The Role Of Democratic Peace Theory In Nato's Intervention In Kosovo

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THE ROLE OF DEMOCRATIC PEACE THEORY IN NATO'S INTERVENTION IN KOSOVO

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INTRODUCTION

In 1989, the government of Yugoslavia abolished the autonomy of the southern province of Kosovo and reasserted Serbian direct rule. Shortly after, under the leadership of Ibrahim Rugova, ethnic Albanians in Kosovo began a nonviolent campaign to gain back their autonomy. In 1995, however, the Albanian rebels forming the Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA) resorted to violent means and began to target Serbian police officers. The Serbian government responded to these attacks with a counter-insurgency campaign through the summer of 1998, driving 200,000 civilians from their homes.1 As the aggressions increased on both sides, President of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (FRY) Slobodan Milosevic initiated an ethnic cleansing campaign waged against the ethnic Albanians.

When the violence escalated in Kosovo during 1998, the international community condemned Milosevic and was confronted with pressures to resolve the situation. The United States delegated negotiator Richard Holbrooke to reach a deal with Milosevic, in which the ethnic Albanians would be granted partial autonomy and the violence would end. Eventually, Milosevic consented to monitors from the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) to enter Kosovo and monitor the violence between the two groups. Yet despite the monitors, Serbian aggression continued.

On January 31st the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) authorized air strikes against Serbia if Milosevic did not agree to talks with the

Kosovars. After failed negotiations with Milosevic at Rambouillet outside of Paris, NATO followed through with the ultimatum to issue air strikes against the Serbian government. On March 24, 1999, NATO began its air campaign against Serbia. The air strikes lasted for 78 days, in which Milosevic finally ceded under NATO attack.  

NATO’s intervention in the FRY has been called everything from an altruistic, humanitarian intervention to unprovoked aggression toward a sovereign nation. The western states praise NATO for thwarting an ethnic cleansing campaign waged by the Milosevic regime against the defenseless ethnic Albanians. The intervention has been termed as a “humanitarian” intervention, as in taking military offensive action to protect the human rights of the ethnic Albanians, and correct humanitarian wrongs. The western democratic world described the intervention as necessary to uphold democratic values and the rule of law; the western democracies could not advocate ideas of freedom and human rights while witnessing such massive human rights violations in the backyard of Europe. Finally, the western states supported NATO’s intervention with the mindset of “never again.” This position suggests that the western powers will no longer stand by and witness such atrocities similar to what took place during World War II.

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On the other hand, NATO has been portrayed as the bully in the war, engaging in an unprovoked assault on a nation that did not threaten the borders of any one of the NATO states.\textsuperscript{5} NATO was criticized for intervening in the domestic affairs of a sovereign nation-state without the United Nation’s authorization, a direct violation of UN Charter Law stated in Chapter 8, Article 53.\textsuperscript{6} These criticisms stem primarily from Russia, China, and India.\textsuperscript{7}

Other critics of the intervention debated whether NATO intervened to save face. NATO had threatened Milosevic so often during the Bosnian crisis and with Kosovo that “it was ultimately compelled to act upon its own threats or face irrelevance.”\textsuperscript{8} Others scholars questioned whether the NATO states intervened in Kosovo to secure strategic interests.\textsuperscript{9} The argument has been stretched to suggest that NATO’s intervention was American imperialism masked in humanitarian terms.\textsuperscript{10} Slavoj Zizek notes the two-sidedness of NATO’s intervention:

If we look at the situation in a certain way, we see the international community enforcing minimal human rights standards on a nationalist neo-Communist leader engaged in ethnic cleansing, ready to ruin his own nation just to retain power. If we shift the focus, we see NATO, the armed hand of the new capitalist global order, defending the strategic interests of the capital in the guise of a disgusting travesty, posing as a disinterested enforcer of human rights, attaching a sovereign country which acts as an obstacle to the unbridled assertion of the New World Order.\textsuperscript{11}

Whether NATO was legally justified in intervening in Kosovo or not under international law, NATO’s motivation for intervention has been fodder for debate. Since the beginning of the NATO air strikes, scholars questioned whether there was a reason beyond the argument that NATO intervened entirely for humanitarian purposes. If this was truly the case that the U.S. and NATO were taking a stand against ethnic cleansing and the murder of innocent people, then “why the utter indifference and silence to the teacup civil wars, far more deadly, brutal and enduring raging in Sierra Leone, Congo, Sudan, Sri Lanka,” Rwanda, East Timor, and elsewhere?12

The issues the critics have raised compel us to look deeper into NATO’s justification for intervention in Kosovo. On April 23, 1999, NATO issued a statement declaring that the purpose of the intervention was the “immediate ending of violence and repression in Kosovo.”13 Beyond this, the Secretary-General of NATO Javier Solana stated that NATO acted to prevent a wider war and the spread of violence into the neighboring states. Solana stated, “The destabilization caused by Milosevic’s security forces constituted a threat to the entire region. We knew it would not be the first time that a regional crisis in the Balkans turned into something far bigger and nastier.”14 Thus, NATO’s motivation for intervention is a synthesis of securing moral values and strategic interests.

NATO’s rationale for intervention in Kosovo based on the grounds of moral values and strategic interests challenges what is called the normal rules of war. David Fromkin argues that in the traditional view of international relations, countries “should go to war only to defend vital interests.” Vital interests include defending against attack and defending the country’s livelihood (such as oil supplies). As the NATO states were not threatened with attack or in need of defending their vital goods, the Kosovo intervention represents “a new kind of approach to the use of power in world politics.” That is to say, with the threat of the Soviet Union gone in the post-Cold War era, the US is “now free to indulge in backing up [its] ideals and sympathies with cruise missiles.”

Democratic peace theory offers a theoretical framework that incorporates the motives of moral values and strategic interests into one unified theory. Democratic peace theory holds that liberal democracies are peaceful in their relations with other liberal democracies. Advocates of democratic peace assert that as liberal democracies increase in number, the zone of peace will extend across the globe. On the other hand, the theory also suggests that liberal democracies tend to be hostile in their relations with illiberal states. As such, democratic peace theory proposes that liberal states are tempted to engage in moral crusades to protect their values and to extend the zone of peace.

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16 ibid. p. 166.
17 ibid. p. 164.
18 ibid. p. 164.
19 Note that liberal democracies are defined as republican governments that subscribe to liberal values of freedom and equality, in which the executive and legislative branches are separated. Illiberal regimes tend to be authoritarian where power and decision-making are concentrated in the hands of a few or one.
NATO's intervention in Kosovo can be viewed as an example of this "temptation to engage." That is to say, NATO's rationale for intervening in Kosovo is rooted in the tenets of democratic peace theory. In this example, the Western powers viewed the FRY as an illiberal state and were therefore inclined to act with hostility toward Yugoslavia in an attempt to liberate the Kosovars from the oppressive regime.

In an effort to understand democratic peace theory I will explore its origin in Immanuel Kant's essay on "Perpetual Peace." Secondly, I explain how democratic peace theory has been incorporated into American foreign policy. I will explore how the tenets of democratic peace gave rise to a policy of enlargement and engagement in the Clinton administration. Finally, I will discuss how this foreign policy directed NATO's intervention in the FRY.

By understanding the ideas behind NATO's rationale for intervention in Kosovo, I hope to understand the true nature of its intervention. This, I hope, will give insight into the changing rules of war and whether interventions for humanitarian purposes will be likely in the post-Cold War era. Also by understanding the criteria that determined the grounds for intervention in Kosovo, I hope to answer why the U.S. and NATO chose to intervene in Kosovo and not in countries such as Sierra Leone or East Timor.
CHAPTER I

DEMOCRATIC PEACE THEORY AND ITS CRITICS

Immanuel Kant's essay "Perpetual Peace" provides the basis of
democratic peace theory by proposing that there are peaceful relations between
liberal states.\(^1\) Kant purported that perpetual peace is guaranteed through the
creation of a pacific union of liberal states. Kant held that the internal structures
of republican states and the international system explain the tendency of liberal
states to form such a union and maintain peaceful relations with each other. Kant
also maintained that the desire to expand the pacific union would in turn create a
tendency for states to be hostile in their relations with illiberal states.

