHK China Project, 1995b, p. 143. The military training at Beijing University and Fudan University was cut down to one month three or four years later.

16Baum, 1994, p. 306.


19Ibid., pp. 244-245.
mentioning his name. Zhu was hand-picked by Deng Xiaoping to restructure the national economy because of his understanding of economics. Chen denounced him, insisting that the criterion for Party leadership should be commitment to the communist ideology, not technical skills. At the Eighth Plenum of the Central Committee (CC), Bo Yibo, a conservative, presented six points made by Chen Yun. These were: 1) the major criterion of Party leaders should be ideological soundness; 2) the PRC should not compromise with the United States on the human rights issue; 3) the strife over the Party line should continue; 4) it would be necessary to ideologically purify the Party in order to maintain the role of the vanguard party; 5) reformers have brought a heavy cost to the Party; and, 6) the Party's main task should be to fight against bourgeois liberalization.

All these conditions emphasizing ideological soundness since 1989 alarmed Deng Xiaoping and cast a dark shadow over the course of his policy of the Reform and Opening Up. He struck back in January, 1992. His well-publicized tour to southern China, where reform was most advanced, aimed at mobilizing support for him to swing the recent policy trend toward the acceleration of the reform. In this tour, he made a series of speeches, which eventually brought China back into the course of further reforms. He remarked, "The reform needs a search for a new thinking. The key is liberation of thought," and "Watch out for the Right [liberal reformers], but mainly defend against the Left [conservatives]." He also remarked:

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23quoted in Baum, 1994, p. 344.
The major criteria for determining "socialist or capitalist in name" should be whether or not it is advantageous to the development of production of the socialist society, whether or not it is advantageous to building up general national strength of the socialist nation, and whether or not it is advantageous to raising the living standard of the people.24 This counter offensive was so successful that most party leaders supported his statements during this trip, concerning the acceleration of the reform process. Consequently, the anti-peaceful evolution campaign degenerated and conservatives expressed their support for the Reform and Opening Up.25 The CCP Fourteenth National Congress (October, 1992) adopted the acceleration of the Reform and Opening Up and economic development as the basic Party line for the next five years.26 The Congress ratified Deng Xiaoping Theory concerning "the need to shift China from 'socialist planned commodity economy' to a 'socialist market economy.'"27 The Congress was closed with a resolution, stating, "We have to arm the entire party with Deng Xiaoping Theory in regard to construction of 'socialism with Chinese characteristics,' adapting to a new situation in which the process of the Reform and Opening Up and modernization accelerate."28 The continuation of the reform was affirmed and the anti-peaceful evolution campaign terminated.

This heralded a shift of top priorities among the leadership. As the Chinese visiting scholar understood, from 1989 to 1992, ideological rectification and economic retrenchment were the top priorities of the party. In 1992, economic growth became the top priority again.

After 1992, the leadership found another way to deal with peaceful evolution through

26 Ibid., p. 152.
27 Baum, 1994, pp. 360-361.
the construction of a *socialist spiritual civilization*. The Sixth Plenum of the Fourteenth CC (October, 1996) adopted the "socialist spiritual civilization" resolution. This resolution, originally suggested in 1986, aims at (re)establishing social morality among people, commercial morality among entrepreneurs, and political morality among Party members because "in some areas, morality degenerated, and mammonism, hedonism and individualism are rampant." In this resolution, Jiang Zemin attempts to solve these social problems which can undermine the legitimacy of the Party. Referring to the analogy, "When one opens a window, not only fresh air but also flies come into the room," the Chinese visiting scholar remarked, "You need not close the window. You have other ways to deal with dust and flies. That is what they [Chinese leaders] call spiritual [socialist] civilization."

The end of the official anti-peaceful evolution campaign has two contradictory implications. First, it does not mean rectification is also over. As described above, rectification still continues in a new fashion, probably to a lesser extent. Second, it does not mean, as the "socialist spiritual civilization" resolution implies, that *bourgeois liberalization* has disappeared. In fact, there is still rampant corruption and a crisis of faith, and Western ideas are increasingly accepted. The second point will be discussed in chapter four of this thesis.

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31 Ibid.
Politics behind the Campaign

There are four sources which I found that caused the anti-peaceful evolution campaign: an international environment hostile to communism, China's integration into the global economy, changes in Chinese mentality, and factionalism within the Party.

First, the international atmosphere was not favorable to communism. The collapse of communism in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union alarmed Chinese leaders with the possibility of a similar event in China. These leaders concluded that the collapse of communism was a result of peaceful evolution and that they should apply certain measures to prevent a similar event in China.33 After the attempted coup in the Soviet Union in 1991, Chinese leaders, especially conservatives such as Wang Zhen, Deng Liqun, and Lie Ruihuan, denounced liberal and capitalist ideologies as subversive to communism.34 Chen Yun insisted on preventing a "Yeltsin-like figure" from emerging in China as a matter of urgency.35 Beijing University President Wu Shuqing condemned the Voice of America and the British Broadcasting Corporation for poisoning the youth and polluting the society through the infiltrating of individualism and capitalist ideologies.36

Susumu Amako pointed out that the anti-peaceful evolution campaign was the result of a linkage between the external and domestic environments after 1989. According to him, it was a response to a tide of democratic movements, both worldwide and domestic. He interpreted the unstable political situation after the June-Fourth Incident in that, "[The Party]

34Baum, 1994, pp. 334-335.
36Ibid., p. 335.
attempted to 'constrict' and restore political stability by demonstrating a hard-line diplomacy both externally and internally and inciting tension domestically.\textsuperscript{37}

Second, the Reform and Opening Up linked the Chinese economy to the global economy. This left Chinese leaders with a sense of vulnerability since China could no longer exercise as much control over its domestic economy as before when it was almost autarkic. This is the context in which conservatives insist on less engagement in the international economy.\textsuperscript{38}

Third, changes in Chinese mentality and life style alarmed Party leaders. Although these will be discussed in detail in chapter four, I will briefly explain here the Chinese inclination toward Western ideas, a decline in faith in the Party, and mammonism. The 1980s witnessed diversity on Chinese college campuses. Many students were fascinated by new, particularly Western, ideas and read writings of Western philosophers such as Rousseau and Montesquieu.\textsuperscript{39} An increasing number of students came to feel that the selflessness and altruism emphasized in communism were nonsense.\textsuperscript{40} They came to think that socialism suppressed individuality. They became less enthusiastic about politics and joining the Party.\textsuperscript{41} Mammonism spread so far that a young man in Guangzhou said, "What's wrong with


\textsuperscript{38}Goldstein, 1992, p. 74.

\textsuperscript{39}There are, of course, countertrends to westernization of ideas. Yan Jun, lyricist and artist director for the rock band Tang Dynasty, remarked, "I've been westernized almost my whole life... And now I really hate anything from the West. I resent its influence... modern Chinese culture has never lived up to the tradition because it's been ruined by all Western influence. We have to get back to our roots..." (quoted in Janes, 1994, p. 160)

\textsuperscript{40}Chi, 1991, p. 156.

\textsuperscript{41}Ibid., pp. 156-157.
mammonism?" As noted earlier, juvenile crimes have increased and are increasingly atrocious. An increasing number of youngsters commit crimes, homicide in extreme cases, for money to play around and to buy luxuries. These changes are not desirable, or even acceptable, to the Party leaders. It is not difficult to imagine that the Party might take measures similar to those in 1989 if a large number of students, inspired by Montesquieu, demonstrate demanding the rule of law.

Fourth, factionalism within the Party was probably the most important factor in the anti-peaceful evolution campaign. There are two reasons for the importance of factionalism in post-Maoist Chinese politics. First, Deng's effort to bring about the rule of law reduced a sense of insecurity among Party leaders and enhanced the role of bureaucratic interests and personal policy preference in policy making. Also, higher civility, a result of an attempt to bring about the rule of law, meant higher tolerance for diversity and factional opposition. Second, Deng emphasized pragmatism and dismissed the priority given to ideology. The decline in the importance of ideology (i.e., less urgency to adhere to one ideology) resulted in increasing factional maneuvers. For these two reasons, "[F]actions are more oriented toward enhancing group and member interests and pressing desirable policy alternatives.""
Lowell Dittmer and Yu-shan Wu found that since 1984, when urban-industrial reform started, the business cycle of the economy has synchronized with the reform cycle (between reform and retrenchment) and the movement cycle (between social tranquility and protests). In other words, prosperity is accompanied by reform and social tranquility. Once the economy overheats, retrenchment and protests start, leading to economic depression. Then, after depression hits bottom, reform and prosperity come again. According to this theory, the pro-growth faction attempts reform, which produces an overheated economy and social unrest. Then the pro-stability faction takes charge to bring stability to the economy and society and adopt austerity and retrenchment policies, accompanied by ideological constriction. That, in turn, provokes reaction from the pro-growth faction, which then takes control.  

This theory helps explain the course of the anti-peaceful evolution campaign. In 1988 and early 1989, Chinese people experienced rapid economic growth, high inflation, and social unrest, resulting in a mass demonstration in the spring of 1989. Subsequently, Chen Yun's pro-stability faction initiated their preferable policies, resulting in tight ideological, economic, and political policies. Such strict measures alarmed Deng, who reacted strongly when he took the tour to southern China in 1992. The policy swings appear to confirm the theory suggested by Dittmer and Wu. This theory helps explain the peaceful evolution campaign as a result of factional strife for preferable policies.

The strife was further motivated by personal reasons. Chen Yun and Deng Liqun are noteworthy among other members of the pro-stability (or conservative) faction. One of Chen

48Ibid., pp. 483-492 passim.
Yun's motivations was his antagonism toward Deng Xiaoping's style of leadership. In Chen's eyes, Deng acted as a one-man decision maker in the supposedly collective leadership.\textsuperscript{49}

Deng Liqun was a party theoretician. In the late 1970s, this ex-political secretary of Liu Shaoqi's\textsuperscript{50} contested for the favor of Deng Xiaoping with Hu Yaobang. When Deng Xiaoping chose Hu as a successor to the general secretary of the CCP, Deng Liqun became disappointed and changed his allegiance from Deng Xiaoping to Chen Yun. Since then, he has opposed Deng Xiaoping and his protégé.\textsuperscript{51}

Of the four major factors contributing to the anti-peaceful evolution campaign, the latter three (entanglement with the global economy, changes in Chinese mentality, and factionalism) were associated with the essence of the Reform and Opening Up. In other words, the Reform and Opening Up produced conditions for the anti-peaceful campaign (a sense of vulnerability in global economy among Chinese leaders, cultural changes, and factional politics in Dengist era) and endangered itself. It is interesting that the Reform and Opening Up initiated by Deng endangered itself by its own nature and became secure and accelerated once again only by Deng's intervention.

At the macro level, the anti-peaceful evolution campaign attempted to preserve ideological soundness among the Chinese although it seems to have been utilized as a context for factional strife. But how about at the micro level? Were policies of the campaign well implemented on a specific policy? The next chapter examines the pervasiveness of this

\textsuperscript{49}Baum, 1994, p. 320.

\textsuperscript{50}Liu Shaoqi was a general secretary of the CCP from 1959 to 1969. After the destructive Great Leap Forward (1958-1959), he and Deng introduced incentive mechanisms resembling the reform in agriculture since 1978. Both he and his policy were under harsh attacks during the Cultural Revolution, during which he died in prison.

\textsuperscript{51}Baum, 1994, p. 11.
micro policy. It will focus on China's policy toward student and scholar exchanges. Chinese students abroad can certainly be agents of peaceful evolution by disseminating foreign ideas to Chinese on the mainland. What is the government policy toward them? What are some reasons behind such a policy? Are those students really agents of peaceful evolution having a lot to do with changes in Chinese minds? In other words, what kind of influence, and how much, do the students abroad wield? The next chapter will try to answer these questions, based on a literature review and the survey I conducted among Chinese students in the United States.
Chapter 3: Chinese Students in the United States

Policy toward Student Exchanges

The politics of student exchanges between the People's Republic of China and the United States must be understood from a broad perspective. For this reason, it is necessary to approach the source of student exchange policies first and specific policies second.

