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"For Those Who Have No Voice": The Historical Significance Of Chile's National Accord For Transition To Full Democracy (1985)

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"FOR THOSE WHO HAVE NO VOICE": THE HISTORICAL SIGNIFICANCE OF CHILE'S NATIONAL ACCORD FOR TRANSITION TO FULL DEMOCRACY (1985)

A THESIS SUBMITTED IN CANDIDACY FOR THE DEGREE OF BACHELOR OF ARTS

DEPARTMENT OF HISTORY

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<td>AChA</td>
<td>Acción Chilena Anticomunista (Chilean Anti-Communist Action)</td>
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<td>AD</td>
<td>Alianza Demócrata (Democratic Alliance)</td>
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<td>AN</td>
<td>Avanzada Nacional (National Advance)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CNI</td>
<td>Centro Nacional de Inteligencia (National Center for Intelligence)</td>
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<td>DINA</td>
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<td>FPMR</td>
<td>Frente Patriótico Manuel Rodríguez (Manuel Rodríguez Patriotic Front)</td>
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<tr>
<td>MIR</td>
<td>Movimiento de Izquierda Revolucionaria (Leftist Revolutionary Movement)</td>
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<td>MPD</td>
<td>Movimiento Popular Demócrata (Popular Democratic Movement)</td>
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<td>PCCh</td>
<td>Partido Comunista de Chile (Chilean Communist Party)</td>
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<td>PDC</td>
<td>Partido Demócrata Cristiano (Christian Democratic Party)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PN</td>
<td>Partido Nacional (National Party)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UDI</td>
<td>Unión Demócrata Independiente (Independent Democratic Union)</td>
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GLOSSARY

Acuerdo: An "accord" or "agreement." A shorthand name deriving from Acuerdo Nacional y Transición a la Democracia Plena (National Accord for Transition to Full Democracy).

Apertura: An "opening" in the ban on political parties that would allow for limited partisan operation.

Carabineros: Members of Chile's paramilitary police force assigned to enforce civil laws while adhering to strict standards of military discipline.

Desaparecido (feminine: desaparecida): A citizen who has "disappeared" with no evidence of his/her death.

Gremialista: A member of the UDI (Independent Democratic Union).

Junta: A gathering, meeting, or committee. In a military dictatorship, it is a group (usually of military affiliation) that overthrows a national leader and assumes power.

Mirista: A member of the MIR (Leftist Revolutionary Movement).

Población: Population. Also refers to any lower-income shantytown.
PREFACE

"No historian, no matter how slanted or subjective, could claim even tomorrow in good faith that my public actions were in response to an alleged personal ambition or any other motive that was not for the good of Chile."

- General Augusto Pinochet

The first time I met Felipe, I was sitting in a Santiago café and cramming for a quiz in my linguistics class at the Pontifical Catholic University of Chile. My professor had given us little notice, and I was so nervous that I spilled my cup of Nescafé. Felipe, a crippled man in his late forties, approached dutifully with a mop and reassured me that it was no problem. I began to frequent the café, and each afternoon, Felipe was there, clearing tables and muttering to himself in English, French, German, or his native Spanish. I found his multilinguality puzzling because the owner often referred to him as "retrasado," or mentally disabled. I waited two weeks before I gathered the nerve to ask for his story.

Felipe, explained another frequent customer, was at one time a Marxist economics professor. Tortured to the point of brain damage, he became one of the many victims of Chile's seventeen-year dictatorship. During my year-long stay in Santiago, I eventually observed that Felipe's fate was unique in that he was one of the few unhidden fragments leftover from the dictatorship, and his story inspired me to seek answers that Chile seemed to be hiding.

I began to discover that although the Pinochet dictatorship had ended only seven years before I arrived in Chile, the nation was keeping this portion of history hidden from public eye. I once heard the argument that Chileans under Pinochet became so accustomed to hiding their views, namely to avoid a fate like Felipe's, that today they try to conceal what happened, to dismiss the dictatorship as a meaningless fragment of the past. During my first month in Chile, I noticed that there were none of the bright mariachi bands and Viva-Pancho-Villa graffiti that North Americans often associate with Mexican culture. Instead, the Chileans expressed national pride more quietly with clean parks, fine imported
clothing, exotic restaurants, and advanced public transportation. I shared this insight with a Chilean friend, Lilia Schuller. In order to change my naïve impressions and show me another side of Chile, she gave me a simple assignment. I was to take any random city bus, follow it to the end of the line, and then report to Lilia what I saw.

The next morning, I took bus #206 to the neighborhood of Cerro Navia. As the smog cleared and the congested traffic died down, I pressed my face to the bus window and observed my surroundings: graffiti-splattered walls, drifting candy wrappers, barefoot children skipping rope, men carrying toddlers piggy-back, and women chattering on doorsteps. I stepped off the bus and spent the afternoon weaving through Sunday markets and trying to absorb this new Santiago. I passed the Mapocho River, unaware at the time that less than one decade ago, it carried many floating bodies of the desaparecidos. When I spoke with Lilia that evening, she explained to me that after the fall of President Salvador Allende, the Chilean government relocated the shantytowns, hiding poverty in the city's outskirts. More affluent areas of the city, meanwhile, underwent massive urban renewal and enjoyed a booming influx of European and North American imports, distracting the "haves" from the struggle, suffering, and even existence of the "have-nots."

This clearly marked social gap provided a means of hiding not only poverty, but also human rights abuses. Chilean paramilitary forces pillaged only the lower-income neighborhoods like Cerro Navia, where citizens were suspected of accumulating weapons and secretly conspiring to overthrow General Augusto Pinochet. Meanwhile, victims of exile, torture, and death came from every social class. Yet to conceal these cases, undercover police carried out the arrests quietly and at nighttime. The electrodes, the most frequently employed method of torture, left no scars or bruises on victims, thereby concealing any external evidence of abuse. Another way of hiding the abuses was to "disappear" the victims, to kill them without any physical or recorded evidence of their deaths.

In many cases, attempts to conceal the nation's hardships have proven successful. I encountered numerous Chileans who argued assuredly that there were no human rights
abuses under Pinochet. In the meantime, the poverty was an ongoing national problem that one could get around by avoiding city buses (too much risk of being robbed) and hiding houses behind iron gates, security alarms, and sophisticated intercom systems. Most notably, it seems feasible to deny that the dictatorship was a negative time in Chilean history. Pinochet carried out not a coup, but an intervention, a detour away from Allende's dangerous "democratic road to socialism." On the other side, however, there are the shantytowns, the "disappeared," the student protesters, the Catholic clergy who risked their lives to protect endangered citizens, and numerous other Chileans who cannot deny what appears to be hidden. Lilia's assignment, a simple busride, showed me that Chile's national pride involved not only positive steps like the clean parks and efficient subway system, but also an unhealthy cover-up of the nation's setbacks and injustices.

Just as every Chilean will tell a different version of the story, every historian will interpret this period with a different perspective and methodology. With this in mind, I do not promise complete objectivity as I place the Pinochet years in a historical context. My personal involvement in the aftermath of the dictatorship will undoubtedly affect my interpretation of this complex period in Latin American history. As much as possible, however, I have attempted to represent the diverse perspectives of the Chilean people involved by relying heavily on taped interviews and personal observations recorded in my travel journals. In order to analyze this period with a Chilean perspective, I am treating the dictatorship as a Chilean issue. For this reason, I have generally shied away from any mention of United States foreign policy or intervention in Chilean affairs. Furthermore, I have focused the topic on opposition from political parties and Catholic Church hierarchy rather than labor unions, student movements, or other grassroots organizations. Because Santiago serves as the nucleus of Chilean political and church-related activity, this thesis covers the dictatorship in urban and not rural areas. Again, every piece of Chile will have a different story to tell. My intent is to tell the story of Chilean church and political leaders and to uncover one hidden portion of Chilean history.
Any city bus in Santiago will stop in a lower-income neighborhood. Records of human rights abuses maintained by the Vicariate for Solidarity and the Chilean Human Rights Commission have proven that there were indeed numerous cases of torture. Pinochet's recent arrest in the United Kingdom for the torture of Spanish citizens has turned the military dictatorship into an international controversy. And Felipe still cleans tables and floors at the café. Hiding an epic of history may initially seem feasible. Yet as evidence of past events gradually resurfaces, historians must assume the challenge of providing a rational interpretation to this emotionally provocative period of time.
CHAPTER 1
CHILE PRIOR TO THE DICTATORSHIP

"I am content with the present Chilean church—it has the independence and freedom to criticize."1 When a Chilean bishop made this comment during a 1980 interview, seven years had passed since General Augusto Pinochet Ugarte and his three-man military junta ousted socialist President Salvador Allende Gossens and proclaimed military rule. From September 11, 1973, the day of the historic coup, to March of 1990, Pinochet headed a rightist bureaucratic-authoritarian regime that dramatically reshaped Chile's political practice and economic structure. In praising Pinochet's tolerance, the bishop spoke for members of the church hierarchy untouched by the dictatorship's political repression, human rights abuses, and the nationwide poverty that increased as a result of the implementation of particular economic reform programs. As the regime continued, however, the church began to recognize its own vulnerability to the authoritarian government, and eventually, it turned to full-scale opposition.

This opposition became official in August, 1985, when Archbishop of Santiago Juan Francisco Fresno Larraín endorsed the historic National Accord for Transition to Full Democracy. Representing both the church and eleven political parties, the accord was a petition that attempted to negotiate a peaceful return to democratic, civilian rule. To Chileans and international onlookers alike, it marked a possible end to military rule. Yet when Pinochet rejected its provisions, as well as any requests for talks and negotiations, the accord seemed to disappear into Chilean history as one of many failed attempts to attain democratic rule. Although historians have since overlooked the importance of the accord, both supporters and signers overcame numerous obstacles to produce what became Chile's most historically pivotal step towards democratic transition.2 The accord became a crucial turning point in the dictatorship for two key reasons. First, it marked the most influential action
against the military government, bringing the opposition from the underground to
La Moneda, Chile's presidential palace. Second, in refusing to acknowledge the accord or
negotiate with opposition forces, Pinochet sealed his own fate; in a 1988 plebiscite that was
called for in the 1980 Constitution, Chilean citizens voted him out of office. To understand
more clearly Pinochet's place in history, however, it is necessary to examine the events prior
to this defeat.

The overthrow of Allende marked an end to Latin America's most stable democracy, as
well as the beginning of a regime that would claim numerous lives and lead every sector of
Chilean society, from the workers of Santiago's surrounding poblaciones (lower-income
shantytowns) to military higher-ups under Pinochet, to demand a democratic transition.
Although grassroots opposition played its own pivotal role in countering the dictatorship, the
two historical forces behind the accord were the Catholic Church and an eclectic gathering of
political parties.