Kant held a realistic perspective that the natural state of affairs among
nation-states is anarchic. Kant argued, "This does not always mean open
hostilities, but at least an unceasing threat of war."\(^2\) As there is always this
possibility of war between states, peace among nation-states does not naturally
exist. Thus, "in order to be secured against hostility it is not sufficient that
hostilities simply be not committed . . . unless . . . security is pledged to each by
his neighbor, each may treat his neighbor, from who he demands this security as
an enemy."\(^3\) Therefore, Kant maintained that in order for a state of peace to exist
it must be established; states must cooperate and pledge security to other states.

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\(^1\) Kant wrote "Perpetual Peace" in 1795 in the form of a hypothetical peace treaty between nations. Writing at the time of the Napoleonic wars, Kant discussed what conditions were necessary to end all wars and create a lasting peace.


\(^3\) ibid. p. 276.
Kant held that a perpetual peace is established by the acceptance of three definitive articles of peace and the widening of the pacific union. First, states will accept the republican form of government. Second, the republican states will be peaceful toward other liberal states and enter into a federation of free states. Third, liberal republican states will develop a system of cosmopolitan law. Kant’s first article asserted that the only civil constitution of a state that will yield perpetual peace is that of liberal republicanism. When Kant uses the term republicanism, he specifically is referring to a civil constitution of a state in which the executive power is separated from the legislative. By definition, monarchies could be considered republics; therefore, it is important to note that Kant was speaking specifically of states consisting of liberal institutions.

Kant suggested that the liberal republican constitution is the only constitution that is fitting to the rights of man. Certain conditions within liberal states allow for peace within states and between states. Kant explained that liberal republican states are based on principles of freedom and equality. Establishing civil freedom within a constitution allows for “the public use of one’s reason,” which facilitates peace as it creates an enlightened public. Such enlightened decision-making will perpetuate peace because if given the choice, the public looks for peaceful solutions to conflicts as opposed to going to war. As the citizenry would have to suffer the costs of war and repair their country after the war, the people most often would be reluctant to go to war.

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4 ibid. p. 279.  
5 ibid. p. 279.  
6 ibid. p. 264.  
7 ibid. p. 278.
Also, the competing ideas inherent in liberal republics allow for peace to be established between citizenry and government and citizen-to-citizen. Within liberal republics, the people often check the actions of the governments through elections and judicial systems. Thus, as leaders are not able to get away with abuse of the public, peace ensues in the government’s relationship with its citizenry. Also, the practice of open debate and compromise in liberal states inhibit man’s natural inclination to conflict with others. Kant explained, “Whereby the powers of each selfish inclination are so arranged in opposition that one moderates or destroys the ruinous effect of the other.” ⁸ Therefore, the structures of checks and balances within democracies as well as the democratic norms of fair competition establish peace within a state.

Kant’s second definitive article asserted that the structure and norms of liberal republics are externalized in their relations with other states. Kant held that states would establish peace within a federation of free states in order to maintain the rights of each state. As stated above, the natural relation of states is one of anarchy and tendency toward war. Within the anarchic system of states, states can secure their territory and rights by means of war or cooperation with other nations. Kant argued that free states would associate themselves with other free states in order to secure their freedom and protect their sovereignty. ⁹ This association of free states is developed into a federation of states. Similar to a

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⁸ ibid. p. 291.
⁹ ibid. p. 282.
social contract among individuals, once a compact of states is established, the states will develop a system of international law.10

However, Kant distinguished this compact among nations from civil compacts that form individual states. Within a social contract, individuals give up certain rights to secure the majority of others. Yet in the federation of states Kant described, he asserted that no state should give up its rights, rather states are to maintain their freedom. The federation, once established, does not act as a world state nor hold power over the individual states. The power of each state in the federation extends “only to the maintenance and security of the freedom of the state itself and the other states in the league with it.”11 Also, Kant explained that no one state shall dominate the federation of states. Although hegemony may promote peace and eradicate the anarchic system by asserting an order within the relations of nation-states, a hegemonic system is less desirable than the anarchic system because it would ultimately create “one universal monarchy.”12 Thus, states will chose to enter into a pacific union in order to maintain sovereignty and freedom.

Kant maintained that an association of free republics is the only means of obtaining a lasting peace. As discussed above, the cooperation of free states into a federation is the only means by which a liberal state can secure its freedom in the anarchic system. Therefore, free states will tend to promote cooperation and pacifism with other free states in order to create such associations. As more and

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10 ibid. p. 283.
12 ibid. p. 292.
more associations of free states develop, the federation may be “gradually extended,” thus extending the zone of peace.\textsuperscript{13}

Kant’s third definitive article establishes a cosmopolitan law that is based upon the notion of universal hospitality. Kant explained that hospitality means that a person has a right to not be treated as an enemy in the territory of another state.\textsuperscript{14} Thus, Kant asserted the liberal value of tolerance toward others. Further, Kant proposed that the federation of free states allows for the maintenance of universal human rights. Shared values between states would create a sentiment of world citizenship in which “a violation of rights in one place is felt throughout the world.” This idea of world citizenship, Kant argued, “is a supplement to the unwritten code of the civil and international law, indispensable for the maintenance of the public human rights and hence also of perpetual peace.”\textsuperscript{15} Thus, the pacific union is necessary to maintain universal human rights and establish a cosmopolitan law.

However, on the other side, the same reasons that drive liberal republics to establish a federation of free states will also drive these states to be hostile in their relations with illiberal states. Kant suggested that a liberal state will be tempted to establish liberal republican constitutions through coercive means rather than allowing a nation to establish a constitution based on principles of freedom through its own reason.\textsuperscript{16} A liberal state will practice three sophisms to accomplish this end. First, the liberal state will “seize every favorable

\begin{footnotes}
\item13 ibid. p. 283.
\item14 ibid. p. 284.
\item15 ibid. p. 286.
\item16 ibid. p. 300.
\end{footnotes}
opportunity for usurping the right of the [illiberal] state over its own people or over a neighboring people."\(^{17}\) Secondly, a liberal state will justify the use of force in order to protect against the possibility that the illiberal state would have attempted to conquer the liberal state if that state were not met by force. Finally, Kant asserted that with foreign states, "it is a pretty safe means to sow discord among them so that, by seeming to protect the weaker, you can conquer them one after another."\(^{18}\)

Kant held that such coercive means to force liberalism on illiberal states are not necessary to establish perpetual peace. Kant purported that perpetual peace is guaranteed by human passions; the mechanism of nature will incline man to establish peace. The state of nature is one of war, in which man will form social contracts to protect himself. Man's selfish inclinations will drive him to cooperate with his fellow man and form a social contract. Through reason, man will eventually arrive at the understanding that a liberal republican contract will best secure his rights to freedom and equality. Kant maintained that man should only come to this conclusion through his own reason, not by force.\(^{19}\)

Further, states will unite in cooperation due to mutual interests. Kant argued, "the spirit of commerce, which is incompatible with war, sooner or later gains the upper hand in every state."\(^{20}\) As states become more involved in trade with one another, "states see themselves forced, without any moral urge, to

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\(^{17}\) ibid. p. 300.  
\(^{18}\) ibid. p. 300.  
\(^{19}\) ibid. p. 300.  
\(^{20}\) ibid. p. 293.
promote honorable peace and by mediation to prevent war wherever it threatens to break out.”

Moreover, as discussed above, liberal governments will come to realize that in order to protect their free nations that it is necessary to cooperate with other free states and form the pacific union. The drive to cooperate will lead to a habit of cooperation, which will deepen international law. Kant stated, “this is because it is the universal will given *a priori* (in a nation or in the relations among different nations) which determines the law among men, and if practice consistently follows it, this will can also, by the mechanism of nature, cause the desired result and make the concept of law effective.” Beyond the federation of free states, Kant proposed that certain criteria are necessary for international order: first, states must dismantle standing armies; second, states must agree not the intervene in the domestic affairs of another state; and third, states must renounce the right to engage in punitive wars with other states.