The student and scholar exchanges between the PRC and the U.S. started in 1979. The exchanges were conditioned by the Reform and Opening Up. As noted earlier, the Reform and Opening Up was an approach to achieve even larger goals—the Four Modernizations (of agriculture, industry, science and technology, and the military).

In order to achieve modernization in science and technology, the participation of intellectuals was crucial. For modernization, the Chinese Communist Party attempted to improve its relationship with intellectuals, which had been a cold one since the establishment of the PRC. In 1978, Deng Xiaoping announced that intellectuals were not a class enemy. He claimed that engagement in science and technology was not a capitalist but scholastic activity. He went on to clarify, "[B]rain workers who serve socialism are a part of the working people." He also argued, "[W]e should, in line with the Party's policy of uniting with, educating and remolding the intellectuals, bring out their specialized abilities, respect their labor and their interest in their progress, giving them a warm helping hand."

A warmer relationship between the Party and the intellectuals did not, however, result in immediate modernization in science and technology. The scholastic capacity was

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1 quoted in Wang, 1992, p. 305.
2 Ibid.
considerably low, largely damaged by the Cultural Revolution. Chinese scientists did not have sufficient accumulation of basic research or adequate institutions to increase internal capacity for science and technology. The PRC needed a quick fix. Under such circumstances, "To catch up with the ever-expanding body of world knowledge, China plans to learn from the advanced nations and develop her own scientific capabilities." National-level officials felt that China needed well-trained intellectuals to achieve the Four Modernizations. For this reason, the decision to resume the student and scholar exchanges was made in 1978. A Chinese visiting scholar, speaking in anonymity regarding the resumption of the exchanges, remarked, "You cannot develop on your own this size of technology. In the '50s, '60s, and '70s, although we achieved a lot, we were still behind. The best and quickest way to catch up is really this way--go out and learn from people, learn things other countries did."

What kinds of policies did this impetus bring about? Before describing the policies, it should be noted that there is a distinction between officially sponsored and self-sponsored Chinese students studying abroad. Officially sponsored students are "those PRC students and scholars who have been chosen to come to the United States by the Chinese government and/or the subordinate organizations." Self-sponsored students refer to "students and scholars who came to the United States from China without being chosen by the government."

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1 Strebeich, 1989, p.75.
3 Orleans, 1988, p. 20.
5 Orleans, 1988, pp. 6-7.
Self-sponsored students finance their study by themselves, usually from family resources or scholarship from universities where they study. One Chinese student explained the process for admission to study abroad in the following way. Students who want to study abroad first apply to schools where they want to study. Schools accepting them send an I-20 form (necessary for applying for a visa from the U.S.) to the students. Next, they obtain a passport from the Chinese government, proving by the I-20 that they will go to the United States to study. This is a relatively easy step. According to this student, virtually everyone applying for a passport can obtain one, except criminals and political dissidents. Then, applicants request a visa at the American embassy or a consulate. This is the most difficult part of the process. After obtaining the visa, students need to obtain a certificate to go abroad, which is the last step. The government usually issues a certificate if an applicant has a visa.9

By 1987, 34,000 officially-sponsored students had come to the United States. Of these students, 12,500 returned to China, 21,000 were still working for a degree, and 500 had changed their visa status and reside now in the United States. During the same period, roughly 22,000 self-sponsored students came. Of these students, 7,000 had already returned, 7,000 were still in school, and 8,000 had changed their visa status.10 By 1989, more than 64,000 Chinese students were studying abroad. Roughly 22,000 have returned.11

Most of the officially sponsored students go back to China. There are several reasons for this. First, they have a clear plan for their study in the United States since they must

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9Ibid., p. 7.
10Chen, 1996.
10Strebeich, 1989, p. 80.
11Wang, 1992, p. 293.
obtain a type of visa (J-1 visa) which clarifies their program while in the United States. Second, even if they want to change their visa status from J-1, sometimes they need to leave the United States for two years before they become eligible for immigrant or certain kinds of non-immigrant visas. Third, officially sponsored students have clear limitations regarding what they can do and are expected to do regarding study in the United States since they must sign a contract with their work units that clarifies their role and expectations and give a guarantor of their return. Fourth, the Chinese government carefully selects students sent abroad so that most of them return after completing their study. For instance, the government tends to select older students with higher degrees.

Concerned with a potential brain drain as a result of the June Fourth Incident, in April, 1992, Deng Xiaoping invited students abroad to come back regardless of their political beliefs. In a State Council circular which was made public on August 20, 1992, the State Council "reassured students that it will not perform investigations or affix responsibility on those who spoke against the government or opposed the government."14

Based on official accounts, treatment of the students returning from abroad is generally good. The government offers better housing and working conditions to returnees. They are also given freedom to leave and enter the country after they come back. Some cities have even adopted their own preferential measures for the returnees. For example, Shanghai guarantees returning students the freedom to choose their residence and workplace.

12Orleans, 1988, pp. 6-7.
Preferential arrangement also applies to their family members.\textsuperscript{17} Another example would be China's Scholar Abroad, an official magazine published by the Chinese Education Commission. In this government publication, one section is specifically designated for introducing the latest achievements and promotions of returnees from abroad.\textsuperscript{18}

Non-governmental sources have also confirmed implementation of the government policy. For instance, one Chinese student told me that the returning students can ward off taxes when they buy a car, have no limitation in selection of residence, and are exempt from the regular course of promotion at universities. He further informed me that limitations on taking foreign currency out of China were terminated in the summer of 1996. Gu Shengzu, an Economics professor at Wuhan University, recounted that returnees receive preferential treatment regarding housing and relative ease for promotion if they resume teaching at universities.\textsuperscript{19} He also acknowledged that recently the number of students returning is definitely increasing, many of them working at joint ventures or for foreign companies.\textsuperscript{20} During a recent trip to China, Denise Incoronato was informed by an American diplomat in Beijing about "a recent phenomenon" that an increasing number of Chinese students in the United States go back to China primarily due to increasing job opportunities.\textsuperscript{21}

As described above, the Chinese government has promoted the student and scholar

\textsuperscript{17}Wei, 1992, p. 11.

\textsuperscript{18}Zhang, 1996. This student showed me several issues of it during the interview.

\textsuperscript{19}Bao, 1996. However, it may not be that returnees are promoted more easily in teaching jobs because of their study at foreign institutions. At least as far as officially sponsored students are concerned, it is very prestigious to be chosen to study abroad. Therefore, the Chinese visiting scholar suggested, when they are chosen, their future is assumed at that moment (Anonymous, 1997).

\textsuperscript{20}Ibid.

\textsuperscript{21}Incoronato, 1996.
exchanges. The promotion of the exchanges seems to have little to do with the notion of peaceful evolution. An official perspective also demonstrates this possible dichotomy. Fang Yi, State Councilor and former Minister of the State Science and Technology Commission, remarked that returnees have not only become "the backbone in the ranks of our science and technology personnel" but "have also enhanced the friendship and mutual understanding between our two people." His statement, regardless of his intention, implies that the role of Chinese students abroad is a vehicle for infiltration of information about foreign countries. Such a statement, then, calls the extensiveness of the campaign into question.

The discrepancy between the promotion of student exchanges and the rectification campaign may be a result of the following propositions. First, government leadership has concluded that the negative impact of student exchanges on Chinese society is rather insignificant. Second, government leaders weigh the scholastic benefit brought back by the student exchanges to be greater than any possible danger. Third, the anti-peaceful evolution campaign may be a mere factional strife and just a rhetorical policy.

Yet, it is not clear which proposition best explains the dichotomy between the rectification campaign and the student exchanges. Findings from the survey I conducted among Chinese students in the United States, nonetheless, suggest a possible reason for the dichotomy. The survey reveals to what extent Chinese students in the United States can influence Chinese people in mainland China, which then enables us to speculate to what degree the Chinese government perceives students abroad as a threat.

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22 quoted in Orleans, 1988, p. 52.
The Background of The Survey among Chinese Students in the United States

Whether Chinese students influence Chinese citizens in the mainland regarding value changes is a difficult question to answer. If one wants a definitive answer, he/she must conduct a large-scale survey, both with Chinese students abroad (not only in the United States) and among Chinese on the mainland. My survey, for this reason, gives only limited but, certainly, suggestive insights into the scope of such influence.  

I assumed that Chinese students are already exposed to some western values while in China before they come to the United States. My hypothesis was that Chinese students in the United States continue to be exposed to Western ideas, and therefore, I expected further significant changes in their attitudes toward certain issues after they come to the United States (in Section III of the survey). This hypothesis derives from my own experiences as a Japanese student in the United States. Although I cannot overgeneralize from my experience and that of my friends, it seems that some degree of adaptation to American values and communication styles is inevitable among any group of foreign students. I hypothesized that this is also applicable to Chinese students. In order to test my hypothesis, I designated a section of my survey for this purpose.

The Method of Analysis

The questionnaire consists of five sections. The first section (I) deals with personal data of the respondents. This section is designed to reveal possible biases of the respondent as well as possible determinants of the answers they provide. Possible biases include: age

23 The questionnaire and basic findings are presented in the appendix.
concerned with mental maturity and degree of rigidness in adapting to a new culture; the urban versus rural nature of their hometown regarding their pre-exposure to foreign culture; and, length of stay in the host culture (with an assumption that the longer they stay, the more "Americanized" they become). Also, I assumed that the degree of exposure to mass-media and association with American friends influence their adaption to and acceptance of new cultural traits and ideas.

Section two (II) has to do with Chinese students' adaptation to a new culture. Positive impressions about the host country, I assumed, tend to lead them to accept its cultural traits. Contrarily, negative impressions tend to lead them to reject a host culture.

Section three (III) pays particular attention to the notions of individualism, capitalism and democracy. Firstly, questions 1 through 5 aim at disclosing Chinese students' attitudes toward society. Questions 1, 2, and 4 reveal the extent to which traditional values are maintained. Questions 3, 5, and 6 show the degree of individualism. Secondly, questions 6 through 10 have to do with economy and respondents' attitudes toward it. Questions 7 and 8 suggest the degree of mammonism. Questions 6, 9, and 10 ask about their attitudes toward market competition, and efficiency resulting from free competition. Thirdly, questions 11 through 16 attempt to disclose their attitudes toward government. Questions 11 and 12 examine the degree of faith in the Party. Question 13 is related to multi-party systems. Question 14 questions whether or not they believe in popular sovereignty. Questions 15 and 16 examine their acceptance of human rights.

Section four (IV) sheds light on these Chinese respondents' current role as a medium of transmitting foreign ideas into China—whether or not they transmit new ideas and whether
or not they communicate a variety of ideas. And section five (V) assesses the prospect of
their role as a cross-cultural medium, that is, whether or not they will keep providing foreign
ideas to other Chinese once they go back.

Administration of the Survey

The survey was conducted from October 14 to December 20, 1996, mainly by
electronic mail (e-mail). The survey was conducted with cooperation from the following
organizations: Berkeley CSSA (Chinese Students and Scholars Association), CSSA-Brown
University, CSSA-Drexel, CSSA-Florida International University, CSSA-IIT, CSSA-MIT,
CSSA-Portland State University, CSSA-University of Connecticut, CSSA-University of
Illinois at Chicago, CSSA-University of Kansas, CSSA-University of Minnesota, CSSA-
University of Rhode Island, CSSA-UCSD, FACSS (Friendship Association of Chinese
Students and Scholars) of West Michigan University, and Northeastern CSSA. I reached
respondents through three channels. First, I directly sent a questionnaire to mailing lists (of
e-mail) of CSSAs. Second, I have sent a questionnaire on e-mail to presidents of CSSAs,
who then post it on their mailing list. Third, a few Chinese students collaborated with me.
They made copies of questionnaires, distributed them face to face, collected them, and
shipped them back to me. From October 14 to December 20, 1996, I received seventy-nine
responses, of which twenty-one were through direct contact with either me or collaborators,
and fifty-eight returned by e-mail.

