Teaching Democracy: An Examination Of The Civitas@Bosnia And Herzegovina Program's Impact On Democratic Consolidation

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TEACHING DEMOCRACY: AN EXAMINATION OF THE CIVITAS @ BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA PROGRAM'S IMPACT ON DEMOCRATIC CONSOLIDATION

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For the victims of a tragic war:
May you rest in the peace of your nation
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Introduction: Bosnia and the call for democracy

There is, moreover, a voice calling for these definitions of principle and purpose which is, it seems to me, more thrilling and more compelling than any of the many moving voices with which the troubled air of the world is filled.

-Woodrow Wilson

"Fourteen-points address to Congress"
January 8, 1918

On January 8, 1918, President Woodrow Wilson defined the future of American foreign policy in his “Fourteen-points” peace plan presented to the Congress of the United States. In this address, Wilson spoke of the need for all nations to have justice and equality for each of their citizens, regardless of nationality or strength. This plan has defined a major aspect of the United States’ foreign policy goals for the last 80-years, and has set the stage for American action abroad. Even though the United States in the Twentieth Century has not always fulfilled the values established by Wilson, hopes for democracy and equality remain. America, through its policies and organizations abroad, still influences the course of democratic development, as recently demonstrated in the former Yugoslavia.

The recent conflict within Bosnia and Herzegovina brought with it a new opportunity for the United States to reestablish its role as a defender of justice, equality and freedom in the international community. However, the aftermath of the conflict left massive social and political upheaval in its wake, making it increasingly difficult to establish a peaceful and stable future.

The Dissolution of Yugoslavia and the Outbreak of War. Andras J. Riedlmayer, a
professor at Harvard University, describes how in the late 19\textsuperscript{th} and early 20\textsuperscript{th} centuries, the
Ottoman and Turkish Empire gradually lost control of its Balkan territories.\textsuperscript{2} This loss
of control, according to Riedlmayer, lead to an outbreak of territorial wars lasting several
years.\textsuperscript{3} In 1917, the Pact of Corfu proclaimed that all Yugoslavs (or “southern Slavs”)
would unite after World War I to form a kingdom under the Serbian Royal House.\textsuperscript{4} When
Yugoslavia was occupied by Germany in World War II, Riedlmayer describes how two
Yugoslavian armies rose to fight against the Nazi forces occupying their country. The
first were the Partisans lead by Josip Broz Tito, a communist revolutionary who was
aided by the Soviet Union. The second group was the Chetniks, lead by Draza
Mihajlovic, who were loyal to the Yugoslavian monarchy.\textsuperscript{5} At the end of World War II,
the monarchy was abolished, and self appointed Marshal Tito, imposed communist rule
in Yugoslavia – killing off any opposition who stood in the way of the Party.\textsuperscript{6}

In 1974, a new constitution was promulgated in Yugoslavia which would make a
more democratic system of governance. Marshal Tito was then elected as president for
life, and provisions were made for his death. These provisions included succession of
leadership in a rotational format in key offices within the communist party.\textsuperscript{7} However,
after Tito’s death on May 4, 1980, the constitution, and thus the democratic principles it
upheld, began to crumble. With this constitutional failure, the democratic transition that

\textsuperscript{2} Andras J. Riedlmayer. “A Brief History of Bosnia.” As printed in the Bosnian Manuscript Ingathering
Project. 1993. \url{http://www.applicom.com/manu/brieflus.html}. \textsuperscript{3}
\textsuperscript{3} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{4} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{5} Ibid. \textsuperscript{4}
\textsuperscript{6} Ibid.
was taking place in Yugoslavia was never fully achieved. Partisan outbreaks of war, and ethnic tensions within major parts of Yugoslavia culminated in the atrocities of the war in Bosnia which broke out in 1992.

In order to gain insight as to what type of obstacles stand in the way of democratic transition and consolidation in Bosnia, it is important to understand the historical breakdown of the 1974 constitution, and the decline of Yugoslavia. By detailing the disintegration of the Yugoslav State, and the rise of ethnic violence in the area, it becomes clear why democracy is a difficult goal to achieve.

_Yugoslavia's Failed Transition (1974-1992)._ When the “New Constitution” was promulgated in 1974, it appeared that Yugoslavia would survive intact, even after the death of life-long dictator Marshal Tito.8 Unfortunately, as Donia and Fine describe, the new leaders faced a “complex machinery of government which Tito had enshrined in constitutional law.”9 This made it difficult for those new leaders to deal with the complex issues surrounding Yugoslavia, largely because of the absolute reliance on Tito’s powerful leadership prior to his death.

With the passing of Tito, the fragility of the federation he ruled quickly became apparent. As the newly established leaders were attempting to work through the details of state building, three ethnic groups fell into conflict.10 The Serbs, who were dominant in Yugoslavia’s politics and army, comprised the Orthodox Christian sector of Yugoslavian

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8 Ibid. 193.
9 Ibid.
society. The Croats, the Catholic population of Yugoslavia, and the Muslims who were spread throughout mixed towns and cities in Bosnia, made-up the other major groups which began to vie for power. This political power struggle arose towards the end of the 1980s as the communist system was slowly crumbling, and many groups began to invoke nationalist sentiment to fill what Reidlmayer labels as a “growing ideological void.”

The political problems confronting Yugoslavia were compounded by socio-economic problems as well. Prior to Tito’s death, Yugoslavia faced a period of significant economic decline. According to Donia and Fine, “Inflation reached triple digits by the middle of the decade; productivity faltered; political gridlock blocked meaningful reforms; and a growing mountain of debt . . . placed heavy burdens on enterprises and the federal government.” This illustrates how significant a decline Yugoslavia was facing economically, which in turn made political and social stability difficult to muster.

Socially, Yugoslavia was also reaching a breaking point. The ethnography of Yugoslavia was such that a major ethnic group dominated each of the six internal republics which comprised Yugoslavia (e.g., Serbs dominated Serbia, Croats dominated Croatia, etc.), except for Bosnia which was controlled by no single group. This ethnic spilt created the tensions which lead to the dissolution of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, marked by the rise of Slobodan Milosevic to power in the late 1980s. According to Riedlmayer, in 1986, Milosevic called for the creation of “Greater Serbia,” which would unite all Serbs into one Serbian State. Riedlmayer goes on to say, “By the
end of 1987, Milosevic was speaking of scrapping the federal constitution and the collective presidency altogether, calling for a new, recentralized Yugoslavia, united under single strong hand.”¹⁵ Milosevic’s style of rhetoric continued until 1991 when he tried to eliminate the ability for a Croatian leader to have his seat in the rotational presidency in Yugoslavia. This move caused Slovenia and Croatia to declare independence from Yugoslavia, gaining formal recognition as states in January 1992.¹⁶

Thus, after the creation of the “New Constitution” in 1974, Yugoslavia was trying to implement democratic reform. However, this reform stalled out while the transition was occurring due to political, social, and economic dissolution in the late 1980s and early 1990s. This breakdown afflicted the entire republic, which was slowly splitting apart. As Robert Kaplan wrote in his book Balkan Ghosts, “… one could see that declining economies, the erosion of communist power structures, and a history of ethnic rivalries might one day lead to conflict.”¹⁷ Unfortunately, for the citizens of Yugoslavia, Kaplan’s doomsday sentiments were a reality.

The Ethnic Assault on Bosnia-Herzegovina (1992-1995). The ethnic and political tensions that developed throughout Yugoslavia in the late ‘80s and early ‘90s culminated in the atrocities seen in Bosnia during the three years of genocide which afflicted the area. On March 1, 1992, Bosnia’s parliament held a referendum on independence.¹⁸ With a Serb boycott of the vote, independence for Bosnia passed by an overwhelming majority due to a vast amount of Croat and Muslim approval.

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¹⁵ Ibid.
¹⁶ Ibid. 6.
¹⁸ Donia and Fine. 287.
The vote for independence spawned a massive outbreak of civil unrest and conflict. Almost immediately after the vote for independence, Serbians within Bosnia (backed by the Yugoslavian army) began to rebel. According to a statement made by a representative from the U.S. State Department, within a few months after the resistance began, the Serbian forces gained control of approximately 60 percent of Bosnian territory. On April 6, 1992, Serbian gunmen opened fire on a crowd of peaceful protesters in front of the Bosnian Parliament building in what was later dubbed “The Sarajevo Massacre.” This event marked the start of a war that, according to Donia and Fine, “encompassed death, atrocities, and terror on a scale unknown in Europe since WWII.”

Despite the history of Bosnia prior to the war, many people in the West have felt that the conflict in Bosnia-Herzegovina was one of purely ethnic origin. And, while Alan Fogelquist, a professor of history at UCLA, agrees that there were “internal ethnic dimensions,” he points out how the conflict was largely due to war of aggression from the outside. This “aggression from outside” was the creation of Serbian and Croatian desires for territorial expansion. Both countries wished to manipulate the ethnic ties they held to certain groups within Bosnia-Herzegovina in order to gain territorial and political control over the now fledgling state.

For almost a year, the international community stood by without acting to stop the violence in Bosnia-Herzegovina. In fact, Kaplan blames “Western inaction” for much of

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20 Donia and Fine. 1.
21 Ibid., 2.
23 Donia and Fine. 201.
the bloodshed that occurred in Bosnia since 1992. However, one of the most significant problems that continued the violence was, according to Fogelquist, the United Nations Security Resolution 713. Passed by the Security Council on September 25, 1991, Resolution 713 set up an arms embargo on all of the former Yugoslavia. This created a condition in which nearly all heavy weaponry and air power remained solely in the hands of the annexation-minded Serbia and Croatia, and left the people of Bosnia with little hope of defending their sovereignty when the time came to do so.

On May 31, 1992, the United Nations took another step to try to ease the conflict within Bosnia. On this date, they imposed economic sanctions on rump-Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro). However, Fogelquist once again points out how ineffective this type of action was in bringing about a resolution to the conflict within Bosnia. He explains how Serbia began to take more money away from domestic programs and funnel a larger amount to their war efforts in Bosnia. Therefore, the international community was ineffective in bringing change in the status of the conflict.

Fogelquist continues his analysis of external action as he describes how, in the summer of 1992, the UN began to send humanitarian aid (i.e., food and medical supplies) to Bosnian cities. In April of 1993, however, NATO had to establish a “no-fly-zone” over Bosnia to ensure safe delivery of these supplies. Meanwhile, the war continued, and millions of citizens were being slaughtered during campaigns of ethnic cleansing. According to Fogelquist, by October of 1995, approximately 3.5 million ethnic Muslims

24 Kaplan, xi.
25 Fogelquist, 8.
26 Ibid.
27 Ibid.
28 Ibid.
29 Ibid.
and Croats were driven from their homes in attempts to flee the Serbian campaigns of "ethnic purification."³¹

On April 10, 1994, NATO finally took direct action to stop the genocide in Bosnia by launching air strikes against Serbian forces. These strikes continued periodically throughout 1994-1995, until a formal peace plan began on November 1, 1995.