Therefore, despite the temptation to engage in a moral crusade to expand the zone of peace, Kant advocated that liberal republics take on a more passive, exemplary approach to securing this peace abroad. As nature will compel states through their own reason to establish liberal republics, Kant suggested that liberal states should stand back and let nature take its course. Kant was realistic in that he did not expect the pacific union to form overnight. He argued that it was

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21 ibid. p. 293.
22 ibid. p. 303.
23 ibid. pp. 273-274.
through slow progress that more and more states would form liberal republics and maintain peaceful relations with each other.24

Theoretical Models of Democratic Peace

Although Kant was writing in 1795, his insights into the peaceful relations between liberal democracies extend far beyond his lifetime. Modern liberal democracies have not engaged in any major wars with each other. Supporters of Democratic Peace Theory assert that a “separate peace” exists among liberal states.25 Accordingly, they argue that realist interpretations of balance of power and insecurity of states does little to explain the peace that exists between liberal states.26 Supporters of the democratic peace position suggest theoretical models and have tested empirical data in order to explain the peace that has existed among democracies.

Democratic peace can be explained through normative and structural models.27 The normative model suggests that democratic norms within states lead to a spirit of cooperation and compromise with other liberal states. As fair competition and compromise are inherent in democracies, democratic states externalize these internal practices in their relations with other liberal democracies.28 If there is a dispute between two democratic states, they will often cooperate and reach a compromise before resulting to illiberal means.

24 ibid. p. 304.
26 ibid. p. 218.
28 ibid. p. 626.
Also, within liberal democracies uphold certain rights such as freedom from arbitrary authority, protection and promotion of freedom, and democratic participation. Supporter of democratic peace theory Michael Doyle writes, “as republics emerge and as culture progresses, an understanding of the legitimate rights of all citizens and of all republics comes into play; and this, now that caution characterizes policy, sets up the moral foundations for the liberal peace.” Recognizing the rights of other states and their democratic rights creates a “mutual respect” between liberal democracies that accounts for the pacific interactions. Doyle adds that this spirit of cooperation can also stem from cooperation in trade and commerce. If two liberal states are trading partners and are faced with a conflict, they will often resolve the conflict through peaceful means rather than disrupt the trade partnership.

The structural model implies that the domestic restraints inherent in democracies restrict leaders’ ability to mobilize the public for war. Zeez Moaz and Bruce Russet contend that due to “the complexity of the democratic process and the requirement of securing a broad base of support for risky policies, democratic leaders are reluctant to wage wars, except in cases wherein war seems a necessity or when the war aims are seen as justifying the cost.” Domestically, officials are restrained by the public. They not only are accountable to the principles they profess and the principles of democracy, they also must serve the

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31 ibid. p. 1161.
32 ibid. p. 1161.
public’s interest. This could limit their decision to engage in war with another liberal state and inhibit their ability to mobilize the public for war.

Moaz and Russett suggest other factors that may explain the democratic peace. Another potential factor in democratic peace is that rich states will be reluctant to go to war because they are most often involved in trade with each other. This factor reflects Doyle’s insight into cooperation between trading states. Other factors include economic growth and the alliance that has existed since the Second World War.

Another supporter of democratic peace, John M. Owen recognizes problems within the two models of democratic peace theory and attempts to remedy them. Owen contends that democratic structures rather than preventing liberal states from going to war can drive states to war with other states. He writes, “cabinets, legislatures, and publics were often more belligerent than the government heads they were supposed to constrain.” In relation to the normative model, Owen argues that there is a lack of consideration on perception. How a liberal state will relate to another state depends on whether that liberal state perceives the other state as liberal or illiberal. Owen notes that liberal theory causes liberal states to divide the world into two camps, liberal and illiberal nations. Thus, Owen emphasizes the importance of perception in relations between liberal states.

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34 ibid. p. 626.
35 ibid. pp. 626-627.
37 ibid. p. 91.
38 ibid. p. 95.
Furthermore, Owen contends that liberal ideology and democratic institutions are the driving force behind a nation’s foreign policy and relations with other liberal states. Liberal states will be suspect of illiberal states as an illiberal state is an adversary to the federation of free states. Owen explains that liberal democracies view illiberal states as unreasonable, unpredictable and potentially dangerous. This is because “illiberal states may seek illiberal ends such as conquest, intolerance, or impoverishment of others.” Also, Owen contends that democracies view illiberal states as suspect because these states are ruled by despots or by “unenlightened citizenry,” or as Doyle puts it, are not constrained by representation. Accordingly, illiberal states are considered unjust because their governments are in a state of aggression with their citizenry. Citizens’ rights are not protected in illiberal governments, as there are no checks on the power of the governments. Thus, Owen offers a model of perception to explain why liberal states are hostile in their relations with illiberal states.

Critics of Democratic Peace Theory

Critics of democratic peace theory attack the normative and structural models as well as the research methods. These critics contend that the two models fall short of explaining how democracies will be peaceful toward each other and yet be war-prone with illiberal states. They contend that realist theory better explains the peace that exists between democracies.
The primary argument against the structural model suggests a flaw in the logic by claiming that democracies will be peaceful because of domestic constraints. If institutional constraints, such as the public paying for the price of war, actually inhibited democracies from engaging in war with other states, then democracies would be peaceful with all states, no matter the regime type.\textsuperscript{42} Christopher Layne maintains that the "sensitivity should be evident when ever their state is on the verge of war, regardless of whether the adversary is democratic: the lives lost and money spent will be the same."\textsuperscript{43} Thus, the critics contend that the checks and balances that deter democracies from fighting with one another does not account for the war-proneness of democracies toward illiberal states.

According to the critics, the normative model must bear the burden of explaining the cause of democratic peace. Layne suggests that for the theory to be valid, the theory "must account powerfully for the fact that serious crises between democratic states ended in near misses rather than in war."\textsuperscript{44} Layne studied four cases in which democracies almost went to war with each other and concluded that realism better explains why democratic states did not enter into war with each other better than democratic peace. Joanne Gowa asserts this position as well. Gowa explains, "the norm-based explanation could be rewritten in terms of the interests of states and the logic of their situations. The interests of states in a peaceful resolution of armed disputes would follow from the relative

\textsuperscript{43} ibid. p. 12.
\textsuperscript{44} ibid. p. 13.
price of that option: bargaining is less costly than war." Layne and Gowa do not view regime type as a cause of the peace between democracies. Rather, they offer that this peace is a condition of realist politics, in which democracies remain peaceful to protect their national interests.

David Spiro and Christopher Layne object to the empirical tests, arguing that wars are so rare and even rarer among democracies that no statistical test can confirm the hypothesis of democratic peace. Spiro holds that although there have not been wars between democracies, the number zero is insignificant. Also, the critics contend that it depends on how analysts define democracies. Spiro gives several accounts of how Moaz and Russett and Doyle have defined the same states as democratic and nondemocratic. Therefore, the critics maintain that if the theory were to truly hold up, definitions would have to be cleared up before the data could be tested.

With these criticisms, the question remains that if the democratic institutions of liberal democracies and the normative practices inhibit democracies from going to war, then how and why do democracies elude these constraining effects and initiate war? The normative and structural models may explain how and why liberal states do not go to war with other liberal states. Also, Owen's model of perception may suggest why liberal states will view illiberal governments as suspect. However all three models fail to explain how and why so-called "peaceful" democracies initiate war with illiberal states.

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48 ibid. p. 55.
To explain why and how democracies may circumvent constraining institutions and norms to initiate war, scholars David A. Lewis, Caroline A. Hartzell, and Charles R. Dannehl performed a study of regime type and justification for war. The scholars looked at liberal and illiberal states and analyzed whether their justification for initiating the use of force fit under the criteria of Just War. Under the Michael Walzer’s Just War Theory, there are three possible justifications for the initiation of the use of force. These include law enforcement, humanitarian intervention, and preemptive strikes. It is understood that a state is justified in going to war if 1) the use of force serves the purpose of maintaining the rights of states and deterring future aggression; 2) the use of force serves the purposes of an oppressed people; or 3) the use of force works to protect the sovereignty or territorial integrity of a state about to be attacked. Thus, in order for a state to claim it has a just cause for going to war, it must be able to identify one of the three criteria as a prerequisite for the use of force.