Despite a low return rate (around 1% or even much lower), I was able to collect 79
completed surveys. Due to the means of collecting data and the return rate, there were two
possible biases among the respondents. Firstly, the majority may have been progressive. Since e-mail is a recent communication device, the majority of the respondents may have been more adaptive to new technology and new ideas. For example, thirteen out of twenty-seven Chinese students (48.1%) enrolled at West Michigan University in Fall, 1996, had an e-mail account. Among 199 Chinese students at University of Kansas, 128 (64.3%) had an e-mail account in November, 1996. Secondly, they might be politically more aware or even more active than average Chinese students in the United States. As suggested by some respondents, the questionnaire contained politically delicate questions, which may have deterred more cautious students from answering. If that was the case, respondents may have been those who were not hesitant to voice their political views. These two potential biases were considered when I made a final assessment.

Findings from the Survey among Chinese Students in the United States

Respondents' background

Most of the respondents were in graduate programs (81.0%) and pursuing a Ph.D. (68.3%). This explains their mean age of 8.82 years. The mean of their length of stay in the United States was 3.47 years. Most of them (84.8%) came to the U.S. after 1989 or even after 1991 (67.1%). Students from the national capital, Beijing, amounted to 29.1%. Twenty-three percent were from Coastal Open Cities. Additionally, 21.5% were from cities whose populations are over a million. That sums up to 73.4% of the respondents who were from the

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24 FACSS of West Michigan University, 1996.
25 CSSA-University of Kansas, 1996.
26 I used SPSS for statistics of this project. I also used Statdisk only for calculating chi-square.
urban sector.

After they came to the United States, most of the respondents frequently watched American television or read American newspapers or both (on an everyday base or every second or third day). Their exposure to Chinese media was less frequent: 53.2% did not read or watch Chinese mass media on a regular basis (less than once a week) while staying in the U.S. Half of them (50.6%) associated mostly with other Chinese and over a third (36.7%) associated equally with both Chinese and Americans. In sum, an image of the average respondent was a graduate student in his/her late twenties, from an urban center, and familiar with both Chinese culture in the Dengist era and American culture. They had high exposure to American mass media while keeping in touch with sources of Chinese influence.

Questions II.2 and II.3 of the survey examined the degree to which Chinese students held a favorable image of the United States. These two questions were on a five-point scale. I found the median for both before and after they came to the United States to be 4.00, which represented a somewhat positive image. Although the mean dropped only slightly from 4.08 to 3.86 after their arrival, 97.4% of the respondents still a neutral to positive image. A closer examination of these questions reveal that those who felt "positive" (point five on the scale) dropped from 37.2% to 23.1% after they came to the U.S., and both "somewhat positive" and "neutral" increased. I suspect that this is a result of their realization that America is not a dream land. Overall, they felt somewhat positive toward the United States both before and after coming here.
Section III of the survey asked the sample about their beliefs, regarding Chinese society, economy, and politics, before they came to the United States. Their belief in Chinese values appeared to be strong at first sight. Most of the respondents believed that there were many virtues in Chinese value systems (91.0%) and that harmony with other people was virtuous (94.4%). However, further questions revealed an inconsistency. For example, one third of the respondents (34.8%) agreed that, "My personal interest is more important than that of social groups to which I belong," and 38.7% agreed with the statement, "I do not want to get involved with anything in which my personal interest is not at stake." And almost half (48.6%) disagreed that, "I must be obedient to my parents, elders, teachers, and famous people."

There seemed to be weakened links among the facets of Chinese values which these students held. For instance, harmony had a moderate, not strong, connection with a sense of group or a sense of altruism. According to Tamotsu Sengoku and Ding Qian, 78.9% of the young generation and 77.4% of the middle-aged generation agreed with the statement, "I rather think that I should meet demands from my group or organization while suppressing my desire to some degree."27 Half of the young generation (55.0%) and 59.0% of the middle-age generation agreed with the statement, "I am better of not being concerned with things with which I have nothing to do."28 Compared to these findings, the respondents of my survey upheld Chinese values a little more than they did on average when they were in China.

27Sengoku and Ding, 1992, p. 34.
28Ibid., p. 204.
Regarding money, 10.7% of my sample agreed that, "Money is more important than anything," while 89.3% disagreed. Half (48.6%) agreed that, "A thrifty life is a prerequisite for prosperity," while half (51.4%) disagreed. In contrast, in Sengoku's and Ding's findings, 36.0% of the young generation and 48.0% of the middle-aged generation agreed to the former statement while 59.0% and 43.6% disagreed, respectively.29 To a similar question on thrift versus prosperity, 27.5% of the young generation and 41.3% of the middle-aged generation agreed while 68.5% and 50.3% disagreed, respectively.30 In terms of money values, my respondents appeared to have held a traditional view (the virtue of thrift and mommonism as a shame) slightly more than the average Chinese in Sengoku's and Ding's survey.

In terms of economic systems, I found slightly inconsistent views among my respondents. Roughly one third of the respondents preferred equal distribution of wealth and did not believe in the utility of market mechanisms, while two-thirds preferred the reverse. Interestingly, when it came down to the issue of ownership, their opinion was divided. Half (50.0%) preferred public ownership and the other half (50.0%) preferred private ownership. It is interesting that there was not as strong a connection between a form of allocation of resources and a form of distribution of wealth.

In terms of political systems, the majority of the respondents showed a preference for western democratic, or "bourgeois" democratic, ideas. That does not mean that they did not believe in communism any more. There was no question in my survey that tapped such an issue. The survey did reveal that loving their country did not mean a faith in the Party. While

29Ibid., p. 230.
30Ibid., p. 228.
most (95.9%) "love[d their] country," only one out of five of the respondents (21.1%) believed, "The government and the Party efficiently handle problems which people face today."

A majority (78.6%) believed in popular sovereignty. Considering the response to the question on the efficiency of the Party, it is questionable, or at least difficult to determine, whether they felt that the Party sustained the principle of popular sovereignty. A majority (80.3%) also believed, "China should introduce a multiparty and free elections so that people can reflect their interests in politics." These attitudes were also tied with other tenets of Western democracy. Most (95.8%) accepted the notion of freedom of the press, and 83.6% believed in the universality of individual human rights (such as freedom of speech, right to property, privacy, and presumption of innocence). Generally, it seems that tenets of western political institutions were accepted and tied with one another.

Sengoku and Ding found that 89.0% of the young generation and 87.9% of the middle-aged generation thought, "[We] should establish a democratic election system soon." Also, 89.5% and 88.7% of their sample, respectively, believed in freedom of the press.31 My respondents appeared to have accepted these notions as much as Sengoku and Ding's respondents did.

Generally speaking, my respondents seemed to be more inclined toward non-traditional values than their elders. The majority appeared to have accepted the utility of market mechanisms while in China. Their affirmation of Western political ideas was also largely developed prior to coming to the United States..

31Ibid., p. 89.
**Chinese Students after Coming to the United States**

Interestingly enough, there are only four questions on which the respondents shifted their opinions in statistically significant ways after coming to the United States. These are questions regarding individualism, obedience to seniors, thrift, and ownership of property.

Question III.3 asked whether they perceived personal interest as important. As illustrated in table 3-1, 17.4% of the respondents changed their opinion and came to agree with this notion of individualism. Although there was no direct factor found to cause the shift, a discussion with a discussion group suggested some insights about the shift. The discussion revealed that there were two possible reasons for the change: American emphasis on individualism and the lack of a sense of belonging. I would like to quote at some length two discussants' remarks regarding these two points. Regarding emphasis on individualism

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32 A discussion group consisted of seven Chinese students. I asked a Chinese friend of mine, also a member of the group, to set up a group whose members had no previous contact with me and the survey. All members were graduate students with their length of staying in the U.S. from a semester to six years. They were studying for either MBA or MS in physics at the same school.
in American culture, one of the discussants said:

This country stresses a lot of values for individuals. Like in all movies we watch, one hero can save the whole world. . . . He can do anything. . . . But in China, we all say, "Because of [thanks to] comrades, because of friends, because of family, because of the Party, [and because of] all people [who] support you, you can achieve something." Here we say, "one person can do [it]." And all other people, like policemen [in movies], are idiots.33

She also said on a different issue, "[H]ere, everything, all [of the] environment forces you to be independent. That's good. You have to do all things by yourself. So you become more independent. That's good for my future."34

Regarding a sense of belonging, another discussant remarked:

[I]n terms of social groups, we all belong to some kind of social group back home. I don't see myself belonging to any social group here because we are not completely in the society yet. We might have Chinese friends [with whom] we gather around, talk, eat dinner together for a long time. But they are not a specific social group which I belong to. . . . [A]lthough we have a strong stance on [American] social issues, we do not belong to any social group. The sense of association, or group, is very weak here [because those are their problems, not our own]. And everybody [Chinese] is busy here [studying and working]. . . . There is a lot of stress we have to go through. If Americans call it stress, what are we? We are in hell. So we really don't have [time for] a group.35

These two remarks suggest the influence of the host culture and the situation of Chinese students in the American culture. An atmosphere emphasizing individual initiatives in American culture seems to have influenced Chinese students. Once they are put in such an environment, it may be inevitable to think and act on an individual basis. The other interesting point is the respondents' sense of their social situation. They still regard

33A Discussion Group, 1997.
34Ibid.
35Ibid.
themselves as guests in this culture. Such an attitude keeps them away from social groups. In any case, they are also just too busy to form or belong to a social group.

The shift toward a preference for individual initiatives was also manifested as more independence from authority. Question III.4 asked if they must be obedient to seniors. As figure 3-2 illustrates, 20.3% of the students shifted their opinion from "agree" to "disagree." The year they left China showed a moderate correlation with their attitudes—the more recently they left, the less obedient they were. After they came to the United States, it seemed that the older they were, the more obedient they were, and that the longer they have stayed in the United States, the less obedient they become. According to a discussant of the discussion group, this shift meant the rejection of blind and absolute obedience. They still respected their parents and elders, but the shift meant they took what parents said as advice, as Americans often do, not as the last word on an issue.36

36Ibid.
Another shift in their opinion was regarding thrift (see figure 3-3). The percentage of those who viewed thrift as a necessity for success decreased (by 15.3% of the total). Correlation with background information showed the older they were, the more respondents valued thrift (both before and after coming to the U.S.). Two background variables produced contradicting results. On the one hand, it seems that the longer they have stayed, the more they value thrift. On the other hand, it seems that the more they have been exposed to American mass media, the less they value thrift. The discussion group agreed that this was the result of American consumerism. They suggested that American material affluence, and American culture's encouragement to consume and borrow influenced Chinese students' perception of thrift. In this sense, it is understandable that the American mass media

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37The question asked whether one agrees that, "A thrifty life is a prerequisite for prosperity." On this question, I intended to find out whether the respondents valued thrift as useful for some purposes. In my intention, when one values thrift, it is not thrift for thrift's sake, or stinginess. I assumed my intention was understood among the respondents because of the way I constructed the sentence, although there was a possibility that some of them confused thrift and stinginess.

38Ibid.
Another shift in the sample's opinion, moderate compared to those revealed in the previous three questions, was regarding types of ownership of property. On the question about two forms of ownership of property, 12.9% of the respondents changed their preference from public ownership to private ownership after coming to the United States. Correlations with background variables revealed interesting points. The later they left China, the more they preferred private ownership of property. Their preference after coming to the U.S. had moderate correlations with their age, degree of their exposure to American mass media, and length of stay in the United States. The older they were, the more they preferred private ownership of property both before and after coming to the United States. Thus, American society seemed to influence Chinese students in two contradictory ways. The more these students were exposed to American mass media, the more they preferred private ownership. On the other hand, the longer their stay, the less they preferred private ownership.
On other questions in section III, the respondents did not show a significant change in their opinion. There were seven questions which indicated that more than two thirds of the respondents accepted non-traditional, non-socialist ideas both before and after they came to the United States. More than two thirds of the sample agreed that: unequal distribution of wealth resulting from competition was preferable (question III.6); market mechanisms were positive (question III.10); the Chinese ruling party was inefficient (question III.12); a multiparty system was desirable (question III.13); popular sovereignty was required (question III.14); freedom of press should be guaranteed (question III.15); and individual human rights were universal (question III.16). There were also four questions which showed that more than two thirds of the sample kept traditional, socialist ideas both before and after they came to the United States. These items were: virtues of Chinese values (question III.1); a virtue of harmony (question III.2); money does not have the highest priority (question III.7); and patriotism (question III.11). There was one question which shows divided opinions both before and after they came to the United States: "I do not want to get involved in anything in which my personal interest is not at stake" (question III.5).