Beyond Dayton. On November 20, 1995, at Wright-Patterson Airforce Base in Dayton, Ohio, members of delegations representing Bosnia and Herzegovina, the Republic of Croatia and the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia concluded the Bosnian Peace Proximity Talks. This resulted in the creation of the Dayton Peace Accords, and the drafting of a new democratic constitution. However, despite the efforts to create a lasting peace within the former Yugoslavia, the resolution offered only a rhetorical solution; substantive action still had to be taken.

Members of many non-governmental organizations, and government-sponsored groups, began to take a significant role in preparing Bosnia-Herzegovina for the transition to democracy. One such group was the Center of Civic Education (CCE), an organization based out of Calabasas, California, and sponsored by the U.S. Information Agency (USIA). CCE made a move to help the transitional efforts of Bosnia-Herzegovina towards democracy. In order to achieve this goal, CCE developed a program

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³¹ Fogelquist. 8.
known as “CIVITAS at Bosnia and Herzegovina,” a program which would introduce a civic curriculum into the Bosnian public education system.  

With the introduction of civic education into the Bosnian system, CCE hopes to accomplish the goals of inculcating 1) civic virtue, 2) civic participation, and 3) civic knowledge. These goals, if met, might help assist a proper transition to a constitutional form of democracy, and would help to consolidate that regime by developing a civic-minded citizenry. However, even with defined goals (and a framework for achieving them) problems remain. The biggest of these obstacles may lie in the imposition of a Western democratic system for the former communist nation.

The above problem hangs over CCE and their CIVITAS program. This necessitates an examination of the CCE and their CIVITAS program in order to assess the effectiveness of the program. This examination can be done using a twofold criteria. First, it is important to examine the theoretical justification of CCE’s attempts at democratic consolidation through education by comparing their framework to basic theories regarding the consolidation of democracies. Secondarily, it is essential to evaluate the practicality of the program through testimony of individuals involved in the program. This two-step approach, will help determine whether the CIVITAS program is beneficial in consolidating a democratic regime in transitioning nations.

Defining Democracy. In order to properly evaluate the effectiveness of a democratic consolidation in Bosnia, it is important to first establish criteria for such evaluation. This

33 Ibid.
can be done by detailing what aspects of democracy which will be focused on in this essay. To do so, it is crucial to draw from a variety of political scholars and theories in order to ascertain a general consensus on what a democracy should be.

Despite the fact that the world is seeing democracy sweep through countries, and take hold at the highest and lowest levels of society, some people still do not have an understanding of what exactly a democracy entails. Roy Macridis, a professor at Brandeis University, has done extensive study on the modern views of political states and ideologies. Compiling both classical and modern viewpoints, Macridis establishes a comprehensive view of a democracy. According to Macridis, the term democracy finds its origins in the Greek words Demos (people) and Kratos (government). Literally translated, democracy means "the government of the people."34 Adding to this understanding, Macridis states that a democracy must meet four characteristics in order to run properly. First, a government by the people must have the "full and direct participation of the people." Second, all people must be equal in the eyes of the law. Third, there must be a regard for the pursuits, viewpoints and talents of each individual in society. This, Macridis labels as "pluralism." And, finally, Macridis describes how there must be a "respect for a separate and private (as opposed to public) domain for fulfillment and expression of an individual's personality."35 (These four characteristics are summarized in Fig. I-1).

35 Macridis, 22. Here, Macridis is largely borrowing from his interpretations of Thucydides' History of the Peloponnesian War. His analysis comes from a speech made by Pericles, the Athenian statesman, as he spoke of democracy in 431 B.C.
Along similar lines offered by Macridis, Henry B. Mayo, an American political philosopher, has established a framework for what a democratic state must consist of. According to Mayo, the four basic principles of a democratic state are: 1) popular control of policy makers, 2) political equality, 3) political freedom, and 4) rule by majority.\(^3\) (See fig. I-1). Here we see how Mayo and Macridis agree that a democratic state must be one that has control by the people of the society, who remain equal in the eyes of the law. Both theorists present the idea of freedom as essential for all citizens in a democracy, differing only on the importance of public versus private domain. However, despite this minor difference, the basic tenants of a democracy are agreed upon by both authors.

A similar understanding of democracy is depicted by Michael Curtis in the introduction to his text entitled Introduction to Comparative Government. Here, Curtis outlines what he feels are the general frameworks that make-up a democratic state. Curtis says that free elections, political opposition, freedom of speech and press, civil and political rights, the lack of army interference in politics, and rule of law, all combine to create a democratic system.\(^3\) (See Fig. I-1). These elements of a democracy are congruent with those highlighted by Macridis and Mayo, because they uphold popular control through elections, rule through equality of law, and uphold fundamental rules for a free and rights protected society.

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Fig. I-1: Elements of democracy.

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<tr>
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<th>Macridis</th>
<th>Mayo</th>
<th>Curtis</th>
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<tr>
<td>Direct control of policy and government by the people</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
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<tr>
<td>Legal equality or “rule of law”</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
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<tr>
<td>Pluralism/Political opposition</td>
<td>X</td>
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<tr>
<td>Majority rule</td>
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<td>X</td>
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<td>Civilian control over military</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Protection of individual rights, liberty and freedom</td>
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The principles of democracy presented above, constitute a basic understanding of a democratic system, which makes it possible to apply that understanding to the democratic transition in Bosnia. This understanding of a democratic state provides a measuring stick to see what has been achieved, and what remains to be done, in Bosnia.

The problem within Bosnia is determining how these democratic principles can be upheld in society for the long term. According to Giuseppe Di Palma, in his book *To Craft Democracies: An Essay on Democratic Transitions,*

In all transitions, crafting copes with the same problem -- the uncertainty of democratic outcomes. The problem (and its treatment) presents, however, varying degrees of difficulty from case to case. Given this uncertainty, given the puzzle of estimating what rewards are promised by the democratic game, the task of democratic transitions is to build what I have called borrowed, or presumptive, legitimacy. This is done in one way only: by outlining in advance the rules of the game -- the norms, procedures and institutions whose operation should effect a fair balance of winning and losing. The outcomes are uncertain; the rules cannot be uncertain.\(^{38}\)

Here we can see how democracy is not something that is simply enacted. A democratic regime (through “borrowed legitimacy”) can have the support of the people during its transitional period because of the perceived benefits. However, democracy must then be
inculcated and fostered in the minds and actions of the citizenry if its principles are to survive. This is not an easy task, and the difficulty surrounding such a transition is more easily understood when one sees how such a regime is formed.

Benefits of Democracy. With the established framework for what constitutes a democracy in mind, it becomes important to see the benefits of such a system. According to Terry Karl and Philippe Schmitter, democratic governments “tend to respect rights much more predictably and extensively than their authoritarian counterparts.” Karl and Schmitter go on to say that, largely due to the highly decentralized structure of a democratic regime, expression is a freedom more regularly granted to the citizens of a democracy. This enables people with dissenting opinions and beliefs to passively release their sentiments, rather than violently rising against a system in which they had no voice. Finally, Karl and Schmitter put forth the idea that internal changes within government (i.e., the changing and rotation of leaders and key officials) is done much more peaceably in a democratic regime than an authoritarian one.40

Another reason why a democratic government is so important for Bosnia is the fact that, as previously noted, many scholars believe that democracy is premised on the foundation of pluralism. This is an issue that shall be reviewed extensively in later chapters, but it is important to note that a pluralistic foundation for society is essential to the survival of political and social stability in Bosnia. According to Ron Chilcote,

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40 Ibid.
pluralism is generally agreed upon as the essential foundation for any style of democracy, regardless of all other factors. In applying Chilcote’s estimation of pluralism and democracy to Bosnia, it becomes essential that a nation once wrought with ethnic violence and social cleavages shifts attention onto tolerance and diversity. With a pluralist structure and mindset, all three major ethnic groups in Bosnia might begin to adequately cooperate and share resources with one another.

Ernest Baker, in *Principles of Social and Political Theory*, highlights the benefits of pluralism that come only from a democratic government. Baker asserts that only in a democratic state can the ideas and interests of a wide variety of individuals be met. Baker supports this claim by describing how democracies use discourse and public cooperation to resolve conflict. This type of conflict resolution, he contends, achieves the best long term stability and prosperity. Baker claims that individuals may not exhibit any remarkable abilities alone, but through discourse and deliberation of ideas, they can achieve greater advancements than any form of autocracy.

One final benefit that is brought about from a democratic system of governance is “rule of law.” According to Alexis de Tocqueville, a democratic system is one that is founded upon equality under law. This equality under the legal guidelines of society not only helps promote a fair and egalitarian system of government, but also helps to uphold the best possible framework of laws for all citizens in society. According to de

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43 Ibid. 605.
44 Ibid.
Tocqueville, the majority of citizens cannot have an interest opposed to their own advantage. This shows how, in a democratic society, the laws and regulations that are imposed will be for the good of the people, because individuals will not impose a system of governance that is in opposition to their best interest. Thus, this social order is beneficial because of a “rule of law” that promotes the best interest of its citizenry.

Though the future of Bosnia remains questionable, each of the above benefits remain pertinent to the situation at hand. Having established an understanding of what a democracy is, and seeing the benefits such a system has to offer, we turn now to the evaluation of the program known as CIVITAS at Bosnia and Herzegovina. Through the two-fold examination of this program mentioned before, it will become more clear as to how effective such a program is in inculcating the principles of democracy among the people of Bosnia. Only then can we decipher whether or not it is possible to teach democracy in this war-torn nation of the former Yugoslavia.

47 Ibid.
Chapter 1: Transition, Consolidation and the CIVITAS program

In Sarajevo, in May of 1997, the first Federation finals of the academic competition known as “Project Citizen” took place. This event represented the culmination of two years of work done by the CCE and their CIVITAS at Bosnia and Herzegovina program. The reason for such a competition is, according to CCE director Charles Quigley, “[to extend] applications in communities and in higher education, specifying the knowledge and skills needed by citizens to perform their roles in a democracy.”\textsuperscript{48} “Project Citizen,” according to the CCE, demonstrated the abilities of students in upper elementary and lower secondary classes to identify public policy problems and offer solutions.\textsuperscript{49} Some of the proposals made by the students were adopted by the Parliament of Bosnia and Herzegovina for consideration for future policy implementation.

The need for civic education is important for the inculcation of democratic values among citizens of Bosnia and Herzegovina as they struggle to create a democratic state. The problems facing Bosnia are not, however, isolated to that country alone. According to Terry Karl and Philippe Schmitter, the world is “witnessing the fourth historical wave of democratization.”\textsuperscript{50} This “fourth wave” sets the stage for new opportunities and risks.

\textsuperscript{49} Center for Civic Education. “CIVITAS at Bosnia and Herzegovina,” (Calabasas, Calif.: Center for Civic Education, 1997), 1.

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for nations like the United States who wish to see democracy prevail as the dominant political ideology in the world. In order to promote this type of political system, groups like the CCE must recognize and act on these historical trends. That is why the CCE developed a framework for promulgating democratic ideals.

In this chapter, it is important to explore the theories of democratic consolidation that have been proposed, and then use these theories to examine the CCE’s CIVITAS at Bosnia and Herzegovina program. This will help determine if such a framework is theoretically sound in assisting the consolidation of democratic regimes in transitioning nations.