Remarkably, all twenty-one signers represented political parties that once merely fought
among themselves. Their motives for signing the accord varied as widely as their political
differences. Frequent human rights abuses and direct governmental attacks on church
hierarchy sparked Fresno and other bishops into opposition. Activists from the Left and
Center, meanwhile, were growing resentful of the political repression under a regime that not
only countered their ideals, but also banned partisan practice altogether. Finally, following a
1981-1982 economic crash, even certain sectors of the Right began to demand that Pinochet
fulfill what he promised at a 1977 political rally in Chacarillas, Santiago: "constitutional
normality" and civilian rule by 1985. In the wakening of this opposition, Fresno remarked,
"At this time it would seem that national aspirations have accomplished unity under one
common name: democracy."³

Prior to the dictatorship, democratic rule in Chile was not a mere aspiration like
Fresno's, but a longstanding tradition. The nation boasted of the second congress founded
in the Western hemisphere, a strict adherence to law, and little political corruption. Chile's 1925 Constitution laid the foundation for a quintessential Western democracy by encouraging political participation and ensuring checks and balances between the three branches of government. Even during the brief quasi-dictatorships of Carlos Ibáñez (1927-1929) and Marmaduque Grove's 100-day socialist regime (1931), Chile's leaders remained committed to Constitutional law. Because of its traditional reverence for civilized, democratic government, Northern European and North American observers had nicknamed the nation "the England of South America." The 1970 election of Salvador Allende Gossens marked the first time in history in which a Marxist came to power by popular vote. Though elected by a narrow plurality of 36.2%, Allende had a strong social base of support consisting of workers, peasants, intellectuals, urban shanty-town residents, and sectors of the middle class who favored structural reforms more radical than those set by the preceding president, Eduardo Frei Montalva.

Inspired and supported by the U.S. Alliance for Progress program under President Kennedy, Frei won Chile's 1964 elections under the campaign slogan, Revolution in Liberty. As a member of the centrist Christian Democrat Party (PDC), Frei sought to reform the economy while representing a third option between the hardline capitalist Right and the Marxist Left. His Agrarian Reform program promised land redistribution to 100,000 peasants, and he proposed to nationalize Chile's leading industry, copper, by purchasing 51% of U.S. interests in the companies. However, the Agrarian Reform only affected one-fifth of the intended population, and the U.S. corporations continued to control major copper companies. In short, Frei succeeded in neither of his two chief goals. Moreover, his presidency dramatically polarized the nation's political spectrum and left the working class with high expectations of more radical social reform.

As a leading figure in the Popular Unity coalition (UP), an influential party consisting of both Marxist and non-Marxist leftists, Allende appeared as the ideal candidate to meet such
Figure 1-1. Prior to the 1973 coup, Pinochet (left) served under Allende (right) as Commander-in-Chief and a leading military advisor. (Courtesy of: http://www.amerikanclaris.com/~fapilan/pinochet/fotos/c1.jpg)
expectations. Following his election, he set forth to pave a "democratic road to socialism" and commence a non-violent socioeconomic transition to redistribute the nation's wealth, carrying Frei's reform programs to new levels. Such changes infuriated private entrepreneurs and landowners. The latter group was already disenchanted by the loss or redistribution of their property under Frei's Agrarian Reform programs. Even those sectors of the middle class that had once provided Allende's base of popular support were beginning to resent the tremendous tax hikes imposed to fund numerous social programs such as public works employment, workers cooperatives, literacy programs, and the distribution of free milk to lower-income children. He fulfilled Frei's mission of nationalizing the copper industry, and Chile remained the highest-ranked nation in Latin America for education, literacy, and size of the middle class. As government spending soared, however, so did inflation. By 1973, rates shot above 1000%, the highest figure recorded in Latin America prior to that time. Workers in private businesses were staging numerous strikes, and food shortages left numerous Chileans standing in long lines to obtain basic necessities.\(^7\) Underlying the declining support for Allende was a fundamental fear of communism. Near the end of Allende's presidency, the military was beginning to conspire against the president under an international network of support and the leadership of General Pinochet.

Born in 1918 in the naval port city of Valparaíso, Pinochet joined the armed forces at age fifteen. Upon ascending to the rank of General, he appeared to cooperate with any government in power, as well as popular trends in politics. "Whoever does not do it [ascend in rank] this way is out, he is expelled by the system," remarked Chilean journalist Patricia Verdugo. "If he [Pinochet] has to be Catholic, he's Catholic. If he has to be a mason, he's a mason." Surely enough, Pinochet swore his loyalty to Allende hasta las últimas consecuencias ("until the final consequences"). Allende, in turn, named him a key advisor and Commander in Chief. Hence, although Chilean citizens, including numerous Roman Catholic bishops, predicted a coup, few had expected Pinochet as its head.\(^8\)
The bombing of La Moneda lasted only a few hours. At 8:30 a.m. on September 11, 1973 the junta announced the takeover on the radio. Allende remained in La Moneda, refusing to surrender even as total destruction of the palace became increasingly imminent. Aware that the military would soon shut down all radio access, he delivered his last words over the airways:

Workers of my Fatherland, I have faith in Chile and her destiny. Other men will rise in this dark and bitter moment of betrayal that imposes itself upon us. Always know that much sooner than later the great avenues will open through which man shall pass freely to build a better society. Long live Chile, long live the people, long live the workers! These are my last words, having certainty that our sacrifice will not be in vain. I am certain that at least there will be moral sanction that will punish crime, cowardliness, and betrayal.9

Some twenty minutes later, the handful of Allende's supporters still in La Moneda heard shots from inside his office. To this day, the cause of his death remains a mystery. Pinochet supporters dismissed it as a cowardly suicide. Chilean leftists, however, insisted that it was a military assassination, instantly making Allende a martyr to their cause. Pinochet, meanwhile, justified the coup by assuring Chile that Allende's government was a threat to national well being. He stated:

The lamentable trilogy of demagoguery, statism and Marxism reached its worst extreme in our fatherland with this last government of the republic. Many today have forgotten how, during the Marxist government, the most characteristic values of our nationality were threatened or sneered at. The free spirit was threatened by imminent totalitarianism. Strong, just and impersonal authority had disappeared, giving way to anarchy. The judicial spirit was destroyed by a government that despised legality. The sentences of our courts were ignored in a systematic way. All economic private initiative was suffocated by socialist collectivism . . . It was necessary to gather all the reserves of our patriotism, to impede this fall into the abyss with the intervention of the armed forces.10

Following the coup, Pinochet immediately attempted to purge all potential enemies from
Figure 1-2. On September 11, 1973, General Pinochet's forces brought Marxism in Chile to a violent end. (Courtesy of: http://www.amerikanclaris.com/~fapilan/pinochet/fotos/moneda.jpg)
the political arena. He suspended civil rights, carried out mass arrests of Allende supporters, abolished congress and numerous political parties, and took over universities and the national bureaucracy. With support from the private sector and upper and middle classes, he used these sweeping reforms to discredit and weaken any potential opposition. He governed under the theory of geopolitics, which advocated the state as a supreme and centralized authority and argued that civilian, or non-military, politicians were incompetent at governing. Individuals were to sacrifice their rights to the power of the state, and critics or opponents were stigmatized as subversive traitors.11

As he eliminated the opposition, Pinochet also worked to gain approval. He spent the first decade of his regime attempting to document his government's legitimacy. In 1978, he held a national plebiscite in which citizens responded "yes" or "no" to the following provision:

In light of the international aggression unloosed against the government of our Fatherland, I support Pinochet in his defense of the dignity of Chile and I reaffirm the legitimacy of the government of the Republic to lead sovereignly the process of the institutionalization of the country.4*

On the voting ballot, a black square covered the box next to the "no" option, and a Chilean flag filled the "yes" box. The results of the election pointed to overwhelming approval, as a proclaimed 75% of Chileans favored the new regime. Another plebiscite, held in 1980, was to approve a new constitution. The government announced that 64.04% voted in favor, and the following year, the Constitution was enacted into law. The Constitution stressed such values as orthodox Christianity, patriotism, national security, and respect for the patriarchal nuclear family.13 It reiterated in somewhat vague terms the ideals from the 1977 Chacarillas rally. Democratic rule was at hand, but Chileans would have to wait until 1988 to vote in another plebiscite on Pinochet's continuing rule.
Although the 1980 Constitution guaranteed the "right to life and physical and psychological integrity of the citizen," governmental repression continued to increase. In the name of "cut[ting] out . . . the malignant tumor of Marxism," the junta began massive terror campaigns, particularly in the lower-income poblaciones, in order to rid Chile of dissidents and intimidate other citizens into submission.\textsuperscript{14} On June 15, 1974, Manuel Contreras founded the Department of National Intelligence (DINA), a gestapo-like investigations force that employed some 20,000 people and engaged in quiet arrests and secret interrogations. Partially under U.S. pressure from the Carter Administration, the DINA was eventually dissolved. The junta replaced it with the National Center for Intelligence (CNI), an even more secretive and efficiently run organization that used torture to intimidate and indoctrinate. With the DINA publicly abolished, the CNI hid violence from the public eye and left much of Chile oblivious to the abuses for the rest of the dictatorship.\textsuperscript{15}

Junta violence remained underground not only because the secret police worked quietly, but also because Pinochet's rapid economic "shock treatment" was distracting middle and upper classes as imports flooded the country. Under Allende, Chileans purchased both basic necessities and sophisticated appliances on the black market. Now, Pinochet was opening the international market and bringing in a wide array of goods. He credited the economic boom to the "Chicago Boys," a group of young entrepreneurs educated in the United States, many at the University of Chicago, and well versed in Milton Friedman's monetarist economic theories. As Pinochet's close advisors, the Chicago Boys began to shift Chile's economy to the world market, where profits were higher than on the domestic front. They convinced Pinochet to drop most tariffs, thereby leaving Chile's domestic industry without any protection.\textsuperscript{16}

Despite the nation's surging economic euphoria, the poorer citizens suffered consequences unseen by the more privileged classes. In order to fund these reforms, Pinochet relied on international loans and slashed the government spending that prevailed
under Allende. As a result, many citizens lost their access to social security, pensions, and healthcare. Because of the decrease in expenditures, inflation rates plummeted to 10%; however, 2/3 of the population fell into poverty. Shantytown residents suffered frequent raids of their homes by *carabineros* (national paramilitary police), who searched for hidden weapons and often left with political prisoners, a routine that would carry on well through the 1980's. By this time, however, the dictatorship was taking a turn that would spread well beyond the *poblaciones*.

In 1981, a new "shock treatment" struck the nation and sparked protests up and down Chile's 2500-mile spine. Suddenly, Chile found itself in its greatest economic downturn since the depression of the 1930s. Private foreign debt soared and, by 1985, reached twenty billion U.S. dollars. Tariff reductions were hurting small businesses and increasing the amount of bankruptcies. Domestic industry weakened under free-market weight, leaving almost 30% of Chile's workforce unemployed. Finally, in November 1981, numerous Chilean banks collapsed. Suddenly, the darker side of "Chicago Boy" economics was giving way to a renaissance of opposition that would inspire the National Accord.