Examination of background variables revealed some interesting, both expected and unexpected, tendencies. What I found most interesting was the sample's age and inclination toward non-traditional ideas. In many cases, age was positively correlated with non-traditional, western ideas, especially those related to economic activity--the older students were, the more they tended to prefer individual initiatives and competition. Chinese media did not help them preserve socialist political ideas in the United States. Association with American friends served as a factor in both changing and preserving their Chinese values.
American media appeared to have influence on acceptance of a market economy.

One of my original hypotheses about background variables was that those who were studying social sciences would be more aware of social issues than those who are studying physical sciences, and that social science students, therefore, would be distinctively different from physical science students on issues under study. The survey indicated otherwise. I found little differences between the opinions of social science students and physical science students.

Cross comparisons with a question within section III reveals how much the respondents interconnect various related ideas. Figure 3-5 discloses their relation to society.
Eighty-four percent of the respondents believed not only in the virtues of Chinese values but also in the virtue of harmony. However, they did not keep the entire set of Chinese values. Only 28.0% believed the virtues of Chinese values and that they must be obedient to seniors, and 4% rejected both items. Thirty percent of the students accepted both the virtue of harmony and that of obedience to the elders, and 9.9% rejected both. In other words, 59.1% did not connect these two values. This was probably because, as a discussant from the discussion group remarked before, to be harmonious with seniors did not mean to be blindly obedient to them. Slightly over half of the students either agreed or disagreed to both, "My personal interest is more important than that of social group to which I belong" (question III.3), and, "I do not get involved with anything in which my interest is not at stake" (question III.5).

Figure 3-6 exposes the sample's attitudes toward economic systems. Slightly less than half of the respondents connected self interest and unequal distribution of wealth when they thought of their self interest as supreme and preferred unequal distribution of wealth or when they did not think of their self interest as priority and preferred equal distribution of wealth. Similarly, 46.6% related individualism with unequal distribution of wealth by accepting both ideas or by rejecting individualism and preferring equal distribution of wealth. As these comparisons indicated, about forty-five percent of Chinese students in the United States connect the capitalist distribution of wealth with self interest and individualism.

The cross comparisons among questions regarding distribution of wealth, mammonism, and thrift revealed a weak inclination toward mammonism. Fifty-six percent of the respondents rejected mammonism and preferred private ownership of property.
Likewise, 56.9% showed their rejection of money as the most important thing, as well as an inclination toward consumerism by rejecting the virtue of thrift. It seems that simply being in the United States did not make them mammonish. In fact, less than 10% showed a mammonish tendency by seeing money as the most important thing, rejecting thrift, and preferring unequal distribution of wealth.

Figure 3-7 also shows to what extent the respondents connected tenets of economic systems: distribution of wealth, forms of ownership of property, and the utility of market mechanisms. As shown in figure 3-7, roughly 65% of the respondents perceived these tenets to be connected either by accepting the utility of market mechanisms, private ownership, and unequal distribution of wealth, or by rejecting all of them. Moreover, it is noteworthy that
in each comparison, the percentage of those who connected a given capitalistic tenet with another increased by roughly 10% to 13% after they came to the United States. This is to say, half of them already accepted related tenets of market economies while in China and increasingly did so while in the United States.

Figure 3-8 shows to what degree the respondents connected tenets of political systems. Curiously, 79.9% of the respondents did not regard loving the Party as equivalent to loving their country. Two thirds of the respondents did not think that, "The government and the Party efficiently handle problems which people face today," but that, "China should introduce a multi-party system and free elections so that people can reflect their interest in politics."

As figure 3-8 shows, respondents highly correlated (around eighty percent) tenets of Western democracy—multiparty systems, popular sovereignty, freedom of press, and individual human rights. Additionally, these percentages were close to those of the same
comparisons on their attitude before they left China. What this means is that not only did most of them already accept these four ideas while in China but also that they closely linked these ideas with one another before they came to the United States.

The Influence of Chinese Students Abroad on Chinese People in the Mainland: Today and Tomorrow

Section IV of the survey was designed to study the degree of current influence on Chinese in mainland China by Chinese students in the United States. Section V, in contrast, is designed to look at these students' future influence once they go back to China.

In section IV, 82.3% of the respondents said that they do communicate what they see in the United States to Chinese back home. A quarter of them communicated everything.
Another 43.1% talked or wrote about cultural and social issues (including the O. J. Simpson case); 18.5% communicated economic issues; and 9.2% relayed political issues. On those issues they discussed, 55.4% of them received positive responses from those with whom they communicated. Only 6.2% received negative responses. Over all, most of the Chinese students communicated their experience and reflections. A quarter of such students talked or wrote about anything, and half of them received positive responses.

Once they go back to China (question V.1), whenever that will be, 84.8% said that they would be willing to share their experience with Chinese people on the mainland. Three out of ten respondents would share anything; 20.6% would share cultural and social issues; 11.8%, economic issues; and 5.9%, political issues. These findings suggest that Chinese students in the United States can greatly shape images of the United States and the lives of Chinese students abroad once they go back in China. A comparison of this survey with another survey, and the fact that 55.4% received positive responses when they communicated their experience and reflections, suggest that Chinese students in the U.S. are creating positive images of the United States among mainland Chinese. Tsuyoshi Hori conducted a survey on study abroad and perceptions of Japan among Chinese and Taiwanese in their respective motherlands in 1989. In the PRC, the survey was conducted in Beijing, Chongqing, Shanghai, and Xian. The survey revealed 80% of the respondents were willing to study abroad. Roughly a third of the respondents gained information about study abroad from "friends abroad or friends who experienced study abroad," and another third from "relatives and friends within the country." Under such circumstances in which a majority

40 Ibid., p. 136.
gain knowledge from non-specialized sources, there is room for students abroad to influence images of studying abroad in the United States and of American society in general.

Additionally, 92.4% of my respondents were willing to correspond with their American friends in the future. In other words, most of them expressed the desire to keep a source of American influence in the future. Through correspondence they would be informed about new foreign ideas in the future regardless of whether they accept them or not. Lastly, 81.0% "encourage other Chinese to come America." It is obvious that the majority had a positive impression of their experience in the United States.

Suggestions from the survey

As I have shown so far, and contrary to my hypothesis, Chinese students in the United States do not go through significant changes (or Americanization). Rather, the tenets of a market economy were already accepted before they came to the United States and the degree of their acceptance remained the same. The tenets of Western liberal democracy were also largely accepted. Only in terms of human relations did these students show a moderate, not radical, shift toward individualism. Also, they tended to connect the tenets of liberal democracy slightly more closely with one another after they came to the United States.

In terms of this survey's potential biases, as the comparison with the surveys by Sengoku and Ding suggests, the political views of the respondents in my survey were not different from those in China. They accepted non-traditional, or Western, ideas as much as, or as little as, mainland Chinese.

Most of them communicated a variety of issues, either of a social and cultural nature,
or anything. In addition, they were likely to transmit their experiences and reflections in the future.

Chinese students abroad have the potential to influence Chinese on the mainland in the manner of peaceful evolution. However, if they do not change much after coming here, it is difficult to attribute peaceful evolution to Chinese students abroad.

What is, then, the implication of this survey in a broader picture? What is happening in Chinese minds if a large portion of the Chinese students in the survey already accepted some Western liberal democratic ideas? As indicated in chapters one and two, Chinese are said to be increasingly inclined toward Western ideas. If so, what are some reasons behind it? The following chapter will examine these questions.
Chapter 4: Value Changes in Chinese Modernization

Changes in the Chinese People

Peaceful Evolution? Who are agents of changes?

As noted earlier in chapters one and two, contemporary China has experienced changes in values and lifestyles, particularly in urban areas. On the one hand, the Chinese Communist Party claims that such changes are brought about by the West's intention to pollute Chinese youth and subvert the communist regime. This argument resembles the notion of cultural imperialism (the CCP perceives Western nations as imperialists anyway). Cultural imperialism can be defined as "the subversion of another state's language, cultural habits, religious beliefs, and institutions, or ethical values, and also its political culture and political values."\(^1\) In other words, these changes are the result of deliberate attempts by the outsiders and the domination, or imposition, of a strong culture over weak ones.

On the other hand, these changes may be an unintentional product of the Reform and Opening Up, or modernization and internationalization. In other words, these changes are the result of adaption to, and adoption of, new external cultural traits by the Chinese. This is what is called cultural diffusion. Diffusion generally refers to "The process by which cultural elements are borrowed from another society and incorporated into the culture of the recipient group."\(^2\) It is a selective process by which one culture borrows social practices and attitudes which are useful to the borrowing culture and compatible with its norms and

\(^1\) Raymond, 1992, p. 228. However, the term also connotes modernization threatening traditional values of the developing world. See Sharritz, Williams, & Calinger, 1993, p. 351.

traditions, and the process by which borrowed traits go through changes and adaptation to the borrowing culture.³

When the interaction between cultures becomes intense (either through direct or indirect contacts), *acculturation* occurs. It is defined as "a process of extensive cultural borrowing in the context of superordinate-subordinate relations between societies."⁴ It can happen without direct or even indirect force. This process was formulated into the Law of Cultural Dominance by Kaplan. The Law of Cultural Dominance says, "That cultural system which more effectively exploits the energy resources of a given environment will tend to spread in the environment at the expense of less effective systems."⁵

These concepts suggest that ideas, attitudes, and social practices tend to spread both intentionally and unintentionally. In the era of globalization, international and intercultural interaction increases. Probably no culture is immune to foreign cultures, and the Chinese culture is no exception. The question which *peaceful evolution* raises is whether changes among the Chinese populace (what the Party leaders call bourgeois liberalization) are an imposition of Western culture over the Chinese, or Chinese voluntary adaptation to new ideas without particular purposes in doing so. The theories give us a basis for making an assessment of the changes among the Chinese people—whether the changes are unintentional adaptation to new ideas or foreign subversion. The following section examines some changes in Chinese values and attitudes toward the Party as well as some of the means by which bring such changes are likely to occur.

³Ibid., pp. 451-453.
⁴Ibid., p. 453.
⁵quoted in Crapo, 1993, p. 327.
**Value Changes in China Today**

*Paul's World* is the most popular radio program among youth in Guangzhou. It plays Hong Kongese and Western hip-hop music. What attracts the youth most is live talks between Paul, the DJ, and listeners:

DJ: You are listening to Guangzhou Radio, Paul's World. Tonight I would like to discuss with you about what youth in Guangzhou are thinking about. What's your name?

L[Listener]: [My name is] Whinny. I'm calling you today because I want to talk about the puzzlement I feel. Now, I am sorry for youth in Guangzhou, both boys and girls.

DJ: How come?

L: Maybe because of the current social climate. . . . Everybody thinks of money and profit above anything. I feel so. "How can I make a profit from stocks and business?" Things like that. So human relations are stiff around me and in my work place.

... DJ: What are you confused about?

L: Our minds are all in disorder and nobody thinks about sharing what [he/she] gets. [They all] are self-centered.

L: The contemporary society is cruel, I think. Because it requires only the successful. . . .

L: I want to go back to my hometown. After making a racket at karaoke with my friends all night, I feel very empty instead. I have no friend who understands me in this city.7

These conversations in *Paul's World* illustrate some changes in values among Chinese youth further discussed below.

Sengoku and Ding have conducted extensive surveys to reveal changes in Chinese values. In their *Social Values and Lifestyles in China Today*, they compared old,
middle-aged, and young generations to recognize value changes in the history of the PRC. This section is drawn heavily from their work.