**Bosnia: A Transition to Democracy?**

The collapse of the former Yugoslavia created a situation in the Balkans meshed with both opportunity and peril. This war, lasting three years and claiming hundreds of thousands of lives, demonstrated how volatile the area had become. And, given the attempt at establishing a democratic government in 1974, this war highlighted a “stalled transition” to democracy. However, when the war ended, and the Dayton Peace Accords were drafted, a new opportunity for democracy had come to Bosnia. This is what necessitates an examination of the failed transition after 1974 to the present day, and see why the past failures should not be repeated under the Dayton Accords.

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50 Karl and Schmitter, 43. Samuel Huntington, a professor of government at Harvard University, lays claim that the world is actually in its third wave of democratic transition. In his essay “A New Era in Democracy,” Huntington does not distinguish between the first and second waves presented by Karl and Schmitter, but groups them both into one. Although in an article he released in 1984, “Will More Countries become Democratic?” Huntington does divide the historical trends into “four phases.”
**Modes of transition** According to Karl and Schmitter in their analysis of democratic transition, there is no one level of determination for understanding what is going to force a regime to change to a democracy.\(^{51}\) However, certain principles can be determined according to the circumstances surrounding the transition. Karl and Schmitter outline these instances as: 1) Point of departure; 2) Mode of transition; 3) Role of external actors; and 4) Sequence of transformation.\(^{52}\) By seeking an understanding of these circumstances, the situation in Bosnia is more easily comprehended.

In addressing the first issue, the point of departure, a determination of the situation in Bosnia is already difficult to grasp. Not only does Bosnia not meet the aspects of traditional points of departure, but it also makes the other circumstances more complex. It is necessary, however, to determine the point of departure in Bosnia in order to place the country into a proper context. According to Samuel Huntington, in defining the point of departure, the determination of the existing social, political and economic situations prior to the democratic change are necessary if one is to see the obstacles in the way of democratization.\(^{53}\) (See Fig. 1-1).

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\(^{51}\) Karl and Schmitter, 47.
\(^{52}\) Ibid.
According to Fine and Donia, when Josip Broz Tito died on May 4, 1980, the situation in Yugoslavia became highly volatile due to a political power vacuum which developed causing rampant partisanship. Here, the authors describe how the wars for Yugoslav succession in 1991, came as a result of the power struggles that arose after Tito’s death. The former communist state, held together once by the powerful leadership of Tito began breaking down, as there was no longer one official power that could hold the area together. It was the break down in the 1974 constitution that illustrates Bosnia’s failure to make the transition to a democratic state. Tito’s death caused political struggles within Yugoslavia, and led to the outbreaks of war for succession.

However, the politics of Yugoslavia are not the only area that created problems in the departure from a communist/authoritarian system to a democratic one. Economics also play a significant role in this point of departure. The hyper-inflationary period following Tito’s death created significant problems for Bosnia, as it struggled for

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54 Donia and Fine, p. 194.
resources and monies to divide among its citizenry. This created a difficult situation for
democratic transition. Without proper economic reform, political change was highly
tenuous.

Adding to the previously described social and political crisis that arose in the
1980s and 1990s, the economic status of Yugoslavia revealed a large social and political
problem within states like Bosnia. According to Donia and Fine:

For rump Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) and the self-proclaimed
"Serbian Republic of Bosnia and Hercegovina," economic devastation
and the status of international pariahs accompanied military success. The
conduct of their forces in Bosnia brought international condemnation
and ruinous economic sanctions imposed by the United Nations. Rump
Yugoslavia was beset by absurdly high inflation, around one million percent
a month. The central bank revalued the currency by removing six zeros
from the dinar in October 1993 and another nine zeros in December 1993.
as of this writing, the meager civilian economy functions on German
marks, barter, and black market smuggling from Bulgaria, Greece, and
Hungary. For a few liters of gasoline or heating oil, residents wait in line
for days.55

Thus, from this description, it seems that sanctions, mixed with poor economic planning,
and the wars of secession, disrupted the monetary stability within Serbian controlled
areas of Bosnia. This in turn created a situation of social and political instability due to
the lack of provisions and resources available to the masses of the area.

Perhaps the most difficult aspect of departure plaguing the area of Bosnia-
Herzegovina was that of ethnicity. The problem here was aggravated by the communistic
organization of Yugoslavia under Tito. Even though it might appear that everyone was
placed with the mindset of equality (accepted or forced under this regime), and that
Bosnia would be socially ready to accept most democratic principles, that was not the
case. As Karl and Schmitter point out, "Without more substantial and more stable class

55 Ibid.
56 Ibid., 275-276.
and sectoral differences, the politics of these neo-democracies are likely to be driven
by... ethnicity or religious identity." This type of social cleavage, along ethnic and
religious lines, creates a difficult obstacle to democratic transition for Bosnia-
Herzegovina.

According to H.J. DeBlij and Peter Muller, “When the communists ruled the
country, they divided it up into six internal ‘republics’ along the Soviet model.” This
shows how Bosnia, even under the rule of the communists, is different from all other
nations that comprised the former Yugoslavia. Croatia, for example, is largely comprised
of Catholics, and Serbia by Orthodox, but the diverse ethno-religious social organizations
in Bosnia led to the troubles that developed in Bosnia. Both Serbia and Croatia looked for
territorial expansion into Bosnia, justifying it on the basis of their ethnic kin living within
Bosnian borders. According to Donia and Fine:

Croat and Serb chauvinists have wanted to depict (the conflict) as an
ethnic war to justify the territorial expansion of Serbia and Croatia, the
two neighboring states that have both been actively involved in the warfare.

This war, based on ethnic and religious lines, illustrates the difficulty on erasing the
social cleavages, and exacerbates the problems for a smooth transition to take shape in
Bosnia.

From this perspective, the point at which Bosnia began its democratic transition is
one that is plagued with political, social and economic instability. By understanding these
aspects in Bosnia and Herzegovina (as Huntington claims is essential in analyzing the
transition of a country to democracy) it is clear that there are significant obstacles that
must be overcome if democracy is to become a reality.

57 Karl and Schmitter, 49.
58 DeBlij and Muller, 107.
Moving away from the issue of examining the point of departure for Bosnia-Herzegovina, focus can now be directed to the second aspect mentioned by Karl and Schmitter, "the mode of transition." Here, Karl and Schmitter illustrate how the transition was implemented in 1974, and on what levels the ideas for democracy arose. In relation to Yugoslavia, Karl and Schmitter say that "reform" was what implemented the change to democracy. "Reform" simply means that the masses mobilized from below and, without resorting to violence, imposed change in the political system. This type of regime change might be considered ideal, since it developed from the agreed upon voice of the masses.

Unfortunately, as Karl and Schmitter themselves admit, regime changes are rarely that easy to classify. In the case of Bosnia, the policy changes in the 1974 constitution came about without a resort to violence by the people. However, when the succession plank of the constitution failed to bring about the necessary leadership for Bosnia in the 1980s, and violence later erupted, reform had to be forced by external elites in the form of the Dayton Peace Accords. Elite imposition upon the people shows precisely the problems that face Bosnia, as it illustrates how perhaps the people of Bosnia are not fully ready to accept the ideas behind and motivating democracy.

The third aspect of transition brought forth by Karl and Schmitter is that of the role of external actors. In Bosnia, the role played by foreign influences becomes highly prevalent. Here, the United Nations, NATO and the United States in ending violence in Bosnia, and drafting the peace accords at Dayton. Karl and Schmitter hypothesize that

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59 Donia and Fine, 6.
60 Karl and Schmitter, 50.
external actors, while not playing a significant role in the transition phase, are playing an increased role in the consolidation phase of democracy.\textsuperscript{61}

The final area which Karl and Schmitter focus upon in regime change is the sequence of the transition. This aspect is considered the most important by Karl and Schmitter, as it lays the foundation for the course of the entire transition. When Yugoslavia was divided into its six republics under the communist regime of Tito, an inherent problem for transition was created. Similar to the problems of Gorbachev in the former Soviet Union, rather than working from a national level down, elections and transformation in Yugoslavia took place at a local level and then extended outward. This makes the transition follow a backwards pattern, and creates the political problems seen in the breakdown of Yugoslavia.

When elections took place after the death of Tito, the division of Yugoslavia on a republic level caused a political power struggle, and led to the break up of the federal level of government. Within the area of Bosnia specifically, the sequence of this transition significantly impeded the progress of transition. Without an established ethnic or national identity, the transition from a local level to a larger one was doomed to failure from the start. According to Dankwart Rustow’s essay, “Transitions to Democracy,” without prior consensus on national or ethnic identities, and boundaries for said groups, little to no progress will come about in the area of democratic consolidation.\textsuperscript{62} Such is the case with Bosnia. (See Fig. 1-1).

\textsuperscript{61} Ibid., 52.
Obstacles Blocking Consolidation. Along with the problems confronting the democratic transition of Bosnia, other factors create obstacles when addressing the issue of consolidation. When Francis Fukuyama declared that the world had reached the end of history and ideology, he created the misconception that liberal democratic principles would always rule once implemented. However, after both the second and third waves of democratization, according to Huntington, there were periods denoted by "reverse waves of democracy." These periods saw a move from authoritarian regimes, to democratic ones, and then a move back to authoritarianism. This illustrates how essential it becomes to uphold consolidation efforts after a democratic transition has taken place.

However, propagating elements of consolidation is just as difficult as promoting transition. Some of the obstacles in consolidation mirror those of transition; ethnic and religious cleavage, economics, and political failures. Still other problems become more specific to consolidation. One such problem illustrated by Huntington is the systematic failures of a democratic society. Huntington describes how easily discouraged people in a democratic system can become when such a system cannot immediately provide the promised welfare, equality, and liberty of the citizenry. Such compelling disillusionment, caused by the systematic failure of the new government to meet rising expectations in an expedient fashion, among the masses can cause a revolt back to authoritarianism. This regression could mark the end of democratic possibilities within that nation. (See Fig. 1-1).

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64 Huntington, "A New Era in Democracy," 15.
Aside from the loss of faith in democracy due to systematic failures, other problems arise when tradition and culture are brought into the milieu. According to Samuel Huntington, there exists a cultural preparedness underlying successful democratic consolidations. In “New Era in Democracy,” Huntington writes:

It has been argued that the world’s great historic cultural traditions vary significantly in the extent to which their attitudes, values, beliefs and related behavior patterns are conducive to the development of democracy. A profoundly antidemocratic culture would impede the spread of democratic norms in the society, deny legitimacy to democratic institutions, and thus greatly complicate if not prevent the emergence and effective functioning of those institutions.

In other words, traditional behavioral patterns can impede the promulgation and spread of liberal democratic thoughts and actions. Huntington goes on to argue that it will always be more difficult for non-Western societies to implement democratic change.

Within Eastern Europe, including the former Yugoslavia, there has existed 1600 years of autocratic tradition. This lack of experience with other systems creates a significant obstacle to consolidation. With the stark contrasts between a sovereign citizenry posed by democracy, and the authoritarian rule of an autocracy, it becomes difficult to break down the political culture of the masses. This is due to a lack of democratic thought, or due to traditional beliefs that are hostile to democratic principles (e.g., Islam or Confucianism). This perspective holds that there must exist an attempt to breakdown centuries worth of traditions, beliefs, behavioral patterns, and socio-political mindsets in order to hold and foster democratic ideals.