The first significant protests, however, began on a grassroots level. Rodolfo Seguel, president of a copper miner's union, declared May 11, 1983, the National Day of Protests. Street demonstrations continued through the following September and always ended in *carabineros* combating protesters with waterbombs and tear gas. Although Pinochet had outlawed public demonstrations when he first seized power, Chileans were now willing to defy the law despite the risks. Eventually, the government responded by declaring a State of Siege on November 6, 1984, that would last for nearly a year. The State of Siege allowed military officers to ban public gatherings, impose an early-evening curfew, and impose censorship. While most Allende supporters were shipped to a concentration camp on the Antarctic Dawson Island in the early 1970s, the military now found a camp for dissidents closer to its Santiago powerbase: the Estadio Nacional, a giant soccer stadium in the
working-class neighborhood of Nuñoa. In the wake of the violence and economic upheaval, Chile became Latin America's last standing rightist dictatorship. Yet Pinochet continued to insist that he was apolitical. "I am neither rightist nor leftist," he claimed. "I am Chilean." The Catholic Church would become the first force to put this statement to the test.
CHAPTER 2
THE CATHOLIC CHURCH AS OPPOSITION

"I want to be prudent, but I will not be cowardly."

-Churchman Francisco Fresno Larraín

While Chile was at war from within, the Catholic Church appeared ambivalent for the first decade of the dictatorship. It did not express firm opposition to the regime until two factors forced it to strengthen its stance: pressure from the lower levels of the church and direct governmental attacks on church hierarchy. Initially, Archbishop Raúl Silva Henríquez of Santiago spearheaded many opposition-based initiatives between 1973 and 1980, including the writing of letters criticizing the regime, and he established the Vicariate for Solidarity in 1974. The latter would prove to be pivotal not only for providing a legal defense umbrella for leftist intellectuals and militants, but also for maintaining records of the regime's victims. Despite Silva's activism, he did seek to maintain reasonably peaceful relations with the junta. He and the church hierarchy therefore qualified any criticisms by praising Pinochet for stamping out Marxism.

For example, in 1975 the Episcopal Conference released "Gospel and Peace," a petition advocating the rights to life, bodily integrity, and participation in society. To the bishops, these were the three factors that defined human rights. However, never once did the document directly address the specific issue of torture, and a significant portion of it praised the junta for exterminating Marxism. Even the 1974 "Reconciliation in Chile," the church's first major statement against the junta, balanced criticism with attempts to appease the government. Silva wrote:

We understand that particular circumstances can justify the short-term suspension of civil rights.---But there are rights which pertain to the very dignity of the human person and those are absolute and inviolable. The church must speak on behalf of all, but especially for those who have no voice.
Table 2.1 Church Attempts at Opposition Prior to the Accord

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<tr>
<td>September 13, 1973</td>
<td>&quot;Declaration of the Cardinal and the Permanent Committee of the Episcopal Conference&quot;</td>
<td>Lack of military respect for social gains of the poor during the Allende years.</td>
<td>Insignificant. Contained no call for change and praised the coup.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>April, 1974</td>
<td>&quot;Reconciliation in Chile&quot;</td>
<td>Increased pressure from lower levels of the church working closely with the persecuted.</td>
<td>No impact on diminishing repression. Both criticized and commended the coup.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>September, 1975</td>
<td>&quot;Gospel and Peace&quot;</td>
<td>More pressure from laity and lower levels, along with graphic accounts of malnutrition, torture, and other human rights abuses following the coup.</td>
<td>No impact on public policy. Criticism more harsh, but still balanced with praise. Left hierarchy in disunity on how to respond to the military regime.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>August 12, 1976</td>
<td>Two untitled declarations</td>
<td>Arbitrary expulsion of two bishops and harassment by DINA of bishops at Pudahuel Airport in Santiago.</td>
<td>Junta accused church of Marxist infiltrations. Now that prominent church leaders were affected by dictatorship, bishops spoke out.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>March, 1977</td>
<td>&quot;Our Life as a Nation&quot;</td>
<td>Reprisals against the PDC, with whom the church held a tight affiliation.</td>
<td>Media criticism of church. Church unites in unequivocal opposition.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Despite the more aggressive stand that it represented, the aforementioned passage expressed the tension that was characteristic of church documents prior to the National Accord. And neither it nor "Gospel and Peace" yielded any response from the government or impact on public policy (see Table 2.1). Furthermore, the church's statements received scarce media attention, namely the back page in Santiago's *El Mercurio*, and no editorial comments.4 One explanation for the church's equivocal behavior lies in the historical relationship with the government.

Prior to 1980, Chile was under the 1925 Constitution that mandated the separation of church and state. This measure overturned the church's traditional involvement in government. Now, legitimacy was no longer theocratic or Hobbesian; the assumption of a title or power was no longer justified by God's grace or blessing, but by popular election or, in Pinochet's case, the 1980 popular plebiscite. Yet while diocesan influence in political and economic decision-making declined over the next fifty years, the church remained with the military as one of "the two pillars of Latin American society." Indeed, church and state in Chile shared equal status and common privileges. Both encouraged peace among social classes, feared radical leftist movements, and promoted such values as tradition, discipline, hierarchical control, and institutional autonomy. Moreover, both played some role in the legitimization of a government, even if only symbolic and secondary.5

In fact, since the colonization by Spanish settlers in the 14th and 15th centuries, the Catholic Church has traditionally provided moral legitimacy to the government in power. Typically, the archbishop has been present at a new leader's inauguration and conducted a High Mass to mark the regime's first year. The reverence that a right-wing government like Pinochet's has paid to the church stems from the idea that Catholicism represents Western civilization, exactly what the junta claims to defend in the face of a communist threat.6 Hence, the church was one source among many, including popular plebiscites and international approval, used by Pinochet's government as an attempt to gain legitimacy.

Following the tradition of the *conquistadores*, Silva presided over a High Mass on
September 18, 1973. He replaced the traditional *Te Deum* (Mass of Thanksgiving) with the Mass of Reconciliation of all Chileans. In his homily, Silva did not fulfill the junta's wish in gaining complete church sanction, as he recognized the government for its military role, but not its political power. He prayed:

> We ask you, Lord, that there not be among us either conquerors or conquered. For this purpose, for the reconstruction of Chile, we would like to offer our impartial collaboration to those who at a very difficult time have taken upon their shoulders the very heavy responsibility of guiding our destiny.7

Even though the church was the only non-governmental organization that could continue to operate freely, neither "Reconciliation" nor any other documents sent to the government yielded any responses. On the contrary, after 1974, the government began to rely less on church approval for its actions. Discouraged by their failure to improve Chile's human rights situation, many bishops resorted to secret negotiations with the military and DINA agents to arrange for the release of political prisoners. One bishop involved in such activities claimed,"Dinners, private letters or conversations are more effective than public denunciations . . ."8 Yet over the next decade, Chilean bishops were growing weary from extinguishing occasional flare-ups of human rights abuses and, in the process, having no long term goals.

Clergy and laity finally defined their objectives more clearly when Silva established the Vicariate for Solidarity in 1974. The Vicariate's mission was chiefly to take uncompromising action in protecting the civil rights and well being of vulnerable citizens. Not only did it shelter the political activists that Pinochet deemed subversive, but it also distributed meals and provided medical assistance to the beaten and tortured. Furthermore, it began to tally the nation's human rights abuses, including cases of the murdered, tortured, and "disappeared." For instance, Vicariate records indicate that between 1973 and 1977, the government was
Figure 2-1. In 1976, Fresno was elected to the Episcopal Conference as a moderate conservative and junta sympathizer. (Courtesy of: http://www.gw.cl/arzobispado/cfoto9.jpg)
responsible for the deaths of approximately 2000 Chileans. Though perhaps the strongest base of moral opposition to the regime, the Vicariate consisted primarily of the lower and less influential levels of the church. Yet in founding the organization, Silva foreshadowed opposition that would come from the hierarchy. For the next decade, members continued to dodge governmental attacks, such as numerous attempts to close them down, and pressure the bishops to make a stronger stand against the civil injustices. Such pressures, however, initially caused more divisions than unity within the church. And while the lower levels continued their grassroots oppositions, the bishops focused their attention on matters that threatened their 350 years of prestige and influence. Two specific events began the showdown between church and state.

The first occurred in November, 1975, when Jaime Guzmán Errázuriz, a hardline Pinochet supporter and rightist leader, appeared on national television and attacked Vicariate members involved with shielding MIR affiliates from governmental intervention. He also criticized Silva for acting against the government in forming the Vicariate. Although Silva, too, condemned the alleged communist leaning of some clergy members and laity, he did believe in the Vicariate's mission of preserving human life despite any leftist affiliations. While Guzmán was implying that the church was acting against the government, Silva issued a public commentary accusing Guzmán of "conspiring" against him and encouraging the public to disobey his mandates. Such actions, Silva reasoned, warranted excommunication. Guzmán, who had proclaimed himself "an observant and faithful Catholic," responded by publicly reiterating his respect for church authority. Although Guzmán escaped excommunication, he and Silva brought to public attention a moral issue arising for the first time in Chilean history: whether to align with church or state authority.

The second incident took place that same year when Fresno was elected to the Episcopal Conference, a first step towards becoming Archbishop when Silva retired. As a moderate
conservative and junta sympathizer, Fresno inherited the church's chaotic situation. When he was appointed Archbishop of Santiago in 1983, First Lady Lucía Iriarte de Pinochet exclaimed, "God has finally answered our prayers!" Fresno's pro-junta sentiments, however, began to diminish when the church became as vulnerable as common citizens to the suspension of civil rights.

When the government began to include church documents within its realm of censorship, relations were growing increasingly more tense. In June, 1984, Fresno arrived in Santiago. Breaking an ageworn tradition, Pinochet did not meet the new archbishop at the airport, providing even more evidence that church and state were at odds. Yet even prior to this time, direct governmental attacks on church hierarchy were what originally led Fresno and a support group of other bishops to turn to intransigent opposition.

On August 12, 1976, three Chilean bishops—Enrique Alvear of Santiago, Fernando Ariztía of Copiapó, and Carlos Gonzáles of Talca—all arrived at Santiago's Pudahuel Airport from a conference in Riobamba, Ecuador. As they left the building, a crowd of pro-government demonstrators, including many alleged DINA members, hurled stones and insults at them. When word reached Fresno, the church released an unequivocal statement condemning the government for its direct attack on three prominent church figures:

If this can happen to [these] prestigious professional people of well-known intellectual capacity who have held positions of the highest responsibility, what could happen to simple and ignorant citizens?

Two major confrontations with the government, the stand-off with Guzmán and the harassment from the DINA, as well as increasing pressure from the Vicariate, moved the church from applauding the coup to scorning the junta. In order to combat the regime effectively, Fresno had to work cautiously, as the military was inconsistent in enacting and enforcing laws barring public meetings and political activity. On one hand, some of the most
powerful church-based opposition was forced to remain underground as the Vicariate
ensured the continuing existence of disbanded political parties, and clergy often hosted
opposition meetings disguised as Mass. Yet despite the junta's numerous threats and
criticism, no law would ever emerge to overthrow the 350 years of church authority in Chile,
as Guzmán proved with the consequences of his audacious attack. Centrists and eventually
leftist activists were therefore quick to take advantage of the Vicariate and Church support as
their only route to partisan activity.
CHAPTER 3
POLITICAL PARTIES AS OPPOSITION

"As a spiritual inspiration to the leftists, Allende may prove to be more potent dead than alive."