As the quotation from *Paul's World* illustrates, Chinese youth, especially those in cities, are influenced by mammonism, egoism as an extension of individualism, and a sense of alienation. Figure 4-1 shows a part of a cross-cultural survey (1989) among youth of eighteen to twenty-four years old across eleven countries. According to this study, the purposes of Chinese youth's lives were prioritized as: 1) "living as I wish" (35.9%); 2) "becoming wealthy" (31.6%); 3) "devoting [myself] to society" (12.3%); and 4) "gaining social status" (11.9%). The percentage of youth "devot[ed] to society" was considerably

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*NHK China Project, 1995b, pp. 198-199.
low, in fact, lower than that of South Korea (16.3%) and Brazil (16.0%), and about the same as that of the United States (10.2%), the society which the CCP regards as the exporter of *spiritual pollution*. The percentage of "becoming wealthy" was the second largest, following that of Japan (38.7%). "Living as I wish" ranked first among eleven countries. This can be seen in both capitalist and socialist nations.9

However, the high percentage of those responding that "becoming wealthy" was a priority does not automatically point to mammonism. Concerning a work ethic, Chinese youth preferred an "easy and not busy workplace although [I am] not given responsibility and competence" (50.2% of the effective responses) to "a workplace giving me responsibility and competence although busy and demanding" (49.8%).10 In terms of money, a majority of Chinese youth disagreed with the statement, "Money is more important than anything" (59.0%).11 Also, 44.9% of them believed that "money is the source of all evil." However, more of them agreed with the following statements regarding spending money: "Money is for spending, not for saving. Thus, one should spend money if [he/she] has money" (47.6%); "One can do anything if one has money in today's world" (54.6%); "One should strive to gain money so that he/she does not need to economize" (68.0%).12 Finally, a majority of the respondents rejected thrift. They disagreed with the statements: "A thrifty life is prerequisite for success in business" (68.5%); and "There is

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10Ibid., pp. 111-112.
11This question revealed an interesting attitude among the middle-aged, or the Cultural Revolution generation. Forty-eight percent (52.3% of the effective responses) agreed with the statement, "Money is more important than anything." Also, a majority of them (65.0%) agreed that, "One can do anything if one has money in today's world." These numbers suggest that social disturbance might cause a crisis of faith and an inclination toward money as security.
12Ibid., pp. 229-231.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Generations</th>
<th>Young</th>
<th>Middle-aged</th>
<th>Old</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Money is more important than anything.</td>
<td>Agree</td>
<td>36.0%</td>
<td>48.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Disagree</td>
<td>59.0%</td>
<td>43.6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>5.0%</td>
<td>8.4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Money is the source of all evil.</td>
<td>Agree</td>
<td>44.9%</td>
<td>55.2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Disagree</td>
<td>51.5%</td>
<td>36.4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>3.6%</td>
<td>8.4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Money is for spending, not for saving. Thus one should spend money if [he/she] has money.</td>
<td>Agree</td>
<td>47.6%</td>
<td>48.8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Disagree</td>
<td>48.6%</td>
<td>42.8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>3.8%</td>
<td>8.4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>One can do anything if one has money in today's world.</td>
<td>Agree</td>
<td>54.6%</td>
<td>65.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Disagree</td>
<td>41.7%</td>
<td>28.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>3.7%</td>
<td>6.7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>One should strive to gain money so that he/she does not need to economize.</td>
<td>Agree</td>
<td>68.0%</td>
<td>67.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Disagree</td>
<td>28.0%</td>
<td>24.6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>4.0%</td>
<td>8.1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A thrifty life is a prerequisite for success in business.</td>
<td>Agree</td>
<td>27.5%</td>
<td>41.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Disagree</td>
<td>68.5%</td>
<td>50.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>4.0%</td>
<td>8.4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>There is a possibility that those living a luxurious life cannot set a goal in life.</td>
<td>Agree</td>
<td>32.0%</td>
<td>41.6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Disagree</td>
<td>64.0%</td>
<td>50.6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>4.0%</td>
<td>7.8%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Japanese Research Center of the Youth, 1989. Adopted from Sengoku and Ding, 1992, P. 228; P. 230

a possibility that those living a luxurious life cannot set a goal in life" (64.0%). As Deng Xiaoping called for, "Get[ting] rich ahead of others," or "Getting rich is glorious," increasing numbers of people headed to make money. The worry of Party elders concerned with mammonism is probably legitimate. Nevertheless, it is mammonism in the sense that an increasing number of people are concerned with money, not in the sense that all 1.2 billion of Chinese people have become mammonish. For instance, a majority still believed
that there was something else more important than money.

Increasingly, Chinese youth prefer individualism to egalitarianism. For the question, "Which do you prefer, an unequal society with free competition or an egalitarian society with no competition?" roughly 70% of young Chinese workers preferred free competition, while roughly 30% of them preferred egalitarianism. Also, nine out of ten Chinese thought that enterprises should compete more against one another. Moreover, individualism in China increasingly becomes egoism. Sengoku and Ding revealed in their cross-cultural survey that the Chinese were more individualistic than Americans. However, they, in contrast to Americans, do not seem to have a sense of justice or obligation for the public good. For instance, when a person was nearly drowned in a river, some argued for a fee in return for helping.

Sengoku and Ding characterized Chinese youth's attitudes as typical of anomie and apathy. They suggest that anomie among Chinese youth was caused by loss of values. Only 17% of Chinese youth felt that they were happy. When Chinese youth were discontented with society, roughly 25% of them "actively [took] a legal action" in order to improve the society, a little more than 20% "[did] not take active action," 16.7% "[did]..."
not take any action," and roughly 33% of them did not answer the question. Reasons for not taking action included "an individual can do little about it" (roughly 70%) and "suitable persons should do [for others]" (roughly 20%).\textsuperscript{16} Sengoku and Ding described apathy among Chinese youth as, "The reason why Chinese youth do not take active action when they are dissatisfied with society is because of a sense of powerlessness that an individual cannot help it, not that they are indifferent, nor that they have something else to live for."\textsuperscript{17} Some China watchers call a co-culture (sub-culture) characterized by such attitudes as \textit{gray culture}. Components of the gray culture are rock and roll, pulp fiction, pop art and punk fashion.\textsuperscript{18} According to Australian Sinologist Geremie Barme, Chinese belonging to the gray culture combine "hopelessness, uncertainty and ennui with irony, sarcasm and a large dose of fatalism."\textsuperscript{19}

Coupled with anomie and apathy is a sense of alienation. The cross-cultural survey revealed that the number of Chinese respondents who had close friends was the second lowest among eleven nations; roughly 15% answered that they did not even have a close friend. Only 44.4% of the Chinese respondents were satisfied with their relationship with friends, half that of English youth, two-thirds of West German youth, and the lowest among other nations. Moreover, when they had a worry, 20.6% did not consult with

\textsuperscript{16}Ibid., pp. 198-201.
\textsuperscript{17}Ibid., pp. 201-202.
\textsuperscript{18}Schell, 1992, p. 20. However, one should not conclude from their egoism and apathy that they are indifferent toward their country's relationship with other countries. Prideful of their accomplishment in modernization, they long for their country to translate such an accomplishment into its international relations so that it can redress the past humiliation and exert more influence in the international arena (Swaine, 1995, p. 46).
\textsuperscript{19}quoted in Schell, 1992, p. 20.
anyone.20

Roughly 50% of youth, 60% of the middle-aged, and 20% of the elders agreed with the statement, "The most reliable is family." Sengoku and Ding also revealed a correlationship among various values associated with this statement. Those who answered that, "family is most reliable," rejected self-sacrifice. They also disclosed their inclination toward mammonism. Naming them "family-octopus-trapists" (meaning those who escape to their family as an enclave), Sengoku and Ding summarized these respondents' tendency as follows:

As a result of political distrust, family-octopus-trapists abandoned sacrificial spirit as the revolutionary spirit and turned their interest to money. Their overall image is more often than not egoistic, mammonish, distrustful of anything, and dissatisfied with many things. And they share a large [portion of contemporary] Chinese values. . . . They provoke an image of unprincipled masses who lost revolutionary thought and traditional values.21

Traditional, socialist values appear to have collapsed. Revolution, liberation, and communism do not sound appealing to the Chinese any longer. After losing faith in Marxism and Leninism, they have explored new ideas--those of Sartre, Nietzsche, Freud, and then Mao Zedong. Most recently, there has also been a business boom.22 Crises of faith and mammonism may be reinforcing one another.

Sources of changes

The findings of Sengoku and Ding disclosed contemporary Chinese values, but not

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20Sengoku and Ding, 1992, pp. 155-158.
21Ibid., p. 191.
22Ibid., p. 203.
the sources of those values changes. There are two notable sources for these new values—contact with the West and television. As Fang Lizhi remarked, "The greatest change was that people learned more and came to know about the outside world." Kojima noted that the opening up has brought a lot of new information and ideas into the country. As a result, the Chinese, especially urban dwellers, have gained measures to compare themselves "horizontally" (with other nations) as well as "vertically" (with their past).

There are various media which possibly bring about changes in Chinese values and attitudes—diplomatic exchanges, business people coming in and out of China, television, music, literature, and student and scholarly exchanges.

James Lull, in his *China Turned On*, described the impact of television on Chinese people. His argument was four-fold. Firstly, before television became a popular medium, Chinese leaders remained distant from the masses and mystified politics so that they could enjoy wielding greater authority. Television originally functioned as a means to convey the Party line and solidify the masses. However, television also shrank the distance between leadership and the masses via a television screen, resulting in the Party's greater accountability to the masses. Secondly, as Fang Lizhi pointed out, Western television's movies, dramas, and commercials gave viewers information about the outside world. In Western television programs, Chinese viewers pay attention to customs, values, institutions, life, and societies existing outside their own country and tested the validity of

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23 quoted in Kojima, 1994, p. 35.
24 Ibid., p. 29.
government propaganda about the West.\textsuperscript{26} Through television, moreover, the Chinese came to realize the outside's material affluence, including that of Hong Kong, and came to question the efficacy of socialism.\textsuperscript{27} Furthermore, commercialism on television generated demands from the masses, but simultaneously frustrated them by the wide gap between their life and the one illustrated in a commercial.\textsuperscript{28} Thirdly, television allowed viewers to develop their imagination and establish their subjectivity. A consequence was that they no longer blindly believed Party propaganda.\textsuperscript{29} TV's role was not mere emission of information. Viewers discussed programs with others, recognized messages and issues raised by the programs, and shaped their political consciousness and attitudes accordingly. Subjectivity fostered by television allowed them to watch an official announcement cautiously and interpret it, which sometimes resulted in their disillusionment with the Party.\textsuperscript{30} Fourthly, the more that policies were conveyed through television, the less often viewers had to meet at political meetings. Since political meetings were to convey policies, let participants discuss issues, and solidify ideological coherence among them, the new means of propagation of Party lines has reduced the Chinese people's interest in politics.\textsuperscript{31}

Sengoku and Ding closed their study by concluding, "China faces the crisis of 'peaceful evolution.' And we must say that the crisis arises from within the socialist system.
itself, rather than a subversion from outside. It is indeed undermined from within." They appear to be right in the sense that the process of cultural changes was generated by internal factors. If internal factors generate the changes, what are these factors? What changes are happening deep within Chinese minds? It is worthwhile to investigate the Chinese mind—what conditioned Chinese people to experience peaceful evolution?—because these changes are consequences of Chinese reflections on their society.

Deep in Chinese Minds

For the investigation of Chinese minds, it is helpful to briefly review studies on China's quest for Chineseness by Tongqi Lin, Perry Link, and Lucian W. Pye, and one on modernity by John Tomlinson.