If Huntington’s analysis is assumed to be true, it is clear that democratic reform in Bosnia-Herzegovina may remain illusive if a new civic culture cannot be developed.

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67 Huntington, 17.
Such a view supports the need for the CCE's program. However, there remains debate in the scholarly world on whether this assumption is true. Bhikhu Parekh, in his essay entitled "The Cultural Particularity of Liberal Democracy," argues that there is a separation between a democracy and a liberal democracy.\(^6^9\) Parmeh argues against the assumption that all democratic systems must automatically fit into a mold established by Western views of what constitutes a democracy. He asserts that, because of this distinction, a variety of democratic systems of government can emerge, given the context of a given society. This would enable the consolidation of a democratic framework of government without a pre-existing cultural and traditional acceptance. (See Fig. 1-1).

Parekh also argues that there exists no universal order or hierarchy to values held by all people in any given culture.\(^7^0\) He does, however, assert that all cultures have some form of respect for basic human values such as "the security of life, liberty, property, and so on, and, at a different level, the development of their powers of reason, will, and autonomy."\(^7^1\) This would mean that all cultures, because of these shared values have some foundation for a democratic system. These assertions offered by Parekh counter those made by Huntington, and offer hope for a democratic future for Bosnia despite a lack of a traditional liberal culture.

*Steps to Consolidation.* Despite all the obstacles that face democratic transition and consolidation in the area of Bosnia, there still exists a significant hope that democracy

\(^{6^8}\) Ibid.
\(^{7^0}\) Ibid., 160.
\(^{7^1}\) Ibid.
can be established and maintained within the area. Many models of consolidation have been established which may show how Bosnia can create a cohesive democratic state.

John A. Hall, in his essay entitled “Consolidations of Democracy,” outlines the approaches necessary to solidify a democratic regime after the initial transition has taken place. Hall dictates the necessity of a “loyal opposition,” as well as establishing eight key factors which enable democratic stability and longevity. ⁷²

When Hall speaks of a “loyal opposition,” he refers to the creation of a dominant party and an opposition to that party. Both the dominant party and its opposition have the ability to see a transfer of authority between those groups. It remains essential, according to Hall, that the opposition “refuses to entertain plans to change the system and to exterminate its rivals – thereby of course ensuring its own safety.” ⁷³ This ideal is important to democratic consolidation, because it allows for a variety of views to be expressed, but it does it within an established framework. This decreases the risk that democracy, after it is implemented, will be threatened with a reversion back to an authoritarian regime. Thus, it is essential that individuals within a democratic structure to work within the system, and not try and alter the government in order to promote their goals.

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⁷³ Ibid.
The establishment of a loyal opposition is possible through what Rustow calls the “consensus for the basis of a democracy.”\textsuperscript{74} This formation of consensus relates to the necessity for a common understanding of the “rules of the game,”\textsuperscript{75} which are the fundamentals of the system and its procedural processes. This fits Hall’s description of a “loyal opposition,” as it shows how groups can work within a system to promote civil change, rather than focusing on the regime itself. Through a common agreement on how systematic procedures and guidelines, and a shared understanding to work within that system to promote change, a democracy can begin to experience longevity after a transition.

\textsuperscript{74} Rustow, 337.
\textsuperscript{75} Ibid.
The lack of a loyal opposition after the death of Tito in Yugoslavia exacerbated the problems of economic failures and civil unrest. According to Donia and Fine, after the death of Tito, the wars of Yugoslav secession broke out as a resurfacing of past tensions between ethnic groups. These conflicts, Donia and Fine go on to explain, were borne out of a hatred that dated back before, and during, the ethnic cleansing of the World War II era. Each of the three dominant ethnic groups were struggling for power, and were attempting to gain control through whatever means possible. However, none were willing to work together under the established rules of the 1974 constitution. Without an agreed upon superstructure, and with a lack of willingness to “loyally oppose” one another, these groups were unable to achieve a working democratic system. This demonstrates how a breakdown in the ideas underlying a “loyal opposition” can create a collapse within a democratic state.

The failure to create this “loyal opposition” after the 1974 constitution was a major factor in why the transition to democracy stalled. However, in the post-Dayton period, this type of opposition (if effectively established) can help ensure a stable democratic system. This is one of the main differences between the stalled transition attempted under the constitution of 1974, and the consolidation of the system imposed in 1995 under Dayton – learning from past mistakes helps to create a more predictable and stable future. Also, the experience of the recent wars might help consolidate democracy by providing a current example of the costs of not abiding by the rules. Although these wars could spark intense feelings of aggression, resentment, and revenge among the

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76 Donia and Fine, 221.
77 Ibid., 221-222.
people. There are thus both benefits and costs to the recent wars as they impact the ideas of a loyal opposition.

Aside from a “loyal opposition,” Hall goes on to list the eight key factors which enable democratic consolidation. Each of the provisos, labeled by Hall as “enabling factors,” assist in maintaining a democracy after a regime change has taken place. These factors comprise a traditional understanding of consolidation, and establish a model of action for Bosnia in order to maintain democratic ideals.

The first enabling factor brought forth by Hall is that of “sequence.” This factor, according to Hall, encourages liberalism to come prior to democratization. In having liberalism, a feeling of moderation is introduced into the political arena, which allows the elite protection from an uprising of the masses. This is critical if democracy is to be maintained, due to support of this system by the elite, which increases their willingness to work with the citizenry to promote change.

Unfortunately, no such sequential transformation occurred in Bosnia prior to the outbreaks of war in 1992. According to Dennison Rusinow, the problem that existed within the Bosnian system was the failure of a transition away from the autocratic-socialism that existed under Tito. This structure did not promote individualism, competition, democracy, or any other aspect of liberalism. Without the establishment of these principles, democracy was a failure after the death of Tito, and could possibly fail again today if these types of problems are not addressed.

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78 Hall, 277.
79 Ibid.
80 Rusinow, 343-347.
The second factor outlined by Hall is that of property. Here property has come to mean two types of reform that are needed in order to consolidate democracy. The first is an attempt to break up concentrations of land and resources. This land reform will disperse property to all levels of society, and decentralize the power that comes from a concentration of property in the hands of the elite. This will help promote democratization as power becomes diffuse across society, and enables more people to hold efficacy in directing the course of their lives and society. However, land and resource reform means nothing without another step. Hall states that the education of laborers in a society is necessary in order to ensure that property is dealt with adequately and resources are used to their maximum utility. This will direct an efficient development of the nation, and ensure the likelihood of its continued stability.

These types of reforms are necessary in Bosnia, because it will help break down the class divisions that fall along religious and ethnic boundaries. Even though there has not traditionally been one vastly dominant ethnic group in Bosnia, Donia and Fine note that Muslims in Bosnia have traditionally held an economic edge over the ethnic Serbs and Croats. This has created a significant amount of tension between these groups, as it highlights not only divisions, but also illustrates segregation and exclusion of individuals from certain market benefits. With land reform, however, steps could be taken to break down this type of socio-economic barrier.

Third, Hall mentions how the state needs to relinquish control of the military to the citizenry. Simply, civil control of the military will decrease the chance that

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81 Hall, 278.
82 Donia and Fine, 78.
83 Hall, 279.
militarism will become a hindrance to democratization. This becomes an issue when it is understood that few regimes have ever fallen when, according to Hall, they have a professional-civil army.\textsuperscript{84} When a military is controlled by the civilian populous, it will not be used to put down an outspoken opposition looking for civil or political change (e.g., Tiananmen Square). This reduces the chance that democracy can be thwarted by leaders who have absolute control over the military, and do not wish to relinquish their authority when the masses deem it necessary.

In Bosnia, this issue is of great importance. One of the most significant problems which blocked the democratic transition established by the 1974 constitution was the dominance of a Serb controlled military throughout Yugoslavia. According to Donia and Fine,\textsuperscript{85}

\begin{quote}
The (Yugoslav People's Army) also underwent a mutation: beginning in the summer of 1991, the army abandoned its role as a defender of multinational federalism and became an agent of Serbian national aims, unrecognizable in mission and considerably different in personnel from the original YPA.\textsuperscript{85}
\end{quote}

Serbian dominance of the YPA created a military that was not under civil control in Yugoslavia. This led to many of the problems of ethnic cleansing and genocide that came out the war in Bosnia-Herzegovina. With civilian control, these types of military outbreaks of oppression might, in the future, be prevented.

The fourth factor, as illustrated by Hall, is that of international cooperation.\textsuperscript{86} This point made by Hall is simply that the international community must ban together in order to support democratic regimes if they are to be successful. If the world does not support the regime change, then it might possibly be doomed from economic crisis and political

\textsuperscript{84} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{85} Donia and Fine, 195.
\textsuperscript{86} Hall, 279.
uncertainty. Simply, the world is uniting as a global community, and if the nation-state is to stand, it can only do so with the support of that global community.

In Bosnia, international action played a very significant role in determining the course and future of the current democratic transition and consolidation. When war first broke out, the international community took action through proximity talks, economic sanctions, and humanitarian relief. When these actions did not bring about an end to the war, and a creation of a more peaceful Bosnian state, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) took direct action to end the conflict. In conjunction with coordinated Croat and Bosnian ground assaults which regained much territory, NATO (under the auspices of the UN) performed air strikes within Bosnia until all parties agreed to a cease-fire. After the cease-fire was created, and the diplomatic negotiations for the Dayton Accords were enacted, the international community helped define the future of governance in Bosnia and Herzegovina. Not only was this done through the drafting of a new constitution, but it was also done through continued NATO peace enforcement, as well as the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) monitoring of the democratic elections within Bosnia. This shows how important a role the international community played in the transition, and now consolidation of Bosnian democracy.

Bosnia is not the only country to have a democratic constitution imposed upon them from external actors. In February of 1946, General Douglas MacArthur’s

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87 Fogelquist. 8.
88 Ibid.
Governmental Section drafted a new constitution for the country of Japan.\(^9\) Enacted on May 3, 1947, this constitution imposed a democratic system of government within Japan that mandated widespread political and social reform.\(^9\) And, despite it not having a high level of initial acceptance, the new "Constitution of Japan" slowly began to gain a massive amount of support by 1954.\(^9\) This illustrates that democratization imposed upon it by external actors can receive support from a population. It may take time and continued effort by the international community, but in the end, foreign influences may help foster democratic ideals until embraced by a transitioning state.

Next, Hall mentions the importance of right mindedness, or attitudes, towards the systematic governance in a democracy.\(^9\) This refers to the like-minded beliefs of the workings of the system, and the procedural methods of that system as mentioned in the segment describing the "loyal opposition." This helps establish the proper mentality for individuals within a society to embrace and use the system of democracy, rather than reject it for something different. Without this type of acceptance which comes from "right mindedness," a system is too easily rejected if things are not running smoothly, or are not going in a manner which the citizenry would like to see. This makes right mindedness towards, and attitudinal acceptance of democracy of particular importance to democratic consolidation.

Sixth, Hall describes the need for a "civil society."\(^9\) This is merely the implementation of a system that allows for diversity, tolerance and individualism.