After performing the study, Lewis, Hartzell, and Dannehl created a theoretical framework that links democracy, just cause, and war initiation. The scholars found that democracies will initiate war when there is a just cause for war. Correlating to the normative and structural models of democratic peace theory, the scholars arrived at two assumptions of just cause. In relation to

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50 ibid. p. 5.
51 ibid. p. 5.
democratic norms as a constraint against the use of force, Lewis, Hartzell, and Dannehl contend:

Although democratic norms generally tend to rule out violence as a means to achieve policy objectives, a just cause brings countervailing norms to bear on democratic decision-makers: the right to aid a victim of aggression, the right to self-defense, or a humanitarian impulse. In such circumstances, these “competing” norms may have the effect of diminishing the salience of nonviolent compromise, and a resort to arms may then be considered a legitimate policy option.52

Secondly, in relation to the structural checks and balances within democracies, the scholars maintain, “crises that meet just cause criteria lower the institutional costs faced by democratic leaders considering initiating the use of force.”53 Therefore, a just cause may not necessarily compel democracies to initiate war, but it can diminish the constraining effects of the democratic norms and structure that deter democracies from waging war.54

According to Gabriel Negretto, Kant would not support the doctrine of humanitarian intervention, or just wars. Negretto writes, “Kant believed that peace could not be attained until statesman abandoned the idea of just wars that entitle a party to wage a punitive war against a wrongdoer.”55 Therefore, Kant maintained that defensive war is the only kind of war that is acceptable. Besides defensive wars, nations would have to “agree to renounce any kind of war of aggression” in order to establish a peaceful international order.56

52 ibid. p. 13.
In an attempt to protect against illiberal states, as Kant suggested, liberal democracies will be tempted to spread democracy throughout the globe and thus expand the zone of peace. There are two general methods of how to achieve this end, which divides policy makers into two camps. One approach is to stay out of the affairs of other nations and cheer history along from the sidelines.\(^57\) With this, nations can encourage democracy by setting a primary example for other nations to replicate. This is the path Kant supported as he argued that nature would eventually compel states to form liberal republicans. The second camp can be referred to as “Crusaders.”\(^58\) Within this approach, policy makers “are more optimistic about the possibility of shaping political development elsewhere are more willing to bear costs in the attempt. They think that [a nation] should step in and give history a push.”\(^59\) In modern day, liberal democracies will “use foreign aid to encourage other states to develop or to maintain liberal governmental forms.” In addition, “the more powerful ones also attempt to discourage the destabilizing regional expansion policies of other states through alliance balancing, threats, bribes, appeasement, and coercion.”\(^60\) Kant warned against this approach.

Democratic peace theory informs foreign policy, but it does not give specific guidelines for action. The tenets of democratic peace theory validate a framework from which policy makers can reason policy paths. However, when

\(^58\) ibid. p. 186.
\(^59\) ibid. p. 186.
met with the realities of the modern world, policy makers must incorporate other factors into determining what action to take in order to expand the zone of peace.
CHAPTER II
THE CLINTON ADMINISTRATION AND THE ADOPTION OF
DEMOCRATIC PEACE THEORY

From the discussion above there are two distinct paths states can pursue to expand the zone of peace: either states can be exemplary and pacific, or states can be active and coercive. This division gives rise to different foreign policy approaches within liberal democracies that includes humanitarian intervention.

After World War I, President Woodrow Wilson was concerned with creating a system of international collective security that would confront conflict before it escalated into a full war.\(^1\) Wilson strongly believed in the notion that democracies do not go to war with each other.\(^2\) Therefore, Wilson argued that World War I was fought to make the world safe for democracy, and in turn democracy could make the world safe.\(^3\) Wilson's idea of internationalism was grounded in the value of freedom and the belief that states had a right to self-determination.\(^4\) He argued that conflicts between states could be minimized through international law and international institutions in which the democratic procedure could be applied at the international level.\(^5\) Therefore, after World War I Wilson attempted to create a League of Nations that would solve international disputes through collective security.

\(^2\) Ikenberry, G. J. (1999). Why export democracy?; the 'hidden grand strategy' of American foreign policy is reemerging into plain view after a long Cold War hibernation. The Wilson Quarterly, 23, p. 56.
\(^4\) Ikenberry, G. J. (1999). p. 56.
Wilson’s proposals for American foreign policy challenged the traditional realist perspectives of balance of power and the idea that states only go to war to secure their national interests. Wilson believed these two perspectives were immoral because he thought that this mindset did not give priority to democracy and peace, but rather lead to war. Therefore, Wilson maintained that foreign affairs should uphold “superior ethical standards and the exaltation of moral and spiritual purposes.”

John Ikenberry, professor of political science at the University of Pennsylvania, contends that Wilson’s ideas of internationalism comprise a liberal grand strategy in U.S. foreign policy. According to Ikenberry, the liberal grand strategy in the U.S. consists of five elements: 1) the amity of democracies, 2) free trade, free countries, 3) the importance of interdependence, 4) international institutions, and 5) the value of community. The grand strategy proposes that democratic processes and economic openness at the international level will serve to extend the zone of peace.

Ikenberry notes that the grand strategy lost credit after Wilson’s failure with the League of Nations. However, at the end of World War II, the U.S. under President Truman reasserted Wilsonian internationalism by striving for “economic openness, political reciprocity, and the management of conflicts in new multinational institutions.” After World War II, president Truman pursued liberal policies in relation to Germany, Japan, and Europe. The Marshall Plan was

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6 ibid. p. 74.
9 ibid. p. 56.
designed to create economic stability in Europe, which would allow for the conditions of democracy to take root. In deciding what to do with Germany and Japan, the U.S. attempted to democratize these nations and pull them into the alliance with the western democracies. This policy was grounded in the idea that democracies are peaceful with each other; a democratic Germany and Japan would mean that they would not become threats to the western democracies in the future. Yet, again during the Cold War the strategy was “hidden” as realpolitik and containment dominated U.S. foreign policy.

Now, in the post-Cold War era, Ikenberry purports that the liberal grand strategy is “re-emerging.” Liberal leaders, such as Wilson, Truman, and now Clinton, believe that democracies do not go to war with each other. The reason for the amity of democracies is explained through the structural and normative models of democratic peace. Checks and balances within democratic structures limit the ability of leaders to mobilize for war. Also, externalized norms of cooperation and peaceful conflict resolution compel democratic states to solve conflicts through peaceful means. Further, Ikenberry explains that international institutions limit conflict because “states that agree to participate in such institutions are, in effect, joining a political process that shapes, constrains, and channels their actions.” Finally, a value of community establishes common norms by which nations can look to resolve conflicts peacefully. Therefore, the liberal grand strategy echoes the tenets of democratic peace theory in expressing

10 ibid. p. 57.
11 ibid. p. 57.
12 ibid. p. 57.
13 ibid. p. 57.
14 ibid. p. 58.
that structural constraints and normative practices foster democracy around the
globe.

With the other two elements of free trade and interdependence, liberal
leaders assert that open trade creates economic growth, which in turn fosters
democracy. Economic growth creates the conditions that cultivate the political
culture and political attitudes necessary for democracy.\textsuperscript{15} Only in prosperous
conditions are leaders more likely to “accept defeat peacefully at the polls, secure
in the knowledge that they will have fair opportunities to regain political power,
and opportunities for economic benefit when they are out of power.”\textsuperscript{16} Also,
“economic development creates a rising middle class, with a far greater degree of
immunity to the appeal of class struggle and antidemocratic parties and
ideologies.”\textsuperscript{17} Ikenberry suggests that trade and interdependence creates “mutual
dependencies” and also “socializes” other nations, which extends the zone of
peace. As nations trade with each other, their economies evolve and thus it is in
their interest to continue good relations with those other nations in order to
maintain trade.

With these two elements of the liberal grand strategy there is a greater
emphasis on the role of economics in bringing about democracy and peace than in
democratic peace theory. The element of interdependence coincides with Kant,
Doyle and Moaz and Russett when they proposed that mutual interests in trade
would prompt states to cooperate and maintain peaceful relations with their
trading partners. Yet, the American liberal perspective, according to Ikenberry,

\textsuperscript{15} ibid. p. 57.
\textsuperscript{16} Bolgy, T.J. and Schwarz, J. E. Cited in Ikenberry, G. J. (1999). p. 58.
\textsuperscript{17} Ikenberry, G. J. (1999). p. 57.
proposes that trade not only promotes peace between states, it allows for the conditions for democracy to take root by creating economic growth and stability.

Within the post-Cold War era, the principles of the liberal grand strategy and democratic peace theory are remerging and shaping foreign policy for both liberals and conservatives. The Clinton administration adopted the belief that democracies do no go to war with each other and has incorporated the tenets of democratic peace theory in its foreign policy. The Clinton administration developed of policy of “enlargement and engagement,” in which Clinton advocated expanding the zone of peace by fostering democracy around the globe.