Lin discussed China's search for Chineseness in the modern era. After interaction with Western nations started, the Chinese have sought to find, redefine, or reconstruct Chinese consciousness. The search has been celebrated in the post-Mao era. A humanist quest for China's soul started with Wang Ruoshui. He asked, "If the practice is the sole criterion of truth, what then is the criterion of the successful practice?" According to Lin, the humanist quest occurred in three phases. The first phase was "a quest for the independent existence of man (humanity) with inherent value, dignity, and rights, namely a quest for the 'rediscovery of man.'" The second phase was "a quest for the essence and
strength, the distinguishing features and inner structure of man in which man seeks to know himself, the 'reexploration of man.'" (emphasis as in the original)36 The third phase was "a quest for the ultimate meaningfulness and fulfillment of life as man seeks to realize himself, a quest which may be called the 'rebuilding of man.'" (emphasis as in the original)37 In this third phase came the culture fever (1984-1989), in which intellectuals, as well as commoners, revitalized traditional Chinese cultures even as they were analyzing Chinese and Western cultures.

In his article, Link discussed culture fever, which he also argued should be perceived as a process in China's search for moral values and institutions:

Many of these mushrooming problems [of peaceful evolution] can be understood as filling the vacuum left by the retreat of Communist power. At its Maoist height, that power reached everywhere in Chinese society, structuring all values..., and destroying many of the values and nearly all the institutions that had formerly filled the space between the state and the individual. . . . Now. . . state power retreats and people leap toward "freedom". . . . A fundamental question for China today is: What values and institutions can help to restructure a civil society within the current vacuum?38

In the post-Mao era, neither Confucianism nor Communism appears to be able to answer this question. But there remains the space between the state and the individual. In this context, culture fever is seen as Chinese attempts to establish moral values and institutions with modern Chinese characteristics.39

Pye argued that China has sought a moral order. After the Qing Dynasty ended, and

36Ibid.
37Ibid.
38Link, 1993, pp. 190-191.
39Ibid., pp. 194-196.
the Confucian moral order consequently collapsed, Marxist-Leninist-Mao Zedong Thought, or what Pye calls "Confucian-Leninism," became a new moral order.⁴⁰ With the fiascos of the Great Leap Forward and the Cultural Revolution, the legitimacy of the new moral order declined, which resulted in a crisis of faith. A new leadership under Deng Xiaoping restored a sense of legitimacy by providing materialistic well-being. Nevertheless, it has failed to reestablish a new moral order and institutions, which are basis of legitimacy.⁴¹

The three authors suggested that China has been searching for Chinese identity—what it means to be a Chinese and how Chinese can construct a morally good and orderly society and live a good Chinese life. This has been a long quest. But it has become important since the failures of the Party to achieve socialism (the Cultural Revolution as the most important one) disillusioned Chinese citizens and the Party loosened its tight grip on their civil life. Under such circumstances, Chinese inclination toward non-traditional, Western ideas can be understood as a quest to find a new moral and political guidance with modern Chinese characteristics. It is a process in which Chinese experiment with new ideas either to adopt them in a wholesale manner or to modify and incorporate some non-Chinese cultural traits into the existing values.

Unlike the three authors above, Tomlinson's study is about cultural imperialism and modernity in general. His study, although not directly related to Chinese modernity, provides a framework to understand some implications of modernization to China. Tomlinson started his discussion on cultural imperialism by asking if it is an imposition

⁴⁰Pye, 1990, p. 60.
⁴¹Ibid., pp. 60-61.
of one culture over another when an aboriginal family spends their pastime by watching TV on the edge of Tanami desert. The main focus of his work was answering this question. In one chapter, he explores cultural imperialism as the spread of modernity and development, suggesting that these two aspects eliminated some problems associated with the discourse of cultural imperialism. What should be recognized first is, "the embeddedness of modernity’s discontents in a political economic system which simultaneously offers attractions over 'traditional' societies."42

According to Marshall Bermann, whom Tomlinson refers to, modernity was an inevitable stage in development, or in Bermann's words, "a mode of vital experience," which eventually places human beings in a state of Promethean paradox--possible hope for a constructive future, coupled with possibility of destruction.43 He also defines modernism as "giv[ing people] the power to change the world that is changing them."44 In other words, modernity is based on people's choices which modernism, not a traditional society, gave them. Thus, he said:

What they [Third World] are projecting onto aliens, and prohibiting as 'Western Decadence,' is in fact their own people's energies, desires and critical spirit. When government spokesmen and propagandists proclaim their various countries to be free of this alien influence, what they really mean is merely that they have managed to keep a political and spiritual lid on their people so far.45

Or in Tomlinson's words, "Modernity is thus not a cultural imposition but rather a liberation of the human spirit."46

43Ibid., p. 147.
44Quoted in Ibid., p. 148.
45Quoted in Ibid., p. 149.
Modernity emancipated men and women from traditional, dogmatic world views and socio-political institutions. Also, the use of reason, or rationality, expands the variety of choices which humans make. These are generally understood as development.

However, the basis of modernity contained a major problem, or what is known as *social imaginary signification*. Some key concepts of development, according to Tomlinson, are not scrutinized rationally despite the fact that development and modernity were based on rationality. One such concept is the notion of progress. Tomlinson goes on to introduce Cornelius Castoriadis's notion of progress as *social imaginary signification*.

Tomlinson summarizes that:

> imaginary signification is a representation which is neither 'real' in the sense of being available to perception and empirical scrutiny nor 'rational' in the sense of being deducible via the rule of thought of a culture. . . . [T]he imaginary is prior to the real and the rational: it is a product of an act of cultural production which is fundamental to any subsequent system of cultural representation.48

This is a difficult concept to grasp. This is the very basis of basic function of culture as a system which gives meanings to everything so that we can make sense of the world.

Castoriadis' use of God as an example helps clarify this notion.

> Whatever points of support his representation may take in perceived reality, whatever his rational effectiveness may be as an organizing principle of the environing world for certain cultures, God is neither a signification of something real, nor a signification of something rational. . . . God is neither the name of God nor the images of a people may give him, nor anything or the sort. Carried by, pointed at by all these symbols,

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46Ibid.

47Ibid., p. 154. The notion of rationality and progress vary from context to context. Evidently, Tomlinson talks about the progress in the Western sense in his discussion of cultural imperialism as a spread of modernity. Rationality he means here, I suspect, is effective, or more effective, in economic terms—effective exploitation of resource, labor and time.

48Ibid., pp. 156-157.
he is, in every religion, that which makes these symbols religious symbols—a certain *signification*, the organization of signifiers and signifieds into a system. . . . And this signification, which is neither something perceived (real) nor something thought (rational), is an imaginary signification.\(^4^9\)

The social imaginary signification appears clear when one considers traditional cultural practices. However, aspects and notions associated with capitalism are also products of social imaginary signification, since there is no *rational* reason for producing and consuming beyond the level of basic needs. Because the rationalizing process of modernity stems from fragments of rationality, not from any single belief or purpose, a social imaginary is "empty of any existential purpose or comfort."\(^5^0\) According to Tomlinson, this is the source of the discontent with modernity. Because of this inability of the social imaginary signification to provide qualitative goals and visions, the notion of development directs its movement to a quantitatively undefined goal, *more*, both in consumption and production.\(^5^1\)

Therefore, Tomlinson concludes, cultural imperialism is a spread of social imaginary signification of the West, accompanying the spread of socio-politico-economic institutions and technology, capitalism and large bureaucracy to name a few. Although it is undeniable that modernity appears to provide a wider variety of choices to people, the spread of modernity, or cultural imperialism, is not an *imposition* of one culture on others, but a spread of *loss* of culture since modernity cannot provide what traditional cultures were able to provide: existential meanings.\(^5^2\) Toward the end, recognizing the

\(^{4^9}\) quoted in Ibid., p. 156.

\(^{5^0}\) Ibid., p. 159.

\(^{5^1}\) Ibid.
difficulty of determining whether cultural imperialism is an intended imposition and spread of one culture over others, Tomlinson suggests that the notion of imperialism should be replaced by that of globalization:

The idea of 'globalization' suggests interconnection and interdependency of all global areas which happens in a far less purposeful way. It happens as a result of economic and cultural practices which do not, of themselves, aim at global integration, but which nonetheless produce it. More importantly, the effects of globalization are to weaken the cultural coherence of all individual nation-states, including the economically powerful ones—the 'imperialist powers' of the previous era. (emphasis in original)

If his theory on modernity is to be applied to China, when China started the Reform and Opening Up and took a capitalist approach to its modernization, the Western imaginary signification of development and other associated values flooded into China. The spread of modernity, the spread of loss of culture, facilitated the search for Chinese existence since modernity, taking over traditional values and socio-political institutions, cannot provide answers to existential questions. A search for Chineseness can be understood, besides China's domestic context mentioned by Lin, Link, and Pye, as a search for answers to existential questions which traditional China would provide. Moreover, the Western social imaginary signification provides China a mechanism to pursue development and associated material and non-material values. The incorporation of the imaginary signification of development gave China a context within which they accept and pursue non-traditional, Western values.

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52Ibid., pp. 162-164.
53Ibid., p. 175.
Chapter 5: Peaceful Evolution: Its Reality

The question remains—is peaceful evolution an imposition of Western, particularly American, culture over that of the Chinese? This study has examined changes in Chinese values during the modernization, the Party's attempts to rewind the clock in the ideological sphere, and how these two phenomena are reflected in student and scholar exchanges. This study has shown that Chinese youth are increasingly rejecting traditional Chinese and socialist values and accepting individualist and capitalist ideas. Coupled with these inclinations, crises of faith are prevalent, particularly among youth—they are less enthusiastic about socialism. A discussant from the discussion group remarked, "It is not the crisis of faith that Chinese youth face today. The older generation faces the crisis of faith. But our [young] generation face the lack of faith." As mentioned in the previous chapter, the inclination toward Western values and the crisis of faith have reinforced and aggravated each other once the Reform and Opening Up started.

The inclination toward Western values and the crisis of faith has alarmed Party leaders in two ways: as the undermining of socialism, and the abandonment of Chineseness. Perceiving the Tiananmen demonstration in 1989 and the collapse of communism in East Europe as manifestations of such changes, or peaceful evolution, the Party started the anti-peaceful evolution campaign. Besides the changes in Chinese values, reasons for the campaign included ramifications of the Reform and Opening Up (the Party's loss of the total control over Chinese domestic economy and new significance given to factionalism), and an

1 A Discussion Group, 1997.
international climate hostile to communism. The campaign appeared to contain many elements of factionalism. Although this particular campaign is over, the Party's efforts for rectification continue.

Despite Chinese students' potential to wield change in Chinese values, the government has promoted student and scholar exchanges. The fact that Chinese students can be a bridge of mutual understanding between China and the United States signifies potential spread of foreign ideas. The survey revealed that non-traditional tendencies were observed among Chinese students in the United States, as well. As far as they are concerned, before intense contact with American culture, they were already exposed to non-traditional ideas while in China. Their direct contact with American culture does not appear to have much influence on their views on human relations, economy, and politics. As far as the student and scholar exchanges are concerned, the results drawn from the survey call into question the notion of peaceful evolution as "alleged Western attempts."

As the study on Chinese values and the survey among Chinese students in the United States suggest, changes in Chinese values and crises of faith come from within rather than without. In her book, Zha Jianying illustrated value changes among her intellectual friends in China. Her illustrations implied that these changes came from within. Among the intellectuals, she observed idealism before the suppression of the demonstration at the Tiananmen Square in 1989, cynicism and apathy after 1989, and mammonism after 1992. The cynicism and apathy were products of a sense of powerlessness among intellectuals, which arose after the defeat of their naive idealism at the Tiananmen Square in 1989. The mammonism was a result of Deng's southern tour in 1992, in which he insisted on the
acceleration of the Reform and Opening Up. Based on Zha's account, cynicism, apathy, and mammonism were caused by domestic events.