However, Hall does separate this from the notions of "civic virtue" which would claim

\(^9\) Curtis, 264.
\(^9\) Ibid.
\(^9\) Ibid.
\(^9\) Ibid.
\(^9\) Hall, 281.
that a society has a set standard of uniform beliefs under which it operates. The difference being that civic virtue represents the attitudinal support of the foundations of a democratic regime, while civil society allows for digression in beliefs and supports a plurality of beliefs and actions. And, given the variety of dispositions based on ethnic background or belief systems, such a civil society is essential if future conflict is to be avoided in Bosnia.

Seventh, Hall specifically references the problems of consolidation in Bosnia when he mentions the importance of “single culture”95 Hall writes:

This factor is so obvious that it needs no commentary. One is tempted to say: remember Yugoslavia! More particularly, one can predict that newly independent Slovenia, blessed with an homogenous population, is more likely to consolidate its democracy than are newly independent Croatia or Bosnia-Hercegovina. This principle is all too easy to apply to other cases, especially to many of the former republics of the former Soviet Union.96

This idea parallels the ideas of social cleavages mentioned in the transition theories mentioned by Karl and Schmitter. A culturally diverse society by definition lacks coherent unity, and it makes it difficult for those groups to come together with common beliefs and understandings. However, Hall calls for the breakdown of those social schisms if democracy is to survive.

Finally, “memory” is mentioned by Hall as an important factor influencing consolidation.97 Here, memory is important because it shapes attitudes toward accepting or rejecting democratic principles. Groups remembering great disasters between one another (i.e., the ethnic cleansing in Bosnia) may find it difficult to unite to form a civil society. This issue of memory as an imposition on democratic consolidation is illustrated...
by Robert Kaplan in his book *Balkan Ghosts*. Here, Kaplan describes how the memory of past atrocities in the Balkans continues to haunt the citizens of that land. Speaking with a Muslim whom he calls Ismail, Kaplan transcribes the following dialogue:

‘Do you know why I don’t drink plum brandy, why I drink beer always? because the Chetniks [World War II Serbian partisans] used to do their killing after drinking plum brandy. Do you know what it is to throw a child into the air and catch it on a knife in front of its mother? To be tied to a burning log? To have your ass split with an axe so that you beg the Serbs to shoot you in the head and they don’t? ‘And they go to their church after. They go to their goddamn church. I have no words. . . .’

Ismail shuddered. ‘There are things that are beyond evil, that you just can’t speak about.’

He went on shouting. Ismail was only twenty-six; he had no personal knowledge of the events he described. Rats infested his house, he told me. The Serbs were to blame.98

The fact that Ismail bared no witness to these events shows the deep seeded issues imbedded in memory. This illustrates how socially and culturally the former Yugoslavia is divided, not only because of the events of the present, but the memory of the past.

However, memory may also be used to bring groups closer together as they reflect on times before a democratic change was implemented. This is what Di Palma refers to as “borrowed legitimacy.”99 Borrowed (or presumptive) legitimacy is, according to Di Palma, a willingness by the people to work within “uncertain parameters” in creating a democratic society.100 This is done with understanding that a democratic regime will yield benefits formerly unseen in that society under a different form of government.101 Therefore, the people in Bosnia may not see the types of immediate benefits that they would like from their new democratic government. However, they are more willing to work within that system rather than see a reversion back to the violence and genocide of

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98 Kaplan, xxi.
100 Ibid.
101 Ibid.
the past. These examples show how memory can hinder democracy, or possibly promote it.

In addition to the model of consolidation presented by Hall, Deane Neubauer states in his essay "Some Conditions of Democracy" that two more primary conditions must be met if consolidation is to take place. First, there must be communication among members of the political system. Second, socialization into the "rules of the game," which the parties have agreed upon, must take place. These two factors, added to those presented by Hall and Di Palma, create a useful framework for democratic consolidation. This framework will enable a theoretical determination of the applicability of the CCE's CIVITAS at Bosnia and Herzegovina program to democratic consolidation in Bosnia and Herzegovina.

Inculcating Democracy Through Education

In his "Commonwealth Club Address" in 1932, President Franklin D. Roosevelt stated:

Government includes the art of formulating a policy, and using that political technique to attain so much of that policy as will receive general support; persuading, leading, sacrificing, teaching always, because the greatest duty of a statesmen is to educate.

This idea supports the role of government as a body that helps to educate democratic ideals among a population. Here, Roosevelt is highlighting the necessity of an informed populous for even government's role as a legislative body. If the people do not know how a system works, they will never be able to work within the system.

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Roosevelt’s perspective on the importance of education is shared by the Center of Civic Education. Their goal, according to a September 1996 mission statement, is to “promote informed and responsible participation in civic life by all citizens.” In order to achieve this type of civil responsibility and action, citizens must be committed to the values and principles fundamental to a constitutional democracy. And, although the program, which started in 1964 at UCLA, was designed for inculcating civic virtue in America’s citizenry, that mission is being extended overseas through the CIVITAS program.

However, despite the overall goals of the CCE’s programs, there still exists the likelihood that such a program will not fit into the consolidation phase of a transitional democracy. Doubts exist on whether or not a program such as CIVITAS at Bosnia and Herzegovina will have much impact on the consolidation of democracy. By evaluating the CIVITAS program on the basis of acknowledged elements of consolidation theory, its theoretical soundness can be assessed. This is one way of assessing the role this program can play in creating a more stable democratic system in Bosnia.

**CCE and the CIVITAS at Bosnia and Herzegovina Program.** The mission of CCE is quite clear; they are attempting to solidify the strength of constitutional democracies around the world through a civic education program which will inculcate a civic virtue into the minds of the masses. More specifically, the programs of the CCE are designed to achieve three goals to promote a democratic lifestyle. The first of these goals, civic knowledge, is

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to increase the understanding of institutions of a constitutional democracy, and the fundamental principles upon which they are founded.\(^{105}\) The second goal of CCE, civic virtue, is to foster "the skills necessary to participate as effective and responsible citizens."\(^{106}\) Finally, the CCE is attempting to promote civic participation, or the "willingness to use democratic procedures for making decisions and managing conflict."\(^{107}\) The rationale directing these three goals being that an informed and responsible citizenry can take action in government and society in a way that promotes the civility and uniformity of that society. Or, as the CCE stated:

> No one's civic potential can be fulfilled without forming and maintaining an intention to pursue the common good; to protect individuals from unconstitutional abuses by government and from attacks on their rights from any source, public or private; to seek broad knowledge and the wisdom that informs judgement of public affairs; and to develop the skill to use that knowledge effectively. Such values, perspectives knowledge and skill in civic matters make responsible and effective civic participation possible. Fostering these qualities constitutes the mission of civic education.\(^ {108}\)

The CCE holds that only with these qualities will a democracy survive. And, as the theories outlined on democratic consolidation show, it is only through an inculcation of citizenship will these types of values ever properly be attained.

As a branch of the CCE, CIVITAS International Civic Education Exchange Program was designed to take the lessons and goals of the CCE's efforts in America, and apply them abroad. This program is a cooperative project of civic education programs in the United States and other participating nations. Supported by the US Department of Education and the US Information Agency, this program enables civic educators from the


\(^{105}\) Ibid.

\(^{106}\) Ibid.

\(^{107}\) Ibid.

\(^{108}\) Ibid.
U.S. and other nations to assist one another in developing a program curriculum to support education for a constitutional democracy. The primary purpose of such a program, according to the CCE, is to “exchange ideas and experiences regarding the goal of developing civic competence and responsibility among youth in a free society.”109

_Civic Virtue._ The first level of civics promoted by the CCE’s CIVITAS program is that of “civic virtue.” This idea merely relates to the desire for citizens to put the good of society above their own personal desires. This type of perspective is considered as virtuous, and the contrary (putting self before society) is considered a form of corruption.110 This type of mindset and perspective will keep a citizen’s attention focused on promoting the betterment of governance and governing institutions so as to better reflect the will of society.

When applying the underlying foundations of civic virtue to our models of consolidation, we find that there is an important role played by this type of education. If one can truly inculcate the values of civic virtue through education, it would advance some of the criteria that have been established by our models of transition and consolidation. First of all, civic virtue presupposes the necessity for a “rule of law.” As mentioned previously, this would create a system that is not based on arbitrary authoritarian rulings to dictate the course and nature of a society. Rather, rule of law would promote the ideal visions of everyone being equal in the eyes of society, because it would promote the same standards to all individuals, regardless of what social position they hold. Of course this perspective may not always hold true, but the theory underlying

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109 Ibid., 2.
it is highly important. Equality under law is essential in a democratic society, and an increased understanding of this principle by the citizenry is important if it is to ever be achieved.\textsuperscript{111} This shows how civic virtue will help to develop a long term notion of “fair play” based on the ideas of an enlightened self-interest.

Another aspect of civic virtue in which we see the promotion of democratic consolidation is through the introduction of what the CCE labels as “civic commitments.”\textsuperscript{112} This principle contains such important understandings as minority rights, civilian control of the military, separation of church and state, federalism, and democratic representation. Each of these commitments is important if stability and longevity are to be achieved in a democratic society. Only through an understanding of these commitments, and knowing what their role is in promoting them, can citizens act properly within a democratic society.

In the case of Bosnia specifically, the idea of civic virtue is highly important because of the memory that exists within the people of the recent genocide and conflict. The promotion of values like minority rights, representation, and public (or common) good, might help to eliminate, or breakdown, some of the hostility that remains from the atrocities of the conflict. On a broader level, even though the memories of the genocide and war remain, the introduction of general values like diversity, equality, individual rights (i.e., life, liberty, property and happiness), and justice are highlighted through the teaching of civic virtue, and may help the people move past recent history, and focus upon building a stronger society in the future. It is important that these values are

\textsuperscript{110} Ibid. 2.
\textsuperscript{111} Ibid. 3.
\textsuperscript{112} Ibid.
understood by and inculcated among the people of Bosnia. This type of framework will help the people unite and work as one, rather than as three groups divided against one another.

Civic virtue is an important attribute of a democratic society. Only through the promotion of these basic values and attitudinal frameworks can the foundations for a democratic society be established. Many tenants of civic virtue were outlined as important prerequisites to theories of proper transition and consolidation (See Fig. 1-1), and it is important that these ideas are embraced by the citizens of Bosnia. If the masses promote these ideals, then civic virtue can help support the fragile formation of a democratic future.

Civic Participation. The second component of CIVITAS is the promotion of "civic participation." This is done in a variety of ways including (but not limited to) forming governmental action groups, voting, and monitoring public policy. However, this does not mean that people just go through the motions of participating, but education for civic participation hopes to promote a competent and responsible citizenry that knows how to effectively deliberate upon, and influence governance. This would create an ideal population for the systematic governing of a democratic society.

Not only does civic participation uphold the basic foundations of democracy by having the will of the people dictating the future of government, but it also meets a key requisite of democratic consolidation. As mentioned previously, one of the factors that will determine if a country will remain democratic or revert back to authoritarianism is

113 Ibid. 4.
whether or not people feel the system is working. This creates a catch-22 in many instances, because the people do not know how to properly influence a system of government ("civic knowledge"), but are frustrated with the entire system if it does not work in accordance to their desires. This creates a tenuous situation for the future of democratic leadership, and must be avoided if democracy is to be upheld.