-Everett C. Martin1

The church umbrella was not the only factor enabling the resurgence of political parties. The government itself was beginning to make concessions. When Pinochet imposed the State of Siege in 1984, opposition was stirring everywhere from the streets to within the junta. In the initial stages of the coup, no member of the military dared to disagree with the General for fear of facing the same punishments inflicted on civilian dissidents. In one case, Pinochet forced Air Force General Gustavo Leigh Guzmán to resign because of his public criticism of the delay in a return to civilian rule.2 Yet a dramatic increase in street protests led Pinochet's top advisors to advocate an end to the State of Siege, as well as an apertura, an "opening" in the law that would allow limited political activity and dialogue with opposition forces. In a government whose Constitution had promised progress and order, they argued, instigating a State of Siege was "an admission of failure," a sign that the military government was too weak to control its own citizens. Pinochet yielded to these pressures and appointed Sergio Onofre Jarpa, a pro-opening confidant, to serve as Minister of the Interior and oversee talks with the opposition. Remarkably, Jarpa was the first civilian political figure whom Pinochet assigned to a major cabinet post.3

A second step toward a political opening occurred in January 1984, when the government released a statement allowing political parties to continue to meet, provided that they accepted the conditions of the 1980 Constitution. Nonetheless, the 1974 ban on political parties remained in effect when communists and hardline socialists refused to acknowledge the Constitution's legitimacy. The Chilean Communist Party (PCCh), the Socialist Party,
Figure 3-1. While opposition forces worked to undermine the regime, Pinochet rallied for support. (Courtesy of: http://www.amerikanclaris.com/~fapilan/pinochet/fotos/salu.jpg)
and the radical leftist MIR were among the most influential activists affiliated with these ideologies. Following the coup, leftists went either underground or to the Estadio Nacional. Meanwhile, rightist parties such as the National Party (PN), Fatherland and Liberty, and the gremialistas (the Chilean equivalent to the Republican Party in the U.S.) declared themselves in dissolution. Centrist parties such as the Christian Democratic Party (PDC) took advantage of political openings to continue their operation. Yet because of the church's historical alliance to the party, it could resort to the Vicariate during times of heightened repression.

Despite the movement towards an apertura, political parties under Pinochet had to overcome numerous obstacles to unite in opposition and successfully push the accord into action. Numerous factors contributed to these challenges, including a decline in popular support, confrontations with the military (especially in the case of socialist factions), and the destruction of the very bases for their existence, such as congress and popular elections. Ideological quarrels, however, marked the most significant setback in their struggle to unite. As they endured these challenges, they remained highly dependent on church protection. Because the church held many advantages over political parties, it was imperative that an archbishop and not a political figure spearhead the accord. For instance, both the church and political parties endured internal differences of interest and opinion. Yet as the previous chapter indicates, the church was only split into two sides, the upper and lower levels, both of which eventually united when human rights abuses and attacks on the hierarchy escalated. The political parties, by contrast, suffered from seemingly irreparable differences. These ranged from conflicting economic philosophies to mere bickering over who should be the next party leader. One political scientist drew a diagram of Chile's political parties from 1964 to 1987. The result yielded a mesh of 117 different parties and factions therein. The diagram demonstrated another advantage that the church held over political factions: tradition in unity. Compared to political parties, the church had never suffered enough internal divisions to provoke its dissolution. Chile's parties, however, had a history of appearing
and disappearing. Finally, the junta's main objective was to dissolve political parties, not the church. Despite the tensions that the dictatorship was creating, the church and the military were traditional allies, and both held authority over common citizens. Political parties, however, became the enemy. Pinochet worked to ensure that no party partook of the free political forums that had allowed Marxists to seize power in the democratic election of Allende. In response to the 1978 plebiscite, he declared to all politicians, "It's finished for you." As challenges arose, political parties were determined to prove the General wrong.

The first major threat to stability of Chile's political parties was the lack of public support. In the early 1980s, however, this problem did not appear as evident. The Estadio Nacional was filling daily with political prisoners, and many labor unions once strong under Allende were taking to the streets under Rodolfo Seguel. Others in opposition were volunteering for the Vicariate, and still others were participating in numerous clandestine communist movements. Indeed, many critics asserted that the dictatorship did not deter, but encouraged, the rise of communists in Chile, as they reacted to restrictions on their practice by strengthening their unity and ideology. The rise of popular opposition may imply an automatic support for politicians advocating democratic change, as both sectors were clearly in opposition. However, Fresno and accord signers considered most popular protests a form of violence, exactly what they were trying to discourage in the accord. Another factor contributing to the lack of public support was the backing for Pinochet among certain sectors. While banks and private businesses paid homage to the General, most of the upper and middle classes passively accepted a regime that saved them from Marxism. According to political scientist Moisés Naim, "... the simple promise of working telephones and reliable garbage collection could build popular support for the sale of public utilities far more easily than ideological sermons about the private sector." Hence, Pinochet struck a Faustian bargain with his people, who in turn agreed to exchange basic rights for the creature comforts of quiet streets and upscale department stores. Although this lack of support for the political
Table 3.1 Major Rightist Chilean Political Parties

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>PARTY</th>
<th>FOUNDED</th>
<th>IDEALS/POLITICS</th>
<th>KEY LEADERS</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Fatherland and Liberty (Patria y Libertad)</td>
<td>1970s</td>
<td>Far Right. Began as a clandestine force under President Eduardo Frei Montalva and resurfaced under Pinochet as an influential pro-junta force and advocate for the YES-vote in the 1988 Plebiscite.</td>
<td>NA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Independent Democratic Union (Union Demócrata Independiente)</td>
<td></td>
<td>Center-Right to Right. Originally founded to oppose university involvement in governmental affairs. Full support to military regime and declared self in dissolution to respect ban on political parties.</td>
<td>Jaime Guzmán Errázuriz (founder), Jovino Novoa (Vice President)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>National Advance (Avanzaña Nacional)</td>
<td></td>
<td>Far Right. Strong ties to UDI and fervent support to junta.</td>
<td>Col. Álvaro Corvalán Castillo, Eduardo Díaz</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>National Party (Partido Nacional)</td>
<td>1965</td>
<td>Center-Right. Cooperation with regime and opposition to state control over economy. Later endorsed the accord.</td>
<td>Sergio Onofre Jarpa (founder), Mario Anello (Secretary General)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>National Renovation (Renovación Nacional)</td>
<td>1987</td>
<td>Right to far Right. Pro-junta and advocate for the YES-vote.</td>
<td>Andrés Allamand Zavala Sergio Onofre Jarpa (left the party due to the 1988 Plebiscite controversy)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
parties did little to boost the morale of political leaders, it did not pose a major threat to partisan survival. On the contrary, the dissolution of political parties included the abolition of any electoral appeals, and politicians were aware that popular approval was a moot basis for support.

A more looming threat to the accord's fate was the military. Shaped by French and German advisors in the early 20th century, Chile's armed forces have been characterized by strict discipline, patriotism, and an innate fear of communism. The latter provided its primary reason for existence, particularly under Pinochet. The military government based its performance on black and white definitions of what construed enemies and allies and was unable to distinguish loyal opposition from constructive criticism, and non-violent opposition from terrorism. As a result, every suspect was deemed subversive on equal terms, including literacy teachers in the poblaciones, anthropologists living among the Mapuche, Marxist historians and professors, and priests who refused to relay information to the DINA or CNI about information they acquired in the confessional. "If the submerged elements try to rise against our people," Pinochet warned in a 1974 speech, "we will not hesitate to react with drastic means. Until we have caught them all, I will not lift the military measures."9 Pinochet did not limit these words to a mere handful of miristas, guerrillas from the MIR. Left and center-left factions saw that they were equally as vulnerable.

In 1982, Socialist activist Sergio Aguiló Melo was sentenced to 541 days in prison "for political motives." Following his release, he assumed direction of the Socialist Bloc, a coalition of various left and center-left parties. On November 7, 1984, one day after Pinochet declared the State of Siege, carabineros raided the Socialist Bloc's headquarters. They arrested everyone on the scene and purged it of all contents, including light fixtures.10 Those socialists who were not arrested or exiled went underground. Some joined more radical factions, and others wound up endorsing the accord.

Even the centrist PDC was clashing with the military government. Pinochet began to
include them in what he deemed an international Marxist conspiracy. In one case, he accused them of duplicity:

These people pretend to be cooperating, but according to information that we have, in reality they are not cooperating. They always say yes to you, but when the moment comes to act they move slowly, they mislay documents, they change a word or a comma. They may comply with an order, but privately they talk against it.11

As a centrist party, the PDC had historically experienced disagreements between its center-right and center-left factions. Initially, the party shared the church's view of the coup, claiming that it served as a panacea for the national disorder under Allende. Yet when Pinochet did not carry out his Chacarrillas promise of a rapid return to democratic rule, the PDC evolved into an opposition force. "The Christian Democrats regard the military as a bunch of fools," stated an anonymous PDC member, "and the military regard the politicians as a bunch of crooks."12

Political parties were now without popular support and at odds with the military. Their final challenge lay in redefining their role. With the Left repressed and the Center restricted, Pinochet extended his military control to all levels of civil society, including congress, foreign service, education, and local governments. His control over the courts and the press, restrictions on labor unions, and censorship of allegedly subversive documents were all efforts to muffle and often destroy the one-third of Chile's population that had proclaimed itself leftist under Allende. Political parties were unaccustomed to these measures that erased the very means of their existence. As a result, they were increasingly divided by factionalism, ideological disputes, tactical disagreements, and an overall loss of morale.13

These setbacks pertained not only to Center and Left factions, but also to the Right.

Favoring Pinochet's resignation and a rapid transition to democracy, the PDC resorted to its original philosophies based on Christian humanism and a desire to overcome the
nation's economic underdevelopment. Founded in 1957 as a democratic reform party, the PDC advocated a "third way" between communism and capitalism, and it emerged in 1963 as the nation's largest political party. Indeed, it gained almost instant popularity in Chile, and Frei's 1964-1970 presidency has remained a legacy to Chileans of most political persuasions. The PDC united in unabashedly opposing Allende's economic restructuring, and divided when Pinochet came to power. Members leaning to the party's Right quietly accepted the junta; however, the bulk of the party continued to oppose the dictatorship and support the exiled Popular Unity alliance still meeting in Europe.

In March 1975, the PDC held a secret meeting from which it issued a declaration that described junta policies as "erroneous, unjust and incompatible with our principles regarding human rights, economic orientation and the situation of the workers." Numerous factors contributed to their anti-government stance. When even the junta's own General Gustavo Leigh Guzmán began to criticize the regime, the PDC realized that Pinochet had no intention of making any immediate transition to democracy. The indefinite government shutdown of their broadcasting station, Radio Balmaceda, only heightened the PDC's resentment towards a regime that it initially had accepted. With more members than any other Chilean party, the PDC under Pinochet was forced to define its identity; going Left would reinforce the General's accusations of Marxist infiltrations in the party, and going Right would mean allying with pro-coup groups. With this dilemma in mind, the party continued its secret meetings between 1982 and 1986 to discuss political objectives and ensure partisan loyalty.