During Clinton’s campaign for presidency he outlined his foreign policy objectives: “updating and restructuring American military and security capabilities, elevating the role of economics in international affairs, and promoting democracy abroad.” However, in his first term Clinton focused primarily on his domestic policy; his foreign policy staff were instructed to keep international issues away from him so he could concentrate on domestic issues.

Although Clinton was more centrist, his foreign policy team’s position was described as “pragmatic neo-Wilsonianism.” Clinton’s foreign policy staff consisted of Secretary of State Warren Christopher, who served as Deputy Secretary of State in the Carter administration; Secretary of Defense Les Aspin; Deputy Secretary of State Strobe Talbott, a past classmate of Clinton’s at Oxford;

\[18\] ibid. p. 57.
\[20\] Hyland, W. G. (1999). A world of troubles: the real test for the Clinton administration has been its relationships with the great centers of power: Russia, Europe, China, and Japan. World and I, 14, p. 46.
\[21\] ibid. p. 46.
National Security Advisor Anthony Lake, who was the state department’s Policy Planning Staff in the Carter administration; and UN ambassador Madeline Albright, a Jewish refugee from Czechoslovakia.  

When Clinton took office he inherited the immediate issues of Bosnia, Somalia, and Haiti from the Bush administration. Initially, the Clinton administration was accused of lacking vision in its foreign policy.  

Conservatives criticized that:  

In the absence of a grand design, [Clinton had] fallen into the reactive practice of Band-Aid diplomacy: improvising policy at each flash point, proposing half-remedies to intractable situations and using nonaction as a form of action—all to protect U.S. strategic interests abroad and Clinton’s personal popularity at home.  

Critics argued that his lack of vision in his foreign policy was what caused him to blunder in Bosnia, Somalia, and Haiti.  Although Clinton had a reasonable approach to Bosnia of lifting the arms embargo and threatening air strikes, he pursued this policy “with an air of hesitation and reluctance, and in the face of European resistance, Clinton retreated.” In Somalia, Clinton “allowed the mission of American forces to shift from humanitarian assistance to “nation building,” which inevitably led to armed clashes with the various Somali factions and eventually to American casualties.” In Haiti, the administration retreated from military confrontation with the Haitian dictators.

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26 ibid. p. 46.  
27 ibid. p. 46.  
28 ibid. p. 46.

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It was in the middle of this confusion that President Clinton asked Anthony Lake to organize a study group and devise a “single word or slogan” policy that would include the three policies Clinton advocated during his campaign. Lake was looking for a “blueprint for America’s post-Cold war foreign policy” that would fuse neo-Wilsonian principles with pragmatism. The Clinton administration settled on the phrase “enlargement and engagement.” The intent of enlargement was to enlarge the democratic blue blobs contrary to the American Cold War policy of containment in which the purpose was to contain the communist red blobs on the world map. The changing threats to the security of the U.S. during the post-Cold War era necessitated a change in foreign policy. Lake noted that threats to America included “terrorism, proliferating weapons of mass destruction, ethnic conflicts and the degradation of our global environment[... sluggish economic growth.”

The Clinton administration advocated the tenets of democratic peace theory to explain the rationale behind the policy of enlargement. National Security Advisor Anthony Lake outlined the objectives of Clinton’s foreign policy in a speech delivered at the School of Advanced International Studies of the Johns Hopkins University. In this speech, Lake acknowledged the tendency of democratic nations to be peaceful toward each other and argued that it is within the US interest to promote democracy overseas. Lake maintained, “our own

30 ibid. p. 111.
security is shaped by the character of foreign regimes.” Lake explained, “the addition of new democracies makes us more secure because democracies tend not to wage war on each other or sponsor terrorism. They are more trustworthy in diplomacy and do a better job of respecting the human rights of their people.”

With this policy of enlargement and engagement, Lake suggested that the policy incorporated the nation’s values and interests and required that the U.S. take on a leadership role in world affairs. Lake asserted, “Our interests and ideals compel us not only to be engaged, but to lead.” Lake outlined four objectives under this strategy for engagement and enlargement, which mirrored the objectives of the liberal grand strategy and the tenets of democratic peace theory:

First, we should strengthen the community of major market democracies.

Second, we should help foster and consolidate new democracies and market economies, where possible, especially in the states of special significance and opportunity.

Third, we must counter the aggression—and support the liberalization—of states hostile to democracy and markets.

Fourth, we need to pursue our humanitarian agenda not only by providing aid, but also by working to help democracy and market economies take root in regions of greatest humanitarian concern.

With the first objective, the Clinton administration planned to strengthen relations with the U.S.'s democratic allies in Europe, Japan, and Canada. Under this, the Clinton administration pursued the policy of NATO expansion in order to

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33 ibid. p. 15.  
34 ibid. p. 15.  
36 ibid. p. 15.  
37 ibid. p. 15.  
38 ibid. p. 15.
bring more European states under the transatlantic alliance. This, the Clinton administration held, would broaden the zone of peace within Europe.

Also, with this first objective, the Clinton administration purported the idea that market economies and the development of democracy go hand in hand. In his speech, Lake asserted that the processes of democracy and market economies strengthen each other. Lake stated, “Democracy alone can produce justice, but not the material goods necessary for individuals to thrive; markets alone can expand wealth, but not that sense of justice without which civilized societies perish.”

Following this logic, the Clinton administration planned to strengthen economic ties with their democratic allies and enact the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) with its neighbors.

The second objective of engagement and enlargement echoed the tenets of democratic peace theory. Lake discussed how it was an imperative to expand democracy and markets to those areas with the strongest security concerns and where the U.S. efforts can be effective. Lake maintained that this was “not a democratic crusade; it is a pragmatic commitment to see freedom take hold where that will help us most.”

Underlying this statement was the idea that democracies are peaceful in their relations with each other. If the U.S. wanted to be secure, then it needed to foster democracy and markets in places of the greatest security concern. According to Lake, the areas of great security concern included the new democracies of Central and Eastern Europe, Russia, and countries in the Asian Pacific area.
Lake's discussion of the third objective exemplifies how liberal democracies view illiberal states. Lake argued, "democracy and market economies have always been subversive ideas to those who rule without consent." States that fall under this category are states with strong centralized power or with lawless dictators. Lake argued that centralized power "not only wields tools of state power such as military force, political imprisonment and torture, but also exploits the intolerant energies of racism, ethnic prejudice, religious persecution, xenophobia, and irredentism." Lake called such states as Iran and Iraq "backlash" states. He explained that these "states are more likely to sponsor terrorism and traffic in weapons of mass destruction and ballistic missile technologies. They are more likely to suppress their own people, foment ethnic rivalries and threaten their neighbors." Lake asserted, "When the actions of such [illiberal] states directly threaten our people, our forces, or our vital interests, we clearly must be prepared to strike back decisively and unilaterally."

Lake argued for the humanitarian agenda with the idea that the U.S.'s efforts could stimulate democracies and market economies around the globe. These efforts included "economic and military assistance, disaster relief, and projects to assist education, nutrition and health." In deciding where such military assistance will be given, Lake listed certain criteria. Lake noted that the U.S. must consider "cost; feasibility; the permanence of the improvement our

41 ibid. p. 17.  
42 ibid. p. 17.  
43 ibid. p. 17.  
44 ibid. p. 17.  
45 ibid. p. 17.  
46 ibid. p. 18.  
47 ibid. p. 18.
assistance will bring; the willingness of regional and international bodies to do their part; and the likelihood that our actions will generate broader security benefits for the people and the region in question.48 Lake argued that the U.S. must use its military leadership to pursue national objectives, yet only when "reasonable risks" are involved.49

Lake asserted that with the criteria there would not be many situations that will justify U.S. "military intervention."50 However, with the stipulation of "where we can make a difference," Lake argued that the US “should not oppose using our military forces for humanitarian purposes simply because these missions do not resemble major wars for control of territory."51 In determining whether to intervene and whether to act unilaterally or multilaterally, Lake noted that the U.S. would go on a case-by-case basis. Lake asserted, "We should act multilaterally where doing so advances our interests—and we should act unilaterally when that will serve our purpose."52 Lake argued, "We should be principled about our purposes but pragmatic about our means."53