Again as we look to the case of Bosnia, we find that as citizens are introduced to an entirely new system of government, it is important that they know how to enact their new role in that system. After nearly 1600 years of authoritarian rule, citizens are not going to be able to work within a system of democracy, if they do not know how to do so. That is why the value of civic participation should be part of an educational curriculum. With this type of curriculum, students will know not only how to participate, they will also receive the knowledge necessary to do so properly. This will help to ensure that the new democracy in Bosnia is one that will not systematically fail because it is not complying to the will of the people. That is the value of teaching civic participation.

*Civic Knowledge.* The final factor considered by CCE’s CIVITAS program is an all encompassing one. That factor is “civic knowledge.”115 This final principle is one that not only informs citizens of their rights in a constitutional democracy, but also informs them on how to use such a system. This is important, because people will fully learn the role of government in protecting them, but also will learn how they must act if that government is to function properly. In this sense, civic knowledge helps stabilize the foundations of democracy (the people), in order to allow for the democratic process to achieve its full

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114 Ibid.
potential. Or, as one social studies organization put it, “The improvement of civic education for democracy is essential to the development of a healthy civic culture and sustenance of vigorous democratic institutions.” Such is the case with the CIVITAS at Bosnia and Herzegovina program. Only through a proper outlook on their rights and responsibilities in a society can citizens hold efficacy in determining the proper course of governmental and personal action.

Civic knowledge gives not only a foundation for acting according to an individual’s responsibilities, but also gives a guideline for judging the effectiveness of government. By knowing one’s rights, and knowing what one is entitled to by law, then citizens can adequately assess their government to see if it is acting in a legitimate fashion. This ensures that all facets of society are operating in coordination toward a stable political and social future. It also ensures that people will be able to act upon their rights when necessary, and make sure the government is performing its duties properly, and not merely putting forth a limited effort to help its citizens. Because of civic knowledge, citizens in Bosnia can, for example, evaluate the elections that recently took place, and determine whether they ran efficiently and effectively. This is one way that civic knowledge will help promote the stability and longevity in the democratic processes of Bosnia-Herzegovina.

Another way that civic knowledge will help promote democratic consolidation is by teaching the complications that exist in a democratic system. By informing a population that democracy can be a messy and drawn out system, civic knowledge may

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115 Ibid., 5.
help citizens understand that they may not see immediate results. However, a background in civic knowledge may help foster patience in the citizenry. Civic knowledge may help individuals understand that they must possess realistic expectations from their new government. And, similar to the presumptive legitimacy theories established by Di Palma, this style of education may help people understand that democracy may not be a perfect system, but it is better than the alternatives.

**Assisting Democracy: The Theoretical Justification for the CIVITAS at Bosnia and Herzegovina Program**

Through an analysis of democratic transition, it is clear how a variety of factors push nations to the brink of having a democratic revolution. Whether that revolution is one of violence or compromise; uprising or elite imposition, it will have an impact upon the future of the democratic regime that is established. The transition is, however, just the beginning. After a country implements change to give sovereign authority to its citizens, then a new struggle, that of consolidation, must begin.

In studying the theories of transition and consolidation, it is important to note how certain requirements must be met in order to establish a democracy that is both stable and long standing. If these factors are not met, the democracy is threatened by a reversion back to an authoritarian regime. This is why it is important to support a newborn regime in anyway possible – including through education.

*Conclusions on CIVITAS.* It would be highly presumptuous, and outright false, if anyone were to make the claim that education is all that is needed to bring about the
consolidation of fledgling democracies like that of Bosnia. Civic education does not solve for the problems that arise out of economic instability. Nor does it erase all aspects of tradition, culture, religious practices, or other factors that may infringe upon a stable democratic transition. Civic education does however offer hope for other aspects of transition and consolidation. Through the promotion of civic virtue, participation and knowledge, programs like CIVITAS can assist consolidation of democracies and ensure a smooth transition.

**Fig. 1-3: CIVITAS' Ability to Assist Democratic Consolidation**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Criteria for democratic consolidation</th>
<th>CIVITAS at Bosnia and Herzegovina</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Establishment of a “loyal opposition”</td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sequence of liberalization prior to, or consistent with, democratization</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Land reform, and education on utilization of land resources</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Civilian control of military</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>International Cooperation</td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Right mindedness; proper attitudinal preparedness for democracy</td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Establishment of a civil society</td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Establishment of a single culture</td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Breakdown of memory issues impeding social and political cooperation</td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Socialization into the rules of the game</td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Communication among members in society</td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

These ideas are graphically illustrated in Fig. 1-3. This graph shows how the goals and methods of CIVITAS are in line with the major components offered as prerequisites to democratic consolidation. The CIVITAS program, in its theoretical formation, is designed to meet eight of the eleven criteria listed. It might also be argued that CIVITAS could assist with the establishment of a civil military (in so far as its ability to instruct a citizenry on what it means to have influence over the military organization). However, it
is essential that military officers “stay in the barracks” in order to secure and maintain the idea of a loyal opposition. Thus, the CCE still helps promote major aspects of democratic stability. This shows that, for the most part, the CCE is theoretically sound in its operation in countries like Bosnia-Herzegovina.

After signing the Dayton Peace Accords, both President Slobodan Milosevic of the Republic of Serbia, and President Alija Izetbegovic of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina, wrote to Secretary of State Warren Christopher. Their letters read: “My government will actively develop student exchanges between the two countries, as well as nominate students to participate in joint exchange programs with the United States.”

These words, written by two of the key figures in the start and resolution of the conflict in Bosnia-Herzegovina, illustrate the emphasis upon education as a way to establish peace for Bosnia. That is the CCE’s goal as well, and through the CIVITAS program, perhaps they can help to establish such a peaceful democracy as the Dayton Peace Accords outline.

However, despite the fact that the CIVITAS at Bosnia and Herzegovina program is theoretically justified, the question remains on whether it can, by practical measures, help consolidate democracy in the area of Bosnia. That is the question the next chapter will attempt to answer.

Chapter 2: Impacts of Education on Democratic State Building

Richard D. Kauzlarich, U.S. ambassador to CIVITAS at Bosnia and Herzegovina, stated after a meeting with the teachers involved with the 1998 session of the program that American teachers “offer hope for Bosnia’s future.” Kauzlarich went on to say that he believes “there is nothing more important for the long-term in uniting (Bosnia) than education.”

The CIVITAS at Bosnia and Herzegovina program recently completed its third summer of training. In 1998 alone, participants in the program worked with several hundred Bosnian educators, and over an estimated 7,000 students in all ten cantons of the federation. Commenting on this program to the Education International World Congress, President Clinton stated:

We are working in Bosnia ... to help students there learn about democracy so that they can preserve what so many have given so much to create – a real, sustainable peace in a multiethnic democracy.

This shows the United States’ continuing emphasis on the importance of education in democratic state building, and illustrates the importance of the CIVITAS at Bosnia and Herzegovina program.

However, despite all of the theoretical justifications, and support given by high officials in the United States government, questions as to the actual effects of the program remain. Namely, how effective has the CIVITAS at Bosnia and Herzegovina program been in assisting democratic consolidation in Bosnia?

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119 Ibid.
120 Ibid.
In order to address this question it is important to examine the logistics of the program. In doing so, it is essential to see not only how CIVITAS at Bosnia and Herzegovina works, but also to gain insight from the people involved. Here it will become clear what individuals who participate in the program think about their role, as well as to shed light on how the governmental agencies justify continued involvement with civic education in Bosnia. This will provide the necessary information to critically evaluate the “vindication” aspect of the program. That is, to see if this program can work to provide the theoretical goals and steps outlined in the previous chapter.

CIVITAS at Bosnia and Herzegovina: A Framework for Democracy

On July 31, 1997, Nathan David Breen, a high school social studies teacher from Cheyenne, Wyoming, arrived in Sarajevo. Stepping off his plane, he was immediately struck by the natural wonders of the area. Describing the valley that makes up Sarajevo, Breen noted the “verdant and tree-lined hills,” and the contrast of “alpine beauty” mixed with “warm humidity.” And, although captivated by his surroundings, Breen was reminded of the job awaiting him by the sight of French soldiers who were monitoring the airport. He was here as a part of the CIVITAS at Bosnia and Herzegovina program, designed to assist the new democratic state in bringing peace and stability to the future of this war-torn federation.
Breen is one of 34 teacher-trainers from the United States who have participated in the CCE’s CIVITAS at Bosnia and Herzegovina program. This program, which is administered by the educational leaders of Bosnia and Herzegovina, receives support from the USIS Sarajevo, the Center for Civic Education, the United States Information Agency (USIA) and the United States Department of Education (USDE). After the 1997 session, 1,345 upper elementary and secondary teachers were trained with the CIVITAS materials in Bosnia. In turn, these teachers have introduced the civic curriculum to 53,500 students in more than 500 schools.

The CIVITAS program, according to the CCE, focuses on lessons outlined in the books We the People . . . The Citizen and the Constitution, Foundations of Democracy: Authority, Privacy, Responsibility, and Justice, and We the People . . . Project Citizen. Each of these texts, published by the Center for Civic Education, offers a different area of insight as to the nature of democracy and the role of the citizen. According to a National Education Association publication, the materials in these books covers “the philosophical foundations of democracy, modern policy evaluation, policy formation skills, and more.” The article goes on to say that the courses run for six hours each day for a span of two weeks.
According to the Center for Civic Education, We the People . . . The Citizen and the Constitution focuses on the area of "civics and government." The culminating activity of the information given in this text is a simulated congressional/parliamentary hearing in which students play the role of legislators. The CCE goes on to state that the information provided in this text "helps students develop the skills necessary to pass the citizenship section of state competency tests." This is crucial to the CCE's goal of increasing knowledge and participation of a citizenry in a constitutional government.

Foundations of Democracy, according to the Center, helps students develop a fundamental understanding of politics and government. This type of curriculum is designed to help high school aged students "develop the skills and attitudes necessary to participate as effective, responsible citizens." This aids in inculcating the values of civic participation and knowledge, but also goes on to develop civic virtue. Thus, this type of text is crucial to each of the CCE's stated goals in their CIVITAS program.

The final text, We the People . . . Project Citizen, encourages students to take the knowledge they have learned and use it to change their surrounding environment. According to the CCE, "The program encourages civic participation among students, their parents, and members of their community." In this way, the education given in the classroom is extended out beyond just what the students are learning, and pushes it out to the community.

135 Ibid.
136 Ibid.
137 Ibid.
138 Ibid.
139 Ibid.
140 Ibid.
According to Breen, the Project Citizen lessons had the class brainstorm ideas about problems in their community that the students could change. The students would then divide up the class into 3-5 groups, and decide on what topics they would like to work with. These groups would then organize a portfolio based on hearings, interviews, news reports, photographs and letters. After compiling this background research, students would define the problem confronting them, develop methods to solve these problems, and then compile end results to evaluate the outcome. According to Mary Bristol and Al Bell, two American educators working in Zenica, the topics examined by the students ranged from issues of the environment, citizen welfare, and educational concerns. Gail Huschel, an American educator from St. Croix Catholic School in Minnesota, describes how many of the concerns in Livno were similar to those described by Bristol and Bell. "There's a lot going on with youth issues," Huschel states, "drugs, alcohol, sex, that the older generation refuses to face." These were some of the issues students she worked with chose to focus on.