On August 6, 1983, the PDC banded with a handful of non-communist social democratic parties, including the Socialist Bloc, to form the Democratic Alliance (AD). Despite their past ideological quarrels, these parties drafted a ten-point plan whose demands included Pinochet's immediate resignation, the establishment of a mixed economy, autonomy for universities, and the overall restoration of civil liberties. A political opening was at hand, and the AD prepared itself for numerous meetings with the Minister of the Interior,
Table 3.2 Major Leftist Chilean Political Parties

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<th>PARTY</th>
<th>FOUNDED</th>
<th>IDEALS/ POLITICS</th>
<th>KEY LEADERS</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Chilean Communist Party (Partido Comunista de Chile)</td>
<td>1929</td>
<td>Left to far Left. Advocates gradual nationalist revolution to overthrow Chilean oligarchy and foreign imperialism. Opposed Cuban Revolution and favored instead a more peaceful transition.</td>
<td>Luis Corvalán, (exiled Secretary General)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Leftist Revolutionary Movement (Movimiento de Izquierda Revolucionaria)</td>
<td>1966</td>
<td>Far Left. Favored rapid and radical social change via confrontation and armed struggle. Pro-Castro.</td>
<td>Andrés Pascal Allende, nephew of former President Salvador Allende</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Party for Democracy (Partido por la Democracia)</td>
<td>1987</td>
<td>Center-Left. Anti-junta. Favored gradual transition to a socialism and democratic rule.</td>
<td>Ricardo Lagos Escobar</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Socialist Party (Partido Socialista)</td>
<td>1934</td>
<td>Left to far Left. Pro-Castro and in favor of a transition more immediate than that which the PCCh advocated. Favored nationalized industry and the exclusion of foreign influences Altamirano, from Chilean affairs.</td>
<td>Salvador Allende Gossens, Ricardo Lagos Escobar, Sergio Aguiló Melo, Carlos Clodomiro Almeyda, and Jaime Inzunza.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Sergio Onofre Jarpa. This formation was the opposition's first step toward unity prior to the accord. Yet such unity was incomplete without a voice from the Left.

Despite Pinochet's massive campaigns to purge Chile of leftist groups, the Socialist Party and the PCCh remained significant forces. Both parties considered themselves Marxists. Yet some profound differences separated their ideologies. For instance, the PCCh had more experience in maintaining unity under state repression, as it had already been outlawed for a time in the 1950s and had always held ties with Moscow. Formerly known as the Socialists Workers' Party, the PCCh changed its name in 1922 to the Chilean Communist Party. By 1970, it had grown into one of the largest Communist parties in the West, following closely behind those of France and Italy. That same year, it aligned with the Popular Unity Coalition and successfully put forth Allende as president. "Chile has a strong, experienced, real Communist party," noted political scientist Howard J. Wiarda.17 Remarkably, Wiarda made this observation in 1990, at the closing of the dictatorship. Such timing indicates that although outlawed, the PCCh was geared for survival.

Unlike the PCCh, the socialists were not tied to an international body and had no previous experience in clandestine operation. Having achieved its greatest influence in the early 1970s, the party was undergoing severe repression for the first time as the armed forces were imprisoning activists such as Sergio Aguiló Meló. The party began to fragment as one of its key leaders, Carlos Altamirano, aligned with the PDC in joining the Democratic Alliance. In response, two smaller and more zealous socialist factions considered this move too compromising and eventually chose to join the communists.

Meanwhile, movements on the extreme Left, such as the MIR, criticized both communists and socialists for being too soft in their ideologies and argued that violent revolution was necessary to overthrow the existing social order.18 Yet like other radically leftists factions, the MIR's ideal was the polar opposite of the Pinochet regime, and the party grudgingly united with some communist and socialist factions into the Popular Democratic
Movement (MDP).

The MDP was founded on September 3, 1983, when four communist and radical socialist parties came together under two leftist militants, Manuel Almeyda and Jaime Inzunza. Unlike the AD, the MDP took a less compromising stance. While the AD was attending meetings at the Ministry of the Interior, the MDP questioned the value of such talks, claiming that they would buy more time for Pinochet and drain strength from the opposition. The MDP began to appear weak and vulnerable in 1984, when Inzunza was expelled from Chile and Almeyda was imprisoned. Despite this setback, the opposition's strength multiplied when the AD and the MDP joined forces in order to hurry democratic transition into action.19

Yet without backing from the Right, centrists and leftists remained largely stagnant. The accord would mark the first form of documented opposition to fall directly into Pinochet's hands and rightist sectors argued that they needed to have the greatest say in the final draft, as nobody knew better than they how to appeal to a rightist leader. Appealing to Fatherland and Liberty for support was not an option. At the time of the coup, this far-Right party adhered to the motto, "If we have to burn half of Chile to save it from communism, we will do it."20 The party subsequently proved its loyalty to the junta in 1973, when it declared itself in dissolution.

Like Fatherland and Liberty, the gremialistas (who form what is today known as the Independent Democratic Union and retain strong ties with the Republican Party in the U.S.) emerged in the 1970s as a reaction to Allendeian socialism. Their founder was Jaime Guzmán Errázuriz, the very individual whom Archbishop Silva nearly excommunicated in 1975. Both the UDI and Fatherland and Liberty remained staunchly patriotic, and much of the radical Right joined a campaign in which the government persuaded supporting citizens to surrender their valuables for the good of national reconstruction. As the Banco Central (Central Bank) was flooded with wedding rings and silver, centrists and leftists looked to the
only rightist party not participating in the effort to back the regime, the National Party (PN). Founded by Jarpa himself, the PN advocated an even broader *apertura* and the legalization of all political parties.21

Chile's opposition had now gathered the four essential ingredients for a successful National Accord: Church, Center, Left, and Right. Prospects for the accord appeared even more hopeful as the future signers came to overcome many of the aforementioned obstacles. Yet as the accord was coming into being, the ideological quarrels remained the most pending challenge to leading Chile towards democratic rule.
CHAPTER 4
PRESENTATION TO THE MINISTER OF THE INTERIOR

When an unexpected and highly eclectic band of political parties converged, a united opposition came into being. Yet ideological differences resurfaced, and when it came time for Fresno and his supporters to draft the accord, parties began to defend their own platforms rather than pursue a common goal. As participants continued to bicker, the AD broke off from the MDP, the very organization that sparked even the most reluctant centrists to take more aggressive steps toward democratic rule. The most hotly debated issues included street protests, the use of violence, class relations, the role of private property versus state ownership, and the specific kind of transition that the accord should propose.

The original MDP factions—communists, radical socialists, and the MIR—supported not only the popular protests, but also the use of violence. The latter became controversial within the PCCh, and it remained divided on the issue. Considering themselves the political voice of the poor, members of the PCCh wanted a complete overthrow and economic restructuring, not simple negotiations for a mere return to "bourgeois democracy." In other words, the Left demanded political and economic change. The transition, they argued, needed to be swift and drastic.

Members of the AD insisted on their own tactical strategy, but they suffered more fragmentation than their MDP counterparts. In fact, they converged only on their anti-violence stance. Discouraging street protests was Fresno’s brainchild and did not receive unanimous support. Ricardo Lagos, an Altamirano socialist, claimed that such mobilization was necessary "to give the accord political force." The socialists reluctantly agreed to accept the defense of private property; however, none of these factions agreed on how to treat the issues of class relations and a timetable for transition. As a result, the accord never directly addressed these issues. Indeed, leftist factions not invited to the drafting
Figure 4-1. As an Altamirano Socialist, Lagos opposed the exclusion of the PCCh from the accord. In 1990, Lagos began vying for the Chilean presidency. (Courtesy of: http://www.geocities.com/CapitolHill/Senate/2005/Lagos2.gif)
process accused the participants of not directly confronting a number of other controversies. Whereas member of the AD had previously pushed for Pinochet's resignation, in no part of the accord did they call for it. Moreover, they did not specifically address human rights nor how to bring torturers to justice. Finally, there was no mention of what particular steps Chile should take to attain democratic rule.

What it did address, however, were issues pertinent to a successful democratic transition. Namely, the accord proposed a restructuring of the economy that respected private property and competition while taking steps to address the nation's poverty. Furthermore, accord signers demanded the restoration of such basic democratic liberties as free speech, direct democratic elections, the legal operation of political parties, the permitted return of all exiled Chileans, and an end to the State of Siege. Yet political leaders underwent numerous struggles before finally agreeing to these statutes.

For instance, the Democratic Alliance committed perhaps its most crucial error in excluding the PCCh. In response to this measure, Lagos insisted that "... the Cardinal [Fresno] made a mistake when he invited sectors to his table that did not represent the entire Chilean political spectrum. As a party we made him see how serious this was and the future difficulties that it could bring about." True to Lagos' prediction, the exclusion of the PCCh presented the first difficulty in 1985, when the communists and radical socialists broke their traditional alliance. On a larger scale, the exclusion of the PCCh, as well as the entire MDP, proved that tactical and ideological disagreements, as well as factionalism and an overall loss of morale, threatened the opposition's continuing existence. Parties that once held prominent influence in Chilean politics were now, under the weight of an authoritarian regime, resorting to petty domestic squabbles. In the midst of this ideological chaos, Fresno feared that accord signers were "... still lacking a clear consensus as to the kind of democracy that we wish to reach, as well as the changes and timeframe to reach it. The problem, as I see it, does not lie in the difference of opinions, but in the uncompromising attitudes with which they are
As Fresno indicated, compromise was the only route to a common platform. Hence, in order to include the varied array of ideologies, the accord contents remained consistently centrist. Signers proposed not a rejection of the 1980 Constitution, but a series of radical changes to its provisions. The accord was pro-junta in limiting leftist influence and pro-democracy in calling for electoral politics. An elected executive, a mixed economy, the separation of powers, and the restoration of basic political liberties were among the other chief demands. The contents never addressed the legitimacy of Pinochet's government, allowing the junta to incorporate accord provisions into Chilean law.

The final product numbered fewer than five concise pages of the constitutional and socioeconomic demands, as well as immediate measures calling for an end to the State of Siege (which Pinochet never officially lifted despite the political opening), formation of voting registries, an end to the recess of political parties, and a swift return to free elections and expression. The accord stated:

Democratic values govern our coexistence and so that they will be obtained, the following are required: an orderly handing over of the political power to authorities invested with full and indisputable democratic legality; a social-economic-political framework that will guarantee both the governability of the country and the basic conditions for the collective effort that these challenges of today and the future raise; and also, the return of the Armed Forces to their indispensable permanent functions, fully respecting their values, dignity, and institutional requirements.

The governing junta had attacked the church, suppressed political opposition, and instigated a series of hardline monetarist measures whose harsh consequences penetrated every level of Chilean society. Accord signers were no longer imitating the soft criticism of previous church documents.