President Clinton embraced and strongly promoted the policy of enlargement engagement. Within the post-Cold War era, emerging democracies and transitional states presented “much promise and trouble.” National Security Affairs Deputy Assistant Nancy E. Soderberg argued that the changing world

48 ibid. p. 18.
49 ibid. p. 18.
50 ibid. p. 18.
51 ibid. p. 18.
52 ibid. p. 19.
53 ibid. p. 19.
presented “new responsibilities and opportunities” for the U.S. government.\textsuperscript{54} These responsibilities included promoting peace, strengthening democracy, preventing conflicts and alleviating crises. Clinton explained, “We have a chance, a chance to create conditions of greater peace and prosperity and hopefully more lasting peace and prosperity, but only if the world’s leading nations stay actively engaged in the effort.”\textsuperscript{55} The Clinton administration planned to pursue more humanitarian goals with this foreign policy. In a speech to NATO forces in Macedonia, President Clinton remarked,

\begin{quote}
Whether you live in Africa or Central Europe or any other place, if somebody comes after innocent civilians and tries to kill them \textit{en masse} because of their race, their ethnic background, or their religion, and it’s within our power to stop it, we will stop it.\textsuperscript{56}
\end{quote}

Thus, the criteria of whether intervention would advance American interests and ideals included situations of mass human rights abuses and other atrocities that challenged the values of freedom and self-determination. However, President Clinton added, “America cannot solve every problem and must not become the world’s policeman. But we do have an obligation to join with others to do what we can to relieve suffering and restore peace.”\textsuperscript{57} Therefore, Clinton implied that there was a limit to this policy of engagement and enlargement. In deciding when and where to implement these policies, Soderberg suggested that the U.S. should ask: 1) Will our efforts advance American interests and ideals? 2)

\begin{thebibliography}{99}
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Will they be successful? 3) Are they a good use of our limited resources? 4) How do our interests compare to the costs and risks?  

Therefore, within its first term, the Clinton administration started off slowly and unsure of itself in foreign affairs. Yet, by the end of the term, the administration appeared more confident in pursuing its policy of enlargement and engagement. Also, the administration began to develop criteria for determining what kind of approach to take for each category of state. As for those humanitarian crises similar to Bosnia, the administration began to develop criteria to decide when and where to respond to such crises.

During the second term, it became apparent that Clinton planned to continue this policy and further define it. This implied that President Clinton was not looking to innovate his foreign policy, but rather looking for more consistent and stronger implementation of the existing policy. The new foreign policy staff included Madeleine Albright as Secretary of State, William Cohen as Secretary of Defense, and Samuel (Sandy) Berger as National Security Advisor.

The new staff continued to pursue the four objectives Lake asserted in his 1993 speech. Secretary of State Albright suggested a hierarchy of engagement strategies based on the level of democratization and economic development of states. The foreign policy strategies ranged from pacific relations of trade to military intervention. She stated, “We must skillfully use every available foreign policy tool, from the mildest demarche to the use of force. . . . [W]e must

60 ibid. p. 48.
recognize and capitalize on the linkages between democracy, stability, and economic growth."^{61}

Whether or not the US would intervene or engage in a state depended upon the political status of the state. Madeleine Albright explained:

If our dynamic world were to stop for a snapshot today, it would be possible, very generally and imperfectly, to discern four basic categories of countries: full members of the international system; those in transition, seeking to participate more fully; those too weak, poor, or mired in conflict to participate in a meaningful way; and those that reject the very rules and precepts upon which the system is based.\textsuperscript{62}

In relation to each category, Albright outlined the administration’s strategy to pursue its foreign policy objectives. With the first category, Albright explained that the administration’s policy was to strengthen relations with these countries that share common interests. Albright maintained, “this serves America by contributing to stability, fostering vibrant economic relations and having partners available to respond to regional and global problems.”\textsuperscript{63} In terms of countries that are emerging democracies, Albright suggested that “we must fortify the international system by helping transitional or otherwise troubled states become full participants.” She explained:

We are encouraging rivals in areas such as the Middle East and South Asia to settle their differences peacefully. We are helping our friends in central Europe and the newly independent states of the former Soviet Union navigate financial minefields, fend off criminals, rebut communist backsliders, and position their societies for entry into key regional institutions.\textsuperscript{64}

\textsuperscript{62} ibid. p. 50.
\textsuperscript{63} ibid. p. 50.
\textsuperscript{64} ibid. p. 50.
For those countries that were poor or plagued with conflict, Albright advocated, "we must give a boost to weaker states that are most willing to help themselves." The administration planned to use economic and humanitarian aid to achieve this end. Finally, in relation to illiberal states, Albright argued, "we must repel threats to the system of laws and relationships that affect the security of all nations." Strobe Talbott asserted that "a regime that relies on force in dealing with its own people is predisposed to commit aggression against its neighbors, and that may require the military intervention of the United States."

Again, the policy strategies suggested that the U.S. should not intervene in just any nation for humanitarian purposes, but rather only in those states where the possibility of democracy was most likely. Talbott contended, "While the idea of democracy is potentially viable everywhere, the process of democratization is long and hard, especially for countries where political progress is hostage to economic disadvantage." Douglas Brinkley outlined what conditions would need to be in place for the U.S. to pursue its policy of engagement. He argued, "as for the emerging democracies, Clinton believed that if they developed consumer-oriented middle classes with the desired appetites for American products, peace and prosperity could become a reality."

Relations with countries with bright economic futures such as Mexico and South Korea would then be placed on the front burner in his administration; poor, blighted nations, particularly in sub-Saharan Africa and Central America, would receive back-burner

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65 ibid. p. 50.
66 ibid. p. 50.
attention, at best. Only when the international clamor for humanitarian aid rang too loudly to ignore would the administration focus on other nations.\textsuperscript{70}

Thus, the Clinton administration solidified criteria determining when and where the U.S. should intervene in another nation in order to protect American interests and values. In order for the U.S. to intervene in another country, the situation would have to meet the following criteria:

1) There must be moral justification for intervention;
2) The location of the situation would have to be strategically located;
3) If the U.S. efforts could be effective and there was a chance for democracy to develop;
4) If the intervention presented little risk to the U.S.

If the U.S. were confronted with a humanitarian crisis that threatened U.S. values and interests, it would have to pass the checklist in order for the U.S. to intervene. The possibility of intervention would depend on where the state was located. States in key regional areas, such as Eastern Europe, would be candidates for intervention if there were moral justification to intervene. States such as Sierra Leone or East Timor would not fit the criteria. These states would most likely fall into the third category of weak, poor nations that Albright outlined. If a state were poor, then the U.S. would most likely not intervene but rather would use methods such as humanitarian or economic aid. Finally, the US would intervene in states where there were minimal military and political risks involved. After the lessons learned from Somalia, the U.S. was not likely to intervene in a state in

\textsuperscript{70} ibid. p. 112.
Sub-Saharan Africa. Also, The US was not likely to intervene in China or Russia to promote human rights or secure peace in Chechnya.

The requirement of moral justification (criteria one) is reminiscent of Kant’s argument concerning a temptation to engage in a moral crusade. In criteria two and three there are elements of the realist perspective. By limiting intervention to only those areas that are strategically located, the Clinton Administration followed the traditional realist view that asserts that interests and balance of power determine states’ behavior. A humanitarian intervention in Sierra Leone may correlate with U.S. values, but not with the U.S.’s national interests. Also, the criteria of whether there is a chance for democracy to develop are reliant on the analysis of the economy of that country and where the country is in the democratic process. That is to say, if the country is an emerging democracy that is capable of unraveling, the U.S. would be reluctant to intervene. This factor modifies democratic peace theory by suggesting that not only is the condition of a republican government is necessary to develop democracy, but a strong, liberal economy is necessary as well. Both of these criteria then suggest that the moral justification is not enough of a motivation for a liberal state to engage in a moral crusade. Thus, states will most likely not be guided by values or morality alone, as idealism proposes. Rather, states will continue to be guided by their interests as well. The criteria fuse the idealist and realist perspectives of international relations.

By considering the element of risk involved in intervening into another nation, the Clinton administration was paying homage to the structural model in
democratic peace theory. Even when a leader is able to argue that an intervention is a just cause, and can justify it in humanitarian terms, the leader still faces domestic constraints. When a democratic country goes to war, leaders must make a declaration for war and gain approval through the elected representatives.  