**Formula of Crisis of Chineseness**

According to the findings from the previous chapter, Sengoku and Ding suggested that a loss of faith in communism has caused anomie, apathy, and mammonism. Kojima and Fang Lizhi asserted that the opening up let Chinese compare and contrast their country with the outside world. Lull suggested that television let viewers establish their subjectivity and make cross-cultural comparisons, both of which resulted in viewers' suspicion about the efficacy (if not legitimacy) of the Party. Lin, Link, and Pye suggested that China has sought China's soul for decades. Tomlinson's study implied that the inclination toward Western ideas was attributed to modernity. What these findings indicate is as follows. First, Chinese have been searching a definition of Chineseness and a moral guidance particularly after the collapse of Qing Dynasty. This search became more important in the post-Mao era for two reasons. One was the decline in the faith in Marxist-Leninist-Mao Zedong Thought after fiascos of the Great Leap Forward and the Cultural Revolution. The other was the retreat of the Party from the public sphere, which left the vacuum in the public sphere. Second, related to the latter point was Deng's famous phrase of "Seeking truth from facts." This pragmatism, as in the case of factionalism, emancipated the Chinese from dogmatism and left more room for critical thinking. It also lessened the importance of the official ideology. Third, opening China to the West has provided grounds for comparison and contrast with the

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outside through various media, especially television. Fourth, television provides viewers stimuli to establish subjectivity. Fifth, Chinese people with critical thinking skills compare and contrast their life with that of others in the outside world. Sixth, in this process, some Chinese fall into crises of faith. Seventh, disillusioned by their government and their life, they have become anomic, apathetic, and mammonish. Eighth and last, these attitudes, along with subjectivity and "horizontal" measures, reinforce crises of faith. These eight influences were mutually reinforcing and aggravated by the process of the Reform and Opening Up.

The Reform and Opening Up is, to make the matter simple, marketization with Chinese characteristics. When China imported market mechanisms and Western products, it also imported discontents of the Western modernity, that is, failure to give existential meanings to life. The process of marketization and the above seven factors aggravated each other, and as a result, the importance of ideology decline and that of material value increase. Once China opened its doors, it started a vicious cycle of crises of faith and cynicism, the elements of which were already in existence. The result of my survey revealed that Chinese students abroad who had extensive and intensive interaction with a foreign culture did not really differ from those without such interaction. Many of them already conformed to non-traditional ideas without acculturation before coming to the United States. This vicious cycle is also a trap of modernity. Western social imaginary signification is self-aggravating. Once an individual is in the trap, it is difficult to escape from fetishism.

By emptying culture of its basic function—giving existential meanings—and replacing it with the pursuit of material well-being, modernity has caused a sense of insecurity among Chinese when they interpret the world. The result is a search for Chineseness and the
denunciation of *peaceful evolution*. Both of these reactions romanticize the lack of freedom in the old society and, at the same time, signify a failure, or at least a lack of success at this moment, to reconstruct a new social imaginary significance with modern Chinese characteristics. The argument against peaceful evolution is also made by the leadership in their fear of the energy of the masses demonstrated at the Tiananmen Square, which was further emancipated by modernism.\(^3\)

As described so far, the problems of China are multifaceted. It should be re-emphasized that the notion of *peaceful evolution* implies not only subversion of socialism but also subversion of Chineseness. It is also true that foreign influence has been aggravating the process. However, the problems should be understood in light of China's enduring process in the search of Chineseness. This process became important when the communist regime produced fiascos such as the Great Leap Forward and the Cultural Revolution, the importance of ideology decreased, and Chinese people gained measures to compare themselves with people in other countries.

Therefore, what is considered to be "peaceful evolution" seems to be derived from internal demands for non-traditional cultural traits rather than from an imposition of Western culture, or cultural imperialism. Put in another way, What appears to be Westernization of Chinese people is their search for cultural traits associated with modernity and new meanings to Chineseness, rather than a desire for Western cultural traits. The fact that Chinese students in the United States do not experience major value changes despite their extensive and intensive interaction with American culture appears to support this conclusion. It should be

\(^3\)The fear of the masses precedes modernity. Historically, numbers of enormous floating population and peasants uprisings have endangered, if not ruined, various dynasties.
noted, however, that student and scholar exchanges are not a major medium of infiltration of foreign ideas. I believe that foreign mass media and entertainment media have much stronger impact on Chinese people. In other words, on the one hand, the literature review and the survey in this thesis suggest that value changes in China are changes from within, but on the other hand, there is ambiguity to be explored in the area of external factors of the changes. In fact, a question which I cannot answer in this thesis is, "How did the respondents of my survey become familiar with Western ideas?" They may have gained the ideas through translated books, or maybe through foreign movies. A comprehensive understanding of the value changes in China, once again, necessitates examination of external factors, such as foreign mass media, with a longer period of time. Nevertheless, because of the literature review as exhaustive as possible in a given amount of time and Chinese students' extensive as well as intensive contact with American culture, I am inclined to conclude that "peaceful evolution" is changes from within.

Other questions remain. For example, can any Chinese stop the adoption of Western values in the face of modernization? How far do Chinese accept such values? Are the Chinese going to keep suffering from a sense of insecurity and irrationality in post-modernity? Or will they be able to find a new Chinese social imaginary signification and a new Chinese culture with modernity?

In the end, I would like to quote China's prominent rock musician, Cui Jian, on his concern about values of contemporary Chinese. He said:

I believe that what people in this era lack is a symbol which can truly represent them. So, it is difficult for them to talk about who they are. Then, the youngsters are willing to go abroad, or, otherwise, think about making money. I do not mean to oppose that. Nonetheless, if you contemplate this,
you will notice another problem and another suffering. People do not have a clear goal in their life. Moreover, everyone is afraid of such a topic, and is escaping from such a theme.

Additionally, there is a problem with the government. Whatever the reasons--politics or the economy--the government always attempts to suppress people. . . . Although the government does not understand the way of thinking of the youth, it is afraid of them. . . . [T]he youngsters have to listen to the music of the youth. They have to interact with the youth from the world. But they cannot [listen to] rock on television. They cannot feel the real art which represents the true way of thinking of the Chinese youngsters.

Under such circumstances, the young people feel a loss of self. In any case, all they can do is either escape from this place and go abroad, or make money--buying changes with money. When they cannot do either, their hearts become empty. . . .

I want all [Chinese] to love themselves, love their country, love [their country's] history, love their personal history, and love their future.4

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Appendix: The Survey among Chinese Students in the United States of America

The Questionnaire Distributed to Chinese Students

Dear Chinese students,

Hello! My name is Jotaro Tateyama. I am a student majoring in International Relations at Carroll College in Helena, Montana. Fascinated by Chinese culture, people, and politics, I am currently working on an honor thesis in which I try to investigate (co)relationship between changes taking place in Chinese mentality and changes which Chinese students experience in the United States. I am particularly interested in what kinds of changes have been taking place in their minds while staying in the U. S. In my thesis, a survey among Chinese students constitutes the major part. So I would like to ask you fill out the following questionnaire, which takes roughly 15 minutes. CONFIDENTIALITY IS GUARANTEED. I would really appreciate your, time, concern, and cooperation.

Sincerely yours,

Jotaro Tateyama

QUESTIONNAIRE

I. Please fill out your personal information.
1. Sex: M, F.  
2. Age:  
3. City/province where you are from:  
4. Do you have any relatives in the U.S.? Yes, No  
5. How long have you been in the U.S.?  
6. What is your major? (Choose ONE from below)  
   a. Humanity (e.g., Literature, Philosophy, Art)  
   b. Social Sciences (e.g., Political Science, Psychology, Economics, Business Administration)  
   c. Sciences  
   d. Engineering  
   e. Others  
7. What degree are you working on? BA, BS, MA, MBA, MS, Ph.D., Others  
8. How often do you read American newspaper and watch American TV programs? (Choose ONE form below)  
   Never, Less than once a month, Less than once a week, Once a week, Every 2 or 3 days, Everyday  
9. How often do you read Chinese newspaper and watch Chinese TV programs? (Choose ONE from below)  
   Never, Less than once a month, Less than once a week, Once a week, Every 2 or 3 days, Everyday  
10. Who do you associate with? (choose ONE from below)
II. 1. Why did you come to the United States to study?

2. How did you perceive the U.S. before you came? (Choose ONE from below)

   1  2  3  4  5
   (negative) (neutral) (positive)

3. How do you perceive the U.S. now? (Choose ONE from below)

   1  2  3  4  5
   (negative) (neutral) (positive)

4. What are some differences between your preconceived ideas on American life and the actual life of yours?

III. Please read the following statements. If you had agreed with a given statement BEFORE you came to the United States, choose "Y" after "Before." If you had not, choose "N" after "Before." And if you agree with the given statement NOW, choose "Y" after "NOW." If you do not, choose "N" after "NOW." (IMPORTANT!! Please answer to both "Before" and "Now" for each statement.)

1. There are many virtues in Chinese value systems.
   Before: Y, N. Now: Y, N.

2. Harmony with other people is virtuous.
   Before: Y, N. Now: Y, N.

3. My personal interest is more important than that of social groups to which I belong.
   Before: Y, N. Now: Y, N.

4. I must be obedient to my parents, elders, teachers, and famous people.
   Before: Y, N. Now: Y, N.

5. I do not want to get involved in anything in which my interest is not at stake.
   Before: Y, N. Now: Y, N.

6. I prefer equal distribution of wealth to unequal distribution of wealth resulting from free economic activities.
   Before: Y, N. Now: Y, N.

7. Money is more important than anything.
   Before: Y, N. Now: Y, N.

8. A thrifty life is a prerequisite for prosperity.
   Before: Y, N. Now: Y, N.

9. Private ownership of property is more preferable to me than public ownership.
   Before: Y, N. Now: Y, N.

10. The market system brings about "the greatest good for the greatest number of people" better than the command economy.
    Before: Y, N. Now: Y, N.
11. I love my country.
   Before: Y, N.  Now: Y, N.
12. The government and the Party efficiently handle problems which people face today.
   Before: Y, N.  Now: Y, N.
13. China should introduce a multiparty system and free elections so that people can reflect their interests in politics.
   Before: Y, N.  Now: Y, N.
14. The ultimate power of the government lies with the people.
   Before: Y, N.  Now: Y, N.
15. The government should guarantee freedom of press.
   Before: Y, N.  Now: Y, N.
16. Individual human rights (such as freedom of speech, right to property, privacy, and presumption of innocence) are universal.
   Before: Y, N.  Now: Y, N.

IV. I. Do you communicate what you see in America (both positively and negatively) to your family and friends in China?
   Yes, No
   --If "Yes," answer the next two questions. Otherwise, go to section V.
   2. What kinds of ideas do you communicate?
   3. Do you perceive positive responses from those whom you communicate such issues?
      (choose ONE from below)
      Yes, No, I do not know.

V. 1. Are you planning to go back to China immediately after you graduate?
   Yes, No
2. If "Yes," what occupation would you like to have?
3. Whenever you go back to China, would you like to share your experience in America with other Chinese who have never been there?
   Yes, No
4. If "Yes," what kinds of ideas would you like to share?
5. Once you go back to China, would you like to keep corresponding with your American friends?
   Yes, No
6. Based upon your experience, would you encourage other Chinese to come to America?
   Yes, No

End of the questionnaire.
Thank you very much for your time, concern, and cooperation.
Jotaro Tateyama
Basic Findings

Numbers show percentages. And numbers in parentheses show actual number of respondents.