The strong wording of the accord suggested that change was imminent. Yet several
Figure 4-2. The Manuel Rodriguez Patriotic Front was behind the 1986 assassination attempt on Pinochet. (Courtesy of: http://www.mpmr.com/rodrig/r6/editorial.gif)
factors impeded its incorporation into Chilean law. For one thing, accord signers did not give sufficient weight to one obvious detail. As Minister of the Interior, Jarpa answered directly to Pinochet and had no power to meet opposition demands. Pinochet had appointed him to oversee talks with the opposition more for the form of pleasing his pro-opening officials than the substance of actually negotiating and fulfilling any requests. Furthermore, when accord signers presented the document to Jarpa in September 1985, Pinochet’s own reaction seemed supportive for only a short time. On September 18, Pinochet paid lip service to the opposition’s cause by inviting some of the leaders to attend the National Day Mass for the first time in twelve years. In virtually the same breath, however, he referred to accord singers as "pseudopoliticians." U.S. journalist John M. Beam noted that in one public speech, "He said one kind word for the acuerdo [accord] for every twenty spiteful ones." Finally, following a September 1986 assassination attempt on him by the radical Manuel Rodríguez Patriotic Front (FPMR), he repealed the apertura and resumed the anti-communist civilian monitoring. During a two-week series of raids in April, 1986, 1500 suspected dissidents were arrested.

Still persistent in his efforts to soothe church-state relations, Fresno requested to meet with Pinochet. The quiet Christmas Eve reunion proved both straining and, to Fresno, disappointing. When Fresno mentioned the accord, Pinochet replied curtly, "Let’s change the subject," refusing to speak of anything aside from apolitical, church-related matters. Pinochet’s second refusal to address the issue reiterated his genuine disinterest in the political opening that Jarpa and his advisors had convinced him to create. Moreover, it revealed to Fresno the cruel truth that the pillar of Catholic church influence in Chilean politics had crumbled.

Underlying Pinochet’s harsh refusal of the accord were the recent 1985 democratic elections in the Philippines that transferred power from dictator Ferdinand Marcos to his contender, Corazón Aquino. These elections lingered in the General’s mind as an ominous
threat to his own fate. Hoping to avoid a democratic overthrow and maintain support from the far Right, he sealed off the *apertura* and refused all further requests for negotiations. For awhile, a resurgence of economic growth granted him the popularity that he sought. The Chicago Boys were frantically pushing the sale of stocks to resurrect the fallen economy. In 1987, Chile's stocks continued to rise to impressive heights, and one year later, the country's unemployment fell to 10%, roughly the same as Great Britain's. Moreover, Pinochet also appeared to have support on a political level. A 1986 poll conducted by the Latin American Faculty of Social Sciences revealed that only 13% of Chileans considered themselves fully leftist.

The same poll, however, also showed a figure that Pinochet overlooked. While the Left remained in the minority, 73% of the total sample demanded "radical changes." In response to the accord, nearly a half a million people rallied in November 1985 under the slogan, "Chile demands democracy." Pro-transition sectors used the demonstration to support their argument that the accord represented the views of 80% of the population. Accord signers were echoing the position of Pinochet's advisors; should the General refuse free elections, he would run a greater chance of losing the 1988 plebiscite. Yet Pinochet still had time to develop an effective campaign that catered to the people. If he allowed these free elections, it was likely that he would win a competition between himself and a contender from the bickering opposition.

Indeed, the National Accord weakened more than strengthened partisan opposition. Party representatives had used planning meetings to quarrel over individual ideologies and compete for their own representation within the document. Accord signers indicated a further lack of unity when they excluded representation from other parties. As the dictatorship was winding to a close, participants in the accord saw their influence diminishing. But they would soon benefit from Pinochet's own miscalculations.
CHAPTER 5
RAMIFICATIONS OF THE ACCORD IN THE 1988 PLEBISCITE

"Liberty can be an instrument of its own death."

- General Augusto Pinochet

On October 5, 1988, Chileans voted in democratic elections for the first time in fifteen years. Through the protests, the tortures, the tensions, and the economic prosperity, Chileans knew that these elections were coming; their Constitution had promised them. Even Pinochet's foreign secretary, Ricardo García, boasted, "Do you know of any other dictatorship that has fixed its own end?" Chileans opposing the regime, however, wondered if the plebiscite would indeed mark "the end." Pinochet had scorned the accord and any other requests for a just and more rapid transition to democratic rule. Moreover, in one instance, he compared himself to Roman dictator Cincinnatus, who retired from his political career until popular demand compelled him to return to Rome and save it from hostile forces. With this analogy, Pinochet declared his aspirations to become the savior of Chile. Yet because he had refused to listen to the majority of Chile when Fresno produced the accord, he overestimated his prospects for fulfilling this goal.

Three years after its release, the National Accord emerged victorious. Had Pinochet negotiated with the accord signers, particularly on the demand for free elections, he would have gained public support and perhaps even won the 1988 plebiscite. Yet by opposing the accord, Pinochet composed his own downfall. He had displeased factions of society that could have become a strong base of support for the military government. As a result, Chileans began to recognize him not as the hero who saved Chile from communism, but as the dictator who refused to make concessions to his people.

As the time for the promised plebiscite approached, the opposition could not foresee its victory. The 1980 Constitution set the following timetable for attaining free elections:
Figure 5-1. On March 11, 1990, Pinochet (right) handed the presidency over to Aylwin (left). (Courtesy of: http://www.amerikanclaris.com/~fapilan/pinochet/fotos/entrega.jpg)
1. Pinochet could serve eight more years as the legitimate president of the Republic of Chile.

2. The four-man junta would meet and unanimously name a candidate whom Chile could either approve of or reject.

3. The junta could select any day that it desired prior to February 1989.

4. If the candidate lost the plebiscite, Pinochet would hold office for two more years until Chile held free, multi-partisan elections. Pinochet, meanwhile, would become Senator-for-Life.

5. The approved candidate would remain in power until 1997. 4

Whether the General would adhere to these conditions remained in question. His promises from the Chacarrillas speech proved themselves meaningless, and his refusal to address the accord lowered the opposition's morale. Furthermore, as the winter of 1988 approached, the junta had yet to name a candidate or a plebiscite date. There was little suspense regarding the former; Pinochet had already expressed his intentions of continuing his rule. The plebiscite date, however, remained a mystery until wintertime, when the junta held a closed-door meeting on August 30, 1988.

Not surprisingly, Pinochet announced himself as the upcoming candidate. That same day, he delivered an acceptance speech in which he claimed that he needed the next eight years to release Chile from the bonds of Marxism. When he announced the October 5 plebiscite date, opposition forces panicked. They had only a little over one month to set aside their quarrels and work to attain the very goals that they had asserted in the National Accord. In this limited time, the Concertación para el No (Coordination for the NO-Vote) was formed.

In 1987, key leaders from fourteen political parties (as opposed to the eleven who had endorsed the accord) had agreed to accept the 1980 Constitution and overthrow Pinochet by his own rules rather than their own negotiations. Political opposition was uniting again, this
time with a vengeance. The Concertación became a militant alliance of junta opponents campaigning for the vote against Pinochet in the 1988 plebiscite. Volunteers went door-to-door petitioning for support and even began campaigns of their own. For instance, over national television, Lagos accused Pinochet of wanting "... eight more years of torture, assassination and human rights violations."  

Even a disconcerted Right that had once pledged loyalty to Pinochet had begun to favor the NO-Vote. Even in 1987, prior to the founding of the Concertación, one of the junta members, Fifth Admiral José Toribio Merino, announced to the foreign press that Chile's next presidential candidate should be fresh blood, preferably a civilian. And Jarpa himself resigned as Minister of the Interior, founded the reformist-Right National Renovation Party (RN), and joined the Concertación. The increase in support from the Right gave the opposition the unity conducive to attaining the NO-vote. In the limited time prior to the plebiscite, the Concertación registered voters to a record 92%.  

Leftist parties, meanwhile, pushed ahead with the same ideals that had guided their earlier opposition attempts. Those who had endorsed the accord banded together with the Concertación, while radical groups such as MIR and FPMR continued to bomb banks and kidnap military officials. The latter group actually gave YES-vote forces the upper hand in campaigning, as Pinochet used them as examples of how the opposition as a whole consisted of violent guerrillas.  

Pinochet also retained some further advantages that benefited his prospects for future elections. The YES-vote parties were united by their commitment to Pinochet's economic policies, as well as their faith in the military's ability to maintain peace and order. Campaigning for the YES involved not only propaganda, but also both peaceful and violent methods. In the guise of giving Chile a legitimately democratic vote, the junta allowed the opposition limited television space: one fifteen-minute debate program per day moderated by pro-government journalists and aired either late at night or during the family lunch hour.
Government propaganda, by contrast, dominated every channel. "You decide," announced one commercial showing goods disappearing from a woman's shopping cart. "We continue going forward or we return to the U.P." Like their NO-vote counterparts, Pinochet's advocates also engaged in door-to-door campaigning. Pinochet named his party the National Advance (AN) and sent representatives to both middle and lower-class neighborhoods to offer housing for those who signed up as party members. Meanwhile, Fatherland and Liberty became the party suspected of spraypainting pro-government graffiti on the homes of Concertación leaders. Another organization, Chilean Anticommunist Action (AChA), worked to turn radical opposition over to the CNI.8

Debate and democratic principles were two values ingrained in the Chilean mindset well before the Pinochet years. Chileans were once again making political decisions. To many, Pinochet represented the country's salvation. His 1973 takeover had saved Chile from "the malignant tumor of Marxism." The remainder of Chileans, however, saw him as the instrument of terror responsible for a dramatic increase in poverty, as well as the deaths of 2279 citizens and the torture, exile, and humiliation of still more. "Pinochet left a legacy of five million poor," claimed communist labor union leader Jorge Pávez.9

This drastic polarization of national opinion produced a suspenseful election. By 9:00 p.m. on the night of the plebiscite, computers had counted a half million votes with no apparent majority. Yet the next day, television stations nationwide announced the outcome: 54.5% of Chile voted against Pinochet. Having campaigned under the slogan "me or chaos," Pinochet lost the vote democratically and by his own rules. "The only country in the world to come to Marxism through democratic elections," noted journalist Tina Rosenberg during her stay in Santiago, "became the only country to vote a dictator out of office without his permission."10 On March 11, 1990, PDC leader Patricio Aylwin was inaugurated as president.
CONCLUSION

"We do not live in our time alone; we carry our history within us."

-Jostein Gaarder

On October 16, 1998, Augusto Pinochet Ugarte was arrested in the United Kingdom by request of the Spanish government. Because Spanish citizens were among the DINA and CNI's victims, Spain is currently making efforts to extradite the 84-year-old ex-dictator. The incident has sparked a worldwide controversy and, in Chile, nationwide upheaval. As Chileans representing both sides embark on daily protests, historians are once again forced to reassess the dictatorship, a unique period in the nation's history.