Even if the leaders can somehow bypass by pursuing a non-declared war, this process, the leaders are still held accountable to the people. Using polls and focus groups, the leader will try to gage how much the public supports their plan for action. Michael Ignatieff explains that the process becomes circular: “citizens will endorse those military risks a leader is prepared to take, and a leader will propose only those risks which he believes his electorate will approve.” The elected legislative and the public will keep the leader from taking too big of a risk. Thus, even with a just cause, the constraining effects of democratic structure are only diminished; they do not disappear.

The Clinton administration adopted a foreign policy that incorporated both paths for expanding the zone of peace. The Clinton administration strongly promoted the consolidation of democracies and open economies around the globe. Also, the Clinton administration conceded that situations would arise, which required the prudent use of force in order to advance democracy and address humanitarian concerns. Accordingly, the Clinton administration developed criteria that encompassed a humanitarian agenda.

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72 ibid. p. 177.
CHAPTER III

NATO’S JUSTIFICATION FOR INTERVENTION IN KOSOVO

As the violence in Kosovo escalated during the summer of 1998 to 1999, the situation in Kosovo began to fit the Clinton administration’s criteria for intervention. The Serbian forces were committing massive human rights abuses that challenged the American values of freedom and self-determination. Based on this, the Clinton administration believed it had moral justification for intervening. The post-Cold War era afforded the U.S. and Western Europe an opportunity to integrate Eastern Europe into the political and economic institutions of the western world. The Milosevic regime represented an impediment to the establishment of democracy in the Balkan region. The location of Kosovo threatened the security of neighboring states and thus the whole of Europe if the conflict spread into other nations. Also, the advance of technology reduced the risk to American lives and as well as the lives of innocent citizens.

Moral Justification

NATO justified its intervention into Kosovo in moralistic terms. The Director of the Policy Planning for the U.S. Staff, Morton Halperin, suggested that NATO’s intervention in Kosovo was “a fulfillment of our nation’s and the Atlantic Alliance’s highest ideals: the protection of democracy, human rights, and
fundamental freedoms."¹ Milosevic’s regime presented a challenge to American ideals of freedom and democracy. The joint statement by the Heads of State for NATO argued:

The crisis in Kosovo represents a fundamental challenge to the values for which NATO has stood since its foundation: democracy, human rights and the rule of law. It is the culmination of a deliberate policy of oppression, ethnic cleansing and violence pursued by the Belgrade regime under the direction of President Milosevic. We will not allow this campaign of terror to succeed. NATO is determined to prevail.²

Thus, by intervening in Kosovo, Talbott argued that NATO was "enforcing a vital principle: national leaderships must not be allowed to define national interests or national identity in a way that leads to crimes against humanity and threats to international peace."³ Ending Milosevic’s ethnic cleansing campaign would set a clear example to the rest of the illiberal world that the liberal democracies of the U.S. and NATO states would not tolerate such human rights abuses.

Also, NATO took the moral high ground, arguing that as it was a union of liberal democracies, it was thus obligated to protect the Kosovars and ensure peace. Peter Berkowitz questioned, "Can citizens in prosperous liberal democracies get used to passively accepting the degradation and destruction of whole communities of human beings without weakening their own commitment to the very principles that make liberal democracy possible?"⁴ Secretary General of NATO Javier Solana argued, "to stand idly by while a brutal campaign of

forced deportation, torture, and murder is going on in the heart of Europe would have meant declaring moral bankruptcy.”\textsuperscript{5} President Clinton concurred by stating, “ending this tragedy is a moral imperative.”\textsuperscript{6} By phrasing the intervention as a moral obligation, the Kosovo situation fit the definition of just cause and provided a reason for humanitarian intervention.

**Strategic Location**

NATO intervened in Kosovo also to secure national interests by maintaining security in Europe. The location of Kosovo was key in NATO’s decision to intervene. Conflict in Eastern Europe presents a greater threat to the whole region of Europe than a conflict in perhaps Sierra Leone. NATO argued in terms of stopping the spread of such human rights abuses and thus protecting the lives of more people through the use of force. U.S. negotiator Richard Holbrooke asserted,

> The alternative to engagement is noninvolvement, and the consequences of doing nothing are usually that the crisis gets much worse and eventually costs the United States and the rest of the world much more money on the back end, through refugee relief and humanitarian assistance.\textsuperscript{7}

If the ethnic cleansing were to spread to neighboring countries, this would not only create more instability, but another humanitarian concern. Javier Solana explained:

> With several hundreds of thousands of refugees streaming into neighboring countries, the entire region faced a serious threat of

\textsuperscript{6} Clinton, W.J. (1999a). In the present’s words: ‘we act to prevent a wider war’ New York Times, 3098, p. 15.
general conflict. Those neighboring countries, which themselves faced serious political and economic problems, had long reached the limits of their ability to cope with this exceptional burden. In short, if Belgrade’s policy of deliberate displacement of the Kosovo-Albanians had not been energetically opposed, even more instability and bloodshed would have been the result.8

President Clinton supported this rationale when he asserted, “we act to prevent a wider war, to defuse a powder keg at the heart of Europe that has exploded twice before in this century with catastrophic results.”9 President Clinton argued, “we have a clear national interest in ensuring that Kosovo is where this trouble ends. If it continues, it almost certainly will draw in Albania and Macedonia, and . . . potentially, it could affect our allies, Greece and Turkey.”10 Also, Morton M. Halperin argued that it was in the interest of the U.S. to intervene in Kosovo, “for we know that America cannot be secure unless Europe is secure.”11 Therefore, the U.S. justified intervention in order to protect itself from future involvement and to secure its economic and political interests at stake in Europe.

Where We Can Make a Difference

Ending Milosevic’s regime and dominance could make way for a democratically peaceful Serbia. If the FRY were to develop into a liberal democratic regime, its relations with its people would improve and its relations with foreign liberal governments would be peaceful. The joint statement by the Heads of States for NATO justified NATO’s military action against the FRY in 

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order to “support the political aims of the international community, which were reaffirmed in recent statements by the UN Security General and the European Union: a peaceful, multi-ethnic and democratic Kosovo where all its people can live in security and enjoy universal human rights and freedoms on an equal basis.”12

Strobe Talbott argued that with the fourth Balkan War, “we have an opportunity to make the entire continent safe for democracy, thereby creating an environment in which self-determination can flourish without requiring the proliferation of ethnically based microstates.”13 Madeline Albright in her June 28, 1999 speech to the Council on Foreign Relations reiterated this point. She stated, “with our partners in the European Union playing a big role, we have launched a pact to stabilize, transform and eventually integrate all of Southeast Europe into the continent’s democratic mainstream.”14 This policy is not just for the sake of the Kosovars, but also for America and Western Europe’s interests. Albright argued that integrating Eastern Europe in the mainstream of Western Europe “would greatly serve America’s interest in expanding the area within Europe where wars simply do not happen. And it would mark another giant step towards the creation of a continent whole and free.”15 Thus, NATO’s strong resolve to intervene in Kosovo is deeply rooted in democratic peace theory. A lasting peace could be established through all of Europe and the United States by
democratizing Eastern Europe and integrating Eastern European states into the association of free states.\textsuperscript{16}

**Low Risk Operation**

As leaders of democratic nations, President Clinton and the other NATO heads of state were subject to the public’s opinion of the Kosovo intervention. The leaders always had to take into account the possible risks and costs involved in the intervention. At the onset of the intervention in Kosovo, President Clinton ruled out the use of ground forces.\textsuperscript{17} The use of ground forces would greatly endanger American lives, and thus presented too much of a risk.\textsuperscript{18} If it came to it that ground forces would have to be used, President Clinton knew that this could jeopardize support for the intervention at home and abroad.