After compiling these types of profiles, the students' portfolios, which act as a documentation of all of their work, are submitted to the Project Citizen competition. According to Breen, the educational administration in each canton collects these portfolios, and they are then evaluated by a group of adjudicators. The top group then goes on to compete at the Federation level with those winners in other cantons. This

142 Ibid.
143 Ibid.
144 Ibid.
146 Pat Fietcher and Gail Huschle. "Travnik." Center Correspondent Vol. 9, No. 1. (Calabasas, Calif.: Center for Civic Education, 1996), p. 15
exposes to the students to a variety of social problems, and possible solutions, and also reveals their ideas to governmental officials and administrators in Bosnia-Herzegovina.

*Teaching the Teachers.* The teachers selected from the United States to join the CIVITAS at Bosnia and Herzegovina program are selected by application.\(^{148}\) Coming from all over the United States, these individuals are mostly high school social studies and government teachers. Their applications are sent to the CCE, as well as to the Department of Education, and they are selected on a variety of factors. After being selected, the teachers are flown to Sarajevo, where they attend a conference with Bosnian educational ministers, governmental officials, and representatives from the United States.\(^{149}\) These conferences cover such topics as human rights, economics, and the media.\(^{150}\)

After a few days of introductory seminars and instruction, the American teachers are paired off and sent to different cantons within Bosnia.\(^{151}\) Breen explained how his initial feelings about his first day of teaching were those of nervousness and apprehension.\(^{152}\) Joan Beaver, a teacher of history in Minnesota, shared similar feelings with NEA Today. “They were wary of us, not knowing what we were all about,” said Beaver. “We were all pretty apprehensive.”\(^{153}\) But after a few days of working together, Beaver commented on how both sides began to open up. “Teachers are teachers. And no

\(^{147}\) Breen. December 29, 1998 interview.
\(^{148}\) Foy (interview)
\(^{149}\) Breen [personal memoirs]. p. 7.
\(^{150}\) Ibid. p. 12.
\(^{151}\) Ibid. p. 29.
\(^{152}\) Ibid.
\(^{153}\) Cabrera.
matter where you are, they share one common concern: the well-being of their students.154

The teachers work separately on introducing different materials to their Bosnian colleagues.155 However, they do not just work with the teachers, but also introduce the textbooks in the classroom with the students.156 This enables the teachers in Bosnia to get used to a more interactive teaching style, and helps the students to participate in their instruction. This new methodology of teaching is essential to the future of civic education in Bosnia. According to Breen:

Collectivism and centralized authority for the past half-century has made democratic-civic education a chore for (the Bosnian teachers). They believe in democracy. They know the philosophers and the philosophies, but they just don't know how, or actually realized, that civic education is modeled in the classroom. The teacher must allow for interplay, release from total dictatorial control and permit openness of questioning and research. A democracy cannot be maintained when its children are directed and controlled.157

This new teaching style is therefore necessary if the lessons taught are to truly take hold in the minds of the students receiving the information.

The CIVITAS at Bosnia and Herzegovina program therefore allows for certain essential principles to be introduced into the Bosnian educational system. First, it offers the information necessary to meet the goals of civic virtue, civic knowledge and civic participation. Through the textbooks provided, and the programs offered, the American teachers are introducing the information needed to enhance the intended design of the CIVITAS program in promoting civic education. Secondarily, the program also introduces a shift in the teaching style formerly used by the teachers of Bosnia. By

154 Ibid.
156 Ibid.
157 Ibid. p.53
making the classroom more interactive, students experience a microcosm of what free thought and expression can be in the larger society. This offers them firsthand knowledge of the skills they will need to carry with them in becoming active participants in the newly formed democratic society.

Perhaps the most important role performed by American teacher-trainers is described by Huschle as she reflects on her third year in the program. She states, "I think we Americans do something that is largely hard to define. Our presence tells these teachers they are not alone, they have not been forgotten." This fits the ideas presented on consolidation, because it highlights the important role that external actors can play, and it also shows a breaking down of the memories of the past in which the people of Bosnia felt as though they were struggling alone, until assisted by Western nations.

**United States Government's Role in Civic Education.** Along with the support of the Center for Civic Education in the CIVITAS program, the United States federal government also plays a significant role. According to Rita Foy (no relation), USDE contact to the Center for Civic Education, the Department of Education got involved with the program after mandated by Congress to do so. "Our involvement," explains Foy, "comes as a response to a legislative mandate which was designed to extend help to Eastern and Central Europe." She continues by saying the involvement of USDE in the CIVITAS at Bosnia and Herzegovina program is dependent on a congressional review of the program this year. "The program is coming up to Congress this year for

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158 Feichter and Huschle.
160 Ibid.
161 Ibid.
reauthorization and appropriations,” said Foy. “It will be reviewed again in 2001, because
it exists on the basis of an ongoing evaluation.”162

The mandate given by Congress comes as a response to the Clinton
administration’s ongoing concern with the future of former communist nations in Eastern
and Central Europe. In a speech delivered to the nation on November 27, 1995, President
Clinton stated:

Let me say at the outset, America’s role will not be about fighting a war.
It will be about helping the people of Bosnia secure their own agreement. . . .
In fulfilling this mission, we will have the chance to help stop the killing
of innocent civilians, especially children; and at the same time, to bring
stability to Central Europe, a region of the world that is vital to our
national interests. It is the right thing to do.163

The perspective offered by Clinton in this address, highlights the important role that the
administration thinks America should play in Bosnia. It also shows how he feels the
security of countries in Central Europe is inextricably linked to that of the United States.

In building a democratic state, President Clinton goes on to say that:

[The people of Bosnia] put down their guns; to preserve Bosnia as a single
state; to investigate and prosecute war criminals; to protect the rights of
all citizens; to try to build a peaceful democratic future. And they asked
for America’s help as they implement this peace agreement. America has
the responsibility to answer that request, to help turn this moment of hope
into an enduring reality.164

Again, Clinton’s address focuses on the importance of U.S. involvement in the future of
Bosnian democracy. Not only does the United States have self-interest in the future of
this former communist nation, but it has the moral responsibility, according to Clinton, to
answer the request for help by the people of Bosnia. Thus, the push by his administration
to assist the democratic transition of Bosnia.

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162 Ibid.
163 William J. Clinton. “Let us Lead: Implementing the Bosnian Peace Agreement.” [speech to nation on 27

- 60 -
Writing for Foreign Policy Magazine, Jacques Attali describes how Clinton’s push to help Bosnia forced a rather “isolationist Congress” to follow suit.\textsuperscript{165} This is, in part, a crucial factor driving Congress to mandate federal government funding of the CCE’s CIVITAS at Bosnia and Herzegovina program. That is the mandate, according to Foy, given to the USDE - to fund the CCE’s efforts, and to assist with information and resources when necessary and appropriate.\textsuperscript{166}

Secretary of State Warren Christopher stated before a meeting with Bosnian Prime Minister Haris Silajdžik that one of the main goals of the new democratic government was to establish “political viability.”\textsuperscript{167} This would mean ongoing consolidation efforts to provide stability for the new government in the long term. The political viability he speaks of is not something that the Bosnian government has to face alone. The United States government is willing to assist these efforts, in part through the CIVITAS program. Addressing the role of the U.S. in Bosnia, Assistant Secretary for Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor, John Shattuck said:

\begin{quote}
The challenge facing us since Dayton has been to put its provisions into practice. We are making good progress, although we still face substantial hurdles. We need to overcome the tremendous distrust and ill will that permeates the political atmosphere in the aftermath of a horrible war. There are likely to be problems and setbacks as we try to move forward. Still, we are determined to make this progress work. We have been putting a major effort into implementation.\textsuperscript{168}
\end{quote}

This illustrates the efforts being put forth by the U.S. government in helping provide political stability within Bosnia and Herzegovina. And, with this type of support coming from the United States, there is a greater likelihood that the CIVITAS program will be

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{164} Ibid.
\item \textsuperscript{166} Foy (interview).
\end{itemize}
successful in Bosnia. Therefore, the U.S. government is aiding not only the success of Bosnia, but the potential success of the CIVITAS at Bosnia and Herzegovina program, too.

According to Ron Morris, senior supervisor for the CIVITAS at Bosnia and Herzegovina program, and a high school teacher in Arcadia, CA, “A small portion of the Department of Education budget currently funds the international program. Current years average about one-million (dollars).” Commenting on this funding, Morris goes on to say that, “Money is always short, but teachers are being trained, and programs are in line throughout Bosnia.”

**Strengths of the CIVITAS Program.** The presence of the American teachers is supported by a wide variety of program strengths that make-up CIVITAS. In a description of her efforts in CIVITAS at Bosnia and Herzegovina, Beaver describes how the program is making small, but significant steps in achieving its goals. She writes:

> One teacher in Mostar reported last year that government officials would not meet directly with her students for their Project Citizen portfolio research, preferring that the students go through her to get their information. However, when some students encountered the same attitude this year, they asserted that the official had an obligation to talk to them because they were the ones who put him in office. When he asked them who told them that, they proudly told him that their teacher had taught them that government officials are servants of the people.

This type of display by the students in Mostar illustrates the kinds of ideas that are being taught to the students of Bosnia. Before this type of educational framework, many students would have allowed themselves to be disregarded by public officials, because

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168 John Shattuck, Prospects for Peace with Justice in Bosnia.
170 Ibid.
they would not know any other form of action. However, after being instructed that the officials in the government were servants of the people, the students realized what role they could play in influencing government and politics. This shows just one type of advancement that civic education can make in pushing a society towards a functioning democracy.

One of the main reasons the CIVITAS at Bosnia and Herzegovina program has been successful in influencing change lies in the strengths of the program. Morris describes these strengths, and how they are bolstering the efficacy of the civic curriculum being introduced in Bosnia. According to Morris, “[The] strengths are the commitment of the American trainers, and Center staff, to the goals of CIVITAS.” He goes on to add that the “receptive and talented” teachers throughout Bosnia-Herzegovina who are adopting the American methods are also a benefit to the program. “Warm educators that are receptive to our ideas and to us can be found there, and they can be reached,” he says.

Another strength of the program has been the breakthroughs it has had in certain areas of Bosnia-Herzegovina. According to Morris, “Developing the program in Republika Srpska, the Serb area of control that had been seen as obstructionist, helped send a message to other parts of the country. If we can help here, we could do it anywhere.”

172 Morris (interview).
173 Ibid.
174 Ibid.
175 Ibid.
Rita Foy also insists that the program is strong because it compliments other programs currently in existence in Bosnia-Herzegovina. According to Foy, "The National Council on Economics, based in New York City, is working on promoting economic education within Bosnia, too." This program works to address the growing need for economic stability after the highly destructive war in Bosnia. Foy explains how if these programs are in existence simultaneously, then the problems afflicting Bosnia can be adequately addressed.

Breen also describes some of the strengths of the program when he observes that, "It is better than sending guns." He feels that the strength of the program lies in its ability to address real social issues that are tearing the society apart. Breen also notes that this type of education assists Bosnia more than perhaps any other kind, because it is designed to teach Bosnian educators how to teach this material on their own. "Soon," he says, "American teachers may not be needed there at all." This is important to the future of Bosnia, because it is designed to become self-sufficient after a certain length of time. That means that Bosnia will be able to determine its own future, without relying on other countries to continually support all of its efforts.