The outcome of the 1988 Plebiscite indicated that the "Chilean miracle" was more than just Pinochet's set of economic reform measures; it was also a nation's ability to end an authoritarian regime without resorting to civil war or another coup. Chilean political parties under Pinochet were often the object of criticism, placed in a position inferior to that of the civilian protesters. They held numerous squabbling and counterproductive meetings and often behaved in as petty a manner as the regime that they opposed. Moreover, along with upper levels of the Catholic Church, centrist parties such as the PDC delayed in defining their position on the dictatorship and remained in ideological turmoil once they did. Grassroots opposition, however, earned a reputation for its strong and consistent stances and often its courage, as exemplified in the Vicariate for Solidarity. It is no wonder, therefore, that historians often dismiss political parties as either unproductive or inactive players in the events of the dictatorship. Yet it was neither the Vicariate nor labor and student organizations, but Chilean political parties, that were the key force behind Pinochet's democratic overthrow in 1988 Plebiscite.

The accord did not fail, as the unsuccessful dialogues with Jarpa seemed to indicate;
rather, it was important in that for the first time, parties that once never associated with each other soon came together with the same mission. "The Chilean people have achieved victory through unity and other organization," stated Hortensia de Allende, the exiled widow of the ex-president. Because of this unity, the accord became the first aggressive action against Pinochet and laid an important foundation for the Concertación para el NO.

The dictatorship came to its official end in 1990, but not one Chilean who lived through this era lacks a strong opinion on Pinochet's legacy. Chicago Boy economics and massive internationalization have left Chile's economy as one of the most capitalist and, arguably, most stable in South America. North American fast food chains have replaced small family cafés, and Diner's Club cards have become the ticket consumerism-on-credit. However, a saying holds that there are two Santiagos and, to a larger extent, two Chiles. Santiago's border is the Plaza Italia, a small island in the middle of the Alameda, the city's most congested street. East of the Plaza Italia lie the city's wealthier neighborhoods, including Las Condes, Vitacura, and Providencia. To the West, towards the La Moneda Presidential Palace, the shopping malls and fast food chains gradually disappear until one approaches areas such as Estación Central, Cerro Navia, and Cerrillos, all affected by the economic restructuring and random arrests that characterized the dictatorship.

Although the military government left Santiago with well defined economic divisions and only a small middle class, it remains difficult to determine where each segment of society stands politically. To say that the wealthy sided with Pinochet's government and the poor opposed it is a hasty and inaccurate generalization. Student communist movements abound among middle to upper-class students at the Pontifical Catholic University of Chile in Santiago, and wealthier entrepreneurs have lost their jobs due to alleged socialist leanings. In poorer communities, meanwhile, either fear or apathy contributed to support for the YES-vote. Some residents of the poblaciones feared that voting against Pinochet's continuing rule would lead to consequences even worse than raids on their homes. Others
Figure 6-1. Reminiscent of the Pinochet years, carabineros detain a man protesting in favor of the General's 1998 arrest in the United Kingdom, an event that has provoked numerous demonstrations from both friends and foes of the junta. (Courtesy of: http://www.tercera.cl/casos/pinochet/galeria_fotos/fotos/19.10.detencion.jpg)
hoped to benefit from voting YES, as Pinochet's National Advance lured them with the promise of better housing.4

While Chilean citizens remain faithful to their views, the few who openly express them often urge the foreign visitor to avoid initiating the topic of conversation. Under a regime that punished open opposition, holding opinions to oneself grew into a national habit. And today, many of the faces that moved events during the Pinochet era appear to have disappeared. Some never survived the era; in 1990, leftist militants assassinated Guzmán. Others continue in their political careers, such as Aguiló, who currently holds a seat in Congress. Lilia Schuller, a Nuñoa resident who lives a mere three blocks from Estadio Nacional and actively protested the regime, argued that today's Chile is desperately modernizing itself in an attempt to bury the Pinochet Era. Grandiose beachside apartments have replaced historical sites, and new shopping malls and discount centers are pushing the poblaciones farther and farther away from the city centers. Yet the General's recent arrest is not only galvanizing the nation into popular demonstrations reminiscent of the dictatorship, but they are also forcing Chileans to reevaluate this period of their history as the current president, Eduardo Frei, Jr. of the PDC, works to move the nation forward.

The accord represented not only a miraculous effort at compromise among traditional foes, but it also demonstrated one nation's stubborn adherence to democratic principles. "This [the accord] shatters the myth that our alternatives are Pinochet or chaos," said Eduardo Beninger of the PDC.5 Chile wanted change, and its clerical and political leaders put the demand in writing. The attempt failed, but it taught accord participants how to unite more effectively and gather more support. As a result, Archbishop Fresno and his supporters watched their ideals manifest themselves at the poll tables. And despite the seemingly futile setbacks, the National Accord for Transition to Full Democracy marked a historic turning point that led the military dictatorship to its ultimate defeat.
APPENDIX A

NATIONAL ACCORD FOR TRANSITION TO FULL DEMOCRACY

As a contribution to the appeal for national reconciliation expressed by His Excellency Cardinal Archbishop of Santiago and as evidence of the willingness of very wide political and social sectors of the country for a great national agreement that will ensure the peaceful evolution toward a full and authentic democracy, all those who sign this document, in a positive action toward the reconciliation that is desired, express their support for the political, economic, and social principles that are set forth below.

Democratic values should govern our coexistence and so that they will be obtained, the following are required: an orderly handing over of the political power to authorities invested with full and indisputable democratic legality; a social-economic-political framework that will guarantee both the governability of the country and the basic conditions for the collection effort that the challenges of today and the future raise; and also, the return of the Armed Forces to their indispensable permanent functions, fully respecting their values, dignity and institutional requirements.

Reconciliation, in addition, requires the full respect for the right to life and for all other rights included in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and Complementary Pacts, which means rejecting violence wherever it comes from, as a method of political action, and it makes it indispensable to clear up the crimes and criminal attacks that have disturbed the country and to apply the fullness of the law to those responsible. It is of high priority to unite Chileans in order to build the essential bases of their coexistence.

It is imperative to attend to the exigencies of justice in a manner congruent with the spirit of national reconciliation. For that purpose, the trials to occur over the violation of human rights will require a responsible denunciation for a specific crime, formulated with grounds. Their hearing will fall exclusively to the existing courts, thus ensuring due process, exempt from humiliations, vengeance, and ad hoc mass trials.

The magnitude of the problems that will have to be faced, at least in what remains of the century, makes it urgent that through the great national agreement that is suggested there be achieved a high and persistent growth rate that will lead to higher levels of well-being and equality, the only way to build and make lasting an authentic, modern, and participative democracy.

Taking the above into account, the stability of the democratic system that will be established requires the solemn commitment that is assumed by all those who sign or accede to this document to carry out the political action of the future within a spirit of democratic loyalty, effective application of the law and mutual respect, making it compatible with the institutional, economic, and social principles pointed out here. Only in this manner will the governability of the country and the effective transition toward a full democracy be guaranteed.

To the extent that the national coexistence guarantees more justice and security for all, it will be possible to maintain law and order, prevent the use of violence, contribute to eliminating terrorism, and sanction antidemocratic behavior. In any case, the effective protection of human rights will be a preferential concern in the business of the public authorities.

Those who sign this document commit themselves from now on to employ their will and effort to the task stated and invite the workers, entrepreneurs, professionals and others of

the nation, with equal willingness, to accede to it, so that a really representative democratic reconciliation for all the nation will come about.

I. CONSTITUTIONAL AGREEMENT

The reestablishment of Democracy makes it indispensable for all Chileans to have the right to express their thoughts and to ensure their rights within a constitutional regime that includes, at least, the following aspects:

1. Election by popular vote of the totality of the National Congress, with clear legislative, supervisory and constituent powers.

2. A Constitutional Reform procedure which, by recognizing the necessary stability that the Fundamental Charter should have, will make possible its modifications and, in the case of disagreement between the Executive Branch and the Congress, will submit the reform to a plebiscite.

3. The direct election of the President of the Republic by popular vote, and absolute majority and a second election if it should be necessary.

4. Existence of the Constitutional Court in whose membership are represented sufficiently the Executive, Legislative, and Judicial Branches.

5. The Political Constitution shall guarantee the free expression of ideas and the organization of political parties. The parties, movements or groups whose objectives, acts or conduct do not respect the periodic turnover of those governing by popular will, the alternation of power, human rights and force of the principle of legality, the rejection of violence, the rights of minorities and other principles of the democratic system defined in the Constitution, shall be declared unconstitutional. This determination shall be the responsibility of the Constitutional Court.

6. Regulation of the States of Constitutional Emergency that make it possible to restrict the individual freedoms of assembly, movement, change of residence, information and opinion, specifying that in no case, during the period in force, can human rights be abused and that it will always be possible to appeal to the Courts of Justice for aid and protection.

II. THE SOCIAL-ECONOMIC ORDER

It is indispensable to eliminate any uncertainty with respect to the socio-economic system that will govern once normality has been reestablished. Democratic coexistence requires stability in the basic regulations for the operation of the economy, in order to thus ensure social harmony between the exercise of freedom and equality if desired.

The country should propose for itself simultaneously a high growth rate and a sustained reduction of the inequalities in opportunities and levels of consumption.

In addition, dynamic and equitable development in Democracy requires clear standards, not subject to arbitrary interpretation, that will deter the domination of one social group over another and of the State over society.

In virtue of what has been stated, all those who sign this document pledge their support for the following bases of the future socio-economic order:

1. Priority goals will be overcoming the extreme poverty and alienation [sic]; the creation of productive and stable productive work opportunities; and the achievement of a high and sustained growth rate, for which purpose it will be necessary to overcome the restrictions
imposed by the scarcity of foreign resources and to increase substantially domestic savings, both public and private, principal [sic] limitations for investment, and therefore growth.

2. For the achievement of the objectives indicated, it will be necessary to have a national goal to share fairly sacrifices and rewards. That means austerity in consumption, solidarity and social discipline.

3. Constitutionally, the right to private ownership of tangible and intangible assets must be guaranteed, including the means of production, a necessary condition for stimulating individual initiative under different forms of organization and economic activity. The tax system will not be used as a mechanism of dispossession.

The existence of state and mixed ownership of the means of production must also be recognized.

4. The State must have an active role and it shall determine the great national objective, on the basis of direct planning of its own action and indicative for the other economic agents, preferable [sic] using direct instruments of persuasion and incentive. Thus it will coordinate and guide the operation of the economy, without detriment to its regulatory and redistributive functions.

In this way a mixed economy is shaped in which the State and Private Enterprise complement each other through a defined differentiation of roles and the logical division of tasks, and in which the market, the dealings and action of the State constitute, among others, mechanisms for the effective allocation of resources.

5. In the formulation and evaluation of the national development strategy and in the fundamental definitions of economic and social policy, the opinions and experiences of workers and businessmen shall be considered.

6. The commitment of the different groups who form society to Democracy and Development requires public participation. So that that will exist, it is necessary for civilian society to be organized around the activities that directly affect their interests, for ways to be sought to arbitrate conflicts and for the State to decentralize its functions in order to give the intermediate social organizations a growing responsibility for the solution of their own problems.

7. It is indispensable to reach a social agreement between the economic agents based on the recognition that, without neglecting the interests of consumers, between entrepreneurs and workers exists the common goal of reaching higher levels of general well-being and the acceptance of the principle that conflicts should be resolved through negotiated agreements.