Also, the overbearing power of the U.S. military allowed NATO to safely attack Serbian forces without the risk of a strong counter-attack. If the FRY had the military might to fight back and match U.S. power, the U.S. most likely would not have intervened in Kosovo. Yet, this American power and the use of force also presented a moral problem. Michael Ignatieff explains that throughout the ages states engaged in war have assumed “a basic equality of moral risk: kill or be killed.”\textsuperscript{19} The Kosovo conflict was so unequal that NATO had to observe strict

\begin{footnotes}
\textsuperscript{17} ibid. pp. 162-170.
\textsuperscript{18} ibid. p. 176.
\textsuperscript{19} ibid. p. 161.
\end{footnotes}
rules of conduct and had to be cautious of targets as to not let the conflict turn into a "turkey shoot."\textsuperscript{20}

Ignatieff contends that with modern day weapon technology, NATO could intervene in Kosovo adhering to what is considered legal targets and not risk the lives of NATO pilots. Michael Ignatieff argues that currently a revolution in military affairs has combined the use of computers and lasers to create more accurate weaponry. He writes:

This revolution in military affairs was not the result of a single technological breakthrough, but of many in combination: lasers to improve guidance and targeting, computers linked to satellite positioning systems which made pinpoint accuracy possible; propulsion systems which increased the range of conventional rockets, refinements in explosives technology which reduced damage to civilians, as well as unmanned and robotized surveillance drones which eliminated risks to aviators.\textsuperscript{21}

Thus, as weaponry becomes more precise and fewer lives are risked in warfare today, political leaders and the electorate bear fewer costs to war.

NATO General Wesley Clark explained the three goals of the air campaign:

The first—avoidance of Allied losses—enabled the campaign to persist as long as it was needed. The second—impact on Serb forces in Kosovo—focused NATO’s efforts on those who were committing the atrocities. The third—minimal collateral damage—required detailed risk analyses and use of precision munitions to avoid injury to innocent civilians.\textsuperscript{22}

At first NATO generals debated over what to target: ground forces, the direct cause of the Albanian repression, or Serbian command and control in the

\textsuperscript{20} ibid. p. 161.
\textsuperscript{21} ibid. p. 166.
Belgrade area.\textsuperscript{23} NATO began the campaign with limited targeting, thinking that the initial days of the air strikes would bring Milosevic to the negotiating table.\textsuperscript{24} The NATO forces created a targeting system, in which a military lawyer would review a target and determine whether it was a "justifiable military objective in legal terms and whether its value outweighed the potential costs in collateral damage." \textsuperscript{25} As Milosevic did not budge with the initial attacks, NATO had to increase the intensity of the air strikes. NATO eventually began to target the "nerve centers" of Serbian control.\textsuperscript{26} Although this was a more risky approach as it took out power to hospitals, it was more effective. NATO’s reluctance to resort to such targets exemplified NATO’s care to minimize the risks involved in the Kosovo intervention.

When the U.S. was faced with the challenge of the Kosovo situation, many factors played into its decision to intervene with the use of force. First of all, the Clinton administration perceived the situation in Kosovo as a challenge to the liberal values of democracy, human rights, and the rule of law. The Clinton administration vowed to uphold these values in its foreign policy objectives and to respond to humanitarian crises around the world. Second, the Clinton administration considered the fact that Kosovo was located in Europe and a wider war would threaten all of Europe. Thus, the administration supported intervention in order to protect U.S. strategic interests. Also, the Clinton administration justified intervention in Kosovo because the situation aligned with its policy.

\textsuperscript{24} ibid. p. 111.
\textsuperscript{25} ibid. p. 100.
\textsuperscript{26} ibid. p. 169.
objectives of consolidating new democracies where possible. Finally, with the use of modern technology, the U.S. government could achieve its objectives of stopping the humanitarian crisis and bringing Milosevic to the negotiating table with minimal risk to American lives and resources. This enabled the administration to maintain the support of the public throughout the air campaign until there was talk of introducing ground forces in the last few days.\(^\text{27}\)

Therefore, Kosovo proved to be a unique case in which America could demonstrate its resolve to respond to humanitarian crises and help to consolidate democracy around the world. For each tenet of democratic peace theory, the Clinton administration adopted a policy approach, which in turn developed the criteria for determining where and when the U.S. performs humanitarian intervention.

CONCLUSION

The nature of NATO's intervention in Kosovo was both humanitarian and interest-based. The table below demonstrates the process of ideas, from theory to action, involved in NATO's justification for intervention:

Table 1: The Theory and Policy Behind NATO's Intervention

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Tenets of Democratic Peace Theory</th>
<th>Clinton Administration’s Foreign Policy Objectives</th>
<th>Justifications of NATO’s intervention in Kosovo</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Liberal democracies are peaceful in their relations with each other</td>
<td>We must strengthen our relations with our democratic partners and help foster and consolidate new democracies and markets where we can make a difference</td>
<td>We have the opportunity to make the whole of Europe safe for democracy; a peaceful and democratic Kosovo means the creation of a free and peaceful Europe</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Structural constraints and normative practices produce democratic peace</td>
<td>We must consider the risks and costs involved in our actions abroad in order to maintain the support of the American people and of our democratic allies</td>
<td>The use of advanced technology would reduce the risks of war, which would maintain the support of the American public and the Western World</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Liberal democracies tend to be hostile in their relations with illiberal states</td>
<td>We must counter the aggression of states hostile to democracy and repel threats to the rule of law</td>
<td>Milosevic’s regime represents a fundamental challenge to the liberal values of democracy, human rights, and the rule of law</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Liberal democracies are tempted to engage in moral crusades—Just Cause works to diminish the structural and normative impediments to the use of force</td>
<td>Where we can make a difference, we should not oppose using our military forces for humanitarian purposes</td>
<td>We act to stop gross human rights abuses such as ethnic cleansing and correct a humanitarian wrong</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Borrowing from the logic of democratic peace theory, the Clinton administration fashioned a foreign policy that incorporated the U.S.'s values and interests to confront the new threats of the post-Cold War era.

The changing rules of war in the post-Cold War era and U.S. power may explain why the U.S. pursued a militant path to achieving these ends. David Fromkin argues that during the Cold War, the U.S. never would have engaged in Kosovo.¹ By its intervention in Kosovo, NATO aspired to create new rules governing the military operations in the post-Cold War era. This includes two parts:

The use of force on behalf of universal values instead of the narrower national interests for which sovereign states have traditionally fought; and, in defense of these values, military intervention in the internal affairs of sovereign states rather than mere opposition to cross-border aggression, as in the Gulf War of 1991.²

Although the concept of humanitarian intervention is rather recent, the Kosovo situation nevertheless set a precedence suggesting when and where such interventions are likely to take place. With the knowledge of the criteria for intervention, we could now reasonably predict where the U.S. may intervene in humanitarian crises around the globe. However, whether this new pattern in foreign policy of combining both interests and values to justify humanitarian intervention continues has yet to be seen.

The concept of a risk-free war presents a challenge to the structural model of democratic peace theory. The precision of modern weaponry enables the

possibility of risk-free war. Michael Ignatieff asks, “If military action is cost-free, what democratic restraints will remain on the resort to force?” If the cost of war is what deters liberal democracies from going to war and this deterrent is diminished, does the structural model hold up? Ignatieff suggests that if war becomes less risky, “democratic electorates may be more willing to fight especially if the cause is justified in the language of human rights and even democracy itself.” Therefore, if democratic leaders were able to convince the public and elected representatives that there was a just cause and were able to use technology to reduce the risks of war, this would serve to increase the likelihood of humanitarian intervention.

By also including the economic condition of a state as to whether democracy could possibly take hold, this proposes a new element in democratic peace theory. This brings to light the idea that the temptation to engage in a moral crusade is tilted toward countries with more economic stability that are located in strategic places. This may answer why democracies do not initiate interventions in places like Rwanda or Sierra Leone. Empirical analysis is needed in order to confirm this idea.

The value of assessing NATO’s intervention in Kosovo through democratic peace theory is that we are given new insight into what determines state behavior—interests and values. Understanding NATO’s intervention through democratic peace theory challenges the traditional realist perspective in international relations. The Kosovo example suggests that states do not go to war

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solely to secure their national interests or to maintain the balance of power. Values do play a role in determining state behavior. Yet, the example of Clinton's criteria for intervention demonstrates that when a state is confronted with a humanitarian concern, values alone are not enough to justify a moral crusade. States must consider the national interests and the risks involved.

Even so, with the Kosovo example we are left without an answer to a moral dilemma. How should the U.S. and other powers such as NATO states respond to humanitarian crises that do not fit the above criteria for intervention? Kant would suggest that we let things be; yet, the rhetoric behind American foreign policy in the Kosovo situation suggests that the U.S. has an obligation to confront such catastrophes. It appears, though, that the U.S. will only get involved in those humanitarian situations steeped in self-interest.
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