**Weaknesses of the CIVITAS Program.** Like almost all things, however, the CIVITAS program does not exist without flaws. Perhaps the biggest weakness agreed to by a majority of the participants interviewed is the continued ethnic separation within the schools themselves. According to Morris, "The conditions of the populations and their..."
leaders as to ethnic separation constitutes the greatest obstacle to the goals of
CIVITAS.” 181 Concurring with this statement, Breen reflects on how the classes are
divided among ethnic lines. “Serbs, Croats and Muslims all go to the same schools,”
notes Breen, “but they aren’t allowed to be in the same classroom.” 182

The continued ethnic separation in the classrooms decreases the possibility for
integration and tolerance in society. No matter how the CIVITAS program tries to teach
acceptance of opinions and views from all segments of society, the students within these
classrooms are not able to experience this type exposure to a multitude of perspectives.
Added to this type of separation, Breen also commented on the lack of tolerance in
society that erodes the efforts put forth by the CIVITAS program. “We can talk diversity
all we want,” he said, “but these kids still have to go home to their parents. The same
parents who fought an ethnically based war for three years.” 183 This shows how societal
factors play a role in weakening the efforts of the participants in the CIVITAS program.
As Morris said, “It is very difficult for CIVITAS to penetrate these walls of separation,
but we are making a strong effort.” 184

Adding to the issues of ethnic segregation, Breen notes that CIVITAS needs to
bring about a change in the culture of the people in Bosnia. “There is a cultural battle that
must be realized,” notes Breen. 185 This weakness relates to the CIVITAS program,
according to Breen, because he does not feel as though the CIVITAS program focuses

180 Ibid.
181 Morris (interview).
182 Breen (interview).
183 Ibid.
184 Morris (interview).
185 Breen (interview).
enough on inculcating individual rights through religious and ethnic groups.\textsuperscript{186} “Education sends a conflicting message,” says Breen. “Whereas education, or inculcation, is a means to democracy, the ideals of inculcation often run counter to acculturated ‘givens’ within ethnic groups.”\textsuperscript{187} He feels that these smaller, more isolated, social groups are the key to making a reality what is theorized in the classroom.\textsuperscript{188} “There exists a ‘peasant-mentality’ (in Bosnia) similar to that of youths in American ghettos,” says Breen. “There is no trust in a larger governmental system, and so these individuals look to smaller community groups to define their thoughts on life. Their new education is scary to them because it threatens culture.”\textsuperscript{189} Thus, it is important that CIVITAS begins to incorporate cultural aspects into its curricula in order to allow the lessons to reach past theory into reality for the students, or develop complimentary programs in these cultural associations.

In order for this type of action to take place, Breen feels that the teacher-trainers involved with the CIVITAS program need to stay in Bosnia for longer stints.\textsuperscript{190} Currently, the teachers from the United States stay in Bosnia for only a few weeks. This is not an adequate amount of time to become part of the community, or, as Breen says, “To have the community become part of them.”\textsuperscript{191}

The lack of long term placement in Bosnia relates to yet another weakness related to the program. That weakness is the amount of funding it receives. According to Morris,
“Money is always short.” He continues by saying how the lack of funding for their organization leaves CIVITAS understaffed, and lacking essential resources. According to Breen, funding needs to be allocated in amounts great enough to pay teachers to make their efforts last 2-3 years. This would enable teachers, according to Breen, to get a better understanding of the cultural contexts in which they work, enabling them to reach out more appropriately to students.

The final weakness addressed by Morris is the changing governmental support for the CCE’s efforts with their CIVITAS at Bosnia and Herzegovina program. Morris explains that, “CIVITAS is threatened because the State Department is absorbing the USIA, which has been sponsoring and supporting our efforts over the past three years. [The State Department] needs to know the value of continuing these efforts.” Without the support of the United States federal government, the CIVITAS program would lose essential funding and resources. This would leave the program unable to meet even the most basic of its needs to achieve the goals outlined by its directors. Any loss or reduction in the support received from the federal government by this program would therefore make the efforts of the CCE ineffective.

Assessing the CIVITAS at Bosnia and Herzegovina program. Taking into account each of the program’s strengths and weaknesses, a few conclusions may be drawn about the future of the CIVITAS at Bosnia and Herzegovina program. First, and foremost, support for the program must be given if it is to continue striving to inculcate democracy on the
youths in Bosnia. According to Morris, a short term goal of the program is to train American teachers to become effective trainers. Looking to a more long term perspective, Morris says that the CIVITAS program is working towards making Bosnian educators self-sufficient in teaching a civic curriculum. And finally, Morris speculates that the program can "develop an institutionalized understanding of democratic-political issues, constitutionalism, and other such ideals." With these short and long run goals in mind, the effectiveness of the CIVITAS program's implementation can be examined.

From the teacher's perspective, there are high hopes for the CIVITAS program as it has been implemented in Bosnia-Herzegovina, with a few exceptions. According to Breen, he feels that the program does not have a long-range perspective when it comes down to teacher training. He notes that, "The rudimentary aspects of this program are incredible. However, there must be a long-term commitment." Breen goes on to say that the program cannot be said to definitely work, or not work, for at least a generation to come. "This must be a generation or longer," says Breen, "and it can't be a band-aid solution of sending 2 or 3 teachers for a few weeks at a time. They must be there for years in order to teach, and better Bosnian understandings of, democracy."

Breen's analysis of this program relates a few essential changes that should be made in the CIVITAS program if it is to be more successful in assisting democratic consolidation. First, if teachers from the United States are to reach students at an equal level, it is important that those teachers remain in the canton in which they are teaching.

196 Morris (interview).
197 Ibid.
198 Ibid.
199 Ibid.
200 Breen (interview).
201 Ibid.
for longer periods of time. It is necessary that these individuals learn more about the communities in which they are working. Only by being a part of the community for longer than a couple of weeks as a dignitary or guest can these teachers become regarded members of a community. This, along with education on the language and customs which would make them more viable members of the community, would enable the American teachers to adequately address the program according to what is really happening within these areas, and not merely rely on what the officials and media are telling them.

Another important observation made by Breen about the CIVITAS program is the necessity for continuing this program for the long term. Generations need to be introduced to this type of course material. Change will not come over a short-term period. Breen adds to this perspective when he states, “I am afraid that this program will become the typical American and European bravado. It looks good in the headlines for a while, but when it is no longer glamorous they move on to something that is.”203 Only by continuing with a long-term commitment to this program can it ever become efficacious in affecting change.

From the perspective of the Center for Civic Education, other issues need to be addressed if this program is to be successful in Bosnia-Herzegovina. Morris states that the training of the American teachers is not extensive enough.204 “Institutes need to be conducted which are more extensive than just a few days training,” says Morris.205 These two additions to the program, increased funding and teacher training, would strengthen

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202 Ibid.
203 Breen (interview).
204 Ibid.
205 Ibid.
the CIVITAS program enabling it to better strive for its goals of inculcating civic attitudes into the people of Bosnia-Herzegovina.

An important addendum to this evaluation is that, according to Morris, no evaluation of the CIVITAS at Bosnia and Herzegovina program has been conducted by the CCE or the federal government.\textsuperscript{206} Both of these groups are planning evaluations later this year.

\textsuperscript{206} Morris (interview).
Concluding Remarks: Sowing the Seeds of Liberal Democracy

Perhaps what makes them happy is a fierce commitment to a cause transcending themselves. The world of my dreams has no war in it. But what if we are stuck between war, and a peace with no dreams?

-Sally Belfrage

Living With War: A Belfast Year

For Bosnia, now is the time for peace. The signing of the peace accords in Dayton marked the end of the ethnic conflict that tore apart the newly formed federation. However, in a time of peace, there is a fear of failure - failure of rebuilding, and failure of losing the dream of freedom from war and genocide. This fledgling democracy must keep the mental images of long-term establishment of stability and freedom. The loss of this dream could mean a failure to maintain the peace that has been created. That is why the efforts of CIVITAS at Bosnia and Herzegovina are so important. They must help remind the people of Bosnia of their task of building a democratic state. They must also help fan the fires of the dreams of a government for the people.

Through an examination of this program on a theoretical basis, it is clear that civic education can assist in bringing about consolidation of a newly formed democracy. The CIVITAS at Bosnia and Herzegovina program provides that civic curriculum and helps the educators of Bosnia introduce that to the children of Bosnia. Though it has its share of flaws, the program provides at least a viable attempt at inculcating future generations of Bosnians with democratic principles and virtues. As a project coordinator

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in Republika Srpska stated at a project meeting in Sarajevo, "I hope that our children learn these lessons so they do not make the same mistakes we did."

Susan Roe, a teacher-trainer from Durham, North Carolina, emphasizes the importance of civic education. Roe told the National Education Association, "I think education helped preserve our democracy, and I think it is going to start Bosnia’s." This belief in the program on the part of people involved holds strong despite an unpredictable future in Bosnia. The seed of democracy has been planted, and now it is up to the educators from the United States, working in cooperation with the Center for Civic Education, to fertilize that seed into a full and stable democratic federation. Fahrudin Rizvanbegovic, Minister of Education for Bosnia-Herzegovina, concurred with this idea when he stated at the first annual Project Citizen academic competition in Sarajevo that, "It is my pleasure to have been with this project since the beginning. And... I recognize the future of Bosnia and Herzegovina in this project."

The future of Bosnia is not yet determined. There are many social and political issues that must be addressed before it can be declared that peace has come to the democratic federation. The theories underlying democratic consolidation illustrate how problems with ethnic tensions, displaced refugees, economics, and lack of funding for essential social programs, are but a few of the many problems that are confronting the people of Bosnia. However, as these problems are being faced, they are not being faced alone. Groups like the Center for Civic Education and other international organizations are assisting with these problems, tearing down the walls that are blocking a stable

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208 "Civitas@Bosnia and Herzegovina."
209 Cabrera.
210 Fahrudin Rizvanbegovic. [speech]. Sarajevo, Bosnia. As printed in a memo from The Center of Civic Education. (Calabasas, Calif.: Center for Civic Education, 1997), p. 1.
democratic future. It will be slow in coming, but the generations, given continued support, will reap the benefits of actions taken now. As one writer for *The New Leader Magazine* wrote, “It will take a substantial amount of time for the former Yugoslavia’s republics to digest the events of the last decade, and to again live, if not as a single country, then at least in mutual respect.”

The key to long-term stability for democracy in Bosnia-Herzegovina is held in the hands of the people. Only they can form a government based on democratic principles, and maintain that state for the future. The people of Bosnia must face those issues of democratic consolidation after the imposed transition that came with the signing of the Dayton Peace Accords. This consolidation is important not only for the people of Bosnia, but for the rest of Europe and the world. As His Holiness Pope John Paul, II, told President Clinton in a meeting, “I have lived through most of this century. I remember that it began with a war in Sarajevo. Mr. President, you must not let it end with a war in Sarajevo.” The end of the century is approaching. And, unlike the beginning, it shall end not with images of war in the Balkans, but with the lasting hope for peace.

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212 Clinton.
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