8. The relations between workers and entrepreneurs should be balanced, for which purpose it is necessary to recognize the role of labor in its different expressions and to strengthen the labor organizations and their rights of petition, assembly, strike, and others. They, together with their employer counterparts, will act as intermediate bodies in the proposal of policies of mutual interest and in mediation in controversies with respect to areas common to them.

III. IMMEDIATE MEASURES

In order to return to Chileans the full exercise of their citizenship, with the opportunity to participate in the decisions that affect their future in freedom and equal conditions, and to endow the public process with the elements indispensable for an effective evolutions toward
and authentic democracy, it is necessary to take the following steps:

1. An end to the States of Emergency; full reestablishment of all public freedoms, of a real university autonomy and of constitutional guarantees, and a governmental commitment not to apply Art. 24 trans. of the Constitution of 1980. An end, in addition, to exile, which denies the legitimate right to live in the Homeland, and the return of citizenship to those who were deprived of it.

2. Formation of voting registries.

3. An end to the political recess and repeal of the norms that impede the functioning of parties.

4. Passage of a voting law to elect the President of the Republic, Senators and Deputies through direct personal, free, secret, informed and impartially controlled suffrage, for that purpose ensuring the freedom of advertising and equal access to the State and university media.

5. The plebiscite that will establish the legitimacy of the provisions stated in this document should be held encompassing the guarantees defined in the previous number.

The signers of this document agree to maintain a permanent association in order to perfect and implement its content.

Santiago, August 1985

PARTICIPANTS IN THE APPROVAL OF THE DOCUMENT OF AGREEMENT

René Abeliuk  Armando Jaramillo  Patricio Phillips
Andrés Allamand  Luis Fernando Luengo  Mario Sharpe
Sergio Águilo  Luis Maira  Enrique Silva Cimma
Patricio Aylwin  Fernando Maturana  Ramón Silva Ulloa
Carlos Briones  Sergio Navarrete  Gabriel Válides
Franisco Bulnes  Dario Pávez  Gaston Ureta
Pedro Correa  German Pérez  Hugo Zepeda
APPENDIX B

CUMULATIVE LIST OF KEY DATES

1964: Eduardo Frei Montalva, a Christian Democrat, elected as President.

1970: Salvador Allende Gossens, a Socialist, elected as President.

September 11, 1973: General Pinochet and Chilean Armed Forces overthrow Salvador Allende and proclaim military rule.

September 18, 1973: Archbishop Raúl Silva Henríquez presides over the Mass of Reconciliation for all Chileans, in which he prays for Chile's new leaders.

June 15, 1974: Manuel Contreras founds the DINA.

1974: Chilean political parties officially banned.

1975: Archbishop Juan Francisco Fresno elected to the Episcopal Conference.


March, 1975: PDC holds a secret meeting in which members agree to adopt an anti-junta stance.

November, 1975: Jaime Guzmán Errázuriz, rightist political leader and founder to the UDI, appears on national television and criticizes the Vicariate for Solidarity for its protection of leftist activists.
<table>
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<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Event</th>
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<tr>
<td>August 12, 1976:</td>
<td>DINA agents and pro-government demonstrators harass Chilean bishops</td>
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<td></td>
<td>arriving at Pudahuel Airport from a conference in Riobamba, Ecuador.</td>
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<td>August, 1977:</td>
<td>Pinochet dissolves the DINA, which is almost immediately replaced</td>
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<td>with the CNI.</td>
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<td>1977:</td>
<td>Pinochet delivers a speech at Chacarillas in which he promises a</td>
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<td>rapid transition to democratic rule.</td>
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<td>1978:</td>
<td>First popular plebiscite under Pinochet, in which citizens voted</td>
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<td>on the legitimacy of the military regime.</td>
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<td>1980:</td>
<td>Second popular plebiscite under Pinochet, in which citizens voted</td>
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<td>on the legitimacy of the new Constitution.</td>
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<td>November, 1981:</td>
<td>Chilean banks collapse, beginning a yearlong economic crash.</td>
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<td>1982:</td>
<td>Socialist leader Sergio Alguiló Meló arrested and imprisoned.</td>
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<td>May 11, 1983:</td>
<td>The National Day of Protests, as designated by copper union leader</td>
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<td>Rodolfo Seguel.</td>
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<td>August 6, 1983:</td>
<td>Formation of the AD.</td>
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<td>September 3, 1983:</td>
<td>MPD founded, resulting in a historic split between Chilean</td>
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<td>communists and socialists.</td>
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<td>January, 1984:</td>
<td>Government releases a statement that permits the continuing</td>
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<td>operation of certain non-leftist political parties, provided that</td>
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<td>they accept the 1980 Constitution.</td>
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<td>November 6, 1984:</td>
<td>In response to a dramatic increase in popular protest, junta</td>
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<td>declares a national State of Siege.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>November 7, 1984:</td>
<td>Paramilitary police raid the headquarters of the Socialist Bloc.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>August, 1985:</td>
<td>Archbishop Fresno and representatives from eleven political parties</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>endorse the National Accord for Transition to Full Democracy.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Date</td>
<td>Event</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>November, 1985:</td>
<td>In response to the accord, protesters take to the streets under the slogan, &quot;Chile demands democracy.&quot;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>September, 1986:</td>
<td>FMPR fails at an attempt to assassinate Pinochet.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1987:</td>
<td>Fourteen political parties converge to form the Concertación para el NO in order to campaign against Pinochet's continuing rule.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>August 30, 1988:</td>
<td>Junta holds a closed meeting in which officials agree on the plebiscite date and the candidate for presidency, Pinochet.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>October 5, 1988:</td>
<td>National plebiscite in which Chileans vote against Pinochet's continuing rule.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>March 11, 1990:</td>
<td>Patricio Aylwin of the PDC inaugurated as president.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
APPENDIX C

CUMULATIVE LIST OF KEY FIGURES

Aguiló Melo, Sergio: Socialist activist of the Center-Left Altamirano Wing imprisoned in 1982 before assuming direction of the Socialist Bloc.

Allende Gossens, Salvador: Socialist president elected in 1970 who advocated a "democratic road to socialism." Although he gained tremendous popular favor for establishing numerous social programs, he later became responsible for a dramatic increase in national inflation. He died during the 1973 coup either by suicide or assassination.

Almeyda, Manuel: Founder of the Almeyda Wing of the Chilean Socialist Party, which demanded more radical reforms than the Altamirano Wing. Ultimately, the Almeyda Wing did not endorse the accord, and Almeyda himself was imprisoned for his leftist leanings.

Altamirano, Carlos: Founder of the Altamirano Wing of the Chilean Socialist Party, a Center-Left faction that aligned with the PDC, joined the AD, and sent representatives such as Aguiló to endorse the accord.

Frei Montalva, Eduardo: Elected in 1964, Frei dedicated his presidency to the PDC ideals of massive socio-economic reforms. His most significant actions in this regard were the Agrarian Reform program and the partial nationalization of Chilean copper.

Fresno, Juan Francisco: Center-Right archbishop of Santiago who succeeded Silva and endorsed the National Accord for Transition to Full Democracy.

Guzmán Errázuriz, Jaime: Militant Pinochet supporter who joined forces with the Chicago Boys and founded the UDI. Upon publicly criticizing the Chilean Catholic Church, he faced the threat of excommunication. In 1990, he was assassinated by leftist ideologues in Nuñoa, Santiago.
Inzunza, Jaime: Co-founder of the Almeyda Wing of the Socialist Party who was exiled from Chile in 1984.

Jarpa, Sergio Onofre: As the first civilian assigned to a major cabinet post during the dictatorship, Jarpa served as Minister of the Interior and oversaw talks with the opposition, including the political leaders behind the accord.

Lagos Escobar, Ricardo: Altamirano Socialist who signed the accord and opposed the exclusion of the PCCh. Following the dictatorship, founded the Party for Democracy (PPD) and, in 1993, lost the presidential elections.

Pinochet Ugarte, Augusto: Military general who led a 1973 coup that overthrew Allende and, subsequently, headed a seventeen-year rightist dictatorship that ended in 1988, when he was voted out of office by national plebiscite.

Seguel, Rodolfo: Copper miner and influential labor union leader who initiated a yearlong series of popular protests beginning May 11, 1983.

Silva Henríquez, Raúl: Archbishop of Santiago (prior to Fresno) who held inconsistent opinions on the military regime. For instance, although he established the Vicariate for Solidarity in opposition to Pinochet's human rights abuses, he often condoned the junta for saving Chile from Marxism.
Preface


2. Some names have been changed to protect the identity and privacy of certain individuals.

Chapter I


2. During the course of my research, I noticed that the majority of historians and political scientists resorted to one of two possible methods in their historical interpretation of the dictatorship. The first was to take for granted that specific provisions in Chile's 1980 Constitution allowed for a possible end to military rule via popular plebiscite. According to this perspective, it is neither a surprise nor a miracle that the dictatorship ended officially in 1990. Other scholars, meanwhile, recognize that moving Chile to vote against Pinochet in the plebiscite could not have occurred without the influences of more complex historical forces. Specifically, some interpretations attribute the democratic overthrow to specific historical factors. This thesis takes the latter approach by examining how the National Accord united political activists against the potential continuation of the military regime.


19. Horne, "New Hope for Chile?" 42.

Chapter II

2. Bouvier, Alliance or Compliance, 59.


6. Lernoux, Cry of the People, 49.

7. Mensaje, 22 October 1973, 510-1; quoted in Bouvier, Alliance or Compliance, 45.

8. Smith, "Old Allies, New Enemies," 273-287; Chilean bishop, interview by Brian H. Smith, 18 February 1980, New Haven, CT; quoted in Bouvier, Alliance or Compliance, 52; Lernoux, Cry of the People, 49.

9. Ibid.


11. Eugenio Yañez, La iglesia y el gobierno militar, (The church and the military government), quotation translated by author, (Santiago: Editoriales Andante, 1989), 93.

12. Ibid.


Chapter III


2. Verdugo, Los zarpazos de la puma, 12; Sigmund, "The Military in Chile," 106.


5. Loveman, *Chile*, 325.

6. Constable and Valenzuela, "Is Chile Next?" *Foreign Policy* 63 (Summer 1986): 59.


12. Ibid.


15. Constable and Valenzuela, "Is Chile Next?" 67.


Chapter IV


5. Brown, "Chileans are Gaining on Pinochet," 553; Loveman, Chile, 382.

6. Constable and Valenzuela, "Is Chile Next?" 65.


9. Yañez, La iglesia y el gobierno militar, 96.

10. Constable and Valenzuela, "Is Chile Next?" 69.

11. Hecht Oppenheim, Politics in Chile, 154; Horne, "New Hope for Chille?" 42.

12. "Hanging Tough: Pinochet Turns up the Heat," Time, 2 June 1986, 52; Constable and Valenzuela, "Is Chile Next?" 63; Ibid., 59.

Chapter V


Conclusion


2. de Allende, Hortensia, Storm over Chile, 9.


4. Rosenberg, Children of Cain, 375.

5. Brown, "Chileans are Gaining on Pinochet," 552.
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"Hanging Tough: Pinochet Turns up the Heat." Time, 2 June 1986, 52.