I. The background information of the respondents are as follows.

1. Sex

<p>| | |</p>
<table>
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<tr>
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</tr>
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<tbody>
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<td>34.2</td>
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2. Age (mean=28.82)

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</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
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<td>1.3 (1)</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>12.7 (10)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>21</td>
<td>2.5 (2)</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>8.9 (7)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>22</td>
<td>1.3 (1)</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>7.6 (6)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>23</td>
<td>5.1 (4)</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>11.4 (9)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>24</td>
<td>7.6 (6)</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>3.8 (3)</td>
</tr>
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<td>25</td>
<td>6.3 (5)</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>1.3 (1)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>26</td>
<td>5.1 (4)</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>13.9 (11)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>100.0 (79)</td>
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<td></td>
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3. City or province where they are from

<table>
<thead>
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<th>Harbin</th>
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<th>Provinces</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
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<td>29.1 (23)</td>
<td></td>
<td>Fujian</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>Lanzhou</td>
<td>1.3 (1)</td>
<td>Hubei</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Guangdong</td>
<td>1.3 (1)</td>
<td>Nanjing</td>
<td>6.3 (5)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Qingdao</td>
<td>1.3 (1)</td>
<td>Taiyuan</td>
<td>1.3 (1)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Shanghai</td>
<td>16.5 (13)</td>
<td>Wuhan</td>
<td>2.5 (2)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Tianjin</td>
<td>3.8 (3)</td>
<td>Xian</td>
<td>2.5 (2)</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chnegdu</td>
<td>1.3 (1)</td>
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<td>Hangzhou</td>
<td>1.3 (1)</td>
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<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Yes</th>
<th>43.0 (34)</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>No</td>
<td>57.0 (45)</td>
</tr>
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</table>

| Total | 100.0 (79) |

4. Whether or not they have relatives in the United States

5.a. Length of being in the United States (Length in years. Mean=3.473)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Length</th>
<th>Length</th>
<th>Length</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Less than 0.5</td>
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<td>10.1 (8)</td>
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<tr>
<td>1.0</td>
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<td>8.9 (7)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1.5</td>
<td>8.9 (7)</td>
<td>6.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.0</td>
<td>6.3 (5)</td>
<td>7.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Missing</td>
<td>3.8 (3)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.5</td>
<td>7.6 (6)</td>
<td>8.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.0</td>
<td>11.4 (9)</td>
<td>9.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Total | 100.0 (79) |
5.b. Year when they came to the United States (Calculated from 5.a. Median=1992)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Year</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1985</td>
<td>2.5 (2)</td>
<td>1990</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1986</td>
<td>1.3 (1)</td>
<td>1991</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1987</td>
<td>1.3 (1)</td>
<td>1992</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1988</td>
<td>5.1 (4)</td>
<td>1993</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1989</td>
<td>1.3 (1)</td>
<td>1994</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

6. Major

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Humanity</th>
<th>1.3 (1)</th>
<th>Others</th>
<th>5.1 (4)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Social Sciences</td>
<td>25.3 (20)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sciences</td>
<td>54.4 (43)</td>
<td>Missing</td>
<td>2.5 (2)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Engineering</td>
<td>11.4 (9)</td>
<td>Total</td>
<td>100.0 (79)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

7. Degree in pursuit

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>BA</th>
<th>6.3 (5)</th>
<th>MBA</th>
<th>2.5 (2)</th>
<th>Others</th>
<th>6.3 (5)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>BS</td>
<td>6.3 (5)</td>
<td>MS</td>
<td>13.9 (11)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MA</td>
<td>1.3 (1)</td>
<td>Ph.D.</td>
<td>63.3 (50)</td>
<td>Total</td>
<td>100.0 (79)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

8 & 9. Exposure to American and Chinese mass media (newspaper or television)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>American Mass media</th>
<th>Chinese Mass media</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Never</td>
<td>0 (0)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Less than once a month</td>
<td>2.5 (2)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Less than once a week</td>
<td>5.1 (4)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Once a week</td>
<td>0 (0)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Every 2 or 3 days</td>
<td>22.8 (18)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Everyday</td>
<td>69.6 (55)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>100.0 (79)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
10. Association

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Association</th>
<th>Percent (Count)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Only with Chinese</td>
<td>1.3 (1)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mostly with Chinese and a little with Americans</td>
<td>50.6 (40)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Both equally with Chinese and Americans</td>
<td>36.7 (29)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mostly with Americans and a little with Chinese</td>
<td>11.4 (9)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Only with Americans</td>
<td>0 (0)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>100.0 (79)</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

II.1. Their reasons to have come to the United States for study (Multiple answers)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Reason</th>
<th>Percent (Count)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Degree and advantages in their field</td>
<td>46.8 (37)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Opportunity</td>
<td>29.1 (23)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Experiencing the United States</td>
<td>20.3 (16)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Political freedom</td>
<td>8.9 (7)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Experiencing different lives</td>
<td>1.3 (1)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other reasons</td>
<td>13.9 (11)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Missing</td>
<td>19.0 (15)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>100.0 (79)</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

II.2&3. Their perception of the United States before and after they came to the United States

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Perception</th>
<th>Before</th>
<th>After</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Negative</td>
<td>0 (0)</td>
<td>Negative</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Somewhat negative</td>
<td>1.3 (1)</td>
<td>Somewhat negative</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Neutral</td>
<td>26.9 (21)</td>
<td>Neutral</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Somewhat positive</td>
<td>34.6 (27)</td>
<td>Somewhat positive</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Positive</td>
<td>37.2 (29)</td>
<td>Positive</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>100.0 (78)</strong></td>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
III. Their attitudes toward questions regarding social relations, economy, and politics before and after they came to the United States.

1. There are many virtues in Chinese value systems.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Before</th>
<th>After</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Agree</td>
<td>91.1 (71)</td>
<td>93.6 (73)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Disagree</td>
<td>9.0 (7)</td>
<td>6.4 (5)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>100.0 (78)</td>
<td>100.0 (78)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

2. Harmony with other people is virtuous.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Before</th>
<th>After</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Agree</td>
<td>94.4 (68)</td>
<td>90.3 (65)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Disagree</td>
<td>5.6 (4)</td>
<td>9.7 (7)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>100.0 (72)</td>
<td>100.0 (72)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

3. My personal interest is more important than that of social groups to which I belong.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Before</th>
<th>After</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Agree</td>
<td>34.8 (24)</td>
<td>52.2 (36)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Disagree</td>
<td>65.2 (45)</td>
<td>47.8 (33)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>100.0 (69)</td>
<td>100.0 (69)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

4. I must be obedient to my parents, elders, teachers, and famous people.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Before</th>
<th>After</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Agree</td>
<td>51.4 (38)</td>
<td>31.1 (23)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Disagree</td>
<td>48.6 (36)</td>
<td>68.9 (51)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>100.0 (74)</td>
<td>100.0 (74)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
5. I do not want to get involved in anything in which my interest is not at stake.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Before</th>
<th>After</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Agree</td>
<td>38.7 (29)</td>
<td>40.0 (30)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Disagree</td>
<td>61.3 (46)</td>
<td>60.0 (45)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>100.0 (75)</td>
<td>100.0 (75)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

6. I prefer equal distribution of wealth to unequal distribution of wealth resulting from free economic activities.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Before</th>
<th>After</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Agree</td>
<td>31.9 (23)</td>
<td>31.9 (23)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Disagree</td>
<td>68.1 (49)</td>
<td>68.1 (49)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>100.0 (72)</td>
<td>100.0 (72)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

7. Money is more important than anything.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Before</th>
<th>After</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Agree</td>
<td>10.7 (8)</td>
<td>18.7 (14)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Disagree</td>
<td>89.3 (67)</td>
<td>81.3 (61)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>100.0 (75)</td>
<td>100.0 (75)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

8. A thrifty life is a prerequisite for prosperity.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Before</th>
<th>After</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Agree</td>
<td>48.6 (35)</td>
<td>33.3 (24)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Disagree</td>
<td>51.4 (37)</td>
<td>66.7 (48)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>100.0 (72)</td>
<td>100.0 (72)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

9. Private ownership of property is more preferable to me than public ownership.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Before</th>
<th>After</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Agree</td>
<td>50.0 (35)</td>
<td>62.9 (44)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Disagree</td>
<td>50.0 (35)</td>
<td>37.1 (26)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>100.0 (70)</td>
<td>100.0 (70)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
10. The market system brings about "the greatest good for the greatest number of people" better than the command economy.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Before</th>
<th>After</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Agree</td>
<td>66.7 (44)</td>
<td>74.2 (49)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Disagree</td>
<td>33.3 (22)</td>
<td>25.8 (17)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>100.0 (66)</td>
<td>100.0 (66)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

11. I love my country.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Before</th>
<th>After</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Agree</td>
<td>95.9 (71)</td>
<td>97.3 (72)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Disagree</td>
<td>4.1 (3)</td>
<td>2.7 (2)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>100.0 (74)</td>
<td>100.0 (74)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

12. The government and the Party efficiently handle problems which people face today.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Before</th>
<th>After</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Agree</td>
<td>21.1 (15)</td>
<td>19.7 (14)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Disagree</td>
<td>78.9 (56)</td>
<td>80.3 (57)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>100.0 (71)</td>
<td>100.0 (71)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

13. China should introduce a multiparty system and free elections so that people can reflect their interests in politics.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Before</th>
<th>After</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Agree</td>
<td>80.3 (57)</td>
<td>81.7 (58)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Disagree</td>
<td>19.7 (14)</td>
<td>18.3 (13)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>100.0 (71)</td>
<td>100.0 (71)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
14. The ultimate power of the government lies with the people.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Before</th>
<th>After</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Agree</td>
<td>78.6 (56)</td>
<td>85.3 (58)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Disagree</td>
<td>21.4 (12)</td>
<td>14.7 (10)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>100.0 (68)</td>
<td>100.0 (68)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

15. The government should guarantee freedom of press

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Before</th>
<th>After</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Agree</td>
<td>95.8 (69)</td>
<td>98.6 (71)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Disagree</td>
<td>4.2 (3)</td>
<td>1.4 (1)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>(72)</td>
<td>(72)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

16. Individual human rights (such as freedom of speech, right to property, privacy, and presumption of innocence) are universal.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Before</th>
<th>After</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Agree</td>
<td>83.6 (61)</td>
<td>89.0 (65)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Disagree</td>
<td>16.4 (12)</td>
<td>11.0 (8)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>100.0 (73)</td>
<td>100.0 (73)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

IV. On correspondence with Chinese in Mainland China
1. Whether or not they communicate what they see in the United States

<p>| | |</p>
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>82.3 (65)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No</td>
<td>15.2 (12)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Missing</td>
<td>2.5 (2)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>100.0 (79)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
2. Contents of the correspondence (Open-ended--categorized by author)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Topic</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
<th>Count</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Anything</td>
<td>24.6</td>
<td>(16)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cultural and social issues</td>
<td>43.1</td>
<td>(28)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Economic issues</td>
<td>18.5</td>
<td>(12)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Political issues</td>
<td>9.2</td>
<td>(6)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sino-U.S. relations</td>
<td>3.1</td>
<td>(2)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Missing</td>
<td>26.2</td>
<td>(17)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td>(65)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

3. The responses they receive from those with whom they communicate

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Response</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
<th>Count</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>55.4</td>
<td>(36)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I do not know</td>
<td>24.6</td>
<td>(16)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No</td>
<td>6.2</td>
<td>(4)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Missing</td>
<td>12.3</td>
<td>(8)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>(65)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

V. Prospect for the future influence they wield

1. Whether or not they will go back to China immediately after their graduation

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Response</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
<th>Count</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>20.3</td>
<td>(16)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No</td>
<td>70.9</td>
<td>(56)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Missing</td>
<td>8.9</td>
<td>(7)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>(79)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
2. Types of occupation for those who say yes to the previous question:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Occupation</th>
<th>Count</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Banker</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Business Administration</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Civil servant</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Professor</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Trader</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Missing</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>14</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

3. Whether or not they are willing to share their experience once they go back home:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Option</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>84.8 (67)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No</td>
<td>5.1 (4)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Missing</td>
<td>10.1 (8)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>100.0</strong> (79)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

4. Contents of their future experience sharing (Open-ended—categorized by author):

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Topic</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Anything</td>
<td>30.9 (21)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cultural and social issues</td>
<td>20.6 (14)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Economic issues</td>
<td>11.8 (8)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Political issues</td>
<td>5.9 (4)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sino-U.S. relations</td>
<td>1.5 (1)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other issues</td>
<td>3.0 (2)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Missing</td>
<td>33.8 (23)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>68</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

5. Prospect for future correspondence with their American friends:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Option</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>92.4 (73)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No</td>
<td>5.1 (4)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Missing</td>
<td>2.5 (2)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>100.0</strong> (79)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
6. Whether or not they encourage other Chinese to come to the United States, based on their own experience

<p>| | | |</p>
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</table>
Bibliography


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